THE

THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED

WITH AN ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL NOTES

BY

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PREFACE.

THIS Translation of the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle is a companion volume to my Translation of the *Politics*. But it differs from it in the greater fulness of the notes; for, as I have no thought of publishing an edition of the *Rhetoric*, it seems to me necessary to explain as well as I can my interpretations of some difficult passages and my reasons for them. It is well known that Mr Cope published in his lifetime an *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* and at his death left an elaborate commentary, which has since been edited with scrupulous care by Dr Sandys. Nobody, who has not been led to a close study of the *Rhetoric*, can appreciate the extent and exactness of Mr Cope's labours. Next to his works, but below them in judgment, stands the critical commentary of Spengel. There are many other books bearing upon the *Rhetoric*, which a Translator is bound to consult, as the British Museum Catalogue (s. v.

Aristotle) so fully shews; but it is not worth while to enumerate them. Among personal helps it is a pleasure to remember that I owe an especial debt of gratitude to my friend, Mr W. T. Lendrum, who was one of my colleagues at Dulwich, for his kindness in reading my proof-sheets and in giving me the benefit of his opinion, to which his accurate scholarship lends peculiar value, upon several points in the Translation. The science or, as Aristotle would call it, the art of Rhetoric has had a curious history. It was his creation; and whatever has been best in it from this time to the present is due to him. The definition of Rhetoric, its relation to Psychology, the distinction of its three kinds, the nature of its proofs, the use of enthymeme and example, the special and common topics, the style and arrangement of a speech, all are his. Where the Latin writers, such as Cicero and Quintilian, amplified the field of Rhetoric, it is not unfair to say that they amplified it in a direction which he had deliberately left alone. Nor is there any rhetorical work of a later age which can be placed in comparison with his. Even so late a book as Archbishop Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric* is in its method essentially Aristotelian and hardly goes beyond his statement of principles.

The study of Rhetoric as an educational instrument, although it formed a part of Roman as well as of later Greek culture, although in the middle ages it was one of the subjects of the *Trivium*, although from the era of the Revival of Learning it entered into the curriculum of the Universities, has at least in England been practically neglected since the beginning of the eighteenth century. There are several reasons for this neglect, and they are valid; but it is not a gain without a loss. It is possible that the time will come again when the world will recognize that "it is not enough to know what to say, but it is necessary also to know how to say it" (*οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν*). Then the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle will, I think, be widely read, as being perhaps a solitary instance of a book which not only begins a science but completes it.

It is one of my hopes in publishing this Translation that I may bring the *Rhetoric* within the reach, if I may so express it, of the modern world. The office of a translator, even if he is also in some sense an interpreter, may not unfairly be regarded as a humble one. But as knowledge broadens, and the mass of men have less leisure for studying Greek

thought in the language of the Greeks, it would seem to become more and more desirable that the links which unite the new civilization with the old should be strengthened and multiplied; and of these links translation is the chief. For, as Goethe says in one of his letters to Carlyle, So ist jeder Uebersetzer anzusehen, dass er sich als Vermittler dieses allgemein geistigen Handels bemüht, und den Wechseltausch zu befördern sich zum Geschäft macht. Denn was man auch von der Unzulänglichkeit des Uebersetzens sagen mag, so ist und bleibt es doch eines der wichtigsten und würdigsten Geschäfte in dem allgemeinen Weltwesen.

HARROW SCHOOL,
October 13, 1886.

N.B. The text adopted is that of Bekker's octavo edition. The marginal references are to the pages of the Translation, the references in the foot-notes to the pages and lines of Bekker's text.

As in the *Politics*, the words italicized, except in a few self-evident instances, are inserted in order to make the original fully intelligible.

ANALYSIS.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

RHETORIC is a counterpart (ἀντίστροφος) of Dialectic. Both are general in their application; neither is limited to any definite science.

At present Rhetoric, like Dialectic, is unmethodical; or its method is purely empirical. Still it is possible to treat Rhetoric systematically.

The artistic part of Rhetoric consists in the proofs (πίστεις)—although this is a part of it which is neglected in rhetorical handbooks (τέχναι)—to excite the emotions of the audience is to warp their judgment.

(There are three reasons for preferring the authority of the laws to the decisions of particular judges:

(1) It is easier to find a few competent legislators or judges than a large number.

(2) Laws are the results of mature deliberation; judicial decisions are given on the spur of the moment.

(3) The legislator's decisions are general and prospective; the judge's decisions relate to the issues of the moment in which his personal feelings may be and often are involved.

Still there are certain questions, such as questions of fact, which are necessarily left to the decision of the judges.)

The reason why writers upon Rhetoric have generally confined themselves to forensic Rhetoric is that it affords the most opportunity of "travelling out of the record," i.e. of introducing other topics than strict proof.

The only proper subjects then of artistic treatment are the proofs.

But proof (πίστις) is a species of demonstration (ἀπόδειξίς τις), and the rhetorical form of demonstration is the enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα).

Also the enthymeme is a species of syllogism (συλλογισμός τις). It follows that to understand the construction of syllogisms is—with certain limitations—to understand the construction of enthymemes also.

The four uses of Rhetoric:

(1) It is the means by which truth and justice maintain and assert their natural superiority to falsehood and injustice.

(2) It is the only method of persuasion suitable to unscientific audiences.

(3) As it teaches us to see both sides of a case and to sustain either the one side or the other, so it enables us to see through our adversary's arguments, if they are unfair, and to refute them.

N.B. This capacity of drawing opposite logical conclusions (τἀναντία συλλογίζεσθαι) is peculiar to Rhetoric and Dialectic among the arts.

(4) It is a means of self-defence.

If it is urged that Rhetoric, when used unjustly, may do great harm, the answer is that this objection holds good equally of all good things, except virtue itself.

The function (ἔργον) of Rhetoric is not to persuade but to discover the available means of persuasion in any subject (τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον).

N.B. There are apparent or fallacious, as well as real, means of persuasion; but the discovery of both belongs to the same art.

CHAPTER II.

Rhetoric may be defined as a "faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion on any subject" (δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν).

Rhetorical proofs are of two kinds:

(1) inartistic (ἄτεχνοι), which the rhetorician finds ready to his hand, e.g. witnesses, tortures, contracts.

(2) artistic (ἔντεχνοι), which he invents.

The artistic proofs are threefold, consisting in

(1) the manifestation of moral character (ἦθος) in the speaker,

(2) the production of a certain disposition in the audience,

(3) the argument of the speech itself.

Accordingly the complete rhetorician should possess

(1) the power of argumentative reasoning,

(2) a knowledge of character,

(3) a knowledge of the nature and quality of the emotions (πάθη).

Hence it follows that Rhetoric is an offshoot of Dialectic on the one hand and of Ethics on the other.

The proofs conveyed by the argument are

(1) the example (παράδειγμα), corresponding to the induction (ἐπαγωγή) in Dialectic,

(2) the enthymeme, corresponding to the syllogism,

(3) the apparent enthymeme (φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα) corresponding to the apparent syllogism (φαινόμενος συλλογισμός).

The enthymeme may be called a rhetorical syllogism,

The example a rhetorical induction.

Rhetoric then discovers the means of persuasion in any subject.

But no art takes particular cases into consideration. Hence Rhetoric will consider probability not in relation to an individual, but in relation to a class of persons similarly constituted.

Also the materials of Rhetoric are the ordinary subjects of human deliberation; and these are such subjects as admit of two possibilities, or in other words human actions.

And further, the audience to which Rhetoric addresses itself, is a popular one, without the power of following lengthy arguments.

The propositions of which enthymemes are constructed are probabilities (εἰκότα) and signs (σημεῖα);

and signs are either necessary and conclusive, being then called demonstrations (τεκμήρια),

or not necessary, but only generally true.

The example is an induction, where the example itself and the thing exemplified both fall under the same general law, but the example is the better known instance of it.

The materials of enthymemes are

(*a*) such as are common to many various arts and faculties; these are the "common topics" or "topics," as they are sometimes called *par excellence* (κοινοὶ τόποι or τόποι);

(*b*) such as are special to one art or faculty (ἴδια, ἴδιοι τόποι, εἴδη), e.g. physical propositions to Physics, ethical to Ethics, and so on.

An over-skilful use of the "special topics" is not appropriate to the rhetorician; it leads him into the province of the special art or faculty to which they belong.

CHAPTER III.

There are three kinds of audience, and corresponding to them three kinds of Rhetoric, viz.

deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν),
forensic (δικανικόν),
epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν), i.e. the Rhetoric of display.

They admit of the following classification:

Kind of Rhetoric.	Divisions.	Time.	End (τέλος).
Deliberative	Exhortation Dissuasion	Future	Expediency and Inexpediency.
Forensic	Accusation Defence	Past	Justice and Injustice.
Epideictic	Eulogy Censure	Present	Honour and Disgrace, or Nobleness and Shamefulness (τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν).

Hence the deliberative orator employs propositions (προτάσεις) relating to expediency and inexpediency,

the forensic orator propositions relating to justice and injustice,

the epideictic orator propositions relating to honour and disgrace;

and these are the "special topics" of each kind of Rhetoric.

But they all employ propositions relating to possibility and impossibility, the occurrence or non-occurrence of events in the past and in the future, and magnitude both absolute and comparative;

these are the "common topics."

CHAPTERS IV—VIII.

Deliberative or political Rhetoric (τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν ἢ δημηγορικὸν γένος).

CHAPTER IV.

As the end (τέλος) which deliberative Rhetoric regards is expediency, its subjects are things good or bad, i.e. expedient or injurious,

but not all such things,

not such as do not admit of two possibilities,

nor such as depend on Nature (φύσις) or chance (τύχη).

The subjects of Rhetoric are all such things, being expedient or injurious, as are possible matters of deliberation, i.e. such as naturally depend upon our own action.

The most important of these are:—

(1) Finance.

(2) War and peace.

(3) Defence of the country.

(4) Imports and exports.

(5) Legislation.

Under (1) Finance,

comes a knowledge of the resources of the State and their possible development and its channels of expenditure.

Under (2) War and Peace,

a knowledge of the actual and possible military force of the State and of other States with which it has been or may be at war and of their military history.

Under (3) Defence of the country,

a knowledge of its defensive force and the sites of its fortresses.

Under (4) Imports and exports,

a knowledge of the relation of the State to other States in respect of its necessary supplies.

Under (5) Legislation,

a knowledge of the different kinds of polities and their sources of strength or weakness.

CHAPTER V.

As all men, both individually and collectively, aim at happiness (εὐδαιμονία), it is upon happiness or the constituents of happiness that exhortation and dissuasion turn.

Various definitions of happiness:

(*a*) prosperity conjoined with virtue.

(*b*) an independent state of existence.

(*c*) the pleasantest life conjoined with safety.

(*d*) an abundance of goods and slaves with the ability to preserve them and to make a practical use of them.

Happiness implies the possession of

(1) personal goods (τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγαθά), whether of the soul or of the body;

(2) external goods (τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά), such as nobility, riches, honour.

The constituent parts of happiness are

(1) Nobility, which implies

in a State, that its citizens are indigenous or of high antiquity or have won themselves fame.

in a family, the legitimacy of its members and their good name or celebrity.

(2) The blessing of offspring,

whether of a numerous, stalwart and moral youth in a State,

or of numerous and goodly children, both male and female, in a family.

N.B. It is important to provide for the moral culture of the women as well as of the men.

(3) Wealth, in money, lands, live stock and slaves; not only the productive kinds of wealth, but luxuries. The possession of wealth should be both absolute and secure.

(4) Reputation, whether for personal character or for some prized possession.

(5) Honour, which may assume a number of different forms.

(6) Health.

(7) Beauty, which is different at different periods of life.

(8) Strength.

(9) Size, which should exceed the average size, i.e. height, stoutness and breadth, of men.

(10) Athletic excellence.

(11) A happy old age.

(12) The possession of many good friends.

(13) Good Fortune.

(14) Virtue.

CHAPTER VI.

As the end of deliberative Rhetoric is expediency and whatever is expedient (συμφέρον) is good (ἀγαθόν), it is necessary to apprehend the nature of Good.

Good may be defined as that which is desirable for its own sake and for the sake of which we desire or choose something else, and which is sought by all things or by all sentient or intelligent things or would be sought by them, if they should acquire intelligence.

The following then are goods:

(1) happiness.

(2) justice, courage, temperance (σωφροσύνη), magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία), magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια) and other virtues of the soul.

(3) health, beauty etc., as being physical virtues or graces.

(4) wealth.

(5) friendship.

(6) honour and reputation.

(7) rhetorical and practical ability.

(8) natural gifts, such as memory, sharpness of wit, etc.

(9) all sciences and arts.

(10) life itself, apart from the goods of life.

(11) justice.

These are admitted to be goods; but there are other goods of a disputable kind, and in respect of them Aristotle suggests some twenty topics which may be used in syllogisms to show that a thing is a good.

CHAPTER VII.

Comparison of goods.

It often happens that two things are admitted to be expedient, but the question arises, Which is the more expedient of the two?

Hence it is necessary to consider the question of degree (τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον).

Aristotle suggests a number of topics bearing upon the comparative greatness or goodness of things.

CHAPTER VIII.

The principal means of persuasiveness in deliberative Rhetoric is an acquaintance with the various forms of polity.

The character of a polity is determined by the character of its supreme authority (τὸ κύριον).

There are four polities, viz. Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Monarchy.

A Democracy is a polity in which the offices of State are distributed among the citizens by lot.

An Oligarchy, one in which they are distributed among persons possessing a certain property qualification.

An Aristocracy, one in which they are distributed among the educated class.

Monarchy, or the polity in which an individual is supreme, may be

(1) constitutional Monarchy or Kingship (βασιλεία),

(2) absolute Monarchy or Tyranny.

Of these polities each has its end (τέλος).

The end of Democracy is liberty.
The end of Oligarchy is wealth.
The end of Aristocracy is education and legality.
The end of Tyranny is self-preservation.
The customs or institutions of a polity are relative to its end.

Also polities have their characters; aristocratical sentiments are suited to the character of an Aristocracy, democratical to that of a Democracy, and so on. Hence it is necessary that the deliberative orator should apprehend the characters of the several polities.

CHAPTER IX.

Epideictic Rhetoric (τὸ ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος).

Its subjects are virtue and vice, or nobleness and shamefulness.

Definition of moral nobleness—A thing is noble if, while it is desirable for its own sake, it is laudable, or if, while it is good, it is pleasant in virtue of its goodness.

It follows that virtue is noble;

and the elements of virtue are justice, valour, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, sagacity (φρόνησις) and speculative wisdom (σοφία).

The greatest virtues are those which are in the highest degree serviceable to others.

Taking this conception of virtue, Aristotle proceeds (1) to analyse moral actions, (2) to compare them in respect of their virtuousness.

N.B. Rhetorical artifices:

(1) To represent certain qualities as identical with other qualities which are closely allied to them, e.g. caution as subtlety, foolishness as simplicity, extravagance as liberality.

(2) To consider the qualities held in esteem by the audience.

(3) To display the moral purpose (προαίρεσις) of the person who is the subject of the speech.

(Digression upon eulogy (ἔπαινος), panegyric (ἐγκώμιον), felicitation (μακαρισμός), congratulation (εὐδαιμονισμός):

The subjects of eulogy are actions (πράξεις), those of panegyric are accomplished results (ἔργα).

Felicitation and congratulation are synonymous terms, embracing eulogy and panegyric.

The same topics, differently expressed, are suitable to eulogy and deliberative Rhetoric.)

(4) To employ the means of exaggeration (αὔξησις).

(5) To institute a favourable comparison between the person who is the subject of the speech and other persons of admitted reputation.

These artifices belong especially to epideictic Rhetoric.

In general, exaggeration is peculiarly appropriate to epideictic Rhetoric, the example to deliberative Rhetoric, the enthymeme to forensic Rhetoric.

The materials of censure may be inferred from those of eulogy.

CHAPTERS X.—XIV.

Forensic Rhetoric (τὸ δικανικὸν γένος).

CHAPTER X.

In the treatment of forensic Rhetoric, which includes accusation and defence, there are three points to be ascertained, viz.

(I) the nature and number of the objects of crime.

(II) the dispositions of the criminals.

(III) the character and condition of the victims.

Definition of crime—Voluntary injury in defiance of the law.

But law is of two kinds:

(*a*) particular (ἴδιος), i.e. the written law of any polity.

(*b*) universal (κοινός), i.e. the unwritten law which is always and everywhere recognized.

The causes of a disposition to commit crime are vice and incontinence.

(I) The objects of crime.

All human actions arise from one or more of seven causes, viz.

(1) chance (2) nature (3) compulsion	such actions being not due to ourselves, or involuntary.
(4) habit (5) reasoning (6) passion (7) desire	such actions being due to ourselves, or voluntary.

Aristotle defines and explains these causes.

It appears then that all actions which are due to ourselves, i.e. all voluntary actions, are either good [or] apparently good or pleasant or apparently pleasant.

But the good or expedient has been already discussed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric.

It remains then to consider the pleasant.

CHAPTER XI.

Definition of pleasure—A certain motion of the soul and a sudden and sensible settling (κατάστασις) of the soul into its normal and natural state.

Such being the nature of pleasure, it follows that whatever tends to promote the condition described is pleasant, and whatever tends to destroy it or produce a contrary condition is painful.

Enumeration of things pleasant and (by implication) of things painful, as being the opposites.

CHAPTER XII.

(II) The conditions under which people commit crime.

The conditions are that they should believe the criminal action to be possible in itself and possible to them, whether as expecting to escape detection or, if detected, to escape punishment or, if punished, to endure a punishment which is not equivalent to the advantage gained by the crime.

Aristotle elaborately discusses these conditions.

(III) The victims of crime.

Aristotle describes the classes of persons upon whom crimes are ordinarily committed.

There are certain circumstances which facilitate crime, as e.g. if the articles stolen are easily concealed, or if it is a crime of such a nature that the victim would be unwilling to publish it.

CHAPTER XIII.

Classification of actions just and unjust (δικαιώματα καὶ ἀδικήματα).

They may be classified in two ways:

(1) relatively to the laws,
(2) relatively to the persons affected by them.

The law may be (*a*) particular, i.e. the law of a particular State.
(*b*) universal, i.e. the law of Nature.

The persons affected may be

(*a*) the community as a whole,
(*b*) some individual member or members of it.

Also crimes are committed

either ignorantly and involuntarily,
or knowingly and involuntarily;

and, if the latter be the case,

either of deliberate purpose
or under the influence of emotion.

N.B. It often happens that a fact is admitted, but the description of it or the application of the description is denied. Hence the necessity of clear definitions of crimes.

It is the purpose (προαίρεσις) which constitutes vice or criminality.

The matters which come within the province of unwritten law are

(1) such as are instances of exalted virtue, e.g. gratitude,
(2) such as are remedies for the deficiency of written law.

The justice which supplements the written law is equity (τὸ ἐπιεικές).

This function of equity may be

(*a*) consistent with the intention of the legislator, e.g. if the terms of the law are absolute, and yet it is not absolutely applicable to all cases;

(*b*) contrary to his intention, if it touches upon a point which has escaped his notice.

Aristotle illustrates the province and nature of equity.

CHAPTER XIV.

The magnitude of a crime is proportionate to the magnitude of the injustice which prompts it.

Hence it is sometimes necessary to estimate the comparative magnitude of crimes.

Application of the topic of degree to criminal actions.

CHAPTER XV.

The inartistic proofs (*ἄτεχνοι πίστεις*), which are properly limited to forensic Rhetoric.

They are five, viz.

(1) laws,
(2) witnesses,
(3) contracts,
(4) tortures,
(5) the oath.

(1) Laws.

Topics suitable for upsetting the authority of a law, if it tells against us, and for confirming it, if it makes in our favour.

(2) Witnesses may be

(*a*) ancient,
(*b*) contemporary;

and, if the latter,

either involved in the risk of the action at law or independent of it.

(*a*) Ancient witnesses are:

poets, who testify to facts of the past,
interpreters of oracles, who testify to facts of the future,
proverbs.

(*b*) Contemporary witnesses are:

living authorities, if they have pronounced judgment on a particular point,

witnesses who appear in Court and give their evidence.

Ancient witnesses are more credible than contemporary. Topics for confirming or invalidating the weight of testimony.

Testimony may have reference either to oneself or to one's adversary and either to fact or to character.

(3) Contracts.

Topics of exaggeration or depreciation in regard to contracts.

(4) Torture.

Topics in support or depreciation of torture, as a means of arriving at the truth.

(5) Oaths.

Four possible cases:

(*a*) when a person both tenders and accepts the oath,
(*b*) when he does neither,
(*c*) when he tenders the oath without accepting it,
(*d*) when he accepts it without tendering it.

Also there may be combinations of two such cases.

Or there may be a further complication, if a person or his adversary has already taken the oath.

Aristotle suggests topics suitable to all these cases and combinations of cases.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

As Rhetoric is intended to be judged, there are two things—apart from direct proof—which should be the objects of the rhetorician's endeavour:

(1) To produce a favourable impression of his own character.

(2) To produce a favourable disposition in his audience.

Of these the former is particularly suited to deliberative, the latter to forensic, Rhetoric.

(1) The sources of personal credibility are threefold:

(*a*) sagacity,
(*b*) virtue,
(*c*) goodwill, i.e. goodwill towards the audience.

The means of getting credit for sagacity and virtue may be ascertained from the analysis of the virtues in Book I.

Goodwill will be discussed under the head of the emotions (πάθη).

Definition of the emotions—Such states as are attended by pain and pleasure and produce a change or difference in our attitude as judges.

It will be proper to consider the several emotions under three heads, viz.

(1) the conditions under which people are liable to it,
(2) the persons who are usually the objects of it,
(3) the causes of it.

CHAPTERS II.—XI.

Analysis of the emotions.

(1) Anger. }
(2) Placability (πραότης). }
(3) Love. }
(4) Hatred or Enmity. }
(5) Fear. }
(6) Confidence. }
(7) Shame. }
(8) Shamelessness. }
(9) Benevolence (χάρις). }
Its opposite is selfishness (ἀχαριστία). }

(10) Compassion.
(11) Virtuous indignation (νέμεσις).
(12) Envy.
(13) Emulation (ζῆλος).
(14) Contempt.

CHAPTER II.

(1) Anger.

Definition—An impulse attended with pain to a conspicuous revenge on account of a conspicuous slight shown in some offence against oneself or one of one's friends without any natural reason for the slight.

It follows that anger is always directed against an individual, never against a class.

(There is a certain pleasure in anger, arising from the imagination of future revenge.)

A slight (ὀλιγωρία) may take three forms:

(*a*) contempt (καταφρόνησις),
(*b*) spitefulness (ἐπηρεασμός),
(*c*) insolence (ὕβρις).

(1) The conditions of anger—annoyance, disappointment, unsatisfied desire, etc.

(2) The objects of anger—persons who sneer at us, who disparage our accomplishments, who requite our services with ingratitude, etc.

(3) The causes of anger may be regarded as comprised under its objects and conditions.

It is the task of the rhetorician then to bring his audience into a condition of irascibility against his adversary.

CHAPTER III.

(2) Placability.

Definition—The process of becoming placable may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger.

(1) The persons towards whom it is natural to be placable are those who do not slight us or who slight us involuntarily or

who, if they offend against us, confess their fault and are sorry for it, etc.

(2) The conditions of placability are opposed to those of anger, e.g. times of amusement, feasting, prosperity, etc.

The rhetorician will choose his topics in view of these conditions.

CHAPTER IV.

(3) Love.

Definition—To love a person is to wish him all such things as you suppose to be good, not for your own sake but for his, and to be ready so far as in you lies to effect them.

A friend is one who loves and is beloved in return (*ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος*).

(1) Persons who are the objects of love—benefactors, liberal, brave, just people, etc.

(2) Causes of love—favours conferred, especially if conferred spontaneously and without ostentation.

N.B. Love or friendship admits of various forms, viz. companionship (*ἑταιρεία*), intimacy (*οἰκειότης*), relationship (*συγγένεια*), etc.

(4) Enmity or Hatred—the opposite of love.

The causes which produce it are (1) anger,
(2) spite,
(3) prejudice (*διαβολή*).

(Distinction between anger and hatred.

	Anger	*Hatred*
(*a*)	arises from personal wrongs,	is independent of personal wrongs.
(*b*)	is always directed against individuals,	may be directed against classes.
(*c*)	is curable by time,	is not curable by time.
(*d*)	aims at causing pain,	aims at causing evil.
(*e*)	is accompanied by pain,	is not accompanied by pain.
(*f*)	admits of compassion,	precludes compassion.)

CHAPTER V.

(5) Fear.

Definition—A species of pain or disturbance arising from an impression of impending evil which is destructive or painful in its nature.

(1) It follows that all things are formidable or inspire fear which appear to have a great power of destroying or of inflicting such injury as tends to grievous pain. Such things are the enmity or anger of powerful persons, a criminal disposition, if armed with power, etc.

Persons too are formidable, if they are in a position to commit crime or if they have been the victims of crime and are watching for their revenge, etc.

(2) Conditions of fear.—In order to feel fear it is necessary to regard oneself as capable of suffering and of suffering at the hands of particular people.

(6) Confidence—the opposite of fear.

Definition—hope accompanied by an impression of salutary things as near at hand and of formidable things as non-existent or remote.

The sources of confidence (τὰ θαρραλέα) are the remoteness of danger, the possession of remedies or means of rectification, etc.

The conditions of confidence are frequent successes in the past, frequent escapes from danger, the consciousness of innocence, etc.

CHAPTER VI.

(7) Shame.

(8) Shamelessness.

Definition—Shame may be defined as a species of pain or disturbance in regard to evil things, either past, present or future, which have an appearance of tending to ignominy; and shamelessness as a species of slight or indifference in regard to these same things.

(1) Instances of shameful action—throwing away one's shield in battle, refusing to restore a deposit, etc.

(2) Persons who inspire a feeling of shame. Those who admire us, or whom we admire, or whose admiration we desire to win, etc.

(3) Conditions of shame—When we are conscious of past achievements or actions upon which we shall bring dishonour, when we are likely to live in the presence of the witnesses of our disgrace, etc.

The rule of contraries will supply topics in regard to shamelessness.

CHAPTER VII.

(9) Benevolence.

Definition—It is benevolence in virtue of which the person in whom it resides is said to render a service to anybody in the hour of need, not in return for previous services or for any personal benefit to him who renders it but for the benefit of the recipient alone.

An act of benevolence may be enhanced by showing that it was done at a critical moment or that it has never been done before, etc.

But an act loses its benevolent character, if it is represented as having been done for selfish motives, or done by accident or under compulsion, etc.

The opposite of benevolence is selfishness.

CHAPTER VIII.

(10) Compassion.

Definition—A sort of pain at an evident evil of a destructive or painful kind, in the case of somebody who does not deserve it, the evil being one to which we may naturally expect ourselves or someone of our friends to be liable, and this at a time when it appears to be near at hand.

(1) The condition of compassion then is a capacity of similar suffering.

It follows that people, who are absolutely ruined, or who believe themselves to be supremely happy, are incapable of compassion.

N.B. Compassion presupposes a belief in human virtue; for he who does not believe in anybody's virtue will consider that everybody is deserving of evil.

(2) The causes of compassion are all such painful and distressing things as are destructive and ruinous, and all the evils of Fortune.

(3) The objects of compassion are familiar friends, equals in age, character, etc.

Gestures, tones, habiliments, etc., are useful to the rhetorician as means of exciting and enhancing compassion.

CHAPTER IX.

(11) Virtuous indignation (νέμεσις)—the correlative of compassion but, like it, an honourable emotion.

Definition—A feeling of pain at such prosperity as is apparently unmerited.

(Distinction between virtuous indignation and envy.

Both are painful and perturbing emotions,

both relate to the prosperity of others;

but the former relates to the prosperity of someone who is undeserving,

the latter to that of someone who is like ourselves.

N.B. Virtuous indignation, envy and malice, although different in themselves, are yet proper to the same character.)

(1) Causes of virtuous indignation—not all good things, as e.g. justice or valour, but such good things, when possessed by the bad, as seem to be rightly the possessions of the good, as e.g. wealth, power, etc.

(2) Persons who are the objects of virtuous indignation, such as the *nouveaux riches* and inferiors generally, if they contend against their superiors.

(3) Conditions of virtuous indignation. Whenever we consider ourselves to be worthy of particular things, and others to be unworthy of them.

Hence virtuous indignation is not an emotion of mean natures.

Knowing the means of exciting virtuous indignation, the rhetorician knows the means of destroying compassion.

CHAPTER X.

(12) Envy.

Definition—A species of pain felt at conspicuous prosperity on the part of persons like ourselves in respect of certain goods, and this not with any view to our personal advantage but solely because they are prosperous.

(1) Conditions of envy—People are envious if they have equals in family, age, or reputation, if they are ambitious, etc.

(2) Causes of envy—Achievements or possessions of which we covet the reputation, the gifts of Fortune, etc.

(3) Objects of envy—our equals, rivals, etc.

Envy excludes the possibility of compassion.

CHAPTER XI.

(13) Emulation.

Definition—A species of pain at the manifest presence of such goods as are highly valued and also attainable by ourselves in persons who have a natural resemblance to us, and this not because somebody else is in possession of them, but because we are not equally in possession of them ourselves.

(Distinction between emulation and envy.

Emulation is a virtuous, envy a vicious emotion, for the object of the emulous man is to acquire goods for himself, that of the envious man to deprive his neighbour of them.)

(1) Conditions of emulation—People are emulous, if they consider themselves entitled to goods which they do not enjoy;

and this is a feeling which is a result of wealth or distinguished ancestry.

(2) Causes of emulation—such goods as are held in honour, e.g. the virtues.

(3) Objects of emulation—persons who possess these goods.

(14) Contempt is the opposite of emulation.

Hence people who are in a condition to emulate others or to be themselves the objects of emulation are inclined to contemn those who are subject to such evils as are contrary to the goods which provoke emulation.

CHAPTER XII.

Varieties of character depend upon the emotions (*πάθη*), habits of mind (*ἕξεις*), times of life (*ἡλικίαι*), and accidents of Fortune (*τύχαι*).

The emotions, i.e. anger, desire, etc., and the habits of mind, i.e. the virtues and vices, have been already discussed.

The times of life are youth, the prime of life and age.

Fortune includes birth, wealth, power, etc.

Aristotle elaborately describes the character of youth.

CHAPTER XIII.

The character of age.

CHAPTER XIV.

The character of the prime of life, which is intermediate between the characters of youth and age.

N.B. The time of physical prime is from 30 to 35; that of mental prime about 49.

CHAPTER XV.

The character of nobility.

CHAPTER XVI.

The character of wealth.

CHAPTER XVII.

The character of power.
The character of good Fortune.
The characters of poverty, powerlessness, etc. are evident from a consideration of opposites.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Recapitulation.
Plan of the work.

CHAPTER XIX.

The four common topics (*κοινοὶ τόποι*), i.e. topics which are common to the three kinds of Rhetoric:

(1) Possibility.

Topics tending to show the possibility or impossibility of a thing.

(2) Fact past.

Topics tending to show that a thing either has or has not occurred.

(3) Fact future.

Topics tending to show that a thing either will or will not occur.

(4) Degree.

Topics tending to show the absolute and comparative greatness or smallness of things.

CHAPTER XX.

The common proofs (κοιναὶ πίστεις) are

(1) the example,

(2) the enthymeme.

N.B. The maxim (γνώμη) is part of the enthymeme.

(1) Examples are of two kinds, viz.:

(*a*) historical parallels,

(*b*) inventions of the rhetorician, whether illustrations (παραβολαί) or fables (λόγοι) such as the fables of Æsop.

Fables are suited to popular oratory, and, as compared with historical parallels, are easy to find.

It is proper, in default of enthymemes to make use of examples as logical proofs, but otherwise to make use of them as testimonies in support of the enthymemes.

CHAPTER XXI.

The use of maxims (γνωμολογία).

Definition of a maxim (γνώμη): A declaration relating not to particulars but to universals, and not to all universals but to such as are the objects of human action and are to be chosen or eschewed in that regard.

The enthymeme being the form of syllogism which is appropriate to these matters, if the syllogistic form is done away, the conclusion of an enthymeme or its major premiss is a maxim.

There are four kinds of maxims; for maxims may either have or not have a logical supplement (ἐπίλογος).

Maxims have no such supplement

(*a*) when the maxim is a generally accepted opinion,

(*b*) when it is intelligible at a glance;

maxims which have it are

(*a*) parts of an enthymeme,

(*b*) not parts of an enthymeme, but enthymematic in their character, where the reason of the maxim is contained in the words of the maxim itself.

Where the maxim is disputable, obscure or paradoxical, the addition of the supplement is indispensable.

Maxims are appropriate

(1) upon the lips of persons of years and experience,

(2) in contradiction of popular or proverbial sayings.

There are two important uses of maxims:

(1) That, as being general statements, they are pleasing to a vulgar audience who find in them the generalization, or, as it were, the consummation of their partial experience.

(2) That, as expressing moral predilections, they invest the speech with an ethical character.

CHAPTER XXII.

Enthymemes.

In the consideration of enthymemes it is necessary to consider

(1) the true method of looking for them,

(2) their topics.

The proper materials of enthymemes are not all opinions indiscriminately, but such opinions as commend themselves to the audience.

But it is necessary that the rhetorician should know all or some at least of the special facts of the subject with which he deals, e.g. of military matters, if it is war, of justice, if it is a judicial case, and so on.

There are two species of enthymemes, viz.:

(1) demonstrative (δεικτικά), which consist in drawing conclusions from admitted propositions,

(2) refutative (ἐλεγκτικά), which consist in drawing conclusions which are inconsistent with the conclusions of one's adversary.

The special topics of enthymemes will be derived from the special facts of each particular subject.

But there are common topics belonging to all subjects.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Aristotle gives a list of 28 topics of demonstrative and refutative enthymemes.

N.B. Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative, as they are conclusions of opposites in a small space.

But of all enthymemes none are so much applauded as those which, although not being superficial, are immediately intelligible.

CHAPTER XXIV.

As there are not only true syllogisms but syllogisms which are apparent but not true, it follows that there are apparent as well as true enthymemes.

Aristotle gives ten topics of apparent enthymemes.

CHAPTER XXV.

Refutation (λύσις).

There are two methods of refutation, viz.:

(1) by countersyllogism,

(2) by objection (ἔνστασις).

The topics of countersyllogisms are clearly identical with those of syllogisms.

Objections are of four kinds, being derivable

(*a*) from the enthymeme of one's adversary,

(*b*) from antithesis,

(*c*) from analogy,

(*d*) from a previous decision.

Aristotle illustrates these four kinds of objection.

The materials of enthymemes being fourfold,

viz. probabilities,
examples,
demonstrations (τεκμήρια),
and signs (σημεῖα),

enthymemes constructed from probabilities may invariably be refuted by an objection; but the objection must be more generally true than the fact objected to.

enthymemes constructed from signs or examples are liable to refutation, although they may be probable.

It is enthymemes constructed from demonstrations which are irrefutable, unless indeed the fact alleged as a demonstration can be disproved.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Correction of two possible errors:

(1) Exaggeration and depreciation (τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν) are not elements (στοιχεῖα) or topics of enthymemes but actual enthymemes tending to show the greatness or smallness of things.

(2) Refutative enthymemes do not form a species distinct from constructive.

For refutation must consist either in urging positive proof or in adducing an objection;

and in the former case it is proving the opposite of an adversary's conclusion,

and in the latter it is bringing forward an opinion to show that the adversary's reasoning is inconclusive or that there is something false in his assumptions.

The inventive part of Rhetoric may be now said to have received adequate consideration.

It remains to consider style (λέξις) and arrangement (τάξις).

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Style.

It is not enough to know what to say; it is necessary also to know how to say it.

The subject admits of three divisions:

(*a*) the sources of persuasiveness in facts,
(*b*) the disposition of the facts,
(*c*) declamation (ὑπόκρισις);

and declamation includes

(1) the use of the voice,
(2) the use of the accents or tones (τόνοι)
(3) the use of rhythms.

Upon declamation no scientific treatise exists.

The consideration of it is necessary, if only because of the depraved character of the audience.

The capacity for declamation is a natural gift, and on its histrionic side is hardly susceptible of artistic treatment. But on its rhetorical side it may be reduced to an art.

Declamation originated among the poets, who were generally the declaimers of their own tragedies. The consequence was that a poetical style was originally adopted and admired in prose. But the styles of prose and poetry are distinct.

We confine ourselves therefore to rhetorical style.

CHAPTER II.

The principal virtues or graces (ἀρεταί) of style are

(1) perspicuity,
(2) propriety.

N.B. A certain dignity is imparted to style by the use of words which are a little out of the common. Yet upon the whole

naturalness is persuasive, and artificiality of style is the reverse. Hence the use of rare or foreign words, compound words (διπλᾶ ὀνόματα), etc. should be sparing.

Prose admits in general only (1) the proper or ordinary names of things, (2) metaphors.

Metaphor has been discussed at length in the *Poetic*. But the use of metaphor is more important to prose than to poetry; as prose depends for its effect on a smaller number of artistic means. Also metaphors are sources of perspicuity, pleasure and novelty.

Metaphors, like epithets, must be appropriate; i.e. they must be (1) proportionate, (2) homogeneous, (3) not farfetched, (4) beautiful in themselves.

N.B. Good metaphors may be derived from well-constructed enigmas.

The sources of metaphors are such things as are beautiful in sound or suggestiveness or vividness of representation.

Epithets may be taken either from the lower or from the higher aspect of the things which they describe. Not unlike them in effect are diminutives (ὑποκορισμοί). But epithets and diminutives must be used with due care.

CHAPTER III.

Faults of taste may occur in four points of style, viz.

(1) in the use of compound words,

(2) in the use of rare words,

(3) in the use of epithets, if they are long or unseasonable or very numerous,

(4) in the use of metaphors, if they are inappropriate or obscure.

Aristotle quotes instances.

N.B. Compound words are suited to dithyrambic poetry.
Rare words „ „ epic „
Metaphors „ „ tragic „

CHAPTER IV.

The simile is a metaphor with a slight difference.

Homer's expression "He rushed on like a lion" is a simile. But "He rushed on a very lion," is a metaphor.

Aristotle quotes instances of simile.

Metaphors are always convertible into similes, and *vice versa.*

N.B. The proportional metaphor must be reciprocally transferable; if e.g. the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may be called the goblet of Ares.

CHAPTER V.

The basis of style is purity of language.

But purity of language comprises five points, viz.

(1) the right use of connecting words or clauses (*σύνδεσμοι*),

(2) the use of proper or special names for things (*ἴδια ὀνόματα*) rather than class-names,

(3) the avoidance of ambiguous terms (*ἀμφίβολα*),

(4) the observance of the genders of nouns,

(5) the correct expression of number.

The composition should be easy to read and—which is the same thing—easy to deliver. Hence it is necessary to avoid (1) obscurity of punctuation, (2) zeugma, (3) parenthesis.

CHAPTER VI.

Dignity of style.

Aristotle mentions seven contributing causes, viz.

(1) to employ a definition instead of the simple name of a thing,

(2) to avoid any foulness of expression by substituting the name for the definition or *vice versa,*

(3) to use metaphors and epithets as means of elucidating the subject,

(4) to put the Plural for the Singular,

(5) to repeat the article, as e.g. τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας instead of τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός,

(6) to use connecting particles (σύνδεσμοι),

(7) to describe a thing by negation.

CHAPTER VII.

Propriety.

The conditions of propriety are

(1) that the style should be emotional,

(2) that it should be ethical,

(3) that it should be proportionate to the subject.

Appropriateness of language is one means of giving an air of probability to the case.

It will be emotional (παθητική) if it is angry, indignant, enthusiastic, etc. according to the subject, and, being so, it will command the sympathy of the audience.

It will be ethical (ἠθική) if it is adapted to the character of a particular class or moral state (ἕξις).

It will be proportionate, if it is elevated, when the subject is elevated, humble, when it is humble, and so on.

Opportuneness (τὸ εὔκαιρον) in the use of any rhetorical device is a rule belonging equally to all the kinds of Rhetoric.

The multiplication of compound words or epithets and the use of strange words are most appropriate to the emotional Rhetoric.

CHAPTER VIII.

The structure of the style should be neither metrical, as it would then seem artificial, nor unrhythmical, as it would then seem indefinite.

A prose composition should have rhythm, but not metre.

Of the various possible rhythms;

the heroic is too dignified, and it lacks conversational harmony,

the iambic is deficient in dignity and impressiveness,

the trochaic approximates too much to broad comedy.

There remains the paean, which has been used by prose writers from Thrasymachus downwards. But the paean is of two kinds, which are respectively suitable to the beginning and the end of sentences.

CHAPTER IX.

The style must be

(1) either "jointed" (εἰρομένη) i.e. a style in which the connecting particles (σύνδεσμοι) form the only links of the sentence;

Such is the style of Herodotus;

(2) or "compact" (κατεστραμμένη) i.e. periodic.

A period (περίοδος) is a sentence which has a beginning and an end in itself and such a magnitude as can be easily comprehended at a glance.

A periodic style has two advantages, as being (1) agreeable, (2) easily learnt.

But the period should be marked by the completion of the sense as well as of the rhythm.

Periods may be

(1) divided into members or clauses (ἐν κώλοις),

(2) simple (ἀφελεῖς), i.e. consisting of a single member or clause.

The periods and the members of which they are composed, should be neither too short nor too long.

A further division of the periodic style may be made according as its clauses are (1) simply separate,

(2) antithetical.

Aristotle gives several instances of antithetical clauses.

The agreeableness of an antithetical style lies in its emphatic and syllogistic character.

Parisosis is equality of members or clauses.

Paromoiosis is similarity of extremities, whether the beginnings or the ends of sentences.

The same sentence may combine various points, e.g. antithesis, parisosis, etc.

CHAPTER X.

Clever sayings (τὰ ἀστεῖα).

Learning without trouble is agreeable to everybody.

Metaphors and similes, but especially metaphors, are instructive.

The test of a cleverly constructed enthymeme is its power of conveying rapid instruction.

Enthymemes are popular

(1) if their structure is antithetical,

(2) if their words contain a metaphor which is neither superficial nor far-fetched,

(3) if they vividly represent the subject to the eye.

In a word there are three objects to be kept in view, viz. metaphor, antithesis and vividness of representation.

Metaphors are of four kinds, proportional metaphors being the most popular.

Aristotle gives various instances of metaphor.

CHAPTER XI.

Vividness of representation shows a thing in a state of activity. It may be illustrated by Homer's treatment of inanimate objects as animate.

Metaphors should be derived from objects which are closely related to the thing itself, but which are not immediately obvious.

Another instrument of clever sayings is surprise or deception (παρὰ προσδοκίαν), as it gives people the sense of having learnt something. Hence too the pleasure of good apophthegms, riddles, and puns.

A proper enunciation is requisite in all such sayings. But their chief merit is their appropriateness to the things described.

Metaphor, especially proportional metaphor, antithesis, parisosis and vividness are all means of giving point to a sentence; and the larger the number of these means, the more cleverly pointed the sentence appears.

Similes, as has been said, are always in a sense popular metaphors.

Proverbs are metaphors from one species to another.

Hyperboles of an approved kind are also metaphors.—There is however a character of juvenility in hyperboles.

CHAPTER XII.

Every kind of Rhetoric has its own appropriate style.

There is a difference between the literary (γραφική) and controversial (ἀγωνιστική) styles and in the controversial style between the political (δημηγορική) and forensic (δικανική). But the rhetorician should be familiar with both.

It is the literary style which is the most finished and the controversial which is the best suited to declamation.

Controversial oratory is (1) ethical, (2) emotional.

Hence such artifices as the use of asyndeton and the repetition of the same word, although alien from the literary style, are favourites among controversial orators.

The style of political oratory resembles scene-painting, for as the view is more distant, where the crowd is greater, a finished style becomes inappropriate.

The style of forensic oratory, especially when addressed to a single judge, is most finished.

The epideictic style is best suited to literary purposes.

CHAPTER XIII.

A speech has two parts. It is necessary first to state the case and then to prove it.

The exposition of the case and the proof—these are the only indispensable parts of a speech. But if more parts are added, they must not exceed four, viz. exordium, exposition, proof and peroration.

CHAPTER XIV.

The exordium (*προοίμιον*).

The exordium of a speech corresponds to a prologue in poetry and to a prelude in a musical performance.

The sources of exordia in epideictic speeches are eulogy, censure, exhortation, dissuasion and appeals to the audience.

The exordia of forensic speeches resemble the proems of epic poetry.

The exordia of epideictic speeches resemble the proems of dithyrambic poetry.

The essential function of the exordium is to explain the end or object of the speech itself.

Exordia of other kinds, whether derived from the speaker himself or from the audience or from the subject or from the adversary, are merely the means of remedying certain defects in the audience; they would not be used, if the audience were not corrupt.

The art of exciting attention belongs equally to all the parts of a speech, perhaps to other parts rather than to the exordium. But the topics appropriate to the exordium may all be used as means of exciting attention. No means however is so effective as character.

In political speeches exordia are rare, as the subject is generally familiar to the audience.

In the exordia of epideictic speeches the audience should be led to fancy themselves participators.

CHAPTER XV.

Calumny or prejudice (*διαβολή*).

Aristotle enumerates the topics which are useful as means of creating or dissipating prejudice.

CHAPTER XVI.

Narrative (*διήγησις*).

(1) In epideictic speeches the narrative should be not continuous but fragmentary. But if the facts are notorious, it is

proper merely to recall them to the memory of the audience; there is no need to dwell upon them.

(2) In regard to forensic speeches it is absurd to lay down the rule that the narrative should always be rapid. Here too it is proper to observe the rule of the mean.

The orator may slip into his narrative anything which tends either to prove his own virtue or to gratify the jury.

On the side of the defence the narrative part of the speech may be abbreviated, as the facts upon which it turns are already known.

But the narrative should be ethical; and it will be ethical

(*a*) if it indicates a moral purpose,

(*b*) if it contains such characteristic marks as accompany particular characters,

(*c*) if it seems to proceed not from policy but from the heart.

It is possible to derive topics from emotional signs by describing the familiar features of emotion.

N.B. The narrative should be distributed over the speech.

(3) In political speeches, as referring to the future, there is the least room for narration. It can be introduced only because a knowledge of the past facilitates a judgment of the future.

CHAPTER XVII.

Proofs (*πίστεις*).

The proofs should be demonstrative (*ἀποδεικτικαί*).

In forensic speeches, as there are four points on which the issue may turn, viz. the fact, the injury, the magnitude of the injury or the criminality the proof should be directed to the particular point at issue.

In epideictic speeches the facts must be generally taken on trust, and amplification (*αὔξησις*) used to emphasize their moral or utilitarian character.

In political speeches it must be urged that the policy of one's adversary is impossible or unjust or inexpedient or that it will not have the important results which he anticipates.

Examples are especially appropriate to political Rhetoric.

Enthymemes are especially appropriate to forensic Rhetoric.

The enthymemes, which should be chosen with discrimination, should not be put forward in a continuous series, but intermingled with various other topics.

Enthymemes are out of place in the pathetic or ethical passages of a speech.

Maxims, as possessing an ethical character, should be used both in narrative and in proof.

Political Rhetoric is more difficult than forensic, as it relates to the future, and the future cannot be known; nor does it equally allow of digressions or appeals to the emotions.

In epideictic speeches eulogies should be introduced by way of episodes.

In default of proofs the speech should be both ethical and demonstrative; in default of enthymemes it should be exclusively ethical.

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative.

The reply to the adversary is not a separate branch of the speech.

The arrangement of the speech will vary according to circumstances. In deliberative and forensic Rhetoric, if you speak first, you should begin with a statement of your own proofs and then meet the arguments on the other side. (But if the case on the other side is of a varied character, you should begin by meeting the opposing arguments and then make your own statement.) If you speak last, you should begin with the answer to the arguments on the other side.

As to character, things which would be invidious or tedious, if you said them of yourself, or which would be calumnious or coarse, if you said them of others, may be conveniently put into the mouth of a third person.

Enthymemes should sometimes, by a change of form, be expressed as maxims.

CHAPTER XVIII.

(1) Interrogation (ἐρώτησις).

The interrogation of one's adversary is a device which may be opportunely used as a means of landing him in an absurdity or contradiction.

(2) Reply (ἀπόκρισις).

In replying to ambiguous questions it is proper to proceed by distinction or definition, and not to use too concise a mode of expression. Where the adversary's conclusion is put in the form of a question, the reply to the question should be made at once.

(3) Jokes (τὰ γελοῖα).

It is necessary that they should be such as are suited to gentlemen.

N.B. Irony (εἰρωνεία) is more gentlemanly (ἐλευθεριώτερον) than buffoonery (βωμολοχία), as the former is used simply for its own sake and the latter for some ulterior object.

CHAPTER XIX.

The peroration (ἐπίλογος).

There are four elements of the peroration, viz.

(1) to inspire the audience with a favourable opinion of oneself and an unfavourable opinion of one's adversary,

(2) to amplify or depreciate the subject,

(3) to excite the emotions of the audience,

(4) to recall the facts to their memory.

In the recapitulation it is a good rule to repeat the points several times for the sake of intelligibility.

Comparison, irony, interrogation are all suitable elements of recapitulation.

An asyndeton forms an appropriate conclusion.

THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I. Relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic.

RHETORIC is a counterpart of Dialectic. For both are concerned with such subjects as fall in a sense within the cognizance of all men, and neither is limited to any definite science. Accordingly we are all in a sense dialecticians and rhetoricians; for everybody essays up to a certain point the criticism and support of a thesis, defence and accusation. It is true that most people do this either without any method at all or by a familiarity which is the result of habit.

Possibility of a systematic treatment of Rhetoric.

But the possibility of proceeding in both these ways is itself a proof that the processes may be systematized; for it is possible to investigate the causes of such success as is attained by familiarity or at random, and such an investigation will be universally admitted to be essentially a function of an [1]art.

[1] Aristotle's conception of a τέχνη or art is clearly expressed in the first chapter of the *Metaphysics*. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη (he says) ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις.

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Criticism of existing rhetorical handbooks.

As it is, the compilers of our "[1]arts" or rhetorical handbooks have supplied but a fragment of an art. For while it is the proofs alone which form the proper subjects of artistic treatment, and everything except the proofs is a mere accessory, they omit all mention of enthymemes, which are the soul of proof, and occupy themselves almost exclusively with such things as lie outside the actual issue. For [2]prejudice, compassion, anger and such emotions of the soul have no bearing upon the point at issue; they merely affect the minds of the jury. Our rhetoricians then would not have a word to say, if the practice in all trials were the same as at this moment exists in some few States, especially States which are well ordered; for it is universally allowed that there ought to be, even if there is not actually, a provision in the laws by which a veto is set upon "travelling out of the record," as e.g. in the Court of Areopagus. There is reason in this practice; for it is improper to warp the judg-

[1] The connexion between *τέχνη* and *αἱ τέχναι τῶν λόγων* can hardly be preserved in translation. It is well known that *τέχνη* in the language of the rhetoricians came to mean (1) Rhetoric, as the supreme art, (2) a rhetorical treatise or handbook. (Dr Thompson's *Gorgias* of Plato, *Introduction*, p. v.) The Latin writers use *ars* in much the same sense, e.g. Juvenal *Sat.* vii. 177, *artem scindes Theodori*, where see Prof. Mayor's note.

[2] Nothing can be clearer than that *διαβολή* is here in Aristotle's view a *πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς*. When Spengel says *διαβολή* "non est quidem *πάθος* sed efficit *πάθος*," he separates it generically from *ἔλεος* (compassion) and *ὀργή* (anger) with which it is joined. Perhaps it has the sense not of *διαβάλλειν* but of *διαβάλλεσθαι*, and means a "prejudice" or "preconceived hostility." Cp. p. 64, l. 6, where *ὀργή*, *ἐπηρεασμός*, *διαβολή* are described as *ποιητικὰ ἔχθρας*.

ment of a juror by exciting him to anger or jealousy or compassion, as this is like making the rule, which one is going to use, crooked. It is evident too that one who is a party to a legal suit has nothing to do except to show that the fact alleged is or is not so, or has or has not occurred, and that its magnitude or triviality, its justice or injustice, except in cases where the legislator has determined this, is a point which the juror should presumably decide for himself and not learn from the statements of the parties.

Reasons for preferring the authority of the laws to the decisions of particular judges.

It is best, we may observe, where the laws are enacted upon right principles, that everything should, as far as possible, be determined absolutely by the laws, and as little as possible left to the discretion of the judges. For in the first place it is easier to find an individual or a few than a number of people who are sensible and capable of exercising legislative and judicial functions; and secondly, while legislative enactments are the results of mature deliberation, judicial decisions are given on the spur of the moment, so that it is difficult for the judges in particular cases duly to deliver such a sentence as is just and expedient. But the point of principal importance is this; that, while the legislator's decision is not particular but prospective and universal, the members of the Public Assembly or the Court of Law from the nature of the case decide upon actual definite issues, in which feelings of affection or ill-will and private interests are necessarily often [1]in-

[1] Reading συνήρτηται, which has the support of the *Vetusta Translatio* (ad quos...annexa sunt) and agrees better than συνήρη-

volved, so that they lose the power of adequately studying the truth, and their judgment is clouded by a consideration of their personal pleasure or pain.

It is then, as we say, a general rule that we should limit as far as possible the authority of the judge. But such questions as whether a fact has or has not occurred in the past, or will or will not be so in the future or is or is not so *at present*, are necessarily left to the decision of the judges, as they lie beyond the prescience of the legislator. This being the case, it is clear that to lay down definite rules, as is sometimes done, upon a number of other points, e.g. upon the proper contents of the exordium, the narrative or any other part of a speech, is to make an art of things which are foreign to the issue; for the authors of such rules have no other object than to produce a certain disposition in the judge, while they give no explanation of the [1]artistic proofs, which are the materials of all enthymematic reasoning.

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Forensic rhetoric the principal subject treated in rhetorical handbooks.

Hence it is that, although the same mode of treatment is applicable to the oratory of public life and to that of the Law Courts, and the study of political oratory is more elevated and statesmanlike than a study which limits itself to the ordinary dealings of man with man, they disregard political oratory altogether and set themselves with one consent to make

ται with Aristotle's usage. (See the *Index Aristotelicus* of Bonitz s. v. συναρτᾶν.)

[1] Aristotle is scarcely justified in using the expressions *αἱ ἔντεχνοι πίστεις* and *ἐνθυμηματικός*, as if they would be intelligible at this point of his treatise. It is not until the second chapter that he defines them.

an art of pleading in Court, because it does not pay so well to "travel out of the record" in political questions, and political oratory, as [1]involving wider interests, offers fewer opportunities of chicanery. For while in politics, where the judges are personally interested in the questions which come before them, all that the advocate of a certain policy has to do is to demonstrate that the facts are as he alleges, in forensic cases such a procedure is insufficient, and it is worth while to conciliate the audience. For as they have no personal interest in the decision, they consider their own gratification and, as they do not listen to the case impartially, are carried away by the parties instead of judging between them. The result is that there are many places, as we said before, where the p. 2.
law forbids all "travelling out of the record." In political matters however the judges themselves look to this sharply enough.

Rhetorical proofs.

It is clear then that the only proper subjects of artistic treatment are proofs. But proof is a species of demonstration [2](for we regard a demonstration as the highest form of proof), and a rhetorical demon-

[1] It seems clear from the following words (ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει) that κοινότερον refers to the personal interest of the audience collectively in the subjects of political debate. The jury, who would be the audience in a legal case, would not be personally interested in its result. But it is to be noticed that the ἐκκλησιασταί as well as the δικασταί are called κριταί or judges of the arguments addressed to them.

[2] The alleged reason is in fact little more than another way of saying ἡ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις; but it would be more natural to argue that demonstration is a species of proof than that proof is a species of demonstration.

stration takes the form of an enthymeme, which may be broadly described as the most powerful form of rhetorical proof. Again, the enthymeme is a species of syllogism, and it falls within the province of Dialectic, either as a whole or in some one of its branches, to make a complete examination of the syllogism in all its forms. [1]From all this it appears that the most competent judge of the materials and constructive principles of a syllogism will also be the most complete master of enthymemes, if only he is further acquainted with the proper subjects of enthymemes and with the differences between enthymemes and [2]logical syllogisms. For as it is the same faculty which discerns what is true and what resembles truth, and as men have a sufficient natural aptitude for truth and in a majority of instances attain it, it follows that the most sagacious judge of truth will be at the same time the most sagacious judge of probabilities.

The enthymeme.

Although it is clear then that the matters, which all other writers upon Rhetoric reduce to an art, are irrelevant to the issue, and it is clear why they have inclined by preference to forensic oratory, still Rhetoric is not without its value. *It is valuable, firstly,* because truth and justice possess a natural superiority

The four uses of Rhetoric.

[1] The MSS. reading δῆλον δ' ὅτι may be retained, if the δὲ is regarded as apodotic. It is in Aristotle's manner to build up a protasis of a number of clauses, not all equally influencing the conclusion.

[2] The λογικὸς συλλογισμός, which is complete in all its parts, is here opposed to the ἐνθύμημα, which is an imperfect or rhetorical syllogism.

to their opposites, and therefore, if judgments are not given as they should be, it must be the speakers themselves who are responsible for the defeat; and this is itself a state of things which is reprehensible. Secondly, there are audiences which, even if we possess the most exact scientific knowledge, it is not easy to persuade by scientific arguments. For scientific argument implies [1]instruction; but it is impossible to instruct such people as we are supposing, and we necessarily find the instruments of our proofs and arguments in the generally accepted notions of mankind, as we remarked in the [2]*Topics*, in discussing the [3]method of dealing with ordinary people. Again, in Rhetoric no less than in syllogistic reasoning it is right to be capable of arguing on both sides of a case, not for the sake of doing both (as we have no right to argue in favour of anything that is wrong), but that the true state of the case may not escape us and that, if another party makes an unfair use of his arguments, we may be able in our turn to refute them. There is

[1] Aristotle uses "instruction" (*διδασκαλία*) in a special sense, as implying exact or syllogistic proof. See the passage quoted by Mr Cope in his *Introduction*, p. 75, *περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων*, p. 165 A_{38}—B_2, where after dividing *οἱ ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγοι* into four classes, *διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί*, Aristotle adds *διδασκαλικοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἑκάστου μαθήματος καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν συλλογιζόμενοι.*

[2] Τοπικά i. ch. 2, p. 101, A_{30-34}.

[3] *ἔντευξις* passes from the sense of "intercourse" in general to "specially dialectical or argumentative intercourse," as the passages quoted by Mr Cope seem to show.

no art, it may be observed, which *possesses this characteristic of* drawing opposite logical conclusions *with equal ease*, except Dialectic and Rhetoric, which are both equally ready to take opposite sides. Still it is not the fact that the subject-matter is indifferent to them; on the contrary whatever is true or expedient may be said generally to be always in its nature more easily susceptible of proof and more persuasive. Lastly, it would be a paradox that there should be something disgraceful in the inability to defend oneself by bodily strength, and not in the inability to defend oneself by speech, when speech is more characteristic of man than the use of the body. And *if it is urged* that the unjust use of this rhetorical faculty would be exceedingly mischievous to the world, this is a charge which may be brought against all good things, save virtue only, and most of all against the things of highest utility, such as strength, health, riches and military skill, which may all prove the greatest blessings in the hands of one who uses them with justice, and the greatest curses in the hands of one who uses them unjustly.

The function of Rhetoric.

[1]It is evident then that Rhetoric is not limited to a particular definite class of subjects, but like Dialectic *is universally applicable*, and that it has certain uses *which have already been described.* [2]It

[1] Of the three points which are here said to be "evident," the first and second have been already made good; the third is new.

[2] Aristotle is glancing at the passage in Plato's *Gorgias*, where Socrates says to Gorgias εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς

is evident also that its function is not to persuade but to discover the available means of persuasion in any subject. And in this respect Rhetoric is like the other arts. It is not the function e.g. of Medicine to restore a person to perfect health but only to bring him to as high a point of health as possible; for even people who can never possibly recover their health may still be scientifically treated. Further, *it is evident* that it falls within the scope of the same art to discern the real and the *sham or* apparent means of persuasion, as in Dialectic the real and the apparent syllogism. For it is not the faculty but the moral purpose which constitutes the sophistical character. But *there is this* [1]*difference between Rhetoric and Dialectic, that,* while in the former the name "rhetorician" is descriptive either of the science or of the moral purpose, there is in the latter the name "sophist" to describe the moral purpose, and "dialectician" to describe not the purpose but the faculty.

The fallacious branch of Rhetoric.

But it is now time to endeavour to state the actual system, *or in other words* the means and materials which will enable us to attain the objects

δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ, p. 453 A. But the definition of Rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός is said not to have been Plato's own, but to have descended from Corax and Tisias or Isocrates (Dr Thompson's note *ad loc.*).

[1] The point, which is somewhat obscurely put, seems to be this: There are sophistical rhetoricians as well as sophistical dialecticians; but while the latter are called by the special name of "sophists," the former, having no special name, are simply called "rhetoricians."

proposed. Let us start afresh then, as it were, and, before we proceed, define the actual nature of Rhetoric itself.

CHAP. II. Definition of Rhetoric.

Rhetoric may be defined as a faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion in any subject. For this is exclusively the function of Rhetoric, as

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every other art, [1]whether instructive or persuasive, deals with a subject-matter peculiar to itself, Medicine e.g. with the conditions of health and disease, Geometry with the properties of magnitudes, Arithmetic with number, and so on through the list of arts and sciences. Rhetoric on the other hand may be said to possess the faculty of discovering the means of persuasion in any given subject; and accordingly we hold that the rules of the rhetorical art are not limited in their application to a certain special definite class of subjects.

Rhetorical proofs. (1) inartistic,

Rhetorical proofs are either artistic or inartistic. By "inartistic proofs" I mean all such as are not provided by our own skill but existed before and independently, e.g. witnesses, tortures, contracts and the like; by "artistic," such as admit of being constructed systematically and by our own skill; in fine, the former we have only to apply and the latter we have to invent.

(2) artistic.

The proofs provided through the instrumentality

[1] The distinction between arts as "instructive" or "persuasive," i.e. in other words as exact or inexact, depends upon the special sense in which Aristotle uses "instruction." See note on ch. i. Cp. Plato *Gorgias*, p. 455 A, *οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πειστικὸς μόνον.*

of the speech are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral character of the speaker or in the production of a certain disposition in the audience or in the speech itself by means of real or apparent demonstration. The instrument of proof is the moral character, when the delivery of the speech is such as to produce an impression of the speaker's credibility; for we yield a more complete and ready credence to persons of high character not only ordinarily and in a general way, but in such matters as do not admit of absolute certainty but necessarily leave room for difference of opinion, without any qualification whatever. (It is requisite however that this result should itself be attained by means of the speech and not of any antecedent conception of the speaker's character.) For so far from following the example of some authors of rhetorical handbooks, who in their "art" of Rhetoric regard the high character of the speaker as not being itself in any sense contributory to his persuasiveness, we may practically lay it down as a general rule that there is no proof so effective as that of the character. *Secondly*, proof may be conveyed through the audience, when it is worked up by the speech to an emotional state. For there is a wide difference in our manner of pronouncing decisions, according as we feel pleasure or pain, affection or hatred; and indeed *the power of working upon the emotions* is, as we p. 2.
assert, the one end or object to which our present professors of the rhetorical art endeavour to direct their studies. This is a part of the subject which will be elucidated in detail, when we come to discuss

the emotions. *Lastly*, [1]the instrument of proof is the speech itself, when we have proved a truth or an [2]apparent truth from such means of persuasion as are appropriate to a particular subject.

Qualifications of a rhetorician. Such being then the channels of rhetorical proofs, it is evident that no one can make himself master of all three, unless he is competent to reason logically, to study human characters and virtues, and thirdly to study the nature and quality of the several emotions, the sources from which they spring and the methods of exciting them. Relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic and Ethics. It follows that Rhetoric is, so to say, an offshoot of Dialectic *on the one hand* and *on the other* of the study of Ethics [3]which may fairly be described as political. Hence it is that Rhetoric and its professors assume the mask of Politics, whether from ignorance or imposture or any other human infirmity. For it is *really* a branch or copy of Dialectic, as we said at the outset, p. 1. neither being a science which deals with the constitution of any definite subject-matter, but both being mere faculties of supplying arguments.

Enough has perhaps been said as to the faculty and mutual relations of Rhetoric and Dialectic. But taking the proofs conveyed by real or apparent demonstration, *we find that*, as in Dia-

[1] Omitting πιστεύουσιν.

[2] There is no need to insert ἀληθές after φαινόμενον as in Bekker's text; see e.g. p. 25, l. 22 ἀγαθὸν ἢ μεῖζον, p. 37, l. 13 τῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων.

[3] The view of Politics as the architectonic science, embracing Ethics as a subordinate or ancillary science, is expounded in *Nicom. Eth.* i. ch. 1.

lectics there are three modes of proof, viz. induction, syllogism and apparent syllogism, so in Rhetoric there is the example corresponding to induction, the enthymeme to syllogism and the apparent enthymeme to apparent syllogism. I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism and an example a rhetorical induction. The universal means of demonstrative proof *in Rhetoric* are examples or enthymemes, and there is no other; hence if it is assumed to be absolutely necessary that [1] whatever is proved should be proved either by syllogism or by induction—and this we see clearly from the [2] *Analytics*—it is a necessary conclusion that the enthymeme and example are respectively identical with the syllogism and induction. The difference between example and enthymeme *on the one hand and induction and syllogism on the other* is clear from the [3] *Topics.* For as syllogism and induction have been already discussed, it is clear

Example and enthymeme.

[1] The words ἢ ὁντινοῦν are rightly omitted in Bekker after ὁτιοῦν; they are at best, I think, nothing more than a marginal note, showing that either ὁτιοῦν or ὁντινοῦν would make good sense.

[2] There are several passages of the *Analytics* which may have been in Aristotle's mind, as Mr Cope says (*Introduction*, p. 153); perhaps the clearest is *Analyt. Pri.* ii. ch. 23, p. 68 B_{8-14}.

[3] The meaning, as Mr Cope saw, should be not so much that the difference is stated in the Τοπικά as that it may be inferred from the definitions of syllogism and induction given in the Τοπικά. A syllogism is there defined as λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων, Bk i. ch. 1, p. 100 A_{25}; an induction as ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος, Bk i. ch. 12, p. 105 A_{13}. But the passage remains obscure, unless ἐκεῖ is altered to ἐπεὶ, and φανερὸν supplied before ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

that the proving of a rule in a number of similar instances is an induction in Dialectic and an example in Rhetoric, while the conclusion from certain premisses that something else which is different from them results as a consequence of them by reason of their being what they are, whether universally or generally, is called a syllogism in Dialectic and an enthymeme in Rhetoric. It is clear that there is an advantage in either kind of Rhetoric. For the remark which has been made in the [1]*Methodics* is not less applicable here; there are some rhetorical efforts in which the example and others in which the enthymeme predominates, and rhetoricians are similarly distinguishable by a predilection for the one or the other. It may be added that speeches which make use of examples are fully as persuasive as the others, but enthymematic speeches are more applauded. The sources of examples and enthymemes and the proper uses of them both we will state hereafter. Let us now however define more explicitly these *logical processes* themselves.

[2]Persuasiveness then is a relative conception, and a fact is persuasive and credible either immediately and in its own strength or as seeming to be proved by facts which are persuasive and credible. But no art takes particular cases into consideration. Thus

The limitations of Rhetoric.

[1] A logical treatise of Aristotle, now lost.

[2] I have broken up the long protasis of the sentence; for the conclusion οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει follows not from all the three preceding clauses, but, as Mr Cope says, from the third only, or perhaps more accurately from the first and third.

Medicine does not consider what is wholesome to Socrates or Callias *as individuals* but what is wholesome to a person or persons of a certain constitution; for it is this *generalization* which is characteristic of an art, whereas particulars are infinite in number and cannot be known. Similarly Rhetoric will not investigate what is probable to each individual, as e.g. to Socrates or Hippias, but what is probable to persons of a certain character; and the same is true of Dialectic. *Both are practically limited in respect of the subjects with which they deal.* For Dialectic no less than Rhetoric does not employ any and all opinions indiscriminately as materials of syllogisms (for even people who are out of their minds have certain fancies); but the materials of Dialectic are such subjects as need discussion, and those of Rhetoric are the ordinary and recognized subjects of deliberation. The function of Rhetoric is limited to matters about which we deliberate [1]and do not possess artistic rules *for our guidance in determining them*, and the audience to which it addresses itself consists of persons who are unable to comprehend a number of arguments in a single view or to follow out a long chain of reasoning. Now the proper subjects of deliberation are such as appear to admit of two possibilities; for if things cannot possibly either have happened or happen or be otherwise *than in one particular way*, nobody deliberates about them, at least upon that supposition, *i.e. so long as he regards them as absolutely certain;* for what would be the advan-

[1] The rules of medicine, e.g., would not be the proper subjects of rhetorical argument.

tage of deliberation? (But the materials of syllogistic and inferential reasoning may be either the actual conclusions of previous syllogisms or propositions which have not been syllogistically proved and at the same time need such proof, as lacking probability. Syllogisms of the first class will be necessarily difficult to follow from their length, as the judge is assumed to be a simple sort of person; and those of the second class will fail to carry conviction, as the premisses on which they rest are neither *practically* admitted nor *intrinsically* probable.) [1]We conclude then that the enthymeme and example are necessarily applied to such things as are in general indeterminate; the

The enthymeme.

example being an induction and the enthymeme a syllogism, with its constituent parts only few and generally fewer than those of the [2]primary *or normal* syllogism; for if one of them is well known, it need not be stated, as the audience supplies it of its own accord. *If we wish* e.g. *to prove* that Dorieus has been victorious in a contest in which the prize of victory is a crown, it is enough to say that he has won an Olympic victory; there is no need to add that the prize of an Olympic contest is a crown, as the fact is universally known.

[1] The conclusion is not justified by the sentences which immediately precede it, but follows as a natural consequence from ll. 4—6, βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Accordingly I regard the intervening sentences as parenthetical, and should put a full stop, instead of a comma, after ἐνδόξων.

[2] For the primary syllogism, or syllogism of the first figure, see *Analyt. Pri.* i. ch. 4, or Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. pp. 213—221.

[1] The propositions then which are the materials of rhetorical syllogisms are seldom necessary. The ordinary subjects of our judgments and investigations are indeterminate; for it is human action which is the sphere of deliberation and inquiry; and all such action is of an indeterminate character, it may be said to be practically never necessary. Further, the premisses of such conclusions as are generally true or only possible must themselves be general and possible, and those of necessary conclusions necessary, as in fact we saw in the [2] *Analytics*. It is evident then from these considerations that the propositions which form the materials of enthymemes, although sometimes they are necessary, are for the most part only generally true. For the materials of enthymematic reasoning are probabilities and signs; and [3] it follows that these are respectively identical with the propositions which are generally and necessarily true. A probability is something that usually happens, although the definition must

The materials of enthymemes.

Probabilities, signs and demonstrations.

[1] This is another case in which there is no strict conclusion from the protasis; the conclusion is in fact only a re-statement of part of the protasis.

[2] The reference is to *Analyt. Pri.* i. ch. 8, p. 29 B_{29-35}.

[3] This clause, if I rightly understand it, is somewhat incorrectly expressed. It is true that the materials of enthymemes may be described either as signs (σημεῖα) and probabilities (εἰκότα), or as propositions which are sometimes necessarily and sometimes only generally true. But the inference that the signs are the necessary, and the probabilities the generally true propositions is an unsound one. For although the probabilities are never necessary, the signs may be either necessary (τεκμήρια) or not.

As to εἰκὸς, σημεῖον and τεκμήριον, see Mr Cope's *Introd.* pp. 160—163 and *Analyt. Pri.* ii. ch. 27.

not be stated, as it sometimes is, without qualification, but something that usually happens in such matters as are indeterminate; and it stands to the thing which is to be proved in the relation of the universal to the particular. A sign on the other hand bears *to the thing which is to be proved* the relation either of an individual to the universal or of an universal to the particular. Such signs as are necessary *or conclusive* are called [1]demonstrations; the others have no distinctive name. By "necessary signs" I mean the propositions of which a syllogism *in its strict sense* is composed. Hence a sign of this kind is called a demonstration; for it is when we suppose the statement we make to be irrefutable that we think we adduce a demonstration, meaning that it has been *logically* proved and concluded, as [2]demonstration and conclusion are in old parlance identical. It would be a case of a sign standing *to the thing which is to be proved* in the relation of the individual to the universal, if one were to urge e.g. as a sign that the wise are just, "Socrates was wise and just." This is a sign, but it may be refuted, even if the fact alleged is true; for it is incapable of expression in the form of a syllogism. But such a statement as "A person is feverish; therefore he is ill," or "A woman is giving milk; therefore

[1] The Greek word is *τεκμήρια*, which is rendered "infallible proofs," as is well known, in *Acts of the Apostles* i. 3.

[2] It is difficult in translation to preserve the point that *τέκμαρ* or, as it is in Homer, *τέκμωρ* (which is here identified with *τεκμήριον*) means (1) a limit or conclusion, (2) a demonstrative sign or demonstration.

she has lately become a mother," is an instance of a necessary sign. This is the only kind of sign which is a demonstration, as it is the only one which, if true, is irrefutable. As an instance of a sign which stands *to the thing to be proved* in the relation of the universal to the particular, one may say, "It is a sign that so-and-so has a fever; his breathing is hard." This again however admits of refutation, even if it is true; for a person may breathe heavily without having a fever.

The nature of a probability, a sign and a demonstration, and the difference between them have been here stated; but a more explicit description of them and of the reason why some of them can and others cannot be expressed in the form of syllogisms will be found in the [1]*Analytics*.

As to the example, we have stated that it is an induction and have described the character of the subjects with which it deals. It stands *to the thing which is to be proved* in the relation not of part to whole nor of whole to part nor of whole to whole, but of part to part, of similar to similar, *and is employed* when both the example and the thing exemplified fall under the same general head, but the one is more familiar than the other. Thus, *if we are arguing* that Dionysius in asking for his bodyguard has a design of attempting to gain tyrannical power, *we may urge that* Pisistratus once asked for a bodyguard with this design and, as soon as he had obtained it, made himself tyrant, and that the same was true of Theagenes at Megara; in fact every other

Example.

p. 13.

[1] *Analyt. Pri.* ii. ch. 27.

case with which we are acquainted constitutes an example applicable to Dionysius, whose object in making this request is not yet known to us. All these are instances falling under the same universal rule, viz. that a person who aspires to tyrannical power asks for a bodyguard.

So much then for the materials of the proofs which are commonly regarded as demonstrative. But in the case of enthymemes there is a most important distinction, which is equally true of the dialectical system of syllogisms, although it has been practically almost entirely overlooked. It is that some enthymemes are proper to Rhetoric, [1]as *some syllogisms* to Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, whether actually existing or not yet established. Accordingly [2]rhetoricians ignore this distinction and, in proportion as they handle subjects in the manner of specialists, over-step the province of Rhetoric or Dialectic. But the point will be clearer, if I express it at greater length. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the topics, as we call them *par excellence*, i.e. such as are equally suitable to questions of justice, physics or politics, and to many questions of many different kinds. Such is e.g. the topic of "the more or less," *or of degree*, which will serve equally well to construct a syllogism or enthymeme about justice, physics or anything else, although these are subjects differing in kind. Special topics on the other hand are such as spring from the propositions appropriate to a particular species or class of subjects.

Topics, general and special.

[1] Omitting μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν.

[2] Omitting τοὺς ἀκροατάς.

Thus there are propositions in physics from which it is impossible to form an enthymeme or syllogism upon ethics, ethical propositions again from which it is impossible to form an enthymeme or syllogism upon physics, and so on through the whole range of subjects. The general topics, as having no *special* subject-matter, will not convey a practical knowledge of any class of subjects. But in regard to the special topics *it may be remarked that,* in proportion as a rhetorician is specially skilful in the choice of his propositions, he will imperceptibly construct a science different from Dialectic and Rhetoric; for if he lights upon first principles, *i.e. the principles or axioms of the special sciences,* it will cease to be Dialectic or Rhetoric and will be the science to which the principles in question belong. The materials of enthymemes however are in the great majority of cases the particular and private topics, comparatively seldom the common ones. Accordingly here as well as in the *Topics* it is necessary to draw a distinction between the special and general topics from which enthymemes may be derived. I mean by special topics such propositions as are proper to a particular class of subjects, and by *general* topics such as are common to all alike. We will begin then with a discussion of the special topics. But let us first ascertain the different kinds of Rhetoric, that after determining their number we may ascertain the [1]elements and propositions of each separately.

[1] What is meant by an "element" (στοιχεῖον) of Rhetoric is clear from ii. ch. 22, where Aristotle says στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ

CHAP. III. The three kinds of Rhetoric.

There are three kinds of Rhetoric, corresponding to the three kinds of audience to which speeches are naturally addressed. For a speech is composed of three elements, viz. the speaker, the subject of the speech and the persons addressed; and the end *or object* of the speech is determined by the last, viz. by the audience. Audiences are necessarily either [1]critics or judges; and if the latter, they may be judges of things lying either in the past or in the future. A member of the Public Assembly may be taken as an instance of a judge of the future, a member of the Courts of Law as an instance of a judge of the past; while one who judges merely of the ability *displayed in a speech* is the critic. It follows that there must necessarily be three kinds of rhetorical speeches, the deliberative, the forensic and the [2]epideictic.

The subdivisions of each.

Deliberative Rhetoric is partly hortatory and partly dissuasive; for people who counsel their friends deliberatively on private affairs and people who address popular meetings on matters of State are alike in this, that they always exhort or dissuade. Forensic Rhetoric may be divided into accusation and defence; for the parties to any legal action necessarily adopt either one or other of these lines. To the epideictic

τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό, p. 95, l. 26. The term itself is discussed by Mr Cope, *Introd.* pp. 127, 128.

1 The difference, as appears in the next sentence, is that the "critic" regards a speech merely as an intellectual effort, the "judge" as an argument in which he is personally interested.

2 As ἐπίδειξις is a set rhetorical display, so epideictic oratory is the oratory of display.

orator belong eulogy and censure. Again, there are times belonging to the several kinds of Rhetoric; to deliberative Rhetoric the future, as deliberative counsel, whether hortatory or dissuasive, has reference to things which lie in the future; to forensic Rhetoric the past, as the subject of accusation or defence is always something which has been already done; and to epideictic Rhetoric most properly the present, as it is always existing facts which form the grounds of eulogy or censure, although epideictic orators often amplify their resources by appealing to the past in the way of reminiscence and to the future in the way of anticipation. There are three ends too appropriate respectively to the three kinds of Rhetoric. The end which the deliberative orator has in view is expediency or injury; for if he exhorts to a particular line of action, he recommends it as being better, *i.e. more advantageous*, if he dissuades from it, he does so on the ground that it is worse, and every other consideration, whether justice or injustice, honour or disgrace, he embraces merely as something secondary and subservient to this. The end of the parties to a legal action *or in other words of forensic orators* is justice and injustice; and if they too introduce other considerations, it is always as subordinate to these. Orators of the panegyrical and depreciatory style take honour and disgrace as their end and again refer all other considerations to these. As a sign that the end of Rhetoric is in each case such as we have stated, it may be noticed that an orator will sometimes forbear to argue any point in the case except this one. Thus a person who is a party to

Their times.

Their ends.

a legal suit will sometimes not care to contend that the action with which he is charged has not occurred or that it did no damage; but the injustice or criminality of the action he will never for a moment allow, as, if he did, there would be no need of a suit at all. Similarly deliberative speakers, while they frequently abandon every other point, will never admit that the course which they recommend is inexpedient or that the course from which they dissuade is advantageous; but the injustice of reducing their neighbours, even if absolutely unoffending, to slavery is often a point about which they do not trouble themselves in the least. So too in eulogy or depreciation the speakers, instead of considering the expediency or hurtfulness of a person's actions, often go so far as to reckon it meritorious that he did some noble deed at the sacrifice of his own interest, as when they eulogize Achilles for having avenged his friend Patroclus, although he knew he must perish and he might have saved his life, *if he had chosen.* But in this case, although it was more honourable so to die, yet his personal interest was to live.

The propositions indispensable to a rhetorician.

The remarks we have made clearly show that these, *viz. expediency, justice, honour and their opposites,* are the subjects about which propositions are primarily indispensable to the rhetorician. By rhetorical propositions I mean demonstrations, probabilities and signs. For a syllogism consists of propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions described, *viz. demonstrations, probabilities and signs.* Again, as things which are impossible

cannot have been done in the past or be done in the future, and things which have not occurred or will not occur cannot have been done or be done hereafter, it is indispensable that the rhetorician, whether deliberative, forensic or epideictic, should be master of certain propositions as to possibility and impossibility and as to the occurrence or non-occurrence of events in the past or in the future. And further, as all speakers, whether in eulogy or depreciation, exhortation or dissuasion, accusation or defence, are not contented with trying to prove the points I have mentioned, but try also to prove the greatness or smallness of the good or evil, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice *which is the subject of their speech*, either absolutely or in comparison with something else, it will clearly be necessary to be supplied with propositions respecting greatness and smallness both absolute and comparative, whether universally or in reference to particular cases, as e.g. to the greater or less of two good things or of two actions either just or unjust; and the same is true of every other subject.

So much then for the subjects in regard to which it is right that the rhetorician should acquire his propositions. We must now proceed to distinguish them individually, *i.e. to distinguish* the proper subjects of deliberative, of epideictic, and in the third place of legal oratory.

CHAP. IV. Deliberative Rhetoric. Nature of its subjects.

The first step is to ascertain the character of the good or bad things in regard to which the deliberative orator gives his counsel. For he does not concern himself with all things which are good or

bad, but only with such as either may or may not come to pass; whereas, if a thing either is or will be necessarily or cannot possibly be or come to pass, it is not a proper subject of deliberative counsel. Nor again does he concern himself with all things which either may or may not come to pass; for there are some good things of the kind which are the gifts of Nature or the results of chance, and about these it is entirely useless to offer counsel. It is clear that his subjects are all such things as are possible matters of deliberation, i.e. all things which are naturally referred to our own agency and [1]whose production depends in the first instance on our own will. For we always carry back our investigations to the point of discovering whether the act in question is or is not within our power.

Now any attempt at an exact and particular enumeration and classification of the ordinary subjects of public business and at an accurate definition of them, so far as such is possible, would be inappropriate on the present occasion; for such a task belongs not so much to the rhetorical art as to an art of a more intellectual and authentic character, and a great
p. 12. deal more has already [2]been assigned to Rhetoric than its own proper subjects of investigation. For

[1] For the meaning of the phrase ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν, see *Metaphysics* vi. ch. 8, p. 1033 A_{24} ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπό τινός τε γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον (τοῦτο δὲ λέγω ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστι) κ.τ.λ.

[2] Aristotle is alluding to the practice of preceding writers on Rhetoric. See marginal reference. As Rhetoric is there said to be an offshoot of Dialectic and Ethics, it is clear that "the analytical science" must be Dialectic. See Mr Cope's note *ad loc.*

the truth is, as indeed we have already remarked, that Rhetoric is composed of the analytical science and of the ethical branch of Politics and bears a certain resemblance to Dialectic on the one hand and to the sophistical arguments on the other. But the more one attempts to set either Dialectic or Rhetoric on the footing of sciences rather than of *simple* faculties, the more will one imperceptibly obliterate their nature by transgressing *their proper limits* in the reconstructive process and passing from a science of mere words to sciences of certain definite subject-matters. Still so far as an analysis *of the subjects of public business* has a practical value *and is possible* without encroachment upon the studies proper to political science, it is one upon which we may now proceed to enter.

The five principal subjects of deliberation.

The most important subjects of general deliberation and deliberative oratory are practically five, viz. finance, war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, and legislation. Thus to speak in the first instance of finance: one who aspires to be a deliberative *or political* speaker will need to be acquainted with the nature and number of the resources of the State, so that any resource which is neglected may be added to them and any which is defective may be increased, as well as with all the items of the public expenditure, so that whatever is superfluous may be abolished and whatever is excessive may be cut down; for it is possible to enrich a State not only by adding to its resources but also by curtailing its expenses. But it is not only from experience at home that a comprehensive view

(1) Finance.

of these questions may be derived; it is indispensable, if one is to deliberate and advise respecting them, that he should be equally familiar with the discoveries made in other lands. Under the head of war and peace he must know the strength and character of the existing military force in the State and of the force which can be called into existence, also the wars in which the State has been engaged and its success or failure in them. Nor must his knowledge of these points be limited to his own State; it must extend to neighbouring countries [1] or even *to all countries* with which there is a prospect of war, his object being to conclude a peace with the superior powers and to have the option of fighting or not with the inferior. He must know too whether the forces of the States are similar or dissimilar, as this is a point in which one may have an advantage or disadvantage as compared with the other. With the same view it is necessary that he should have studied the issues of the wars not only of his own State but of other States as well; for similar causes naturally produce similar results. Nor again should he be ignorant of the means of defence possessed by his country; he should know the strength and character of its defensive force and the sites of its fortresses (which is impossible without a practical knowledge of the country) in order to strengthen the force, if it is inadequate, or to abolish any part of it, if superfluous, and to concentrate the attention of the

(2) War and peace.

(3) Means of defence.

[1] It seems best to place only a comma after *εἰδέναι*, so that the sentence, if fully expressed, would run *τῶν ὁμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, ἢ καὶ πάντων πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν.*

citizens upon the most favourable localities. In regard to the question of supplies, *the deliberative orator ought to understand* the total expenditure which is adequate for the State, the nature of the supplies produced at home and imported from abroad and the requisite exports and imports, with the view of making conventions and commercial treaties with the exporting and importing countries. For there are two classes of persons in regard to whom it is necessary that the citizens should always be kept clear of offence, viz. those who are superior *in military strength* and those who control the supplies. But while it is necessary, as a means of safety, that our orator should be a competent observer of all the points we have described, it is especially necessary that he should understand legislation. For as the safety of the State depends upon its laws, he must know all the different kinds of polities, the nature of the measures beneficial to each and the natural causes of its destruction whether inherent in the polity itself or antagonistic to it.

(4) Supplies.

(5) Legislation.

[1]When I speak of the destruction of a polity by causes which are inherent in itself I mean that all polities, except the ideally best polity, are liable to destruction either by relaxation or by intensification; a democracy e.g. is not only enfeebled by relaxation so as to issue actually in an oligarchy but *may be destroyed also* by a marked intensification,

[1] There is a passage of the *Politics* so closely resembling this, even in the illustration drawn from the characteristics of the nose, that the two should be read side by side. It is VIII (V) ch. 9, and will be found on pp. 377—379 of my Translation.

in the same way as not only does the aquiline or snub character *of a nose* become regular by relaxation, but, if the nose becomes excessively aquiline or snub, it acquires such a shape that it ceases to look like a nose at all. It is useful too for legislative purposes not only to understand the nature of the proper polity by a study of the past but to be familiar with the polities of other countries and to know the particular polities suitable to particular peoples. It is clear then that from a legislative point of view there is a value in the accounts of travels round the world, as from them we may learn the laws and customs of foreign nations, and from the point of view of political counsel there is a value in historical compositions, although all this is the province of Politics rather than of Rhetoric.

These then are all the principal topics which the deliberative *or political* orator should [1] understand. But the proper materials of exhortation or dissuasion upon these or upon any other topics remain to be discussed; and the discussion of them will be a fresh branch of our inquiry [2].

CHAP. V. The object of human actions.

It may be said that all men both individually and collectively have a certain object at which they

[1] I can hardly believe in the absolute use of *ἔχειν*, without an object or with *τὰς προτάσεις* to be mentally supplied. Nor does Spengel's *λέγειν* commend itself as an emendation. Is it possible that the true reading is *περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν νοῦν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύειν*? Cp. Plato *Republic*, p. 534 B.

[2] It is perhaps worth while to quote M. St Hilaire's remark upon this chapter: Il est fait pour étonner beaucoup ceux qui croient non-seulement à notre supériorité mais en outre à une différence radicale entre nous et les Grecs.

aim in all that they choose and in all that they avoid. This object may be summarily defined as happiness and the constituents of happiness. Let us then by way of illustration ascertain what is in general terms the nature of happiness and what are the elements of its constituent parts, as it is upon happiness and all that is conducive or prejudicial to happiness that exhortations and dissuasions always turn. For whatever procures or augments happiness or one of its constituents is a thing to be done, and whatever destroys or impedes happiness or creates its opposite is a thing to be left undone.

Happiness.

Happiness then may be defined as prosperity conjoined with virtue, or as an independent state of existence, or as the pleasantest life conjoined with safety, or as an abundance of goods and slaves with the ability to preserve them and make a practical use of them; for it would be pretty generally admitted that happiness is one or more of these things.

Its definition.

Such then being the definition of happiness, it follows that its constituent parts are nobility, the possession of many and excellent friends, wealth, a goodly and numerous family and a happy old age; also such physical excellences as health, beauty, strength, stature, and athletic power, *and finally* fame, honour, good fortune and virtue[1]. For the

Its constituent parts.

[1] After ἀρετήν most MSS. contain the words ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην. But not to say that such an analysis of ἀρετή is, as Spengel says, rather Platonic than Aristotelian, it is clear from the concluding words of this chapter that a specification of the "constituents" of ἀρετή would here be

only way to be absolutely independent is to possess both personal and external goods, as there are no other kinds of goods than these. Personal goods are those of the soul or of the body; nobility, friends, riches and honour are external goods. We hold that resources too and fortune should not be wanting, if the life is to be perfectly secure. Let us ascertain then in the same way as before the nature of these several *constituents of happiness.*

(1) Nobility. Nobility in the case of a nation or a State implies that its members are indigenous or of high antiquity, that its first rulers were illustrious persons and that many of its sons have been illustrious on the score of qualities which excite admiration. The nobility of a private family on the other hand may be derived either from the male or the female side; it implies legitimacy on both sides and, as in the case of a State, the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth or something else which is held in honour among men and the celebrity of many members of the family, men and women, young and old.

(2) Offspring. What is meant by the blessing of a goodly and numerous race is not at all difficult to understand. [1]It implies in a community a large and sterling body of youth, sterling physically, i.e. in stature, beauty, strength and athletic powers, *as well as in regard to* the virtues of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. It implies in an indi-

premature. What Aristotle understands by these "constituents" appears from p. 29, ll. 28—30.

[1] Omitting *εὐτεκνία.*

vidual that his own children, both sons and daughters, are numerous and goodly. *It may be observed that* in a woman the excellences *or graces* of the body are beauty and stature, those of the soul are self-command and an industry which never degenerates into vulgarity. Nor is it less our duty as members of a State than as individuals to try to ensure these virtues among women as well as among men; for where the condition of the women is vicious as at Lacedæmon, it may be said that there is no happiness in half the State.

(3) Wealth.

The constituents of wealth are plenty of money, the possession of landed property and estates and also of chattels, live-stock and slaves of exceptional number, size and beauty; all these are safe, [1] gentlemanly and useful kinds of property. But, while it is the productive kinds of property which are the more useful, it is the means of luxury which are the more gentlemanly; I mean by "productive kinds" the ordinary sources of income, and by "luxuries" such kinds as produce nothing worth speaking of beyond the actual enjoyment of them. The criterion of security *in the case of property* is the possession of it in such a place and in such a manner that you enjoy the power of using it as you like; that of ownership or the reverse is your power of aliena-

[1] When Aristotle speaks of certain kinds of property as "liberal" or "gentlemanly," his words are intelligible, if it is borne in mind that the Greeks looked upon trade and all the property which comes of trade as being essentially unnatural and illiberal. This view is familiar to every reader of Plato's *Laws* or Aristotle's *Politics*. See Mr Cope's note.

tion, i.e. of giving it away or selling it. It is indeed the general rule that wealth consists not so much in possession as in use; for it is the active exercise or use of such things as have been mentioned which constitutes wealth.

(4) Reputation. To have a high reputation is to be regarded by everybody as a man of honour or to be the possessor of something which is an object of desire to all or most people or to the good or the wise.

(5) Honour. Honour is a sign of a reputation for beneficence. It is especially paid, as indeed is right, to past benefactors, although it is sometimes paid too to persons capable of beneficent action. Such action may affect either personal safety and the various causes which conduce to existence or wealth or some other good which is difficult of acquisition either universally or at a particular place or time; for it often happens that people receive honour for services of an apparently insignificant kind, but the explanation lies in the places or seasons at which they were rendered. The elements of honour are sacrifices, memorials in verse and prose, special distinctions, allotments of land, the foremost seats on public occasions, sepulchral monuments, statues, maintenance at the public charge, barbaric compliments, as e.g. the prostrating oneself before a person or giving him place, and such presents as are valued in the particular country where they are made. For the present, as being a gift of property and a sign of honour, is equally an object of desire to the avaricious and the ambitious. For to both it offers something that they need, as on the one hand it is a property, which is the desire of the

avaricious, and on the other hand it confers honour, which is the desire of the ambitious.

Of the physical excellences one is health; and by this I mean that a person is free from disease and has the use of his bodily faculties; for there are many persons who keep themselves in health in such a manner as is attributed to [1]Herodicus and who would not be congratulated by anybody upon their health, as they deny themselves all or nearly all human pleasures. (6) Health.

Beauty varies with the different periods of life. A young man is beautiful, if his body is adapted to exercises of speed and strength, and if he is a pleasant and delightful object to look upon. This is the reason why [2]pentathletes are most beautiful; they are equally ready for feats of strength and of speed. A man in the prime of life [3]*is beautiful, if his body is adapted* to military exercises and if his appear- (7) Beauty.

[1] The best account of Herodicus will be found in Plato, *Republic* iii. p. 406, where it is said that he was a training-master (παιδοτρίβης) who fell into ill-health and invented such a compound régime of gymnastics and medicine as to worry himself and a great many other people to death.

[2] The πένταθλον, as its name implies, comprised five exercises,

ἅλμα, ποδωκείην, δίσκον, ἄκοντα, πάλην,

but it is not certain whether the successful pentathlete was necessarily victorious in all or only in three of the exercises.

[3] Victorius is probably right in saying that the elliptical sentence would, if fully expressed, be ἀκμάζοντος δὲ κάλλος τὸ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικοὺς χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα κ.τ.λ.

It should be remembered that the ἀκμή or "prime" of physical life was, according to Aristotle, attained at the age of 37 or thereabouts. See *Politics* IV (VII), ch. 16 (p. 213 of my Translation).

ance combines grace with sternness; an old man, [1]if his body is equal to such exertions as are inevitable and if it is not repulsive, as having none of the disfigurements of age.

(8) Strength. Strength is a power of moving somebody else at will; and as a person must be moved either by pulling or pushing or lifting or pressing or compressing, it follows that a strong man is strong either in all or in some of these respects.

(9) Size. In respect of size excellence consists in superiority to ordinary people in height, stoutness and breadth, although not to such an extent that the movements are retarded in consequence of the excess.

(10) Athletic excellence. Athletic excellence is composed of size, strength and speed[2]; for a man who can move his legs about and take long rapid strides is a good runner, one who can pound an adversary and hold him down a good wrestler, one who can drive him from his ground by his blows a good boxer, one who is a master both of wrestling and of boxing a [3]pancratiast, and one who is a master of [4]all the exercises a pentathlete.

[1] In full: *γέροντος δὲ κάλλος τὸ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἱκανὸν ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα κ.τ.λ.*

[2] I cannot help thinking that the clause *καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός ἐστιν* is spurious, having been introduced by a copyist who noticed that, while *ἀγωνιστικὴ ἀρετή* consists of three elements, size, strength and speed, the first two only have been described, but not the third.

[3] The *παγκράτιον* comprised wrestling and boxing.

[4] There is some little difficulty in *πᾶσι*, as boxing was not a part of the *πένταθλον*, and quoit-throwing, javelin-hurling and (possibly) leaping, which were included in the *πένταθλον*, have not been mentioned in this sentence. But probably the word *πᾶσι*

A happy old age is one which approaches gradually and without pain; for if its approach is rapid, or painful although slow, it is not a happy old age. It is dependent too on physical excellences and on fortune; for a person will not be exempt from suffering, unless he is healthy and strong, nor will he enjoy a painless and protracted life, [1]unless he is fortunate. It is true that there is such a thing as a faculty of long life even without health and strength, for many people are long-lived who have no physical excellences; but a precise consideration of this subject would not be serviceable to our present purpose. (11) A happy old age.

What it is to possess numerous friends and good friends is evident at once from the definition of a friend as one who, if he considers anything to be good for another, is ready to do it for the other's sake. Thus one who has many such persons about him has a number of friends, and one who has worthy persons has good friends. (12) Friendship.

Good fortune implies the acquisition and possession of either all or nearly all or the most important of the good gifts which Fortune bestows. But while there are some of Fortune's gifts which are equally the gifts of various arts, there are many too which are independent of art, e.g. the various gifts of Nature [2](although Fortune's gifts may also be unnatural); (13) Fortune.

would convey to a Greek the idea of an "all-round" athlete, without any special reference to the exercises named in the context.

[1] Omitting οὔτ' before ἄνευ τύχης.

[2] The clause ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι is strictly paren-

for health may be a product of art, but beauty and stature can only be gifts of Nature. It is a general rule that all such blessings as excite envy are gifts of Fortune. Fortune again is the author of exceptional blessings, as e.g. if all your brothers are ugly and you are handsome, or if everybody else failed to perceive a particular treasure and you discovered it, or if a shot hit your neighbour instead of yourself, or if although you were always in the habit of going *to a particular spot* you were *one day* the only person who did not go to it, and other people, although it was the only time that they ever went there, were killed. All such cases may be regarded as instances of good Fortune.

(14) Virtue. We have still to speak of virtue; but as the most convenient place to discuss it will be when we come to treat of panegyrical Rhetoric, we will postpone the definition until then[1].

CHAP. VI. It is evident then what are the points to be kept in view, [2]as being consequent or as already existing,

thetical. The gifts of Fortune (says Aristotle) are sometimes such as art or science can produce, e.g. health, and sometimes such as Nature bestows, e.g. beauty. But it then occurs to him that the gifts of Fortune may also be unnatural or abnormal; hence the parenthetical words. If he were speaking here exactly, he would not call anything unnatural or abnormal a gift of Fortune (τύχη), ὅταν γὰρ γένηταί τι παρὰ φύσιν, τότε οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γεγονέναι φαμέν, (φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, ii. p. 197 B_{24}). But compare p. 36, l. 25.

[1] See ch. 9.

[2] Although it is true that the future is in Aristotle's view the "time" which especially belongs to deliberative Rhetoric (p. 11, l. 23), yet an appeal to present or existing facts will not be out of

in a hortatory and on the other hand in a dissuasive speech; for the latter are the opposites of the former. [1]But as in deliberative Rhetoric it is expediency which is the end proposed, the subject of deliberation being not the end but the means to the end or in other words whatever is expedient in actions, and as what is expedient is good, it is necessary to apprehend certain elementary propositions respecting what is good or expedient in general.

Description of Good.

Good then may be defined as that which is desirable for its own sake and for the sake of which we desire or choose something else, and which is sought by all things or by all sentient or intelligent things or *would be sought by them*, if they should acquire intelligence. Again, whatever [2]intelligence would assign to each individual or the intelligence of each individual assigns to himself, this is good relatively to him. Or again, that which by its presence produces a good condition and a state of independence, or independence *in the abstract*, or that which is productive or preservative of such things, or that upon which they are consequent, or that which tends to hinder or destroy their opposites *is also a good*. [3]Conse-

place. His exhortation may e.g. assume the form "Show yourselves men, or you will lose the blessings you have," as well as "Show yourselves men, and you will gain greater blessings."

[1] This is another sentence which is logically irregular. The clause βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους......κατὰ τὰς πράξεις has no bearing upon the conclusion and should be regarded as virtually parenthetical.

[2] The supreme or Divine Intelligence.

[3] This and the next sentence form a sort of explanatory note which slightly interrupts the sequence of the argument.

quence however may be either subsequent or simultaneous; knowledge e.g. is consequent upon learning subsequently but life upon healthiness simultaneously. Also a cause may be productive in three senses; as [1]healthiness e.g. is productive of health in one sense, food is productive of it in another and gymnastic exercise, as generally producing health, in a third.

These principles being laid down, it necessarily follows that any acquisition of what is good and any rejection of what is evil is good, as the enjoyment of the good is consequent upon the former subsequently and the deliverance from the evil upon the latter simultaneously. So also is the reception of a greater good in lieu of a less and of a less evil in lieu of a greater; for the excess of the greater over the less is in effect the measure of the good received or of the evil rejected. The virtues too necessarily constitute a good, as it is in respect of them that the virtuous are in a good case, and they are productive of what is good and also [2]practical. But the nature

[1] It is curious that Aristotle speaks here of *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν* as producing *ὑγίεια* and in *Nicom. Eth.* x. ch. 4, p. 1174 B_{25} of *ὑγίεια* as producing *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν*. Perhaps his meaning is the same in both passages, although his language is practically inverted. A healthy condition of body (he seems to say) is productive of health as a visible objective fact.

[2] The distinction between *ποιητικός* and *πρακτικός*, which is necessary to the understanding of this passage, is nowhere perhaps more clearly expressed than in *Politics* i. ch. 4, *τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος* (which is an *ὄργανον*) *ἕτερόν τι γίγνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης* (which are *κτήματα*) *ἡ χρῆσις μόνον.*

and character of the several virtues deserve a separate discussion. Pleasure again must be a good, as all living things naturally desire it; and if so, all that is pleasant or noble must be good, as what is pleasant is productive of pleasure, and what is noble is either pleasant or intrinsically desirable. But, to parti- Goods. cularize, it results *from the definition* that the following are goods. Happiness, as being something intrinsically desirable and independent and for the sake of which we choose many things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, [1] magnificence and other such habits, as being virtues of the soul. Health, beauty and the like, as being virtues *or graces* of the body and as being productive of many things *which are good;* for health e.g. produces pleasure as well as life and is therefore in the popular view the best of blessings, as being the source of the two things most highly esteemed in the world, viz. pleasure and life. Wealth again *is a good,* as being [2] a virtue *or successful result* of acquisition and as something which is productive of many *good* things. Also a friend and friendship; for not only is a friend intrinsically desirable, but he is productive in a number of ways. Honour and reputation again, as being pleasant, variously productive and generally attended by the actual possession of the qualities which are the

[1] The virtue which is called by Aristotle μεγαλοπρέπεια is discussed in *Nicom. Eth.* iv. ch 4, where ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής is defined as one who is able δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. Cp. p. 30, l. 12, *μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική.*

[2] It is rather, I should say, the accumulation of wealth than wealth itself which would be strictly called an ἀρετὴ κτήσεως.

grounds of the honour so paid. Rhetorical and practical ability *are good*, as these and all similar *faculties* are productive of good. Natural gifts again, [1]memory, aptness to learn, sharpness of wit and the like, all these faculties being productive of what is good. Similarly, all sciences and arts and life itself; for life if unattended by any other good is yet intrinsically desirable. And lastly, justice as tending to promote the interest of the community at large.

This is a fairly exhaustive catalogue of such things as are generally admitted to be good. There are other goods of a disputable kind, and in regard to these the materials of syllogism will be as follows. A thing is good if its opposite is evil. Or if its opposite is advantageous to our enemies; as if it is of high advantage to our enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that valour is highly beneficial to our country. It is in fact a general rule that, whatever our enemies desire or rejoice at, the opposite of this is clearly beneficial to ourselves. Hence the point of the lines

"Sure [2]Priam would rejoice," &c.

But this is only a general and not an invariable rule; for there is no absolute reason why our own interest should not in some instances coincide with

[1] Reading μνήμη, with Spengel.

[2] The passage referred to is the beginning of the speech in which Nestor tries to reconcile Achilles and Agamemnon. *Iliad*, i. 255 sqq.

> ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος, Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες,
> ἄλλοι τε Τρῶες μέγα κεν κεχαροίατο θυμῷ,
> εἰ σφῶϊν τάδε πάντα πυθοίατο μαρναμένοιϊν.

that of our enemies. Hence the saying "Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows," when the same danger threatens two people. Again, [1]if a thing is not in excess, it is a good; but if there is more than the proper amount of it, it is an evil. It is a good too, if it is a thing for which a great deal of trouble or expense has been incurred; for it is proved thereby to be an apparent good, and an apparent good is assumed to be an end and *not only so but* an end of various actions, and an end is *ex hypothesi* a good. Hence[2] the lines *beginning*

"Yea, after Priam's heart"

and

"'Twere shame to tarry long"

and [3]the proverb "to break the pitcher at the door."

[1] It seems from the correspondence of the clauses *οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή* and *ὃ δ' ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ* that the former means not "that which does not admit of excess" but rather "that which is not in excess."

[2] Both quotations are from the Second Book of the *Iliad*, vv. 176 and 298. The point lies not in the mere words quoted but in the context. In the first passage Athene is speaking of the noble lives sacrificed for Helen's sake.

κὰδ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ καὶ Τρωσὶ λίποιτε
Ἀργείην Ἑλένην, ἧς εἵνεκα πολλοὶ Ἀχαιῶν
ἐν Τροίῃ ἀπόλοντο, φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης.

In the second it is Odysseus who speaks

ἡμῖν δ' εἴνατός ἐστι περιτροπέων ἐνιαυτὸς
ἐνθάδε μιμνόντεσσι· τῷ οὐ νεμεσίζομ' Ἀχαίους
ἀσχαλάαν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔμπης
αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν, κενεόν τε νέεσθαι.

[3] The pitcher broken at the door after so much trouble in carrying it was a proverbial instance of labour thrown away.

Again, that which is an object of general desire or that which is clearly an object of contention is a good, for we defined a good as an object of universal desire, and the general opinion is regarded as *virtually* universal. That which is an object of praise too *is a good,* as nobody praises anything which he does not regard as a good. Or again that which is praised by our enemies[1], for it is an universal admission *that a thing is a good,* if it is admitted even by those who are the sufferers by it. For [2]it may be argued that, if they admit it, the reason must be that it is indisputable, as *it may be equally argued ex contrario that* people must be vicious, if their enemies praise them. It was thus that the Corinthians considered themselves to have been insulted by Simonides in the line

"The men of Corinth Ilium blameth not."

Again, a thing is a good, if it has been preferred by some sagacious or good man or woman, as Odysseus by Athene, Helen by Theseus, Alexander by the goddesses and Achilles by Homer. The objects of deliberate choice in general are good, these being such things as have been already described or such as are injurious to our enemies or good for our friends or such as are practicable. But what is practicable may be either just[3] possible or easily done, i.e. done either without trouble or in

[1] Omitting καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι.

[2] Upon the whole it seems best to follow Spengel in omitting the words οὓς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοί.

[3] The ἂν should certainly be retained in the text. It is clear

a short time; for the difficulty of a thing is determined either by the trouble it gives or by the length of time it takes. Again, things are good, if they happen in accordance with our desires; for the object of our desire is either not an evil at all or is an evil which is more than compensated by the good *which follows from it*, as e.g. if the *consequent* penalty is either imperceptible or insignificant. They are good too, if they are special or unique or pre-eminent gifts, as in such case they are held in greater honour. Or if they are appropriate to ourselves, i.e. suitable in regard to our birth or influence. Or if they are things of which we feel the deficiency, even though *in themselves* they are insignificant; for it is none the less our deliberate choice to attain them. Or if they are things which are easy of accomplishment; for if they are easy, *à fortiori* they are possible—I mean things in which all or most men or our own equals or inferiors have been successful. Or things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies. Or things which persons whom we respect deliberately choose as objects to be attained. Or things for which we are fitted by nature or experience, as then we anticipate that success will be the easier. Or things which are unattainable by any bad person, as such things are more loudly applauded. Or such things as are in fact the objects of our desire; for these are in our eyes not only pleasant but actually better. *And*

that the distinction is between such things as may conditionally and so by implication rarely come to pass and such as are easy or ordinary occurrences.

finally, whatever it is upon which we are especially bent, *it is this that we regard especially as a good*, e.g. victory, if we are bent upon victory, honour, if upon honour, money, if upon money, and so on.

CHAP. VII. In regard then to what is good and expedient these are the sources from which it is proper to derive our proofs. But as it often happens that people, while they admit two things both to be expedient, differ as to the more expedient of the two, it will be proper, as our next point, to consider the greater good or the more expedient *of two things which are both admittedly good or expedient.*

Comparison of goods.

A thing which exceeds another may be defined as so much and something more; a thing which is exceeded by another as something included in the other. Also while the terms "greater" and "more" have always a reference to something less, "great" and "small," "much" and "little" are relative to the average size of things, that which is called "great" being in excess of this average, that which falls short of it being called "small"; and similarly the words "much" and "little."

p. 39. Now[1] by a good we mean that which is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something

[1] It is necessary in considering the Greek of this sentence, to observe that here, as often in Aristotle, the conclusion does not follow from the clauses of the protasis. The ἀνάγκη, p. 23, l. 17, has nothing to do with the statements that "a good is something desirable for its own sake," &c. which are only the definitions given at the beginning of the last chapter; but it is a result of the new definition ἔστω δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον, although it is not grammatically connected with it.

else and that which is sought by all things or which would be chosen by all things, if they should acquire intelligence and sagacity, and that which is productive and preservative of such things or is attended by them. Also the object *of things* is their end, and the end is the object of everything else, and the absolute good is that which is an end and object to itself. It follows then that the larger number of things is a greater good than a single thing or than the smaller number of things, if the single thing or the smaller number be reckoned as part of the larger; for then *the larger number* is in excess *of the smaller*, and that which is included *in the larger* is exceeded by it.

Again, if the largest member *of one class of things* exceeds the largest member of another, then the first class exceeds the second; and *conversely*, if one class exceeds another, the largest member of the first exceeds the largest member of the second. Thus if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, so are men generally taller than women, and if men are generally taller than women, so is the tallest man taller than the tallest woman; for the excess of one class over another is proportional to the excess of the greatest member of the one over the greatest member of the other. Again, if *A* is consequent upon *B* but *B* is not *necessarily* consequent upon *A*, *B is greater than A*, whether the consequence is simultaneous or subsequent or potential[1]; for then the use of the consequent *A* is involved in the use of *B*. (Life,

[1] The "potential" is a third sort of consequence, not mentioned, p. 20, l. 9.

it may be said, is consequent upon health simultaneously, although the converse is not true, knowledge upon learning subsequently, and cheating upon sacrilege potentially, as a man who was guilty of sacrilege would not hesitate at cheating.) Again, if there are two things in excess of a third, the one which exceeds it by the greater amount is the greater, [1]as it is necessarily in excess of the greater as well as of the less *of the other two things*. Things too which are productive of a greater good are greater; for[2] this is involved, as we have seen, in the conception that a thing is productive of something greater. Similarly, if that which is productive of a thing is greater, *the thing itself is greater;* thus if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what is pleasant, so is health greater than pleasure. Again, a thing which is more desirable in itself *is a greater good* than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as e.g. physical strength than wholesome food; for strength is, and food is not, desirable
p. 39. for its own sake, and this is our definition of a good. Or again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, *the former is the greater good*, as being

[1] If this is the meaning of the clause *ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείζονος*, the reason alleged is hardly more than a re-statement of the point to be proved, and there is an obscurity in *τοῦ μείζονος* denoting "the greater of the other two things" viz. of *τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον* and of the less of *τὰ ὑπερέχοντα*. Is it possible that the words *καὶ τοῦ μείζονος* should be omitted, as being a repetition of *καὶ τὰ μείζονος*?

[2] The argument, which is a little obscure, is that, if *τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ* is *ἀγαθόν*, as appears from p. 23, l. 14, *τὸ ποιητικὸν μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ* must be *μεῖζον ἀγαθόν*.

desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, like gymnastic exercise for the sake of a good condition of body. Or if there is one thing which stands less in need of external help than some other thing or things, *it is a greater good*, as being more independent; and this is the case, when its needs are fewer or more easily supplied. Or if *A* does not exist or cannot come into being without *B*, but the converse is not true, *B is then the greater good*, the thing which does not require something else being more independent and therefore, as is clear, a greater good. The same is true, if *B* is an [1]originating principle and *A* is not, or if *B* is a cause and *A* is not, for the same reason, as without a cause or a principle it is impossible that anything should exist or come into being. Again, if there are two such principles or causes, the result of the greater principle or cause is greater; and conversely, if there are two results, the principle or cause of the greater result is greater. It is clear then from what has been said that a thing may be *shown to be* greater *than something else* in either of two ways; for it will appear greater, if it is an originating principle and the other is not, and again, if it is not an originating principle and the other is, as the end of anything is greater and is not an originating principle. It was thus that Leodamas in his accusation of Callistratus argued that he who advised a conspiracy was a greater criminal than he who executed it, on the ground that

[1] The Aristotelian word ἀρχή is discussed at considerable length in Mr Cope's note. The classical passage relating to it in Aristotle himself is *Metaphysics*, iv. ch. i.

it would never have been executed, if he had not devised it, whereas in his accusation of Chabrias he argued that he who executed it was a greater criminal than he who advised it, on the ground that it would never have taken effect without somebody to execute it, as it is the execution which is the object of any conspiracy. Again, that which is rarer *is greater or more valuable* than that which is plenteous, e.g. gold than iron, although it is not so useful; for the acquisition of it, as being more difficult, is something greater. But there is another sense in which what is plenteous *is greater* than what is rare, as being more abundantly useful; for frequency of use is superior to rarity, whence the saying [1]"The best of things is water." It is in fact a general rule that the more difficult of two things, as being the rarer, is greater than the easier, although in another sense the easier, as gratifying our wishes, may be said to be greater than the more difficult. Again, a thing is greater, if its opposite is greater, or if the deprivation of it is greater. [2]Virtue is greater than non-virtue, vice than non-vice; for virtue and vice are, and the others are not, ends *or complete states.* Again, if the functions of things are nobler or baser, they are themselves greater. Or if the vices and virtues of things are greater, so are their functions, as results

[1] Pindar, *Olympians*, i. 1.

[2] Rhetoric, as Aristotle says, p. 4, l. 13, τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, and the superiority of virtue to non-virtue or of vice to non-vice, i.e. of the positive or complete state to the negative or incomplete, is only, as it were, a rhetorical thesis in which the moral point of view is disregarded.

correspond with their causes or originating principles and *vice versa.* *Things are greater* too, if superiority in them is more desirable or nobler; and [1]conversely, if things are themselves better and nobler, the excesses of them are also better and nobler. Thus keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, as sight itself is more desirable than smell; and as it is nobler to be excessively fond of friends than to be excessively fond of money, the love of friends is itself nobler than that of money. Again, the objects of the nobler or better desires are nobler or better; for the greater impulses are directed to greater ends. So too the desires of nobler and better objects are for the same reason themselves nobler and better. Or if the science which deals with particular subjects is nobler and more moral, so are the subjects; for as is the science, so is the truth *at which it aims,* and every science is supreme in its own province. Similarly the higher and more moral the subjects, the sciences which deal with them are proportionately more moral and nobler for the same reason. Again, that which would be decided or has been decided by sagacious people, whether by all or almost all or the majority or the ablest of them, to be a good or the greater of two goods, must necessarily be such, either absolutely or in so far as their decision was the result of their sagacity. This is a rule which is applicable to everything else as well as to goods; for the nature, quantity and quality of things are always such as science and sagacity would pronounce. But it is only in respect

[1] I cannot doubt that the words καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ...καλλίους should be transposed so as to precede the illustrations.

of goods that we have laid it down; for a good has been defined to be that which would be desired or chosen by each individual thing, if it should acquire sagacity. It is clear then that a thing is a greater good, if it is more strongly pronounced to be so by sagacity, or if it is the property of a superior class either [1]absolutely or in so far as the class is superior, as e.g. valour is a greater good than strength, or again if it is that which would be desired by a superior either absolutely or in so far as he is superior, as e.g. to suffer wrong rather than to commit wrong, this being the part which the juster person would choose. Again, that which is pleasanter *is a greater good* than that which is less pleasant, as all things pursue pleasure and covet it for its own sake, and these are the criteria of the good or the end. But *of two pleasant things* the pleasanter is that which is the less accompanied by pain and the more permanent. Again, that which is nobler *is a greater good* than the less noble; for what is noble is either what is pleasant or what is intrinsically desirable. Anything which we are particularly anxious to effect for ourselves or our friends is a greater good, as anything which we are least anxious to effect is a greater evil. Also whatever is more permanent or secure *is a greater good* than what is less so; for if

[1] Perhaps Aristotle's meaning will be explained by an illustration. If man is superior to the other animals, then it will be true either absolutely that the qualities of a man are higher than those of an animal or in particular that any especial quality which contributes to his superiority, such as valour, will be higher than one, such as strength, which he shares with the animals.

a thing is more permanent, it is longer ours to enjoy, and if it is more secure, it is more an object of desire, as the desire of a thing implies an expectation that the enjoyment of it will be comparatively secure. [1]Further, in accordance with the rule of co-ordinates or of inflexions of the same roots, what is true of any one such word is true of all. Thus if the term "valiantly" is nobler and more desirable than the term "temperately," so is "valour" more desirable than "temperance" and "to be valiant" than "to be temperate." The object of universal choice is a greater good than the object of a choice which is not universal. The object of the choice of the majority is a greater good than that of the choice of the minority; for we defined a good as the object of universal desire, and it follows that the object of greater universal desire is a greater good. A thing is a greater good also, if it is judged to be so by our rivals or enemies or by connoisseurs or by a jury selected by connoisseurs; for in the one case there is a recognition which is virtually universal and in the other the recognition of authorities and specialists. It sometimes happens that that which all men possess alike is a greater good, as there is a certain disgrace in not possessing it, and at other times that that which is possessed by nobody or by a few only is a greater good, as being rarer. Again, the objects of

[1] The meaning is made plain by the illustrations given here and p. 96, ll. 25—29. See Mr Cope's notes. It is to be noticed that although τὰ σύστοιχα and αἱ ὁμοῖαι πτώσεις are virtually identical expressions, the former refers to the logical conception, the latter to the grammatical form.

higher praise, as being nobler, are greater goods. So too are all things of which the honours are greater; for the honour paid to a thing may be regarded as being in some sense its valuation. Things for which the penalties are greater *are themselves greater*. The same is true of things which are greater than other things confessedly or apparently great. Again, the same things may be made to look greater by being divided into their parts; for then [1]the points of superiority seem to be multiplied. Accordingly [2]the poet makes Meleager's *wife* induce him to arise by reciting:

> "The ills of men whose city has been ta'en,
> Their townsfolk perishing, fire-wasted homes
> And children carried far to servitude."

Accumulation too and climax, of which Epicharmus was a master, *are means of magnifying a subject*, partly for the same reason as division—for the accumulation shows great superiority—and *partly* because *the subject* thus assumes the appearance of being an originating principle and cause of great results. And as a thing is greater in proportion to its difficulty and its rarity, the greatness may be due to particular seasons, ages, places, times and faculties. For if an

[1] Grammatically, *πλειόνων* is, I think, governed by *ὑπερέχειν*. The result of the division into parts is that instead of one *ὑπεροχή* there is, so to say, a succession of *ὑπεροχαί*, and the effect of the "superiority" is increased.

[2] Homer, *Iliad*, ix. 588 sqq.; but the quotation does not correspond with the ordinary text. Probably the reading here should be *ὁ ποιητής φησι πεῖσαι τὴν γυναῖκα τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι λέγουσαν.*

action exceeds a person's faculty, age or stature, or is performed in a particular manner or at a particular place or time, it will acquire a high degree of nobleness, goodness, justice or the contrary. Hence the epigram on the Olympian victor

"Once on my back I bore a heavy yoke
And carried fish to Tegea from Argos."

[1] Iphicrates too was wont to eulogize himself by describing from what he had risen to his present position. Again, a natural talent is *a greater good* than an acquired accomplishment, as being more difficult. Hence [2] the poet's lines

"Self-taught am I, &c."

A thing is magnified too, if it is the greatest part of something great, as when Pericles [3] in his funeral oration said that the cutting off of the youth from the State was like taking the spring out of the year.

[1] *τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα*, is quoted p. 32, l. 22. It is said that Iphicrates was the son of a cobbler.

[2] Homer, *Odyssey*, xxii. 347. It is Phemius who speaks to Odysseus; but the point of the quotation lies not so much in the words quoted as in their context

θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας
παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν· ἔοικα δέ τοι παραείδειν
ὥστε θεῷ· τῷ μή με λιλαίεο δειροτομῆσαι.

[3] It is well known that this famous simile, which is quoted again p. 127, l. 22, is not found in the funeral oration which Thucydides (Bk. ii. ch. 35—46) has put into the mouth of Pericles. Some commentators, e.g. Göttling and Westermann, think that it is taken from the funeral oration delivered by Pericles after the Samian War, B.C. 440. There are other references, which cannot now be verified, to passages in the speeches of Pericles, p. 118, ll. 15 sqq., p. 128, l. 1, p. 146, l. 2.

The same is true of such things as are useful when the necessity is greater, e.g. such things as are useful in old age or in times of sickness. Again, of two things that which is nearer to the end is the greater. That which is good [1] relatively to the individual as well as absolutely *is greater than that which is good only in one of these senses.* Possibilities are greater goods than impossibilities, as the possible is good relatively to the individual, and the impossible is not. Such things as are inherent *or implied* in the end of life *are greater goods;* for all that approximates to the end is in a higher degree participant in the character of the end. Genuineness of any kind is a greater good than pretence, the test of pretence being that a person would not choose the thing, if there were no chance of his being known to have it. And from this it would seem that it is more desirable to receive benefits than to confer them, as one would choose to receive benefits, even if they were quite unknown, but would probably not choose to confer benefits without getting credit for them. Again, anything of which the reality is preferable to the appearance is a greater good, as being more genuine. This is the reason why justice itself in the eyes of some people is a poor thing, because it is

[1] Spengel's interpretation, which I have accepted, lays the stress upon the *καί* in the phrase *τὸ αὐτῷ* (*? αὑτῷ*) *καὶ ἁπλῶς*, the good which is useful *both* absolutely and relatively to the individual being preferred to the good which is useful either absolutely or relatively to the individual. But if this is the meaning, it would more naturally be expressed by some such words as *καὶ τὸ καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἢ αὑτῷ ἢ ἁπλῶς.*

more desirable to appear just than to be so, whereas the contrary is the case with health. A thing is a greater good, if it is more conducive to various ends, e.g. to life, excellence of life, pleasure and the performance of noble deeds. Accordingly wealth and health are esteemed so highly important, because they fulfil all these conditions. So too if a thing involves comparatively little pain and affords pleasure, *it is a greater good*, as there is a double advantage in the attainment of two goods, viz. pleasure and the absence of pain. Again, if we take any two things, the greater is that which by addition to the same thing makes the total greater. Things are greater, if their presence cannot be concealed than if it can; for in this case they have more the character of reality. Accordingly wealth, [1]if it is apparent, must be clearly a greater good. So too is any gift, if it is dearly prized or if it is our all, while our neighbours have other gifts as well. Hence the punishment is greater for destroying the eye of a one-eyed man than of a man who has two eyes, as the one-eyed man is deprived of something which he dearly prizes.

The proper sources of proofs in exhortation and dissuasion have been now pretty exhaustively described. But the greatest and most authoritative of all, as a means of persuasion and good counsel, is an acquaintance with all the various forms of polity and an analysis of their several customs, institutions and interests. For it is self-interest which is the dominant force in the world, and whatever is preser- CHAP. VIII.

[1] Reading τῷ δοκεῖν, unless it is permissible to alter μεῖζον to μεῖον.

vative of a particular polity is its interest. Further, it is the [1]expressed will of the supreme authority which is supreme *in any State,* and the supreme authorities are different in the different polities, being as numerous as the polities themselves. [2]There are four polities, viz., Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy and Monarchy; consequently the supreme or decisive authority in each case is either some particular part of these polities or the whole.

Classification of polities.

A Democracy is a polity in which the offices of State are distributed among the citizens by lot, an Oligarchy one in which they are distributed among the persons who possess a certain property qualification, an Aristocracy one in which they are distributed among the educated class. *In speaking of the educated class,* I mean such education as is prescribed by the law of the land; for it is such persons as have been ever faithful to their institutions who constitute the official class in an Aristocracy. Such persons will necessarily appear the best (ἄριστοι); hence 'Aristocracy' *or the government of the best* is the name which has been given to this polity. Monarchy, as its name implies, is the polity in which an individual is universally supreme; but it may be (1) constitutional Monarchy or Kingship, or (2) absolute Monarchy or Tyranny.

The ends or objects of the polities.

It is especially necessary to be acquainted with the end *or object* of each several polity, as it is the means conducive to this end which are the objects

[1] Reading ἀπόφανσις.

[2] This rapid classification of polities may be compared with *Politics,* iii. ch. 7.

of the citizens' choice. The end of Democracy is liberty, that of Oligarchy wealth, that of Aristocracy the means of education and the institutions of the State, that of Tyranny self-preservation. It is clearly necessary then to distinguish such customs, institutions and interests as are appropriate to the end of each polity, as it is to these that the choice of the citizens has reference. But as ethical no less than demonstrative Rhetoric is an instrument by which proofs are conveyed—for we believe a speaker in virtue of his appearing to possess a certain character, i.e. if he appears to be good or well disposed to us or both—it will be proper that we should apprehend the character of each particular polity, as the character of each will necessarily be the most potent instrument of persuasion in dealing with it. The characters of the several polities will be ascertained by the same means *as those of individuals;* for characters are displayed in the moral purpose, and the moral purpose is relative to the end.

The objects then, whether future, or actually existing, at which we should aim in Rhetoric of a hortatory kind, the sources from which we should derive our proofs in regard to expediency, and lastly the means and method of acquiring ample materials in regard to the characters and institutions of the different polities have been described, so far as was appropriate to the present occasion; a full and exact discussion of them will be found in the *Politics*[1].

CHAP. IX. Epideictic Rhetoric.

We have next to discuss virtue and vice, or what is noble and shameful, as these are the objects of

[1] The reference is to the 3rd and 4th Books of the *Politics*.

eulogy and censure. For the discussion of them will incidentally serve to indicate the means by which we shall ourselves be regarded as persons of a certain p. 11. moral character, (which, as we saw, is a second species of proof), since the same means will enable us to represent both ourselves and others as deserving of confidence in respect of virtue. And further, as eulogy is often jocular as well as serious, its subjects being not only men or gods but even inanimate things or any animals however insignificant, it is right to provide ourselves in the same manner with other propositions respecting these. Let us then treat of them too sufficiently for the purpose of illustration.

Definition of moral nobleness.

A thing is noble if, while it is desirable for its own sake, it is laudable, or if, while it is good, it is pleasant in virtue of its goodness.

Virtue.

This being the definition of nobleness, it follows that virtue is noble; for, while it is good, it is also laudable[1]. By virtue is meant according to the popular idea a faculty of providing and preserving good things and a faculty of conferring many great benefits and indeed benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The elements of virtue are justice, valour, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, sagacity and speculative wisdom.

The several virtues.

Assuming then that virtue is a faculty of bene-

[1] It is only necessary to compare this off-hand definition of virtue with the definition given in *Nicom. Eth.* vi. ch. 10 and the discussion of particular virtues which follows it, to see how unphilosophical is Aristotle's treatment of ethical questions in a popular work like the *Rhetoric*.

ficence, we conclude at once that the greatest virtues are those which are in the highest degree serviceable to others. Accordingly none are so highly esteemed as valour and justice, the former being serviceable to others in war, and the latter both in war and in peace. Liberality comes next, as liberal people are always lavish and never contend with their neighbours in the race for wealth, which is the principal object of other men's desire. Justice is the virtue to which it is due that individuals possess their own property and possess it in accordance with the law, whereas to injustice it is due that they possess the property of others illegally. Valour is the virtue which inspires people to perform noble deeds and such as the law enjoins in the face of perils; its opposite is cowardice. Temperance *or continence* is the virtue which leads them to regard all bodily pleasures in the spirit enjoined by the law; and its opposite is licentiousness *or intemperance*. Liberality is the virtue of the beneficent use of money and is opposed to illiberality. Magnanimity is the virtue which inspires beneficent actions on a large scale[1], magnificence the virtue which produces grandeur in matters of expenditure, their opposites being pusillanimity and meanness. *Lastly*, sagacity is an intellectual virtue, rendering people capable judges of the things good and evil which I have described in their relation to happiness.

Elements of moral nobleness (τὸ καλόν).

Virtue and vice in their general character and their constituents have now been discussed sufficiently for our present purpose. Nor is it difficult

[1] Omitting μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

in the remaining cases to see the truth. It is clear that whatever is productive of virtue, as tending in a virtuous direction, and whatever results from virtue must itself be noble; and by these I mean the signs of virtue and its effects. And as the signs and all such things as are the effects of good, [1]whether active or passive, are noble, it follows that any effect or sigu of valour or any deed valiantly done must be noble, and that just deeds and active effects of justice must be noble too, not its passive effects however: for justice is unlike all other virtues in this, that the *adverb* "justly" has not always a noble sense, but in the case of punishment inflicted it is more disgraceful to be punished justly than unjustly. It follows also that the same is true of the other virtues. Again, a thing is noble, if its prize is honour; or if its prize is honour rather than money; or if it is a desirable thing and yet is not done from selfish motives; or if it is good absolutely, like [2]a deed done for one's country without regard to oneself. *It is noble too*, if it is in its nature good, or

[1] Aristotle illustrates his own meaning by the examples which follow. To inflict punishment justly would be an *ἔργον ἀρετῆς* or "active effect of virtue"; to suffer it justly would be a *πάθος ἀρετῆς* or "passive effect of virtue."

[2] Reading *ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος*. The passage, as it stands, can only be regarded as a striking example of the Greek way of looking upon the individual as properly and absolutely a part of his State. But it may be doubted whether services rendered to the State should not constitute a special class of moral actions. The true text ought then to be *καὶ ὅσα ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος τις ἐποίησε, παριδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ. καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά. καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά, κ.τ.λ.*

if it is not good only in relation to the individual, as individual interests are always selfish. Or again if it is something capable of enjoyment after death rather than in life; for there is more of selfishness in the enjoyments of life. Or if it is any work undertaken for the sake of others, as being less selfish. Or any service rendered to one's neighbours and not to oneself. Or a service rendered to one's benefactors, as being a just return. Or any beneficent action, as being unselfish in its object. Or the opposite of anything of which one is ashamed; for we are ashamed of saying or doing or intending to say or do anything shameful, as may be illustrated by the lines of Sappho in reply to the confession of Alcaeus that he would "fain speak, but shame forbade."

> "[1] If thou would'st say aught good or wise
> Nor meditate to speak some ill,
> Shame should not sit upon thine eyes
> But thou should'st rightly say thy will."

Or again anything about which we distress ourselves although without a sense of fear; for this is our natural attitude in regard to all such good things as conduce to reputation. The virtues and functions of the class which is naturally higher in the moral scale are themselves nobler, those of a man e.g. than those of a woman. The virtues which Comparison of virtues.

[1] The reading of this Fragment, as given by Bergk, seems to be best.

> αἰ δ' ἦχες ἔσλων ἵμερον ἢ κάλων,
> καὶ μή τι Fείπην γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κακόν,
> αἴδως κέ σ' οὐ κίχανεν ὄμματ'
> ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίως.

afford gratification to our neighbours rather than to ourselves *are the nobler;* hence the nobleness of just conduct and of justice in the abstract. It is nobler too to avenge ourselves upon our enemies instead of making up our quarrels with them, partly because retaliation is just and just conduct is noble, and partly because a brave man should never be beaten. Victory and honour may both be reckoned as noble; for they are desirable in spite of their unproductiveness and are evidences of superiority in virtue. Such things too as are memorable are noble, and the nobler in proportion as they are more memorable. [1] Such things as survive one's death, or such as are attended by honour, or such as are exceptional *are also noble.* Things of which one is the sole possessor are nobler, as being more easily remembered. So are all unproductive properties, as being more gentlemanly. Again, a thing is noble if it is a speciality of a certain class, or if it is an indication of something admired among a particular people as e.g. the practice of wearing the hair long at Lacedaemon, as a sign of gentility; for if a person has long hair, he cannot easily do any menial work. It is noble to abstain from all mechanical arts, as gentility is incompatible with dependence upon another. It is a good plan, if a person is in possession of certain qualities, to represent the qualities which are nearly allied to these as being identical with them, whether the object we have in view is

Rhetorical artifices.

[1] These are not the same things as are mentioned, p. 30, l. 34, but rather things, as e.g. glory, which, although they may be enjoyed during life, are yet not terminated by death.

eulogy or censure, e.g. to represent a cautious person as cold and designing, a simpleton as a good worthy fellow, and a phlegmatic person as easy-tempered. [1] In fact, in every case we may take the nearest qualities and on the strength of them represent a person in the best light; if he is passionate e.g. or furious, calling him an honest fellow, if he is churlish, [2] proud and dignified, *and so on.* One who has any quality in excess *may be represented* as having the corresponding virtue, a foolhardy person e.g. as courageous, or a spendthrift as liberal; for the statement will commend itself to ordinary minds and will at the same time lead to a fallacy by confusion of motives, since if a person shews a venturesome spirit without necessity, it will seem that he will do so *à fortiori* where his honour is concerned, and, if he is lavish in his dealings with strangers, *it will seem that he will be still more lavish* in his dealings with friends, as it is an excess of virtue to be everybody's benefactor.

Another point is to consider the audience in a panegyrical speech, for, as [3] Socrates said, it is easy enough to be the panegyrist of the Athenians

[1] Although it is convenient to begin a fresh sentence here, the construction is unbroken, and there should perhaps be a comma, instead of a full stop, after πρᾶον.

[2] Mr Cope naturally wishes for μεγαλόψυχον here, in place of μεγαλοπρεπῆ. Still Aristotle's definition of μεγαλοψυχία, p. 30, l. 10, would not suit the present passage. In the Platonic ὅροι μεγαλοπρέπεια is defined as ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὀρθὸν τὸν σεμνότατον, and μεγαλοψυχία itself as μεγαλοπρέπεια ψυχῆς μετὰ λόγου.

[3] Plato, *Menexenus*, p. 235 D.

at Athens. It is proper to attribute *to the subject of the speech* such qualities as are held in honour among the particular people *to whom it is addressed*, whether they are Scythians or Lacedaemonians or philosophers. It is a good general rule to invest the qualities so held in honour with a character of moral nobleness, as what is honourable and what is noble seem to be closely allied.

A deed is noble, if it accords with expectation, e.g. if it is worthy of a person's lineage and antecedents, as there is a source of happiness and an element of nobleness in the acquisition of additional honour. It is the same if it exceeds expectation by attaining to a higher standard of goodness or nobleness, as when a person behaves with moderation in prosperity or preserves his elevation of mind in adversity or is better and more conciliatory as he increases in importance. Witness the saying of Iphicrates:

"How low I was! how great am I become!"

or the epigram upon the Olympian victor,

[1] "Once on my back I bore a heavy yoke,"

or [2] that of Simonides *upon the lady*,

"Whose father, husband, brethren all were kings."

[1] It may be doubted from this passage whether Aristotle would have agreed with some ancient authorities in attributing this epigram to Simonides.

[2] The epigram is given in full by Thucydides, vi. 59. Archediæ, who is the subject of it, was one who had preserved her moderation in prosperity,

ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων
παίδων τ' οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην.

Again, as the subjects of eulogy are actions and it is characteristic of a virtuous person that he acts in accordance with a moral purpose, we must make it our endeavour to prove that the hero of our speech has a moral purpose in his actions. To this end it is useful that he should be shewn to have frequently acted *in the same way*. Accordingly mere coincidences and happy accidents should be represented as actions of deliberate purpose; for if a large number of similar actions are alleged, there will seem to be here a sign of virtue and moral purpose.

Definition of eulogy. Distinction between eulogy and panegyric.

Eulogy is speech setting forth magnitude of virtue. It is the business then *of an orator in eulogy* to demonstrate that the actions of his hero are virtuous. But a panegyric has reference to accomplished results, and the attendant circumstances, such as rank and education, are merely confirmatory from the natural presumption that the children of virtuous parents will be virtuous, and that the recipient of a good education will be good. [1] Hence when we pronounce a panegyric upon anyone, we pronounce it for something that he has already done. But the accomplished results are *praised as being* indications of the moral state; for we should eulogize a person even without his actual performance of the deeds, if we believed him to be capable of performing them.

Felicitation and congratulation.

Felicitation and congratulation, *it may be observed*, although themselves identical, are not identical with eulogy and panegyric; still,

[1] The διὸ follows from the words τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν, the intervening words being unnecessary to the conclusion.

as virtue is included in happiness, so are these included in congratulation.

Relation of panegyrical to deliberative Rhetoric.

There is a community in kind however between eulogy and counsel, inasmuch as the suggestions which you would make in giving counsel may by a change of expression be rendered panegyrical. Thus as we have ascertained the points of good conduct and character, it is only necessary to change and shift the form of expression in order to put them forward as suggestions. Let us take as an [1] example the sentiment that we ought not to be proud of what Fortune has done for us but only of what we have done for ourselves. Put it so, and it is virtually a suggestion. But put it in this way, "Proud not of what Fortune has done for him but of what he has done for himself," and the sentence becomes eulogistic. We arrive then at the following rule, that, if eulogy is your object, you should consider what you would suggest, if suggestion, you should consider what you would eulogize. But the expression will be contradictory *in the two cases*, [2] when the prohibitive and the non-prohibitive elements are interchanged.

Means of exaggeration.

Again, there are various means of exaggeration to be employed. It may be said e.g. that our hero is the only person or the first to have done a particular deed or has been almost single-handed or the chief agent in doing it, all these being points which enhance

[1] The example is taken from two passages of Isocrates, *Panath.* § 35 and *Evag.* § 52.

[2] In the "suggestive" form of expression pride is prohibited, in the "eulogistic" it is not prohibited but rather enjoined.

the nobleness of the deed. Then there are the circumstances of time and opportunity, if they exceed reasonable expectation. There may be the fact that he has been often successful in the same undertaking; a fact which not only increases its importance but is calculated to convey the impression that the success has not been an accidental result but has been due to his own exertions. Or it may be the case that especial incentives and distinctions have been devised or were instituted in his honour. Or that he is the first person who was the subject of a panegyric, like [1]Hippolochus, or the *first for whom some special compliment was devised, like* the erection of a statue in the market-place for Harmodius and Aristogiton. And what is true of signal distinctions is not less true of their opposites.

Further, if you cannot find much to say about your hero himself, it is proper to contrast him with other people, after the manner which [2]Isocrates adopted owing to his inexperience in forensic oratory. But the persons with whom you compare him must be persons of reputation, as superiority to persons who are *confessedly* virtuous lends new dignity and nobleness to the character. Exaggeration naturally finds a place in eulogies; for it is a means of establishing superiority, and superiority is one kind of nobleness. It follows that, even if you cannot compare your hero with persons of Comparison.

[1] Nothing is known, except from this passage, of Hippolochus.

[2] It seems most probable that Aristotle regarded Isocrates as having introduced into his forensic speeches the habit of comparison which was better adapted to panegyrical orations.

reputation, yet it is best to compare him with some other persons, as superiority is taken to indicate virtue.

The characteristics of the three kinds of Rhetoric.

It may be laid down as a general rule that, of the characteristics which are common to the three styles of Rhetoric, exaggeration is most appropriate to the epideictical style—for as the facts are taken for granted *in this style,* it only remains to invest them with grandeur and dignity—examples to the deliberative style, as in this we divine and infer the future from the past; and enthymemes to the forensic style, as in this the obscurity of the facts leaves the largest room for deduction and demonstration.

So much then for the general materials of eulogy and censure, the proper objects to be observed in both and the sources of panegyric or abuse. For having ascertained the one we can at once see their opposites, as the materials of censure are exactly opposed to those of eulogy.

CHAP. X.

Forensic Rhetoric. Accusation and defence.

The three points.

Coming now to accusation and defence, we have next to describe the number and nature of the materials proper for the construction of the syllogisms. There are three points which we have to ascertain, viz. (1) the nature and number of the objects of crime, (2) the dispositions of the criminals, and (3) the character and condition of the victims. But in the first instance it is necessary to define crime.

Definition of crime.

Crime may be said to be injury voluntarily inflicted in defiance of the law. But law may be either particular or universal. I mean by "particular" the

written law which regulates the life of the citizens in any polity and by "universal" the unwritten principles which may be said to be universally recognized. Particular and universal law.

Voluntary action is all such action as is performed with knowledge and not under compulsion. Now an action may be voluntarily performed without being deliberately purposed; but if it is done of deliberate purpose, it is always done knowingly, as nobody is ignorant of his own purposes. Voluntary action.

The causes of a deliberate purpose to commit injury and to do evil in defiance of the law are vice and incontinence. For if there are certain people who have vicious habits, whether one or several, it is in the particular respect in which they are vicious that they are apt to commit crimes,—an illiberal person e.g. in respect of money, a licentious person in his sensual pleasures, an effeminate person in his luxuries, a coward in dangers, by leaving his comrades in the lurch from personal fear, an ambitious person from the love of honour, a passionate person from anger, an emulous person from the love of victory, a vindictive person to gratify his revenge, a foolish person from his mistaken notion of justice and injustice, a shameless person from disregard of public opinion, [1]and so each individual in respect of his own particular subject. Causes of a disposition to commit crime.

This is a matter however which will be sufficiently clear partly from the description already given of the several virtues and partly from the remarks which we shall have occasion to make when we come to discuss the emotions. It remains for us now to describe the p. 60. pp. 115 sqq.

[1] Putting only a comma after δόξης.

objects of crime, the conditions under which people commit it and its victims.

(I) The objects of crime.

Let us begin with a classification of the objects, the attainment or avoidance of which is the motive inciting to crime. For it is clearly the duty of the prosecutor to consider the nature and number of such of these objects as are present to his [1] adversary and that of the defendant to consider the nature and number of such as are not present to him.

Causes of human action.

All our actions are either due to ourselves or not. If they are not, they are either due to chance or else arise from necessity, and, if necessary, are done either under compulsion or by nature. The result is that all such actions as are not due to ourselves are done either by chance or by nature or under compulsion. Actions on the other hand which are due to ourselves and of which we ourselves are the authors may be due either to habit or to impulse and, if to the latter, either to rational or irrational impulse. [2] The one of these is the wish, which is an impulse towards good; for nobody wishes a thing, unless he conceives it to be good; the irrational impulses are e.g. anger and desire.

[3] To sum up then; all our actions are necessarily due to seven causes, viz. chance, nature, compulsion,

[1] Omitting as unnecessary the words *ὧν ἐφιέμενοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι.*

[2] There is no need to insert *βούλησις δ'* as in Bekker's text, although it makes the meaning a little plainer.

[3] It would be better to put a full stop after *ἐπιθυμία*, as the sentence beginning *ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν* sums up the results of the two preceding sections.

habit, [1] reasoning, passion and desire. It is superfluous to make a further classification of actions according to periods of life or moral states or any other occurrences; for if it happens as a matter of fact that the young have quick tempers and strong desires, yet it is not their youth but anger or desire which is the cause of their passionate and sensual actions. Nor again can wealth and poverty be described as causes of action; it happens as a matter of fact that the poor from their indigence are desirous of money and that the rich from their abundance desire the pleasures of luxury, but in these cases as before the cause of the actions will be not wealth and poverty but their desire. The same is true of persons who are just or unjust and of others whose actions are said to be regulated by their moral states; it will be either reason or emotion which is the cause of their actions, although in some cases good characters and emotions, and in others the reverse. Still it is the fact that particular qualities are the accompaniments of particular moral states. No sooner, it may be said, is a person temperate than in virtue of his temperance good opinions and desires in regard to pleasures wait upon him, while contrary opinions and desires in regard to pleasures wait upon one who is destitute of self-restraint. It is right therefore, while we abandon such classifications as have been mentioned, to consider the connexion of particular qualities with particular classes; for although a person may be fair or dark, tall or short without any of the qualities in question regularly following,

[1] λογισμός is equivalent to λογιστικὴ ὄρεξις of l. 20.

yet it does necessarily make a difference whether he is young or old or just or unjust. And it is right to consider generally all such accidental circumstances as produce differences of moral character. It will make a difference e.g. to a person whether he believes himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate. Postponing then this question for the present, let us first proceed to the points which still remain.

The causes of actions considered: (1) chance,

[1] A thing is the result of chance, if its cause is indeterminate and if it is not directed to any object or does not occur invariably or usually or by any regular law, as indeed is evident from the definition of chance.

(2) nature,

It may be said to occur by nature, if its cause is self-contained and regular; for then it happens invariably or usually in the same way. For we need not endeavour to determine accurately whether violations of the law of Nature happen in accordance with some natural law or with another cause, although the more probable view is that such occurrences are also caused by chance.

(3) compulsion,

Again, a thing is said to be done under compulsion, if it is done against the desire or rational faculties of the agents themselves.

(4) habit,

It is done by habit, if the reason for doing it is that it has been often done by the same person before.

[1] The early chapters of the Second Book of the φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις should be studied in connexion with this passage. The distinction between ἡ τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον, which is there emphasized, would be out of place in a popular treatise like the *Rhetoric*.

To the influence of reason may be ascribed all such actions as have an air of expediency in accordance with the catalogue of goods already given, whether as ends or as means to ends, when it is the expediency which is the cause of the action—*a limitation which is necessary,* inasmuch as it sometimes happens that the actions of persons who have no self-restraint are expedient, although the cause of them is not their expediency, but pleasure. (5) reason. pp. 39 sqq.

Passion and anger are the causes of revengeful acts. There is a distinction, *it may be observed,* between revenge and punishment; for the object of punishment is the reformation of the sufferer, and that of revenge the gratification of the agent. (6) anger.

The nature of anger will be seen in our treatment of the emotions. p. 115.

Desire is the cause of all such actions as appear pleasant, and among them of actions with which we are familiar or to which we are habituated; for there are many things, even such as are not naturally pleasant, which we do with pleasure after habituation. (7) desire.

In a word then all such actions as are due to ourselves are either good or apparently good or pleasant or apparently pleasant. And further, as actions which are due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions which are not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must be either good or apparently good or pleasant or apparently pleasant; for I reckon as a good the deliverance from evils either real or apparent or the exchange of a greater evil for a

smaller one, as being events which are in a certain sense desirable, and on the same principle I reckon as a pleasure the deliverance from painful things whether real or apparent, or the exchange of a greater pain for a smaller one. It is necessary then to ascertain the number and character of such things as are expedient or pleasant. It follows that, as expediency has been already discussed under the head of deliberative oratory, we have now to discuss pleasure. But we must regard our definitions as satisfactory, if upon any point they are neither obscure nor yet exact.

CHAP. XI. Definition of pleasure.

Let us assume that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul and a sudden and sensible settling *of the soul* into its normal and natural state; and that pain is the opposite.

Pleasures and pains.

Such being the nature of pleasure, it is evident that everything which tends to produce the condition described is itself pleasant, and everything which tends to destroy it or produce a settling of an opposite kind is painful. It follows at once then that the return to the natural condition is generally pleasant, [1] and never so pleasant as when the processes of nature have attained their full natural development. It follows also that habits *are pleasant;* for that to which we are habituated becomes, as being so, virtually natural, as habit is in a certain sense a second nature, owing to the close connexion between the usual, which is the sphere of habit, and

[1] The meaning is apparently that the pleasure is keenest when not only the general laws of Nature but the bye-laws of one's own individual nature have been satisfied.

the invariable, which is the sphere of Nature. Again, anything that is not done under compulsion *is pleasant*, as compulsion is a violation of Nature. Accordingly all necessity is painful, as has been truly said[1]

"Need-be is evermore a thing of pain."

Acts of attention too or serious effort or strong exertion must be painful, as they involve necessity and compulsion, unless one is habituated to them, in which case habit renders them pleasant. The opposites of these are pleasant. Accordingly all conditions of ease, comfort or inattention, amusements, recreations and sleep may be reckoned as pleasures, none of these having a character of necessity. Anything of which we have a natural desire is pleasant; for desire itself is an impulse to pleasure. But desires may be either rational or irrational. I describe as irrational desires all such as do not spring from any definite theory, meaning all natural desires, as they are called, such as those of which the body is the necessary instrument, e.g. the desire of food, viz. hunger and thirst [2]and so on, or desires of the taste, of sexual love and of the touch in all its forms or of the smell, the hearing and the sight. Rational desires on the other hand are all such as originate in conviction, as there are many things which we are desirous of seeing and acquiring from the report of them and from a conviction *of their excellence*.

Rational and irrational desires.

[1] The saying is attributed to Evenus of Paros.

[2] Omitting τροφῆς and in l. 14 εὐωδίας.

As pleasure then consists in the sensation of some emotion, and impression is a kind of feeble sensation, [1]memory or anticipation must be attended by a certain impression of the object remembered or anticipated. If this is so, it is clear that, as there is sensation, there are accompanying pleasures also in memory and anticipation. Consequently, all pleasant things must consist either in the sensation, if they are present, or in the memory, if they are past, or in the anticipation, if they are future; for the present is the object of sensation, the past of memory and the future of anticipation. Now the objects of recollection are pleasant not only if they were pleasant at the actual time at which they happened but in some cases even if they were not pleasant, provided that the consequence of them has been noble and good.

Pleasures of anticipation or memory.

Hence the lines

> [2]"Tis pleasant to remember ills survived"

and

> [3]"For there is after-pleasure e'en in woes
> For one remembering toils and troubles past,"

[1] Upon the whole there seems to be no sufficient reason for changing the reading or punctuation of the passage. It is true that the apodosis, κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ κ.τ.λ. is not a legitimate conclusion from the clauses of the protasis; but this is often, if not generally, the case in Aristotle. It is his object here to extend the meaning of pleasure from the actually pleasurable sensation of the moment to the remembrance of past or the anticipation of future sensations. Cp. φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, vii. ch. 3, p. 274 A sqq.

[2] From the *Andromeda* of Euripides.

[3] Homer, *Odyssey*, xv. 400—1; but in the Homeric text the second line runs thus:

> ὅστις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθῇ.

the reason being that the mere deliverance from evil is pleasant. The objects of anticipation are pleasant, if their presence appears to be a source of great delight or benefit and of such benefit as is unattended by pain. In fact it is a general rule that whatever by its presence is a source of delight is usually a source of delight in anticipation or recollection. It is thus that there is a pleasure in being angry, as appears e.g. from Homer's description of passion

[1]"Far sweeter than the flowing stream of honey."

For nobody is angry with those who are evidently beyond the reach of revenge or greatly superior to himself in power; [2]or, if we are angry with them at all, our anger is mitigated. In the great majority of desires too there is some attendant pleasure, as we experience a certain sort of pleasure either from the recollection of past, or from the anticipation of future enjoyment. Thus fever-patients derive a pleasure from their thirsty moments by the recollection of past, or the anticipation of future draughts. Lovers too find a pleasure in talking or writing about the object of their love or in ever doing something of which he is the object, as in all this their recollection of him seems to them to amount to actual sensation. It is indeed ever the beginning of affection to find pleasure not only in a person's presence but in the recollection of him too when he is away. And accordingly even when the loss of his presence is pain-

[1] *Iliad*, xviii. 108—110. The word which Homer uses is not θυμός but χόλος.

[2] It is necessary to insert ἀλλ', as in Bekker's text.

ful to us, there is still a kind of pleasure arising in our very regrets and lamentations; for although there is pain in the loss of him, yet is there a pleasure in recollecting him and almost seeing him and his very actions and the manner of man that he was. Hence the appropriateness of the words

[1]"He spake and in them stirred the love of tears."

Other pleasures.

Again, there is a pleasure in revenge. For where failure is painful, success is pleasant; and as angry men are pained beyond all measure by the failure to gratify their revenge, they are equally delighted by the anticipation of it.

Victory too is pleasant, pleasant to us all, not only to those who always hate to be beaten. The reason is that we experience an impression of superiority, and superiority is an object of desire to all in a less or a greater degree. And from the pleasure of victory follows the pleasure of all amusements which are contests of strength or wit, as they afford many opportunities of victory, games of knucklebones or tennis or dice or draughts. The same remark applies to serious amusements; they either become pleasant by habit or are pleasant from the first, as e.g. the chase and every variety of field-sports; for wherever there is competition, there is victory. This too is the explanation of the pleasure which the Bar and the Debating Society afford to all experienced and able speakers.

[1] A line which occurs more than once in the Homeric poems, e.g. *Iliad*, xxiii. 108, when Achilles has seen and sought to hold the shade of Patroclus, *Odyssey*, iv. 113 when Menelaus has told to Telemachus the tale of his sorrow for Odysseus.

Again, there are few things so pleasant as honour and a good reputation; for the consequence of possessing them is an impression that one is a virtuous sort of person, especially if this is the opinion of those in whose judgment one has confidence, i.e. of neighbours rather than of those who live at a distance, of friends and fellow-citizens rather than of strangers, of contemporaries rather than of posterity, of sensible people rather than of fools, of a number of people rather than of a few, as these classes of people are more likely to form a true judgment than their opposites. *It is necessary however that the classes should be capable of judging;* for if they are such as one regards with a strong contempt, e.g. as children or animals, there is no regard paid to their respect or opinion, at least for its own sake or unless for some independent reason.

There is pleasure too in a friend; for love [1]is pleasant—nobody e.g. can be said to be a lover of wine who does not find pleasure in it—and it is pleasant to be the object of another's love, as here again one has an impression of possessing a good character, which is the desire of every sentient being. But to be loved is to be esteemed for one's own sake.

Again, it is pleasant to be an object of admiration, if only for the esteem which it implies.

Again, there is a pleasure in flattery and in a flatterer, as a flatterer is ostensibly an admirer and friend. Or in frequent repetition of the same actions; for habit, as has been already said, is pleasant. Or p. 76.

[1] There is a difficulty here, as elsewhere, in translating φιλεῖν, where it varies between "loving" and "liking."

again in change, as being a return to Nature; for perpetual uniformity produces an excess of the normal state. Hence the saying[1], "Change ever is delight." This is the reason why occasional visitors or occasional events are always pleasant, as not only do they imply a change from the existing condition, but the occasional is *necessarily* rare *and therefore pleasant.* Wonder and learning too are generally pleasant; wonder, because it necessarily involves the desire of learning, and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire, and learning, because it involves a settling[2] into a person's proper natural condition. Again, it is pleasant to receive benefits or to confer them; for the former implies the satisfaction of our desires, and the latter implies possession and superiority, which are both natural objects of ambition. And as the power of conferring benefits is pleasant, it follows that there is a pleasure in setting up our neighbours again *after a failure* and in[3] supplying such deficiencies *as are seen in them.* From the pleasure of learning and wonder it results that there is a pleasure in such things as the imitative[4] arts, e.g.

[1] Euripides, *Orestes*, 228.

[2] The reason assigned here for the pleasure found in learning accords with the definition of pleasure at the beginning of the chapter. But it strikingly shews the Aristotelian sense of *φύσις* as "the perfect or normal state of anything," the fifth of the senses of *φύσις* distinguished by Sir A. Grant in his note on *Nicom. Eth.* ii. ch. 1.

[3] Perhaps the words *καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν* are not in place here; they occur again p. 41, l. 25.

[4] It can hardly be doubted that *τὸ μιμούμενον* is transitive and not, as Mr Cope supposes, passive in its meaning. The first

painting, sculpture and poetry, or in any successful imitative work, even if the actual object of imitation is not pleasant; as it is not the pleasantness of the object which produces the pleasure but an inference[1] from the copy to the original and in consequence of it a kind of learning. Catastrophes *in tragic plays* and hairbreadth escapes from perils are all pleasant, as being all wonderful.

Further, as what is natural is always pleasant, and things which are cognate have a natural relation to each other, it is a general rule that all such things as are cognate and similar are pleasant to each other, e.g. a man to a man, a horse to a horse, and a youth to a youth. Hence the proverbial sayings, "Crabbed age and youth," "Like to like[2]," "One beast knows another," "Birds of a feather" and the like. But as things which are similar and cognate are pleasant to each other, and every[3] one stands in this relation preeminently to himself, the result is that all people are lovers of self in a higher or lower degree; for all the conditions of self-love exist preeminently in the relation of an individual to himself. And all people being lovers of their own selves, the result is that

chapter of the *Poetic* illustrates the conception of Poetry as an imitative art.

[1] For the nature of the inference see *Poetic*, ch. 4. It is not, I think, the discovery of some new quality or feature in the object imitated, but the recognition that the copy is the same thing as, or in other words is an imitation of, the original.

[2] The Homeric line (*Odyssey* xvii. 218) is in full

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον.

[3] The words *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν* are equivalent to *ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιος καὶ συγγενής ἐστι.*

they all find pleasure in such things as are their own, their own works, their own sayings *and so on.* This[1] is the reason why people are generally so fond of flattery or love or honour or again of their children as being their own works. Hence too the pleasure of supplying the deficiencies of others; for then the work becomes what it was not before, our own.

Again, as it is an especial pleasure to be a ruler, a reputation for wisdom is pleasant; for practical wisdom is a commanding faculty, and speculative wisdom the knowledge of many marvels. Again, as ambition is an almost universal quality, it follows that there is a certain pleasure in censuring[2] others, *as censure necessarily implies superiority,* or[3] in dwelling upon the points in which one appears to the best advantage, according to the lines[4] of Euripides

"To that he presses,
To that he gives the flower of every day,
Wherein himself doth show most excellent."

Similarly, as amusement and relaxation of every kind

[1] Although the four objects of natural affection or desire are placed as parallels, there is really a difference between the first three and the last. A man is fond of his children, because, as Aristotle says, they are in a sense his productions, his works. But he is fond of flattery or love or honour as being a recognition or appreciation of himself and his works.

[2] The etymological play upon the words *φιλότιμοι* and *ἐπιτιμᾶν*, which constitutes the point or argument of the sentence, can hardly be preserved in English.

[3] Changing the full stop after *εἶναι* to a comma.

[4] The lines here quoted from the *Antiopa* of Euripides appear, although not without some slight variation, in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 484 E, where a full discussion of them will be found in Dr Thompson's note.

and humour are pleasant, it is clear that what is humorous, whether a person or tale or circumstance, is also pleasant. But the subject of humour has been separately treated in my book[1] on *Poetry*.

We may content ourselves then with this discussion of pleasures, and it is easy to discover pains by a consideration of their opposites.

CHAP. XII. Crime continued.

The objects of crime being such as I have described, it remains to consider the conditions under which crime is committed and its victims.

(II) The conditions under which crimes are committed.

As to the agents, the conditions under which we commit crime are when we believe that the deed is possible and possible to us, whether it is our belief that we shall escape detection or that, if detected, we shall not be punished or that we shall be punished, but the penalty will not be equivalent to the advantage gained by ourselves or by our friends.

The character of such deeds as are apparently possible or impossible *in the abstract* will be described hereafter, [2]as it is a subject equally appropriate to all the three kinds of Rhetoric. But taking the personal view, we believe we are most likely to succeed in committing crimes without incurring any penalty, if we are able speakers and men of action and large forensic experience and if we have a great number of friends and large property. This belief is strongest, if we are ourselves in possession of the advantages I have described; but, failing this, *it*

[1] Not in the *Poetic*, as it exists at present; but perhaps in a Second Book, which has been lost.

[2] *τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον* is the first of the *κοινοὶ τόποι* discussed in Bk. ii. ch. 19.

exists also, if we have friends or subordinates or associates who possess them, as we are thereby enabled to commit crimes and to escape detection and punishment. It is the same if we are the personal friends of our victims or of the judges; for our friends are not on their guard against criminal injury at our hands and, *when the crime has been committed,* are disposed to reconciliation without prosecuting us on account of it, and the judges show partiality to their friends and either absolutely acquit them or inflict a merely nominal penalty.

Persons are likely to escape detection, if their character or condition is inconsistent with the crime alleged, as e.g. an invalid in a case of assault and battery, or an ugly pauper in a case of adultery. *Actions are likely to escape detection,* if they are excessively patent and public, as nobody would anticipate them and consequently nobody is on his guard against them; or if they are of a magnitude and character passing anybody's audacity, as in this case too nobody is on his guard; for everyone is on his guard against ordinary crimes as against ordinary illnesses, but nobody takes precautions *against extraordinary crimes any more than* against an illness which has never yet attacked any human being. Again, *people think to commit crimes with impunity,* if they have no enemies or a great number of enemies; for in the first case they hope to escape detection, because nobody is on his guard against them, and in the second they actually do escape it, because nobody suspects them of being likely to make an assault upon people who are already on

their guard and they are able to plead in their defence the improbability of their having attempted such a thing. The same is the case, if they have any plan[1] or place of concealment or any easy means of disposing *of their stolen goods*. Or if in case of detection they are able to evade or postpone the trial or in some way or other to corrupt the judges. Or if, when mulcted in a certain sum, they can evade the payment or postpone it for a considerable time. Or[2] if they are so poor that they have nothing to lose. Or if, while their gains are clear or considerable or immediate, their penalties are trifling or uncertain or remote. Or if there is no penalty commensurate with the *prospective* advantage, as e.g. in the case of tyranny. Or if the result of the crime is pecuniary gain, and the punishment nothing but disgrace. Or, conversely, if the crime is such as is calculated to win a certain measure of applause, as e.g. if in committing it one had the fortune, like Zeno[3], to exact vengeance for one's father or mother, but the punishment takes the form of a fine or exile or something of the kind. Both these are objects and conditions of criminal action; only in persons not of the same but of different characters.

Again, people are guilty of crimes, if they have often escaped detection or punishment. Or if they

[1] Reading ἢ τρόποις ἢ τόποις upon the best MSS. authority.

[2] The insertion of εἰ is unnecessary, if this sentence is grammatically connected with the last, as εἴ τις may well be supplied as a subject of ἕξει from the preceding οἷς, which is equivalent to εἴ τισι.

[3] Nothing is really known about the case of Zeno.

have often been unsuccessful; for in crime as well as in war there are some people who are ever ready to renew the battle. Or if the pleasure is immediate and the pain is subsequent, or the gain immediate and the punishment subsequent; for such is the natural conduct of all incontinent people, and there is incontinence about any object of human ambition. Or on the other hand if the pain or punishment is immediate *and momentary*, and the pleasure and profit subsequent and more lasting; for this is the aim of all such people as are continent and comparatively sagacious in character. Or if it is possible that their actions[1] will appear to be the result of chance or necessity or nature or habit and in general to be errors rather than crimes. Or if there is a prospect of their receiving an equitable consideration *from the judges*. Or if they feel a deficiency, whether it is a necessity of life that they lack, like the poor, or a superfluity, like the rich. Or if their reputation stands exceedingly high or exceedingly low, as in the one case they will not be suspected of the crime and in the other will not be more strongly suspected than before.

Such then being the conditions under which criminals attempt to commit crimes, I come now to consider the victims and the crimes themselves.

(III) The victims of crime.

The victims of crime are people who are in possession of the advantages which we ourselves require,

[1] It will be noticed that this passage differs from p. 35, ll. 14 sqq. in distinguishing compulsory actions (δι' ἀνάγκην) from natural (διὰ φύσιν) and in apparently classing habitual actions (δι' ἔθος) among those which are there regarded as involuntary.

whether in the way of the necessaries of life or of excess or luxury. Nor does it matter whether they are near to us or far removed; for in the one case the acquisition is speedy and in the other the vengeance is slow, as e.g. if we plunder the Carthaginians. Or people who are trustful rather than cautious or suspicious, as it is always easy to escape their notice. Or indolent people, as a person must be ready to take trouble, if he wishes to prosecute a criminal. Or sensitive people, as they are not disposed to fight for gain. Or people who have been the victims of many crimes without revenging themselves, such people being in the proverbial phrase "Mysians' prey[1]." Or people whom we have never injured before or have often injured; for both will be off their guard, the former from an idea that they will never be injured, and the latter from an idea that they could not be injured any more. Or people who have become unpopular or who are liable to unpopularity, as such people have neither the will to prosecute for fear of the judges nor, *if they do prosecute,* the power of convincing them; and among such people are those who are the objects of hatred or envy. Or again people whom we have an excuse for injuring, because they or their ancestors or friends either inflicted or

[1] It is clear that the contempt felt for the Mysians, as for the Carians, shows itself in this proverb. Yet the origin of it is involved in obscurity. M. St Hilaire understands it as meaning literally "people so feeble that even the Mysians could prey upon them." The usual explanation, which has the authority of Suidas and Harpocration, is that the Mysians, owing to their feebleness or defencelessness, were themselves the prey of their enemies.

intended to inflict injury either upon ourselves or our ancestors or those who are dear to us; for villainy, according to the proverb, only waits for an excuse. Or our enemies, because it is so pleasant, or our friends, because it is so easy, to injure them. Or people who have no friends. Or people who are not great as orators or as men of action; for such people either make no attempt to prosecute or *soon* come to terms or, *if they do prosecute*, achieve no success. Or people whom it does not pay to waste their time in waiting either for trial or for payment, such as foreigners and peasant proprietors; for they are ready to patch up a quarrel on easy terms and make no difficulty about abandoning *the prosecution*. Or people who have committed many crimes or crimes akin to those of which they are the victims; for it is hardly regarded as a case of criminal action, if a person is the victim of a crime such as that of which he was himself habitually the author, as e.g. if an assault[1] is committed upon a man who has been habitually guilty of outrageous insolence. Or people who have either done or intended or intend to do or will in the future do us injury; for then the criminal action has an element not only of pleasure but of morality and looks almost as if it were not a crime at all. Or people whose[2] injury will be a gratification either to

[1] *αἰκία* and *ὕβρις* are both offences recognized by Attic law, the former, which was the less serious, being the subject of a *δίκη* or civil action, the latter of a *γραφή* or public prosecution.

[2] The construction is harsh; for *οἷς* must be taken as an instrumental dative. It is, as Spengel says "idem ac si dixisset *καὶ οὓς ἀδικοῦντες χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις*."

our friends or to the objects of our respect or affection or to our masters or to any one upon whom our own life depends. Or people in relation to whom we may hope for an equitable consideration *from the judges*. Or people against whom we have a cause of complaint and with whom we have had a difference before, as in the example of Callippus[1] in the case of Dion; for a crime so committed seems to approximate to not being a crime at all. Or if people would soon be the victims of the crimes of others, unless they were the victims of ours, *we commit the crimes* on the plea that no time is left for deliberation, in the spirit of Ænesidemus who, as the story[2] goes, sent the cottabus-prize to Gelo after his success in reducing *Gela* to slavery, implying that Gelo had only forestalled him, as it had been his own intention to do the same. Or again if after injuring people criminally we shall have many opportunities of treating them justly, *we commit the crime* in the belief that we shall soon make amends, according to the saying of the Thessalian[3] Jason that it is a duty to do some acts of injustice in order to have the power of doing many acts of justice.

Circumstances which facilitate crime.

A crime is natural, if it is universal or *at least* usual; for then we may expect to be pardoned for

[1] The story is told in Mr Cope's note; but if it is the story which Aristotle had in mind, it would hardly seem that Callippus had any good reason for regarding himself as "having a cause of complaint" against Dion.

[2] See Mr Cope's note. This passage would naturally suggest that speed as well as skill was an element of the popular game known as κότταβος.

[3] Jason of Pheræ.

committing it. Or if *the articles stolen* admit of easy concealment, e.g. if they are such as are rapidly consumed, like eatables. Or if they can be easily disguised by new shapes or colours or mixtures, or easily put out of sight in many different places, e.g. if they are portable and can be hidden away in holes and corners. Or if the criminal has already many things indistinguishable from them or closely resembling them in his possession. Or if the deed is one which the victims are ashamed to publish, such as an outrage committed upon the women of one's family or oneself or one's sons. Or if it is a case in which a prosecutor would be looked upon as litigious, e.g. if the act in question is unimportant or pardonable.

CHAP. XIII. Classification of actions.

Such then being the usual conditions of crime, the nature of criminal actions and the victims and motives, let us now proceed to the classification of all actions whether just or unjust.

Our first consideration is the following. Just and unjust actions admit of a twofold division, according as they are considered relatively to the laws[1] or to the persons affected by them.

Particular and universal law.

[2]I regard law as either particular or universal,

[1] Omitting δύο.

[2] There is a discrepancy of language, which deserves to be cleared up, between this passage and the beginning of ch. 10. Aristotle there describes law as either (α) particular (ἴδιος) or (β) universal (κοινός), defining "particular" law as the statutes of any given state, and "universal" law as the unwritten but universally recognised principles of morality (ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. Cp. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 450 sqq.). The "universal" or "unwritten" law of ch. 10 is the "universal" law or "law of

meaning by 'particular' the law ordained by a particular people for their own purposes, and capable of subdivision into written and unwritten law, and by 'universal' the law of Nature. For there exists, as all men divine more or less, a natural and universal principle of right and wrong, independent of any mutual intercourse or compact; the principle to which Antigone in Sophocles is made to appeal, when she avows that it is right to bury Polynices in defiance *of Creon's edict*, because this is right according to the law of Nature

"Not of to-day nor yesterday
Is this a law, but ever hath it life,
And no man knoweth whence it came or how."

It is in the same sense that Empedocles[1] lays down his prohibition of putting any living thing to death; this (he says) is not right in one land and wrong in another

"But the law universal evermore
Pervades the omnipotent heaven and boundless earth."

So too Alcidamas[2] in his Messenian oration.

Nature" here, but "particular" law is here subdivided into (*a*) "written" law, which is, as before, the statutes of a particular State, and (*b*) "unwritten" which is such equitable considerations, derived from custom, social relations, &c., as are recognized for the time being in a community and serve as corrections or adjustments of the written law. (See infra, p. 47, l. 12, and cp. Plato, *Laws*, vii. p. 793, C and D.) For the "laws of custom" (*οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη νόμοι*) are *ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων* (*Politics*, iii. ch. 16, p. 1287 B_5).

[1] In his didactic poem Περὶ Φύσεως.

[2] The sentence is apparently incomplete; but if the words quoted by the Scholiast are the true ones, ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας ὁ Θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν, they form an ex-

Again, there is a twofold division of actions relatively to the persons affected by them. Actions proper to be done or left undone may have reference either to the community or to some individual member of it. And accordingly just and unjust actions may be also of two kinds, referring either to a particular individual or to the community; for adultery and assault are crimes against particular persons, but the refusal of military service is a crime against the State.

All unjust or criminal actions then may be classified and distinguished as relative either to the community or to some individual or individuals. But, before we proceed, let us define once again what it is to be the victim of a crime. It is to suffer criminal injury at the hands of a voluntary agent; for the
p. 70. voluntary character of crime has been already determined. We have seen too that the victim of crime must suffer injury and must suffer it involuntarily. The various kinds of injury are evident from the
p. 71. remarks we have made; for we have already analysed things good or bad in themselves and have shown that knowledge is a necessary condition of voluntary action. It follows that every crime alleged against a person is relative either to public or to individual interests and is committed either ignorantly and involuntarily or voluntarily and knowingly and, if the latter, either of deliberate purpose or under the in-

cellent instance of a general principle, especially in comparison with *Politics*, i. ch. 3 *ad fin.*

The "Messenian oration" of Alcidamas was according to the Scholiast an exhortation to the Lacedaemonians not to reduce the Messenians to slavery.

fluence of emotion. Passion is a subject which will be discussed in the general treatment of the emotions, pp. 115 sqq. and the object and conditions of deliberate purpose have been already described. pp. 72 sqq. But it often happens that people, while admitting a particular fact, refuse to admit either the description of it or the application of the description; a person will admit e.g. that he took an article, but not that he stole it, or that he struck the first blow, but not that he committed an outrage, or that there was intercourse, but not that there was adultery, or that there was theft, but not that there was sacrilege, as the article stolen was not consecrated property, or that there was trespass but not that there was trespass on the State lands, or that there was communication, but not that it was communication of a treasonable nature, with the enemy. From this we see the necessity of definitions of theft or outrage or adultery, if we are to succeed in putting our case in the strongest light, whether we are anxious to prove or disprove a certain allegation. In all such cases the point at issue is the criminality and wickedness or the reverse of the person accused, as it is the purpose which constitutes vice or crime, and all such terms as "outrage" or "theft" have a certain connotation of the purpose. For if it *is admitted that* a person dealt a blow, it does not necessarily follow that he committed an outrage, unless he had a particular object in dealing the blow, i.e. to insult the person struck or to gratify himself; nor again, if *it is admitted that* a person took an article by stealth, does it necessarily follow that he was guilty of theft,

unless the purpose of his taking it was the injury of somebody else and the appropriation of it to himself. The same is the case with every other crime that may be alleged.

p. 93. [1] We have seen then that cases of justice and injustice may be divided into two classes, viz. unwritten and unwritten. So far as the law expressly declares

Two kinds of unwritten law.

them, they have been already discussed. The unwritten law on the other hand comprises (1) such points as are indications of a high degree of virtue or vice and are the subjects of reproaches, compliments, degradations, honours and presents, e.g. gratitude to benefactors, the repayment of kindnesses received, a disposition to serve one's friends and the like, (2) such points as supply the deficiencies of the

Equity.

special or written law. For equitable conduct is admitted to be just; and the justice which supplements the written law is equity. But this *function of equity* may be either contrary to or consistent with the *legislator's* intention—the former, if the point is one which has escaped his notice, the latter, if it is impossible to specify *all the possible cases which may arise*, and it is necessary *therefore* to lay down a rule as universal, although it is *properly* not universal but only general, or[2] again if it is difficult to specify

[1] The present passage, although it seems only to recapitulate the result arrived at in an earlier part of the chapter, yet so far departs from it as (1) to show that the "universal" law is itself unwritten, (2) to explain the characteristics of this universal unwritten law, (3) to define the nature of that other unwritten law which is a part of the "particular" law of States.

[2] It is better to connect this sentence closely with the preceding one.

all possible varieties of a case, as they are infinite in number, e.g. all the various sizes and kinds of iron instruments with which a wound may be inflicted, as human life is too short for a complete enumeration of them. Hence if an exact specification is impossible, and yet it is indispensable to legislate, it is necessary to employ general language, the result being that if e.g. you are only wearing an iron ring when you lift your hand against a person or deal him a blow, according to the letter of the law you are guilty of a crime, yet in reality you do not commit a crime, and it is in this *merciful interpretation of your action* that equity consists. And from this definition of equity we see at once the kind of actions which do or do not deserve equitable consideration and the kind of persons who are not equitable. For all such cases as deserve indulgence are proper subjects of equity. Again, it is equitable not to treat errors and crimes or errors and accidents alike. I mean by an "accident" anything which cannot be foreseen and does not proceed from vice, by an "error" anything which might have been foreseen and yet does not proceed from wickedness, and by a "crime" anything which might have been foreseen and is itself a result of wickedness; for all such actions as are due to desire proceed from wickedness. Equity consists too in making allowance for human infirmities, in regarding the legislator rather than the law, the intention of the legislator rather than his language, the purpose of an act rather than the act itself and the whole rather than the part, in considering not so much what is a person's character

Its province.

Its nature.

at a particular moment as what it has invariably or usually been, in remembering benefits more than injuries and benefits received more than benefits conferred, in suffering injustice patiently, in consenting to settle disputes by agreement rather than by a trial of strength, in wishing to resort to arbitration rather than to law; for an arbitrator always takes the equitable, whereas a juror takes the legal view, of a case, and indeed the object with which arbitration was devised was to ensure the triumph of equity.

Such then may be regarded as a sufficient description of the nature and province of equity.

CHAP. XIV. The magnitude of crimes.

The magnitude of a crime is proportionate to the magnitude of the injustice which prompts it. Hence the smallest crimes may be actually the greatest, as e.g. the crime alleged by Callistratus against Melanopus, viz. that he had defrauded the temple-builders of an obol and a half of consecrated money. [1]But in regard to justice the contrary of this is true; *for the greater the temptation to commit a crime, the greater is the justice shewn in resisting it.* The reason *of the extreme criminality of petty crimes* is that the greater crime is potentially included *in the less;* for he who stole an obol and a half of consecrated money would be ready to commit any crime. The degree of criminality is determined sometimes in this way and at

[1] If it may be permitted to put Aristotle's meaning into other words, it is that the magnitude of criminality is determined by the smallness of the temptation which was not resisted, the magnitude of the justice by the greatness of the temptation resisted.

other times by consideration of the actual injury. *A crime is the greater*, if there is no possible punishment adequate to it; or if there is no remedy for it, [1]as in such a case it is grievous and *even* incurable; or if the victim has no hope of redress, as it is then irremediable; for legal justice and punishment are remedial processes. *It is the greater* again, if the victim *in consequence of it* inflicted a heavy punishment upon himself; for then the perpetrator seems to deserve still heavier punishment, as Sophocles argued in pleading the cause of Euctemon after his committing suicide in consequence of the outrage inflicted upon him, when he said he would not estimate the proper penalty less highly than the victim had estimated it for himself. Or if the perpetrator of the crime is the only person or the first who has so acted or has had but few associates in his action. Again, an offence is magnified, if it is constantly repeated; or if it is one which has led to the desire and discovery of particular deterrents and penalties, as when at Argos a penalty is inflicted upon any individual on whose account a law has been passed or upon the [2]persons on whose account the prison was built. Again, a crime is the greater in proportion as it is more brutal or more deliberate or as it inspires the audience with sentiments of terror rather than of pity. There are other rhetorical means of exaggeration, as e.g. *the assertion* that the accused has subverted or transgressed many obligations *at*

[1] Perhaps the MSS reading χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον may stand, the infinitive ἰᾶσθαι being supplied with ἀδύνατον.

[2] The indicative mood implies that some definite persons are meant; but the circumstances are not known.

once, such as oaths, pledges, securities and covenants of intermarriage; for so a crime is intensified by multiplication. Again, *it is an aggravation of a crime* that the scene of it should be the spot where criminals are brought to justice, as in the case of perjured witnesses; for where (*it may be argued*) would they be likely to refrain from crime, if they commit it actually in a Court of Law? A crime is magnified too, if it is one of a particularly shameful character; or if the victim of it has been a benefactor of the criminal, as there is then a multiplication of the crime in that not only the injury is done, but the service *which might have been expected* is not done; or if it is an offence against the unwritten principles of justice, as it is an indication of superior virtue to be just without the need of external compulsion. Now while written laws have a character of compulsion, the laws which are unwritten are not compulsory. Yet in another sense a crime is the greater, if it is a violation of the written law, as *it may be contended that* one who is guilty of such crimes as are dangerous to him and render him liable to punishment will not hesitate to commit those crimes to which no punishment is attached.

CHAP. XV. The inartistic proofs. p. 10.

Having now determined the comparative magnitude of crimes, we have next to take a rapid survey of the inartistic proofs as they are called. *We consider them last*, as [1]they belong exclusively to forensic

[1] This is generally, but not quite strictly, true, as appears from the words *καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα*, l. 17, and again *εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον*, p. 51, l. 12, which are appropriate to deliberative oratory.

Rhetoric. They are five in number, viz. laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures and the oath.

We will begin by discussing the proper means of employing laws whether in exhortation and dissuasion or in accusation and defence. It is clear that, if the written law is unfavourable to our case, we must appeal to the universal law and to the principles of equity as expressing justice of a higher order. [1]*We must contend* that the formula "[2]according to the best of my judgment" implies that the juror is not to be absolutely bound by the letter of the law. We must urge that, while equity and universal law, as being conformable to Nature, are perpetual and invariable, written laws are liable to frequent change. Hence the lines in the *Antigone* of Sophocles, where she pleads that in burying *her brother* she had violated Creon's law but not the unwritten law *of Nature*. (1) laws.

"[3]Not of to-day nor yesterday
Is this a law but ever *hath it life;*
This should not I for fear of mortal man
Dare violate."

[1] It is necessary to supply λεκτέον or some such word before ὅτι.

[2] The Athenian δικασταί promised on oath to judge γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ or, more correctly, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ. But the promise so made, as is clear from many passages, was applicable only where there was no law or where it was obscure.

[3] This quotation is made somewhat loosely, as though the passage of the *Antigone* would be familiar to everyone. Cp. p. 45 l. 28. The lines are

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη.
τούτων ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς
φρόνημα δείσας, ἐν θεοῖσι τὴν δίκην
δώσειν.

Again, *we must argue* that justice is something which is genuine and beneficent, but that the sham justice *which consists in a rigorous interpretation of the law* is quite the contrary; hence the written law is neither genuine nor beneficent, as it does not discharge the proper function of law. Or that a judge is like an assayer of coin, whose business it is to distinguish base justice from genuine. Or that a higher virtue is displayed in loyalty and obedience to unwritten than to written laws. Again, [1]it may happen that the law *against which we are contending* is inconsistent with some other law of high repute or with itself; it is sometimes the case, e.g. that, while there is one law which enacts the validity of all contracts, there is another which prohibits the forming of any such contract as is illegal. Or it may happen that the law is ambiguous; then it will be proper to turn it about, and to consider to which of the two possible constructions either the justice or the expediency, as it may be, of our case will adapt itself and, after so considering it, to adopt that construction. Again, if the circumstances which the law was intended to meet have altered but the law remains in force, we must do our best to prove this to be the case and so to contend against the law. But if the letter of the law is on our side, it must be urged that the words "according to the best of my judgment" were never meant to justify illegal procedure on the

[1] The construction is again irregular or elliptical; the true apodosis would be found in some such words as *χρηστέον αὐτῇ τῇ ἐναντιότητι*. Similarly in the next sentence there is some such suppressed apodosis as *χρηστέον αὐτῇ τῇ ἀμφιβολίᾳ*.

part of a juror but only to exonerate him from a charge of perjury, if he should fail to perceive the meaning of the law. [1]Or that nobody desires that which is absolutely good, but everybody that which is good relatively to himself. Or that the law might as well not have been enacted, if it is not to be obeyed. Again, we may appeal to the other arts arguing that *in Medicine e.g.* it does not pay to be cleverer than the doctor, as there is less danger in the mistakes of the doctor than in the gradually acquired habit of disobeying authority. And *finally* we may urge that it is this effort to be wiser than the laws which is prohibited in all admirable codes.

The foregoing discussion of *the mode of appealing to* the laws must be regarded as sufficient for our purpose. Coming now to witnesses, we say that they are of two kinds, viz. ancient and contemporary, and that the latter may be either involved in the risk *of the action at law* or independent of it. I mean by ancient witnesses the poets and any other authorities who have pronounced notorious judgments. Thus the Athenians appealed to the testimony of Homer in the matter of [2]Salamis, and the inhabitants of Tenedos not long ago to that

(2) witnesses

(a) ancient

[1] The point of this argument for abiding by the letter of the law seems to be that the law is in its nature rigidly impartial, but the judgment of individuals is warped by personal considerations. Schrader however gives a different explanation, viz. that the laws of a particular state, as being adapted to its necessities, are better and therefore to be more resolutely guarded than laws of a kind abstractedly higher and more ideal.

[2] It was commonly alleged that the famous lines (*Iliad* ii.

of Periander of Corinth in their controversy with the [1]Sigeans. Thus too Cleophon quoted against Critias the elegiac verses of Solon in evidence of the inveterate licentiousness of his family, as Solon—*so he argued*—could have had no other reason for writing

"Bid Critias the ruddy-haired go listen to his sire."

While then it is the poets and others who are witnesses to facts of the past, as to the future the interpreters of oracles are also witnesses. It was thus that Themistocles insisted upon the wisdom of naval warfare, quoting the expression *of the oracle* "[2]the wooden wall." Proverbs too, as has been said[3], are forms of testimony. If one is giving evidence e.g. against courting the friendship of an old man, one can appeal to the testimony of the proverb "Never befriend a dotard"; or *if one is advocating* the slaughter of

557—8) in which the ships of Ajax are represented as stationed beside the Athenian forces in the war of Troy, had been interpolated in the text by Solon, to serve as arguments for the claim of Athens to the possession of Salamis.

[1] The allusion is really uncertain although Mr Grote (*History of Greece*, Part ii. ch. 14) thinks the "testimony of Periander" was his decision on the controversy between the Athenians and the Mitylenaeans regarding Sigeum.

[2] See Herod. vii. ch. 141.

[3] Not by Aristotle himself; hence Spengel proposes to omit εἴρηται. Perhaps there is a reference to other writers upon Rhetoric; perhaps, as is likely enough, the words are due to a slip of memory. Mr Cope's explanation of them is possible, but less natural; "proverbs are evidence in the way that has been stated," i.e. evidence of the future.

the children whose parents have been already slain, *one can appeal to that of another proverb*

"[1]Fool he who slays the sire and spares the son."

(b) contemporary.

Contemporary witnesses on the other hand are all such authorities as have pronounced judgment on a particular point; for the judgments of such authorities are serviceable, whenever the same questions are at issue. Thus Eubulus quoted in court against Chares the remark of Plato in reference to Archibius, that the avowal of rascality had made great strides in the state. Another class of contemporary witnesses consists of people who, if suspected of perjury, are involved in the peril *of the person whom they support by their testimony.* All such witnesses testify simply to the fact that a thing has or has not occurred or does or does not exist, not to its character i.e. to its justice or injustice, expediency or inexpediency; but the credibility of witnesses at a distance extends to character. None however are such credible witnesses as the ancients; for these it is impossible to corrupt. If we have no witnesses to call, we may employ confirmations of our testimony *by arguing* that judgment should be based upon the probabilities of the case, that this is the meaning of the words "according to the best of my judgment," that probabilities cannot be bribed to deceive and are never convicted of perjury. If on the other hand we have witnesses to call, and our adversary has not, we may urge that probabilities are not responsible agents *like witnesses,* and that testimony would be superfluous,

[1] A line of the Κύπρια of the cyclic poet Stasinus.

if it were enough to review the case by the light of arguments. Also as testimony may relate either to ourselves or to our adversary and either to facts or to character, it is clear that we can never be at a loss for useful testimony; for if we cannot *adduce any testimony* in support of our own case or against our adversary's, yet *it may still be possible to produce testimony* to character such as tends to establish either our own respectability or the low morality of our adversary. All such other arguments as tend to prove a witness friendly, hostile or indifferent, estimable, disreputable or neither absolutely the one nor the other or to establish any other similar characteristic must be derived from the same topics as form the materials of our enthymemes.

(3) contracts. As to contracts; the value of Rhetoric amounts to this, that it is competent to magnify or disparage their importance, to establish their credibility and authority, if they are on our own side, and to invalidate it, if they tell in favour of our adversary. The means of confirming or overthrowing their credibility are precisely the same as in the procedure in the case of witnesses; for their credit is entirely dependent upon the character of the persons who have endorsed them or who have them in their keeping. The existence of a contract being granted, it is necessary to magnify its importance, if it is on our own side. It may be urged that a contract is a law of a special and partial kind, that it is not contracts which impart validity to the law but the laws which impart validity to legal contracts [1] and in general that, as the law

[1] Placing only a comma after *συνθήκας*.

itself is a species of contract, to violate or annul a contract is *virtually* to annul the laws. It may be further urged that, as the ordinary dealings of one man with another and all voluntary transactions are regulated by contracts, to invalidate contracts is to destroy the ordinary intercourse of social life. *These are some of the arguments appropriate to the point*, and there are others which are ready to hand and easily found. If however the contract is one which is adverse *to ourselves* and favourable to our opponents, *it is to be remembered* in the first place *that* all such arguments as might be used in opposition to an adverse law are appropriate here. It is a strange thing, *we may urge*, that, while we refuse to acknowledge the duty of obedience to the laws, if they have been enacted wrongly and under a mistake on the part of their authors, we still acknowledge the necessity of obedience to contracts. We may urge too that the juror is an umpire of justice and that therefore the point to be considered is not the particular *document before us* but the principle of higher justice. Justice again, being an ordinance of Nature, cannot be perverted either by fraud or by force; contracts on the other hand may be made under the influence of cajolery or constraint. Yet again, *it is proper* to consider whether the particular contract is inconsistent *first* with any law either written or universal and, if written, either domestic or extraneous, and secondly with other contracts subsequent or antecedent; for *it may be pleaded* either *that*, if the later contracts are valid, then the earlier are invalidated, or that, if the earlier are right, the later are fraudulent,

according as it may serve our purpose at the time. Finally, it is proper to have an eye to the personal interests of the judges, with which the contract may perhaps be inconsistent, and to various other similar points, *which need not be stated*, as they are equally easy to perceive.

(4) tortures. Tortures constitute a species of testimony and are regarded as possessing credibility, inasmuch as a certain form of compulsion is implied in them. This again is a case in which it is not difficult to define the possible means of exaggeration, showing, if the tortures are favourable to ourselves, that this is the only genuine sort of testimony. If on the other hand they are unfavourable to ourselves and favourable to our adversary, it is possible to dissipate their force by using arguments, which are perfectly true, against tortures generally; for witnesses are fully as likely to give false testimony as true under the compulsion of torture, whether by resolutely persisting in their concealment of the truth or by readily making false accusations in the hope of getting off the rack the sooner. *Lastly*, one should be in a position to refer to parallel instances which have come within the cognizance of the judges.

(5) oaths. Oaths admit of a fourfold division. A person may either tender and accept the oath, or may do neither, or may do one and not the other, i.e. may either tender the oath without accepting it or accept the oath without tendering it. And the case may be still further complicated, if the oath has been already taken by one of the parties.

If you refuse to tender the oath, *you may plead*

that perjury is easy and that, while [1] your adversary, if he takes the oath, will not *be compelled to* restore *the stolen property*, if he has no opportunity of taking it, you believe the court will pronounce sentence of condemnation against him; or that you prefer the risk of leaving the matter to the jury, as you have confidence in them but not in your adversary.

If you refuse to take the oath when tendered to you, *you may plead* that to take it is to [2] set a pecuniary value upon it; or that, if you had no conscience, you would have bound yourself by the oath, as, if one has not a conscience, one may as well gain something by having none, and that thus, while you would have recovered the property, if you had sworn, by not swearing you are likely to lose it. The consequence will be that *your refusal of the oath* will appear to spring not from the dread of perjury but from a virtuous motive[3]. It will be appropriate too to quote the saying of Xenophanes, that the offer of the oath is not a fair challenge, if the parties are a conscientious and an unconscientious person but is the same as if a strong man were to challenge a weak one to give or take a blow.

If you accept the oath, *you may say* that you have confidence in yourself but not in your adversary, or you may reverse the saying of Xenophanes and urge

[1] i.e. if he is not allowed to take the oath, the case will be tried on its merits, and he will be condemned; but if he takes it, the jury are more likely to pronounce a verdict in his favour.

[2] Or in other words, to take it in order to gain a certain pecuniary advantage.

[3] Putting a full stop, as Mr Cope suggests, after τὸ μή.

that the conditions will not be equal, unless it is the unconscientious person who tenders the oath and the conscientious person who accepts it, and that it is monstrous to refuse to take the oath oneself in a case where one expects the jurors to do so before they hear it.

If you tender the oath to your adversary, you may say that it is a pious act to commit the issue to Heaven, and that it is not for your adversary to require any judge but himself, as you are willing to leave the judgment in his hands. Or you may say that it is monstrous to refuse to swear in a case where one expects others to do so.

Having seen then the proper way of dealing with each case separately, we see at once how to deal with them in combination, as e.g. if you are willing to accept the oath yourself but not to tender it, or if you tender it but are not willing to accept it, or if you are willing both to accept and to tender it or to do neither; for as these are necessarily combinations of the cases which have been already described, it follows that the arguments used must be similarly combined.

If you have already taken an oath and it is prejudicial to you, *you may urge* that yours is not a case of perjury; for criminal action is always voluntary, and perjury is a crime, but such actions as are due to force or fraud are involuntary. In this instance then it is right to draw the conclusion that it is not the language but the intention which constitutes perjury.

If on the other hand it is your adversary who has

taken the oath, *you may urge* that not to abide by an oath once taken is to upset everything. It is because of the sanctity of the oath, *you may assert,* that jurors are sworn before they administer the laws; and, *addressing the jury,* you may exclaim "You we expect to abide by the oaths, which you took before hearing the case, and are we ourselves not to abide by our oaths?" And so through all the possible means of exaggeration.

This then may be regarded as a sufficient discussion of the inartistic proofs.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I. THESE then are the proper materials of exhortation, dissuasion, eulogy, censure, accusation and defence, and the popular opinions and *rhetorical* premisses which are serviceable as supplying proofs in each; for it is these which are in a special sense, as we may say, the subjects and materials of enthymemes, in each of the *three* kinds of speeches.

The audiences of oratory judicial.

Indirect means of proof.

As Rhetoric is intended to be judged—for *in deliberative oratory*[1] we pass judgment on the counsel given, and every legal decision is a judgment—it must necessarily be our object not only to render our speech demonstrative and credible, but also to produce a particular impression of ourselves and a particular disposition in our judges[2]. For in de-

[1] Epideictic oratory is for the moment left out of sight, whether as being less important than the other kinds or because the audience of epideictic speeches would not in Aristotle's view be strictly described as "judges" (κριταί). See ch. 18 *in init.*

[2] There is then a departure from the principle laid down at the beginning of Book I. But Aristotle's position is that, although the art of Rhetoric properly disregards everything but actual proof, yet practically in forensic and political matters such is the power of the emotions, such the influence of the impressions

liberative and, although to a less extent, even in forensic oratory, it is a highly important element of proof that the speaker should enjoy the credit of a certain character and should be supposed by his audience to stand in a certain relation to themselves, and further that the audience in their turn should, if possible, have a particular disposition to the speaker. The impression of the speaker's character is especially serviceable in deliberative, and the disposition of the audience in forensic, matters; for our estimate *of a speech* is not the same, but either wholly different or different in degree, according as we regard a person with feelings of affection or dislike, and are angrily or charitably disposed towards him. If we are friendly to the person upon whom we have to form a judgment, we regard him as either innocent or guilty of a very slight offence; if we are inimical to him, the contrary is the case.

Similarly, when we are in an eager and sanguine mood, the result *which is promised us* is probable and advantageous in our eyes; when we are dispirited and out of humour, it is the reverse.

The sources of personal credibility in orators are three; or in other words there are three things, apart from demonstrative proofs, which inspire belief, viz. sagacity, high character and good will. It is *the want* Sources of personal credibility.

entertained by the audience as to make some discussion of theory indispensable in a rhetorical treatise. *δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν.* He justifies in the same way his treatment of style.

of all these qualities or of one of them that occasions great errors in matters of discussion or deliberation; for either people are so foolish that they entertain erroneous opinions, or, although their opinions are right, they are so corrupt that they do not express their true sentiments, or, although they are persons of sagacity and high character, they are not well-disposed to their audience, and perhaps in consequence do not recommend the best policy, although they understand it. These are the three sources of credibility, and there is no other. The necessary inference is that, if a person is supposed to command them all, he will be deserving of credit in the eyes of his audience.

This being so, the means of getting credit for sagacity and high character must be ascertained from pp. 61 sqq. our analysis of the virtues, as it is by the same means that we shall succeed in establishing our own character and the character of others; goodwill or a friendly disposition on the other hand must be discussed now under the head of the emotions. And by the emotions I mean all such states as are attended by pain and pleasure and produce a change or difference in our attitude as judges, e.g. anger, compassion, fear and the like and their opposites.

Definition of emotion.

The emotions to be considered under three heads.

It is proper to consider each emotion under three heads; if we take e.g. anger, to consider (1) the conditions under which people are irascible, (2) the usual objects, and (3) the usual causes of anger; for the knowledge of one or two of these points without the third will not enable us to excite the passion of anger, and the same is true of any other emotion.

Let us follow then our original plan of giving a

detailed account of the proper rhetorical premisses, and let us make an analysis *of the emotions* in the manner already described.

CHAP. II. The emotions. (1) Anger. Definition of anger.

We may define anger as an impulse attended with pain to a conspicuous[1] revenge on account of a conspicuous slight shown in some offence against oneself or one of one's friends without any natural reason for the slight.

Consequences of the definition.

This being the definition of anger, it follows that anger is always directed against an individual, let us say against Cleon, but not against *the genus* man, and is provoked by something done or intended to be done to oneself or one's friend, and that it is invariably attended by a certain pleasure arising from the expectation of revenge. For while there is something pleasant in the thought of attaining our aim, nobody aims at such things as are clearly beyond his power, and *accordingly* an angry man *always* aims at something which is within his power. Hence it is a good description of passion

> "Far sweeter than the flowing stream of honey
> It wells within the heart[2]";

for there is a certain concomitant pleasure which is

[1] It is proposed by Spengel and others to omit the word "conspicuous" (φαινομένης), as it goes beyond the definitions of anger given in Τοπικά (viii. p. 152 A_{32} and περὶ Ψυχῆς i. p. 403 A_{30}). But, whatever may be his view elsewhere, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle clearly regards the notoriety of the revenge as being an element of the pleasure attending it. Cp. p. 61, ll. 10—15.

[2] *Iliad* xviii. 109, a passage which has been already quoted in part p. 39, l. 6.

due partly to this *anticipation of revenge* and partly to the dwelling upon revenge in imagination[1], so that the impression created at the time, like the impression of a dream, produces pleasure.

Slight.

[2]A slight is an active manifestation of opinion in reference to something which appears to be wholly unimportant; for all such things as are good or evil, or as conduce to good or evil, we consider to deserve serious attention; but if a thing has no such tendency or hardly any, we regard it as wholly unimportant.

Three species of slight: (a) contempt,

There are three species of slight, viz. contempt, spite and insolence. Contempt is a form of slight; for if we regard a thing as wholly unimportant, we feel a contempt for it, and if we feel a contempt for it, we slight it[3].

(b) spitefulness,

A second form of slight is spitefulness, spite being an impediment offered to the wishes of others not for the benefit of the person who spites but for the detriment of the person who is spited. It is the fact that the motive of the spiteful action is not the benefit of the agent himself which constitutes the slight; for it is clear that he does not suppose the person whom he spites will do him any considerable

[1] The two elements of pleasure, as here regarded, seem to be (1) the thought that at some *future* time we shall have our revenge, (2) the *present* picturing to ourselves this revenge.

[2] There is no true apodosis; hence I have disregarded the *ἐπεὶ* in translating. The thread of the sentence is broken by the parenthesis *καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ κ.τ.λ.*

[3] The whole sentence will be clearer and more logical, if it is read thus: *ὅ τε γὰρ καταφρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ, ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ καταφρονουμένων ὀλιγωροῦσιν· καὶ ὁ ἐπηρεάζων, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς κ.τ.λ.* The words *φαίνεται καταφρονεῖν* are better omitted.

injury or service, as in the former case he would stand in awe of him and would cast no slight upon him, and in the latter he would pay court to him to secure his friendship. Insolence is another form of slight, as being an act of injury or annoyance involving the disgrace of the sufferer, not for the sake of any benefit to the agent beyond the mere fact of its having been done, but only for his personal gratification; for the requital of injuries is not insolence but revenge. The source of the pleasure found in insolent action is the feeling that in injuring others we are claiming an exceptional superiority to them. This is the reason of the insolence of the young and the wealthy; they look upon it as a mark of superiority. One species of insolent action is disrespect, and this again involves a slight; for if a thing is wholly unimportant, it is not[1] respected as having any value either for good or for evil. Hence Achilles in his anger says (c) insolence.

> [2]"Dishonoured am I; he hath ta'en my prize
> And doth maintain it."

and again

> "Like some dishonoured vagabond."

implying that this is the cause of his anger. Now we suppose that we have a natural right to a high degree

[1] It is difficult in English to preserve the two meanings of τιμή (1) "honour" or "respect," which connects it with ἀτιμία, (2) "value" which is suited to the words οὔτ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ.

[2] The passages referred to are taken as instances of the slight implied in disrespectful or dishonourable treatment. *Iliad* I. 356; IX. 644.

of consideration at the hands of persons who are our inferiors in birth, power or virtue, and indeed in anything common both to us and to them in which we have a great superiority, as e.g. in wealth a man of large property to a poor man, in oratory a good speaker to a bad one, and *in political affairs* a ruler to a subject, or one who fancies himself born to rule to one who is only born to serve. Hence the [1] lines

> "Great pride is there of kings the sons of Gods,"

and

> "Yet afterward he beareth still a grudge";

for the indignation *expressed in these lines* is due to the sense of superiority. Again, *we expect especial consideration* from persons who are bound under an obligation, as we suppose, to treat us well, i.e. persons upon whom benefits have been or are being conferred or are or were intended to be conferred either by ourselves or by somebody at our instigation or by one of our friends.

Conditions of anger. We see clearly then from this statement of the case the conditions under which people become angry, the persons with whom they are angry and the grounds of anger. We become angry under a sense of annoyance; for if a person is annoyed, there is something at which he aims. Whether it is di-

[1] The quotations, as their contexts show, illustrate the principle that "one who fancies himself born to rule" expects a high consideration or respect from "one who is only born to serve." In the first (*Iliad* II. 196) it is Odysseus who addresses the chieftains after the speech in which Agamemnon counsels flight; in the second (*Iliad* I. 82) it is Calchas who deprecates the revengeful anger of Agamemnon.

rectly then that somebody thwarts us in any respect, as e.g. in preventing us from drinking when we are thirsty, or only indirectly, the effect appears to be the same in both cases; and whether a person opposes us or refuses to co-operate with us or occasions us any other trouble when we are in this condition, we invariably become angry with him. Accordingly it is in sickness, in poverty, [1] in war, in love, when we are thirsty or have any kind of unsatisfied desire that we are irascible and readily excited to anger not only, although in an especial degree, against such persons as show a slighting indifference to our present condition, whether it be our malady, if we are ill, or our poverty, if we are poor, or the war in which we are engaged, if we are at war, or our love, if we are lovers, but similarly against other people as well, according as we are individually predisposed by our present emotion *or condition* to be angry in each particular case. Another *occasion of anger* is when what takes place is the contrary of our anticipations; for the greatness of the surprise is an intensification of the annoyance, as it is of the pleasure too, if our wishes are gratified.

It is clear then from these considerations what sorts of seasons, times, dispositions and periods of life are easily excited to anger and what are the usual places and occasions of anger; it is clear too that, the more these conditions are realized, the more excitable to anger we are.

[1] Probably Bekker is right in inserting πολεμοῦντες, as without it the sentence given below, πολεμῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, is out of place.

Persons against whom anger is felt.

Such then being the conditions under which we are readily excited to anger, the persons against whom our anger is directed are those who mock and sneer and gibe at us, as they are insolent to us, or who do us injury of such a kind as betokens insolence, i.e. such of course as is neither retaliatory in its nature nor beneficial to the authors of it; for, if it is neither, it necessarily appears to be due to insolence. We are angry too with persons who disparage and despise the things to which we ourselves attach most importance, e.g. our philosophy, if it is philosophy upon which we pride ourselves, our personal appearance, if it is our appearance and so on. And this is particularly the case, if we entertain a suspicion that we do not possess the said advantages at all, or do not possess them in a high degree, or are not believed to possess them; for if it is our firm persuasion [1] that we possess the advantages in respect of which, *i.e. for the absence of which*, we are satirized, we treat the satire with contempt. Again, we are more disposed *to be angry with* our own friends than with strangers, *if they treat us badly*, as we suppose ourselves to have a natural claim to good treatment rather than the reverse at their hands. *We are soon angry* too with persons who have usually treated us with honour or respect, if they turn round and treat us in a different spirit; for we imagine they have come to feel a contempt for us, as otherwise they would continue to act as they always have acted. Or with persons who fail

[1] Omitting ἐν τούτοις; but it is a question if ἐν οἷς should not be altered to ἐφ' οἷς.

to requite our services or who fail to make an adequate return for them, or with persons who act against our interests, if they are our inferiors; [1]for both these classes show a certain apparent contempt for us, the former *by treating us* as inferiors, and the latter *by treating our services* as if they had been rendered by inferiors. *We are* especially *angry* with persons of no consideration, if they pass a slight upon us; for it is assumed *in accordance with the definition* that the anger provoked by the slight is directed against such persons as have no natural right to treat us in this manner, and it is the natural duty of our inferiors not to slight us. Or with our friends, if they do not speak well of us or treat us well, and still more, if they do the reverse; or if they fail to perceive what we want, [2]as Plexippus in the play of Antiphon was angry with Meleager; for the fact of their not perceiving it is an evidence of slight, as, if we respect a person, we do not ignore his wants. Or with persons who rejoice at our misfortunes or show any kind of cheerfulness in the course of them, as such conduct is an indication either of enmity or of slight. Or with those who do not reflect upon the possibility of giving us pain;

[1] Bekker's text does not show, as it should, that the reason alleged applies to both the preceding sentences. It would be better to put a comma only, or at most a colon, after ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν.

[2] This very doubtful allusion is explained, so far as explanation is possible, in Mr Cope's note. Plexippus was uncle of Meleager, and it is supposed that Meleager's insensibility to his wants consisted in not making him a present of the skin, which was the prize of the Caledonian boarhunt.

this is the explanation of the anger felt against the messengers who bring us bad news. Or with those who either listen to the tale of our weaknesses or look on at any exhibition of them *with indifference*, as such behaviour is akin to a slight, if not indeed to actual enmity; for a man's friends sympathize with the pain he suffers, and [1] everybody is pained at the spectacle of his own weaknesses. Again, *we are angry* with persons who put a slight upon us in the presence of any of the following five classes of people, viz. our rivals, those who are the objects of our admiration, those whose admiration we are desirous to gain, those whom we reverence or those who reverence us. Or with persons who put a slight upon objects which we are bound in honour to defend, such as our parents, children, wives or subjects. Or with persons who make no return for favours conferred upon them, as such a slight is a violation of natural duty. Or who treat us ironically when we are in earnest, as there is something contemptuous in irony. Or who confer benefits upon others, unless they are also benefactors of ourselves; as it is one sign of contempt not to treat us with the same esteem as everybody else. [2] Another provocative of anger is forgetfulness, e.g. forgetfulness of names, although it is shown only in so trifling a matter; for forgetfulness too is apparently a sign

[1] It is necessary to remember that a friend in the Aristotelian view is "a second self" (ἕτερος αὐτός).

[2] Aristotle passes in this sentence from the objects to the motives or at least to one motive of anger; but the two heads (p. 55, ll. 22—25) are so closely related as to be inseparable.

of slight, as arising from indifference which is itself a slight.

The persons with whom we are apt to be angry and the conditions and causes of anger having thus been all treated together, it is evident that the task which lies before us is by our speech to bring the audience to a condition of irascibility, and to represent our adversaries as being guilty of the feelings and actions which provoke men to anger and as possessing a character against which anger is felt.

CHAP. III. (2) Placability.

As to become angry is the opposite of becoming placable, and anger of placability, we have to ascertain the conditions of placability, the persons towards whom we are placably disposed and the means by which we become placable.

Definition of placability.

The process of becoming placable may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger. If then it is persons who slight us that are the objects of anger, and a slight is a voluntary action, it is clear that we are placably disposed to such persons as do not treat us with any sort of slight or do so, or appear to do so, unintentionally. Also to persons whose intention is contrary to their action. Or to persons who behave to themselves in the same way as to us; for it is assumed that nobody will put a slight on himself. Or to persons who acknowledge and repent their fault; for then we cease to be angry under the impression that in the pain which they feel at their own past conduct we have received a certain satisfaction. This we may infer from the punishment of domestic slaves; for while, if they contradict us and deny the deed, we increase the punishment, if they admit the justice

Persons towards whom it is natural to be placable.

of the punishment, our anger ceases. The reason is that the denial of notorious facts is an act of [1]effrontery *or gross disrespect*, and effrontery is a form of slight or contempt; at all events, if we feel a thorough contempt for a person, we do not respect him. Again, we are placably disposed to such persons as humble themselves before us and offer no contradiction to us; for their attitude looks like a confession of inferiority, and inferiority implies awe, and nobody who is in a state of awe offers a slight. That anger subsides when the objects of it humble themselves is evident even from the [2]conduct of dogs in not biting anybody who sits down *when they attack him*. We are placable too to those who take us seriously when we are serious, as such seriousness appears to exclude contempt. Or to those who have laid us under obligations greater than we can return. Or to those who entreat us and deprecate our anger, as so far they humiliate themselves. Or to those who are never guilty of insolence or mockery or slight against anybody or against virtuous people or against people like ourselves. [3](It is indeed a general rule that the means of producing placability are to be ascertained by a consideration of their opposites.) Or

[1] The etymological connexion of *ἀναισχυντία* and *αἰσχυνόμεθα* contributes something to the argument and should be noted, although it can hardly be preserved in translation.

[2] Mr Cope refers to Homer *Odyssey* xiv. 29—31. It is well known that sitting was in the Greek view a posture of supplication.

[3] There is something strangely abrupt in the introduction of this sentence; it is a kind of afterthought or footnote.

to persons who are the objects of our awe or respect; for so long as we are in this state of mind, we do not feel angry with them, as it is impossible to be awed and angry at the same time. Again, if persons have acted on an impulse of passion, we either do not feel angry with them at all or feel less angry, as their action does not appear to be the result of slight; for anger and slight are incompatible, the former being attended with pain and the latter not. [1]And the same is the case, if they are persons who feel a respect for us.

Conditions of placability.

Coming now to the second point, it is clear that we are placable when we are in such a condition as is opposed to angry feeling, e.g. at a time of sport or laughter or festivity or in the enjoyment of prosperity or success or gratification or generally of freedom from pain, of pleasure apart from insolence and of virtuous hope. Also we are placable after a certain interval of time, and when our anger is no longer fresh; for the mere lapse of time appeases anger. Again, anger—even more violent anger—against one person is appeased by punishment already exacted from another. Accordingly it was a clever answer of Philocrates, when he was asked in a time of popular fury, "Why do you not defend yourself?" "Not yet" he replied. "When then?" "As soon as I see somebody else in disgrace." The fact is that we become placable when we have spent our anger upon some-

[1] The contradiction between this passage and p. 58, ll. 18—20 is only a seeming one; for Aristotle is there thinking of people who have lost their old respect for us, and here of people who have not lost it but have done something apparently inconsistent with it.

body else, as happened in the case of [1]Ergophilus; for although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, yet they acquitted him, because on the previous day they had sentenced Callisthenes to death. The same is the case, if we feel pity for a person, or if he has suffered a heavier penalty than we in our anger would have inflicted upon him; for then we feel that we have in a way got our revenge. Or if we consider ourselves to be in the wrong and to deserve no better treatment than we receive; for what is just is not provocative of anger, as we cease in such a case to regard our treatment as a violation of our natural rights, which is essential,
p. 115. as we have seen, to the idea of anger. This is the reason why *actual punishment* should be preceded by expostulation (which is itself a sort of punishment), as it takes the sting out of punishment even in the case of slaves. We are placable again, if we think the victims of punishment will not perceive that it is we who inflict it and that it is inflicted in retaliation for injuries done to us; for anger is always
p. 115. directed against individuals, as is clear from the definition of it. Hence there is a trait of nature in the words

[2]"Say twas Odysseus, pillager of cities,"

[1] It was in 362 B.C. that Ergophilus was in command at the Chersonese against the Thracian king Cotys, and Callisthenes against the Amphipolitans and Perdiccas. See Mr Grote's *History of Greece*, ch. lxxx. vol. x. pp. 129 sqq. Ergophilus was generally unsuccessful, but Callisthenes seems to have suspended operations at the moment when there was a possibility of capturing Amphipolis.

[2] *Odyssey* ix. 504. Odysseus, having blinded the Cyclops, tells

as if the revenge were not complete, unless *the Cyclops* were aware of the author and the motive. It follows that we never grow angry with unconscious beings, nor again do we pursue the dead with our anger, as we believe that their tale of suffering is complete and that they are no more susceptible of pain or any such feeling as it is our effort, when we are angry, to produce. Thus in the case of Hector there is a propriety in the poet's language, [1]when seeking to divert Achilles from his anger against the dead

[2]"Tis but dull dust his fury violates"—

It is clear then that an orator, if he wishes to produce placability, must choose these topics as the materials of his speech, bringing [3]his audience to a suitable frame of mind and representing the objects of their anger as either formidable or worthy of

him that the author of the deed was "Odysseus son of Laertes, who hath his dwelling in Ithaca."

[1] The idiom by which a writer is represented as actually doing what he describes as being done, or as using the language which he puts into the mouths of his characters, is common enough in Greek as well as in other languages. See Mr Cope's note.

[2] *Iliad* xxiv. 54.

[3] Reading αὐτοὺς i.e. τοὺς κριτάς. Cp. p. 66, l. 17; p. 76, l. 16. It is not the orator who is supposed to be the object of anger in the clause αὐτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους, nor again is it the orator who is supposed to feel anger in the clause οἷς δ' ὀργίζονται κ.τ.λ. The judges are angry with someone for whom the orator pleads; and it is his effort to appease their anger (1) by producing in them a temper of placability, (2) by showing that the person against whom their anger is directed possesses such qualities or recommendations as should avert it.

respect or as having been former benefactors or involuntary agents or as exceedingly distressed at their own deeds.

CHAP. IV. (3) Love. (4) Hatred.

[1]The persons who are the objects of love and hatred and the causes which produce these feelings are now to be described; but first let us define love and the act of loving.

Definition of love.

We may say that to love a person *or to be his friend* is to wish him all such things as you suppose to be good, not for your own sake but for his, and to be ready so far as in you lies to effect them. A friend is one who loves and is beloved in return; people who regard themselves as standing in this relation to each other call themselves friends.

Definition of a friend.

Consequences of the definitions.

From these assumed definitions it follows that a friend is one who shares the pleasure of another in his prosperity and his pain in adversity, not for any secondary motive but solely for that other's sake. For as we all feel pleasure in the realization of our wishes and pain in opposite circumstances, it follows that our pains and pleasures are themselves an indication of our wishes. Again, people are friends, [2]if they have learnt to agree in their conception of things good and evil, or if they have the same friends or the same enemies; for such persons will necessarily agree in their wishes, and therefore, if your wishes for another are the same as for yourself, you show

[1] There is a difficulty throughout this chapter in hitting the precise sense of φιλεῖν, which varies between "loving" and "liking," and in preserving the connexion of φιλεῖν with φίλος and φιλία.

[2] Reading ἤδη instead of δή.

yourself thereby to be his friend. Again, we love people, *or are their friends*, if they have rendered services either to ourselves or to those in whom we feel an interest, or if they have rendered us important services or have rendered them *con amore* or on critical occasions or from disinterested motives, or if we believe that it is their wish to render us services. We love them too, if they are friends of our friends and if they love the same people as we ourselves love; or if they are loved by persons who are the objects of our own love; or if they have the same enemies as we have and hate the same people as we ourselves hate; or if they are hated by the objects of our own hate. For all these classes of people consider the same things to be good as we do ourselves and therefore wish such things as are good for ourselves, which is the definition, as we have seen, of a friend. Again, we are fond of persons who are ready to assist us pecuniarily or in defence against personal injury; hence the respect paid to generosity and valour. [1]Or of just persons, and we regard as just all who do not live by preying upon their neighbours, i.e. all who work for their living and chief among these the agriculturalists and chief among agriculturalists *the small farmers* who labour with their own hands. Or again of temperate *or orderly* persons, because they refrain from crime. Or of persons who mind their own business, for the same reason. Or of persons with whom we wish to be friends, if they show the same inclination, I mean persons of virtuous

Persons who are the objects of love.

[1] It is better to put a full stop after τιμῶσι and only a colon after τοὺς δικαίους.

character and high renown either universally or in the society of the most virtuous people or of those who are admired by us or who themselves admire us. Again, we are fond of such persons as are pleasant companions for a day or a lifetime, e.g. of good-natured people who will not be always bringing up our faults against us and who are not contentious or crossgrained, as all such people manifest a pugnacious spirit, which implies that their wishes are contrary to ours; [1]or again of people who have a certain amount of tact in giving and receiving *badinage*, as whether they are good-humoured butts or graceful jesters, they have the same object in view as the opposite parties *in the combat of wit, viz. mutual amusement.* We are fond too of people who laud such accomplishments as we possess, especially if we are doubtful about possessing them. Or of those who are neat in person, dress and general manner of life. Or who are not fond of casting our faults or their own services in our teeth, as, if they do either one or the other, they are censorious. Or who do not bear malice or nurse their grievances but are always ready to make friends again; for as we suppose them to behave in their dealings with others, so we imagine they will behave in their dealings with us. Or who are not backbiters and do not notice the bad points in our neighbours or ourselves but only the good; for such is the conduct of a good man. Or who do not try to thwart people when they are angry or in earnest, as a person who will so act is of a pugnacious character.

[1] Changing the full stop after βούλεσθαι to a colon, so as to mark the construction of the sentence.

Or who have a certain good feeling towards us, e.g. who respect us and have a good opinion of us and are fond of our society, especially if the grounds of their respect or fondness are qualities for which we are ourselves particularly anxious either to be respected or thought well of or liked. Or who resemble us and have the same pursuits, so long as they do not interfere with us or get their living in the same way; for then it is a case of "two of a trade." Or who desire what we ourselves desire, provided that it is something which admits of being shared in common; otherwise, the case is the same as before. We are fond too of people with whom we stand upon such terms that in their presence we feel no shame about appearances, provided that this feeling is not due to contempt. Or of people in whose presence we are ashamed of our own real faults. Again, if a person is our rival or one by whom we wish to be emulated, not envied, we either love him or wish to be his friends. The same is the case, if we cooperate with a person for his advantage, provided that *in helping him* we are not likely to incur a greater loss ourselves. Or if he is as true to his friends in their absence as when they are present; hence the kindly feeling we entertain towards those who show themselves the friends of the dead. It is in fact a general rule that we are fond of people who are very true to their own friends and never desert them; for there are no good men who are so much liked as good friends. Or of people who are not artificial in their dealing with us, such as people who speak *frankly* of their own weaknesses. For it has been already said

that in the presence of our friends we feel no shame about appearances, and from this it follows that, if such shame is incompatible with friendship, the absence of it is a probable mark of a friend. Or of people who are not formidable to us and [1]in whose presence we feel confidence; for it is impossible to be fond of anyone whom we fear.

The species of friendship. Its causes.

The various species of friendship are companionship, intimacy, relationship and the like. The causes which produce it are favours conferred and conferred without solicitation and never made public by the benefactor himself, as in such case it is plain that they are conferred from love of the recipient and not from any secondary motive.

Enmity or hatred. Its causes. The distinction between anger and hatred.

As to enmity and the feeling of hatred, it is clear that they must be studied by a consideration of their opposites. The causes which produce enmity are anger, spite and prejudice. The difference between anger and enmity is that, while the former is always occasioned by personal wrongs, the latter exists equally without such wrongs; for if we suppose that a person has a character of a certain kind, we hate him. Again, while anger is always concerned with individual cases, while we feel angry e.g. with *an individual like* Callias or Socrates, hatred is directed equally against whole classes of persons; for a thief or an informer is an object of universal hatred. In the third place, anger is curable by time, but hatred is not. Also while anger is a longing to inflict pain, hatred on the other hand is a longing to inflict evil; for an angry

[1] Not οἷς; Mr Shilleto is undoubtedly right in preferring οὓς. For the construction cp. p. 67, l. 6.

man wishes to perceive *the effect of his anger*, but if a man hates another, it is not important to him *that he should perceive the effect of his hatred*. Now although painful things are always objects of perception, the worst evils, such as injustice and foolishness, are the hardest to perceive, for there is nothing painful in the presence of vice. Again, pain is a concomitant of anger but not of hatred; you cannot feel anger, as you can hatred, without pain. Lastly while there are many things which in anger may produce a sentiment of compassion, it is not so in hatred; for the aim of the former is to inflict suffering, as a retaliation, upon its object, but that of the latter is to compass his destruction.

From all this it is evident that there is a possibility of demonstrating the fact of enmity or friendship, where they exist, and of creating them, where they do not exist, and, where they are alleged, of refuting the allegation and, if it is disputed *whether a particular action* is due to anger or enmity, of referring it to either the one or the other, as we may choose.

CHAP. V. (5) Fear.

The objects which inspire fear, whether they be persons or things, and the conditions under which we are liable to it, will be evident, if we look at them as follows.

Definition of fear.

Fear may be defined as a species of pain or disturbance arising from an impression of impending evil which is destructive or painful in its nature. *It is necessary that the evil should be destructive or painful;* for it is not every kind of evil that we fear—we do not fear e.g. the prospect of being unjust or stupid—but such evil only as amounts to

great pain or destruction, and even this only if it is evidently not remote but near at hand and in consequence imminent. For such evils as are exceedingly remote we do not fear; we are all aware e.g. that we shall die, but, inasmuch as death is not near, we do not think about it.

Objects of fear.

Such then being the nature of fear, it is evident that all such things are formidable as appear to have a great power of destroying or of inflicting injury which tends to grievous pain. Accordingly the signs of all such things are formidable, as the sign implies the nearness of the formidable object; for it is just this approach of something formidable which constitutes danger. The enmity and anger of persons who have the power of doing us mischief are examples; for as their mischievous desire is unmistakeable, it is clear that the mischief will not be long postponed. Another example is criminality armed with power; *for the purpose to commit crime may be assumed*, as it is the purpose which constitutes the criminality of a criminal. A third is outraged virtue armed with power; for it is clear that virtue, whenever it is outraged, purposes vengeance, and in the case supposed has the power to execute it. A fourth is fear on the part of persons who have the power of doing us mischief, as such persons too will necessarily be in a state of preparation. But as the majority of men are disposed to vice and are slaves to the love of gain and cowards in the face of dangers, it is for the most part a formidable thing to be dependent upon anybody else; and therefore if a person has committed a deed of horror, his accomplices inspire him with

the fear that they will either denounce him or leave him in the lurch. Also persons who are in a position to commit crime are formidable to persons who are in a position to be the victims of it; for it is a general rule that people commit crimes, whenever they can. People who have been or, as they imagine, are still the victims of crime are formidable, as they are always on the watch for an opportunity *of revenge*. People who have already committed crime, if they have the power *of inflicting injury*, are formidable from their fear of retaliation; for it was laid down before that such a condition of fear is p. 134.
formidable. So too people who are competitors for the same objects as ourselves, if they are such as cannot be enjoyed simultaneously by both; for we are always at war with people of this kind. Or people who are formidable to our superiors; for if they can actually injure our superiors, *a fortiori* they will be able to injure us. Or who inspire our superiors with fear, for the same reason. Or who have destroyed our superiors, [1]or are making an attack upon our inferiors; for the former are formidable already, and the latter *will be formidable*, when their power has been increased. Among people who have been injured by us and among our enemies or rivals it is not the quick-tempered and outspoken who are formidable, but the undemonstrative and hypocritical and unscrupulous, as we never know whether their attack is imminent and consequently are never sure that it is remote. Again, any formidable thing is

[1] There should be only a colon after ἀνῃρηκότες; the reason alleged below applies to both the preceding clauses.

still more formidable, if it is one in which a mistake, once made, cannot be repaired, whether indeed it is absolutely irreparable or reparable only at the pleasure of our adversaries and not at our own. Or if it is one in which remedial action is impossible or very difficult. Generally speaking too, a thing is formidable to us, if it [1]excites compassion when it happens or threatens to happen to others.

Such then being practically the principal things which are formidable and objects of fear, let us proceed to describe the mental conditions under which we ourselves experience fear.

Conditions of fear.

Assuming that fear is attended by an expectation of suffering something of a destructive kind, we see at once that nobody is subject to fear who regards himself as incapable of suffering; nor does anybody feel fear of things which he thinks he will be unlikely to suffer or of people from whom or at times during which he thinks he will be unlikely to suffer them. It is a necessary condition therefore of fear that a person should regard himself as capable of suffering *in the abstract* and of suffering at the hands of particular people and in particular ways and at particular times. Now people who do not believe in their own capability of suffering are those who are or think they are in great prosperity and who are consequently insolent, contemptuous, and audacious, being made so by wealth or bodily strength or the number of their *clientèle* or their power; or again, those who think they have already drained the cup of woes and who have grown

[1] *ἐλλεεινά* is a mere misprint for *ἐλεεινά*.

callous in regard to the future, like persons at the point of being bastinadoed to death; *they have no fear, for they have lost all hope,* whereas *in order that fear may be possible* there must be still some underlying hope of preservation from the evil which causes their agony. One evidence of this truth is that fear inclines people to deliberation, whereas nobody deliberates about a case which is hopeless. Whenever it is our interest then to inspire our audience with fear, it is proper to produce upon their minds the impression that they are capable of suffering, inasmuch as others who were greater than they suffered before them, and to give instances of their peers suffering or having suffered, and that from unexpected quarters and in unexpected ways and at unexpected times.

(6) Confidence.

Having ascertained now the nature of fear and of formidable things and the conditions under which particular classes of people are afraid, we see at once as a corollary the nature of confidence, the sort of things which inspire confidence and the mental conditions under which we are confident. For as confidence is opposed to fear, and what is a source of confidence to a source of fear, it follows that the hope *which is the characteristic of confidence* is accompanied by an impression of salutary things as near at hand and of formidable things as nonexistent or remote. The sources of confidence are the remoteness of dangers and the nearness of [1]encouragements. *We feel confidence* too, if there are

Its nature.

Sources of confidence.

[1] The use of the adjective θαρραλέος in the definition of τὰ θαρραλέα is a singular carelessness.

means of rectification or remedy, whether numerous or effectual or both, and if we have been neither the victims nor the perpetrators of crime, and if we have no competitors at all or such as are powerless or, if powerful, such as are friendly to us or have rendered us services or received services from us, or if the persons whose interests coincide with our own are in a superiority of numbers or power or both.

Conditions of confidence.

The conditions under which we feel confidence are when we suppose we have often succeeded and not come to harm, or when we have often encountered dangers and survived them; for there are two ways in which people are rendered [1]insensible *to fear*, viz. either by having had no previous experience *of the danger* or by possessing resources *against it*, as in times of peril at sea it is people who have never seen a storm on the one hand and people whose experience furnishes them with resources on the other that face the future with confidence. Another *condition which inspires confidence* is when the danger is not formidable to our peers or inferiors or to those to whom we consider ourselves superior, as is the case, if we have conquered either them or their superiors or peers. Or when we consider ourselves to have the advantage in the number and degree of those points of superiority which make people formidable, i.e. in wealth, bodily strength, or strength of connexions, of territory and of all or the most important sinews of

[1] *ἀπαθεῖς* has here the sense of freedom, not, as usually, from the *πάθη* in general but from the *πάθος* which is especially under consideration, i.e. fear.

war. Or when we have not committed any crime against anyone or against many people or against such people as are the objects of our fear; [1] or again in general if our relations to the gods, especially as shown by omens and oracles, are satisfactory; for there is a certain amount of confidence in anger, and it is a sense of crime committed against us rather than by us which is provocative of anger, and Heaven is assumed to be on the side of the injured. Or *lastly* when we suppose we are likely or certain to take no harm or to be successful in our undertaking.

So much then for the objects which inspire either fear or confidence. I proceed to explain the characteristics of such objects as excite sentiments of shame or shamelessness, the persons in whose presence they are experienced and the conditions under which we experience them. **CHAP. VI. (7) Shame. (8) Shamelessness.**

Shame may be defined as a species of pain or disturbance in regard to evil things, either past, present or future, which have an appearance of tending to ignominy; and shamelessness as a species of slight or indifference in regard to these same things. **Definition of shame and of shamelessness.**

Such then being the definition we give of shame, it necessarily follows that we feel shame at all such evil things as appear to be shameful either to ourselves or to the objects of our care, such e.g. as actions which are the results of vice, like the throwing away a shield *in battle* or running away; for these actions **Consequences of the definition of shame. Shameful actions.**

[1] Changing the full stop after φοβοῦνται, as Mr Cope himself suggests, to a colon, in order to mark that the clauses θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή κ.τ.λ. are explanatory of both preceding sentences.

both result from cowardice. Another instance is the refusal to restore a deposit, such an action being a result of criminality. Or sexual intercourse with improper persons or in improper places or at improper times, as it proceeds from a licentious disposition. Or again to make money from mean or shameful sources or from those who cannot help themselves as e.g. the poor or the dead, (whence the proverb "to rob even a corpse *of its shroud*"), for such conduct springs from illiberality and a sordid love of gain. Or to refuse pecuniary assistance, when it is in one's power to give it, or to give it in an inadequate measure. Or to receive such assistance from persons who are not so wealthy as oneself. [1]Or borrowing when it will look like begging, or begging when it will look like asking a return, or asking a return when it will look like begging, or flattering with the view of being taken to beg, and this persistently in spite of previous failure; for all such conduct is a mark of illiberality. [2]*It is shameful* too to praise a person to his face, to praise his good points up to the sky and gloss over his weaknesses, or to display in his presence an exaggerated sympathy with his griefs, and so on, all these being marks of flattery. Or again to be unequal to the endurance

[1] The four cases mentioned may perhaps be illustrated as follows: (1) to ask for a loan of money when you have often borrowed money before and never repaid it, (2) to ask for it from one to whom you have recently rendered some service, (3) to ask for the repayment of a loan when it is not the time or place to ask for it, (4) to praise a person's liberality until it is clear that what you want is some pecuniary help from him.

[2] Omitting *κολακείας*.

of such labours as have been borne by persons who are our seniors or who live luxurious lives or who are higher in authority or in general who are less robust; for all this is a sign of effeminacy. Or to receive services from a neighbour and to receive them often and then to cast one's own services to him in his teeth, these being so many signs of a mean and grovelling temper. Or to employ large and boastful language about oneself and to take credit for the good deeds of other people; for this again is a sign of arrogant assumption. And the same is true of the results of every other vice of character, and of the signs of it and resemblances to it; they are shameful and provoke a feeling of shame. I may add that it is shameful not to participate in the advantages in which all people or all one's own peers or most of them participate, meaning by 'peers' one's co-nationalists, fellow-citizens, contemporaries or kinsfolk and generally all who stand on an equality with us; for *if they are one's equals*, it is at once shameful not to participate in the same advantages with them, as e.g. not to receive equal educational advantages, and so on. And in all these instances the shame is the greater, if the defect is due apparently to oneself; for it necessarily appears to be the result of vice rather than of any other cause, if one has oneself alone to thank for one's defects past, present or to come. [1] Again, we are ashamed of being or having been or being likely to be subjected to such things as tend to bring upon us dishonour and reproach, i.e. to actions which imply a subservience

[1] Putting a full stop after μελλόντων.

of the person or a subservience in respect of shameful deeds, among which I include wanton outrage. In cases of incontinency this subservience *is shameful*, whether it be voluntary or not [1](involuntary subservience being subservience under compulsion) as such passive endurance and non-resistance is itself a result of effeminacy or cowardice.

Such and similar to these are the things of which we feel ashamed. But as shame is an impression in regard to the loss of reputation, and this on its own account without reference to its consequences, and as nobody values reputation or good opinion except for the sake of those who entertain it, it follows that the persons before whom we feel shame are those whom we hold in some esteem. This is the case with people who admire us, or whom we admire, or whose admiration we desire to win, or whose rivals we are, or whose good opinion we do not despise. Now we desire the admiration of people, and ourselves admire them, if they are in possession of some good which confers distinction, or if we have a strong desire of something of which they are masters, as e.g. in the case of lovers. Again, the people whose rivals we are are our peers, and the people whom we esteem as authorities *upon any question* are persons of practical wisdom i.e. persons advanced in life or highly cultured. *The shame we feel too is* the greater in proportion to the patency and notoriety of the

Persons who inspire a feeling of shame.

[1] Mr Cope's reading of the passage is an improvement: *καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα (τὰ δ' εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα) ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας κ.τ.λ.*

facts; whence the proverb which says that [1] the eye is the seat of modesty. It is for this reason that we feel a greater shame before such persons as will continually be near us or as watch us closely; for in both cases there are eyes upon us. Or before persons who are not liable to the same imputations as we are; for it is clear that their sentiments are opposed to our own. Or who are not inclined to be indulgent to apparent failings; for as a man is supposed not to be indignant with his neighbours for doing what he does himself, it is evident *conversely* that he is indignant, if they do what he does not do himself. Or who are fond of spreading reports; for a fault may as well not be suspected as *suspected and* not spread abroad. The people who are likely to spread reports are those who have been injured by us, as they are always on the watch for their opportunity, and slanderers, who will speak evil of the innocent and therefore *a fortiori* of the guilty. Also *we have a feeling of shame before persons* who devote themselves to the study of their neighbours' faults, as e.g. satirists and comic poets; for these too are in a certain sense slanderers and telltales. Or before persons in whose presence we have never met with a failure, as to them we may be said to be objects of admiration. This is the reason why we have a feeling of shame in refusing persons who ask a favour of us for the first time, from the idea that we have never yet lost credit

[1] It may be doubted whether Aristotle applies this proverbial saying rightly, when he takes it to mean that, the more public or visible a shameful deed is, the greater is the shame attaching to it.

in their eyes. It is the same with those who have recently conceived a wish to be our friends; for it is the best points only *in our character* that they have observed, and hence the appropriateness of the [1]answer which Euripides made to the Syracusans. It is the same too with old acquaintances who have no knowledge of anything against us. Nor is it only of the actual shameful things which have been mentioned that we are ashamed, but of anything that is indicative of them, as e.g. of the indications of illicit love no less than of the illicit love itself. Nor is it only of shameful deeds that we are ashamed but of shameful words. Similarly it is not only the persons above described of whom we feel shame, but those too who will give them information, let us say e.g. servants or their friends. Generally speaking however, we do not feel shame before persons for whose accuracy of judgment we entertain a great contempt—nobody e.g. feels shame before children or animals—nor again is it about the same things that we feel shame before our own intimate acquaintances and before strangers, but before the former it is about

[1] The answer, as it is given by the Scholiast, has certainly the air of an invention. Euripides (he says), being sent on an embassy to Syracuse and finding that his efforts on behalf of peace and friendship were unsuccessful, said "You ought, O Syracusans, to respect our prayer and the homage we seem thus to pay you, if for no other reason, yet because we have so recently begun to ask favours of you." It is not however in itself improbable that Euripides, who, as Plutarch relates, was a favourite poet in Sicily, may have been sent to treat with the Syracusans for the ransom of the captives after the disastrous expedition described in the Seventh Book of Thucydides.

such things as are considered to be really and truly shameful and before the latter about things which are shameful only conventionally.

Conditions of shame.

The conditions under which we are likely to feel shame are the following: Firstly, if there are certain persons actually standing to us in the relation of those before whom, as we said, we feel shame, i.e. persons who are admired by us, or who admire us, or whose admiration we wish to win, or at whose hands we require a certain service which we shall not obtain, if we lose credit in their eyes, and these either actual spectators *of our conduct* (as in the example of the harangue delivered by Cydias respecting the [1]colonization of Samos, when he begged the Athenians to imagine that all Greece was standing around them as eyewitnesses of their votes and not as mere hearers only after the event), or again if the persons described are near at hand or are sure to perceive what we do. This is the reason why in the hour of our misfortune we do not wish to be seen by those who were once our emulators, emulation being a form of admiration. Another *condition in which we feel shame* is when we are conscious of achievements and actions upon which we shall bring dishonour, whether they be our own or those of our ancestors or of others to whom we are intimately related, [2]or in general of those on whose behalf we ourselves

p. 142.

[1] There were several occasions on which colonists (*κληροῦχοι*) were sent to Samos; but nothing is known of Cydias or his speech. As to the nature of *κληρουχία* see Mr Grote's *History of Greece*, ch. xxxi. vol. IV. pp. 97—8.

[2] Changing the full stop after *ἀγχιστεία τις* to a comma.

have feelings of shame, i.e. not only the persons already described, but all who guide themselves by the standard of our lives, whose teachers and counsellors we have been, or other people, if such there be, like ourselves, whose rivals we are; for it is from a consideration for them that a feeling of shame often leads us to act or to abstain from acting. And again we are liable to shame in a higher degree when we are likely to be seen by the witnesses of our disgrace and to associate with them publicly. This was the point of the remark made by the poet Antiphon when he had been sentenced by Dionysius to be bastinadoed to death and saw his fellow-victims covering their faces on their way through the gates: "What is the good of covering your faces?" he said, "are you afraid of somebody here seeing you to-morrow?"

So much then may be said respecting shame. In regard to shamelessness on the other hand it is evident that, if we choose the topics opposite to these, we shall be at no loss for arguments.

CHAP. VII. (9) Benevolence.

The objects of [1]benevolence, the occasions which prompt it and the conditions under which it is felt will be evident, when we have defined benevolence itself.

Definition of benevolence.

It is benevolence, we may say, in virtue of which the person in whom it resides is said to render a

[1] It is necessary in this chapter to observe that the single word χάρις is used in three different senses, (1) benevolence, as a disposition or, as Aristotle calls it, an emotion, (2) a benevolent action, (3) the disposition created by benevolent actions, viz. gratitude.

service to anybody in the hour of need, not in return for previous services nor for any personal benefit to him who renders it but for the benefit of the recipient alone. Further, the service is a great one, if the need of it is extreme, or if its results are great and difficult of attainment, or if it is done at a crisis which is great and difficult, or if this is the only or the first or the greatest occasion of its being done. Means of enhancing benevolence.

All our natural impulses are needs, especially those which are attended with pain, unless gratified, as e.g. [1]our desires, such as love [2]and others which are incident to times of physical suffering and peril; for desire is felt by anyone in danger or in pain. Hence it is that those who stand by us in poverty and exile, although the service which they have rendered us be a trifling one, yet from the magnitude of our need and the critical occasion are our benefactors, like [3]the man who lent the mat in the Lyceum. It follows then that the service rendered must have reference, if possible, [4]to these points, *which enhance its value*, and, if not, to others of equal or greater importance. As it is evident therefore what are the occasions and causes of benevolence

[1] *οἱ ἐπιθυμίαι* should of course be *αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι*.

[2] The stop after *ἔρως* should be changed to a comma.

[3] The Scholiast has a story of a man being shut up in a tower and another who passed by throwing him a mat, so that he could let himself down and escape. But it is a story apparently made to suit the text. The allusion cannot now be explained.

[4] Reading *εἰς ταῦτα* I agree with Bonitz (*Index Aristotelicus*, s. v. *ἔχειν*) in taking *τὴν ὑπουργίαν* as the subject of *ἔχειν* and *εἰς ταῦτα ἔχειν* as a single phrase meaning "to be directed to these ends."

and the usual conditions under which we feel it, it is clear that these are the materials which we must employ in trying [1]to work upon *the feelings of our audience;* we must show that the person benefited either is or has been in such want or pain as has been described and on the other hand that the benefactor has done or is doing such a service in such circumstances of need. Nor is it less evident how to rob a deed of its benevolence and to represent its authors as anything but benevolent, by urging that it is for purely selfish motives (which exclude benevolence) that the service is or was rendered, or that it was the result of accident or strong compulsion, or that it was a repayment of past services and not a free gift, whether its authors were aware of this or not; for in either case it was only a return and consequently still not an act of pure benevolence. And in examining a benevolent action we must consider it in regard to all the [2]categories; for it is such, either as being a particular thing or as having a particular magnitude or character or as being done at a particular time or in a particular place. We infer *the absence of a benevolent intention in a kind deed,* if the person has refused to render us a smaller service or has rendered the same or an equal or greater service to our enemies; for in this case again it is evident that the deed was

Means of disparaging benevolence.

[1] I take παρασκευαστέον in the sense of "working upon" or "influencing" an audience. Cp. the use of παρασκευάζειν, p. 61, l. 22, p. 66, l. 17, p. 76, l. 16. Aristotle uses κατασκευάζειν in the same sense, e.g. p. 54, l. 23, p. 59, l. 20.

[2] The ten Categories are enumerated Κατηγορίαι, ch. 4.

not done from disinterested motives. We have the same feeling, if it was valueless and the author knew it to be so; for nobody admits that he wants what is valueless.

CHAP. VIII. (10) Compassion.

Having now described benevolence and its opposite, we may proceed to consider the things which excite compassion, the objects of compassion and the conditions under which we feel it.

Definition of compassion.

Compassion may be defined as a sort of pain at an evident evil of a destructive or painful kind in the case of somebody who does not deserve it, the evil being one to which we may naturally expect ourselves or some one of our own friends to be liable, and this at a time when it appears to be near at hand; for it is plain that a person who is to be capable of compassion must be so constituted as to regard himself or some one of his friends as liable to suffering evil of some kind, and *not only to evil in the abstract but* to such evil as has been stated in the definition or such as is similar or comparable to it. Hence it is that compassion is not felt by those who are absolutely ruined—for they regard themselves as incapable of further suffering, their own sufferings being already past—nor again by those who believe in their own supreme felicity, and who *are not compassionate but rather* insolent; for if they suppose themselves to be in the enjoyment of all possible goods, it is clear that exemption from the possibility of any evil, as being itself a good, will be among the number. The people who would naturally regard themselves as liable to suffering are those who have already experienced suffering and survived it, or

Conditions of compassion.

those who are somewhat advanced in years, as they possess both sagacity and experience, or those who are *physically* weak or who are especially inclined to be timid or who are well-informed and therefore able to calculate probabilities. The same is true of people who have parents or children or wives living, as these are all parts of a man's self and are liable to such sufferings as have been mentioned. It is true too of those who are not in any such emotional state as engenders courage, e.g. anger or confidence (for these are states which are wholly reckless of the future), nor in an insolent disposition of mind (as people who are insolent are equally reckless of future suffering), but who are in an intermediate condition ; [1]and who on the other hand are not in a state of vehement fear; for there is no feeling of compassion in people who are terror-stricken, as they think of nothing but their own emotion. Again, *it is necessary to the feeling of compassion* that we should believe in the existence of human virtue; for he who does not believe in anybody's virtue will consider that everybody is deserving of evil. It is in a word a general rule *that a person is liable to compassion,* whenever he is in condition to recall similar events as having happened either to himself or to any of his friends or to anticipate the possibility of their happening either to himself or to any of his friends.

Causes of compassion.

Such then being the conditions under which we feel compassion, the objects of compassion are evident from the definition. They are all such painful and

[1] Placing only a comma after *τούτων*, as the grammatical construction, like the sense, is unbroken.

distressing things as are destructive and ruinous, and all such evils as are produced by Fortune, if they are serious. By things painful and destructive I mean death in its various forms, bodily injuries and afflictions, old age, disease and want of food; by the evils of Fortune the absolute lack or the scarcity of friends (and it follows that the separation from friends and intimate acquaintances excites compassion), physical deformity, constitutional weakness and bodily mutilation. Another thing which excites compassion is the occurrence, and *still more* the frequent recurrence, of an evil result from something which naturally might have been expected to lead to good. Another is the attainment of some good, when all is over with the person to whom it comes, [1]as e.g. the present sent from the Great King to Diopeithes at the time when he was already lying dead. Another is the utter failure either to attain anything good or, when it is attained, to enjoy it.

Such then and similar to these being the causes which excite compassion, the persons who are the objects of compassionate feeling are our familiar friends, unless indeed they are very closely related to us, for then our feeling for them is much the same as it would be for ourselves in imminent peril. It was thus that [2]Amasis, while he shed no tears, as the

Objects of compassion.

[1] The incident is unknown; for the story which the Scholiast tells is clearly unfounded.

[2] The story is told by Herodotus Bk. iii. ch. 14, but the person of whom he tells it is not Amasis but his successor Psammenitus. It is possible that Aristotle in the words ὡς φασίν is not referring specially to Herodotus. It is more likely however that he has made a slip of memory.

story goes, when his son was led away to execution, wept when his friend asked an alms of him, the reason being that, while the latter spectacle moved him to compassion, the former moved him only to terror; for the motive cause of terror is not only distinct from that of compassion but is calculated to expel compassionate feelings and *even* serves in many cases to arouse its opposites. [1]Again, we experience a feeling of compassion, when the danger *which threatens others* approaches ourselves. We compassionate those who are like ourselves in age, character, habit of mind, reputation or family, as in all these cases there appears to be a greater probability of the same misfortune happening to ourselves *as to them;* for in regard to compassion again it is a general principle to be observed that whatever moves us to fear, when it affects ourselves, moves us to compassion, when it affects other people. And as sufferings are objects of compassion if they are apparently close at hand, whereas, if they occurred ten thousand years ago or will occur ten thousand years hence, the anticipation or remembrance of them, as the case may be, either excites no compassion at all in us or excites it in a much smaller degree, it necessarily follows that orators are more successful in arousing compassion, if they

Means of exciting compassion.

[1] Such must apparently be the meaning, if the text is right; cp. p. 72, l. 4. But Vahlen has some reason for suggesting that it should be οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος. Cp. p. 73, l. 8. Aristotle's view is that evil is apt to excite compassion, when it comes near us; but if it comes too near, if it attacks our intimate friends or kinsfolk, the compassion is changed into terror.

aid the effect of their words by their gestures, tones, habiliments and dramatic action of any kind; for by setting an evil before our very eyes, whether as future or as past, they give it an appearance of proximity. Events of the recent past or of the near future excite a higher degree of compassion for the same reason. Again, *among the elements of compassion it is right to mention* the visible signs *of a tragic event* or [1]*the vivid representation of a person's* actions, as e.g. the clothes and other such relics of the sufferers or the expressions and other such characteristics of people in the hour of their suffering, as e.g. in the very hour of death. But the most powerful of all such elements is a noble demeanour of the sufferer in these critical moments. For all these circumstances increase the compassionate feeling from the apparent proximity of the evil to ourselves, from the impression that it was undeserved by the sufferer and from the vivid representation of it before our eyes.

CHAP. IX. (11) Virtuous indignation.

The proper correlative of compassion is what is called virtuous indignation. For the feeling of pain at unmerited prosperity is in some sense opposed to the feeling of pain at unmerited misfortune, and it proceeds from the same character. Also both these emotions are proper to a virtuous character; for it is right not only to be sympathetic and compassionate in cases of undeserved misfortune but to be virtuously indignant in cases of undeserved prosperity, as any violation of the principle of desert is

[1] Probably the words καὶ τὰς πράξεις should be placed before καὶ λόγους l. 29.

Distinction between virtuous indignation and envy.

an injustice. [1]Accordingly we attribute a feeling of virtuous indignation even to the Gods. It may be supposed that envy too is in the same sense opposite to compassionate feeling, as being closely connected and indeed identical with virtuous indignation; but really it is different, as although envy, no less than virtuous indignation, is a pain which causes perturbation and is felt in reference to *another's* prosperity, yet it is not now the prosperity of someone who is undeserving but of someone equal and similar to ourselves. [2]That the feeling is wholly disinterested and arises solely from the circumstances of our neighbour is a necessary and equally essential feature of both these emotions; for the one will cease to be virtuous indignation and the other to be envy, and, *instead of being such*, each of them will be *merely* fear, if the ground of the actual pain and perturbation is the expectation that some evil consequence to ourselves will result from the prosperity of the other. It is clear too that these emotions will be attended by their opposites. A person who feels pain at unmerited misfortune will feel pleasure or *at least* will not feel any pain at misfortune when it has been merited; thus no virtuous person will feel any pain when punishment falls upon parricides or murderers, as it is our duty to rejoice at such cases, and similarly at cases of merited prosperity; for both are agreeable to justice and fill the heart of a good man with

[1] There should be a full stop or a colon after γιγνόμενον.

[2] The sentence, if fully expressed, would run, τὸ δὲ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον κ.τ.λ., i.e. literally "the not being grieved because of some evil that will happen to oneself."

joy in the hope, which he naturally feels, that what has happened to one who resembles him may equally happen to himself. Further, [1]all these feelings are proper to the same character, and the opposite feelings to the opposite character; for a person who is envious will also be malicious as, if he feels pain at the acquisition or possession of a thing *by another*, he will by a necessary consequence feel pleasure at the denial or destruction of it. Accordingly these feelings, *viz. virtuous indignation, envy and malice*, while they have all a tendency to prevent compassion, are different for the reasons already assigned and in consequence may all alike be serviceable as means of destroying the compassionable aspect of things. Malice.

Let us then consider first the feeling of virtuous indignation, the persons against whom it is directed, the occasions which excite it and the conditions under which we are subject to it, and proceed afterwards to the other emotions.

Definition of virtuous indignation.

But the truth is evident from what has been already said; for if virtuous indignation is a feeling of pain at such prosperity as is apparently unmerited, it is clear in the first place that it is impossible to feel such indignation at goods of every kind *indiscriminately*. It is not for being just or courageous or for acquiring virtue that one will feel a righteous indignation against a person, as neither are compassionate feelings excited by the opposites of justice, courage and virtue, but on account of wealth, power

Objects of virtuous indignation.

[1] "All these feelings," i.e. pleasure at (1) merited good fortune, (2) merited ill fortune, and vexation at (1) unmerited good fortune, (2) unmerited ill fortune.

and the like, and indeed in general terms of all such things as are properly due to those who are *morally* good and who are in possession of the goods of nature, i.e. of nobility, beauty and the like. And as antiquity *of possession* seems to approximate to natural right, it follows that, where two persons are in possession of the same good, the indignation felt is the greater in the case of one who has recently acquired it and who is prosperous in consequence of the acquisition; for greater annoyance is caused to us by the *nouveaux riches* than by persons of ancient and hereditary wealth. The same may be said too of official status, power, a numerous *clientèle*, a good and beautiful family and the like. Nor is it otherwise with any other good which may accrue to persons in consequence of these; for here again it is the *nouveaux riches* in the enjoyment of an official position which they owe to their wealth who are a greater source of annoyance to us than members of the old substantial families. It is the same again in all other cases. The reason is that the old proprietors seem to possess what is theirs *by right*, and the others do not; for the appearance of perpetuity has an air of reality, so that the *nouveaux riches* look as though they were usurpers. Again, each particular kind of good is not appropriate to all persons indiscriminately, but there is a certain correspondence and propriety, fine armour e.g. being appropriate not to the just man but rather to the brave, and grand alliances not so much to the *nouveaux riches* as to members of the *genuine* aristocracy. [1]Accordingly

[1] Mr Cope is clearly right in regarding the protasis, which has

it is a cause of virtuous indignation that a person, if his character stands high, should fail of his appropriate reward, or that an inferior should compete with one who is superior to him, [1]especially when the comparison is made on ground common to both; whence the saying of Homer *that Cebriones*

> [2]"Shunned the good sword of Telamonian Aias;
> For Zeus was wroth with whoso combated
> Against a braver hero,"

but in a less degree whatever be the point of inferiority, as e.g. if a musician enters into competition with a just man, inasmuch as justice is a better thing than music.

The persons against whom we feel righteous indignation and the causes of it are now evident; for they are such as have been described or very similar.

Passing to the conditions, we are disposed to this indignation, if it is the case that we deserve the greatest goods and actually possess them, as there is something unjust in the promotion of persons who are unlike ourselves *and inferior to us* to the like advantages. [3]A second condition is when we are

Conditions of virtuous indignation.

been broken by the intervening examples, as resumed in the words ἐὰν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν κ.τ.λ. But it seems better to break up the sentence in translating.

[1] A bad musician competing with a good one would be an instance of a comparison made "on ground common to both" (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ); a musician competing with a just man would be a comparison of another kind.

[2] *Iliad* xi. 542. The second line does not occur in the received text of Homer.

[3] It is not quite easy to distinguish the second case from the first; hence Muretus proposed to insert μὴ before τυγχάνωσιν. But

good and virtuous persons; for then we are good judges and haters of injustice. A third, when we are ambitious and eagerly desirous of particular functions, and especially if our ambition directs itself to certain objects of which others, who attain them, are unworthy. It is indeed a general rule that, if we consider ourselves to be worthy of particular things and others to be unworthy of them, we are liable to feel a virtuous indignation against them and to feel it on account of these things. And from this it follows that slavish, mean and unambitious natures are not subject to virtuous indignation, as there is nothing of which they consider themselves to be worthy.

From all this it is evident what are the cases of misfortune, disaster or failure in which it is proper to rejoice or at least to feel no pain; for from the conditions which have been described the opposite conditions are manifest, and the result is that, if the speech which is delivered produces a proper frame of mind in the judges who hear it and proves that those who claim compassion on certain specified grounds do not deserve to obtain it or even deserve not to obtain it, in such case the feeling of compassion becomes impossible.

CHAP. X. (12) Envy. Definition of envy.

Nor is it difficult to see what are the occasions and objects of envy and the conditions under which we feel envious, envy being defined as a species of

in the first case the ground of indignation is, I think, that others, who are less deserving than we are, are promoted to an equality with us; in the second it is that others are promoted to advantages which they do not deserve, whether we ourselves enjoy them or not.

pain felt at conspicuous prosperity on the part of persons like ourselves in respect of such goods as have been already described, and this not with any view to our own personal advantage but *solely* because they are prosperous.

For people will be envious, if there are or if they think there are persons like themselves, like, I mean, in race, family, age, habit of mind, reputation or possessions. Or if they only just fall short of having everything *which men can desire;* hence the envious disposition of persons who are engaged in important affairs or who are highly prosperous, as they fancy all the world is robbing them of their due. Or again if they have a permanent reputation for something, and especially for wisdom or happiness. Ambitious persons too are more liable to envy than the unambitious. Pretenders to wisdom are envious, as being ambitious of the credit of wisdom; and in general persons who are eager for reputation in a particular subject are envious in regard to it. Lastly, mean-minded persons are envious; for everything appears important to them.

Conditions of envy.

As regards the occasions of envy, the goods which provoke it have been already stated; for all achievements or possessions of which we covet the reputation or are ambitious, all things which arouse in us a longing for reputation, as well as all the various gifts of Fortune are practically without exception natural objects of envy, and of these such especially as we ourselves either desire or imagine we have a right to possess, or as by their acquisition confer a slight superiority or inferiority.

Causes of envy.

Objects of envy.

It is clear too who are the natural objects of envy, as they are implied in the statement which has just been made; they are persons who are near to us in time, place, age or reputation. Hence the saying

[1] "For to be kin is to be envious."

We are envious too of people whom we are ambitious of rivalling, i.e. of such people as have been mentioned, but not of those who lived many ages ago or who are yet unborn or dead or [2]at the ends of the world. Nor again, where there are people to whom we think we are far inferior or far superior, whether we depend upon our own opinion only or upon that of the world at large, have we the same feeling of rivalry in regard to them and in cases like theirs. But as this rivalry extends to those who are our antagonists in any competition or in love and indeed to all who aspire to the same things as ourselves, these will necessarily be the principal objects of envy; whence the proverb "Two of a trade never agree." Again, we are envious of people who have attained a rapid success, if we have succeeded with difficulty or have not succeeded at all. Or of people whose possession of a thing or whose success is a reproach to us, such people again being near and similar to ourselves; for as it is evidently [3]our own fault that we fail to obtain the good *which they obtain*, it is the annoyance of this fact which

[1] A line attributed by the Scholiast to Æschylus.

[2] The pillars of Hercules were in the Greek view the bounds of the known world.

[3] Reading παρ' αὑτούς.

produces in us the feeling of envy. Or again of people who either naturally or by acquisition possess anything which naturally belonged to us or had been acquired by us; this is the reason why seniors are envious of their juniors. Lastly, people who have spent a large sum upon a particular thing are envious of those who have spent little upon it *with an equal result.*

We see now clearly [1]the occasions upon which envious people experience a feeling of pleasure, the persons whose cases give rise to such a feeling and the conditions under which people experience it; [2]for, whatever be the conditions the absence of which produces pain *at certain things,* their presence will produce pleasure at the opposite things. Hence if the audience has been brought to an envious condition of mind and the persons on whose behalf a claim to compassion or to good of any kind is advanced are such as have been described, *i.e. proper objects of envy,* it is evident that they will not meet with compassion at the hands of those who are masters of the position.

The conditions of emulation, its causes and the persons who are the objects of it are evident from the following considerations. CHAP. XI. (13) Emulation.

[1] Reading ἐφ' οἷς, the οἷς being neuter.

[2] Upon the whole, although not without a good deal of uncertainty, I have retained the οὐκ before ἔχοντες. Aristotle's meaning seems to be this: that, if there are certain conditions which excite pain in the bosom of the envious man, then the opposite conditions will excite pleasure in it, and that, while the cause of the pain is the good fortune of people like himself, the cause of

Definition of emulation.

Emulation is a species of pain at the manifest presence of such goods as are valued highly and also attainable by ourselves in persons who have a natural resemblance to us, and this not because somebody else is in possession of them but because we are not equally in possession of them ourselves. [1](Accordingly emulation is a virtuous emotion, and its subjects are virtuous, whereas envy is vicious, and its subjects vicious; for while the emulous man is induced by his emulation to contrive that he himself should acquire these goods, the envious man is induced by his envy to contrive that his neighbour should not enjoy them.) It follows at once then that people are inclined to emulation, if they consider themselves entitled to goods which they do not actually enjoy, *provided of course that these goods are attainable by them*, for nobody supposes himself to be entitled to such goods as are evidently impossible. This is the ground of emulation in the young and the highminded. It is the same in persons who possess such goods as are appropriate to people who are held in honour, i.e. wealth, a large circle of friends, official positions and so on; for it is from the feeling that they have a natural claim to goodness, as possessing the things which, as we have seen, naturally belong to the good, that they emulously claim such goods as are the marks of honour. It is the same too in

Conditions of emulation.

the pleasure will be the opposite of it, viz. the ill-fortune of people like himself.

[1] The sentence enclosed in brackets is parenthetical. The apodosis begins at the words ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικοὺς μὲν εἶναι.

persons who are regarded by the world at large as entitled to these goods. Again, if there is any particular thing for which our ancestors or kinsmen or friends or race or nation have been held in honour, it is a subject upon which we are disposed to emulation, thinking that it is proper to ourselves and that we have a title to it.

Causes of emulation. If then it is such goods as are held in honour which are the objects of emulation, it follows that this is true of the virtues and of all things which are serviceable and beneficial to the world at large, as we hold our benefactors and good men generally in honour, [1]and also of all goods from which our neighbours derive enjoyment, such as wealth and personal beauty rather than health.

Objects of emulation. It is evident also who are the objects of emulation. They are persons who are in possession of these or similar advantages, e.g. valour, wisdom, and official power; for a great opportunity of beneficence is open to persons in power, such as generals, orators and all who have influential positions of a similar kind. Or again they are persons who are widely looked upon as models or as desirable acquaintances and friends or who are objects of admiration to the world at large or to ourselves or whose eulogies and panegyrics are pronounced by poets and orators.

(14) Contempt. The objects of contempt are the opposites of these, contempt being the antithesis of emulation, and a contemptuous mood of an emulous one. **Conditions of contempt.** It follows that those who are in a condition to emulate others or to be themselves the objects of emulation,

[1] Reading only a colon after ἀγαθούς.

will be so far inclined to contemn those who are subject to such evils as are contrary to the goods which provoke emulation. And hence we often contemn fortunate people, when their Fortune is unattended by such goods as are held in honour.

So much then for the means of creating and dissipating the emotions, these means being the sources of argumentative proofs respecting them.

CHAP. XII. Varieties of character.

It remains for us to describe the varieties of character dependent upon the emotions, habits of mind, times of life and accidents of Fortune, meaning by "emotions" anger, desire and the like, which have been already discussed, and by "habits of mind" virtues and vices; these too have been already discussed pp. 60, 61. as well as the objects of individual choice and action. The "times of life" are youth, the prime of life and age. And by "Fortune" I mean nobility, wealth, power in any of its forms and the opposites of these and indeed any kind of prosperity or adversity.

The character of youth.

The young are in character prone to desire and ready to carry any desire they may have formed into action. Of bodily desires it is the sexual to which they are most disposed to give way, and in regard to sexual desire they exercise no self-restraint. They are changeful too and fickle in their desires, which are as transitory as they are vehement; for their wishes are keen without being permanent, like a sick man's fits of hunger and thirst. They are passionate, irascible and apt to be carried away by their impulses. They are the slaves too of their passion, as their ambition prevents their ever brooking a slight and renders them indignant at the mere idea of enduring an

injury. And while they are fond of honour, they are fonder still of victory; for superiority is the object of youthful desire, and victory is a species of superiority. Again, they are fonder both of honour and of victory than of money, the reason why they care so little for money being that they have never yet had experience of want, as [1]the saying of Pittacus about Amphiaraus puts it. They are charitable rather than the reverse, as they have never yet been witnesses of many villainies; and they are trustful, as they have not yet been often deceived. They are sanguine too; for the young are heated by Nature as drunken men *by wine*, not to say that they have not yet experienced frequent failures. Their lives are lived principally in hope, as hope is of the future and memory of the past, and while the future of youth is long, its past is short; for on the first day of life it is impossible to remember anything, but all things must be matters of hope. For the same reason they are easily deceived, as being quick to hope. They are inclined to be valorous; for they are full of passion, which excludes fear, and of hope, which inspires confidence, as anger is incompatible with fear, and the hope of something good is itself a source of confidence. They are bashful too, having as yet no independent standard of honour and having lived entirely in the school of conventional law. They have high aspirations; for they have never yet been humiliated by the experience of life, but are unacquainted with the limiting force of circumstances; and a great idea of one's own deserts, such as is characteristic of a sanguine disposition, is itself a form of high aspiration.

[1] The saying is unknown.

Again, in their actions they prefer honour to expediency, as it is habit rather than calculation which is the rule of their lives, and, while calculation pays regard to expediency, virtue pays regard *exclusively* to honour. Youth is the age when people are most devoted to their friends or relations or companions, as they are then extremely fond of social intercourse and have not yet learnt to judge their friends or indeed anything else by the rule of expediency. If the young commit a fault, it is always on the side of excess and exaggeration in defiance of [1] Chilon's maxim; for they carry everything too far, whether it be their love or hatred or anything else. They regard themselves as omniscient and are positive in their assertions; this is in fact the reason of their carrying everything too far. Also their offences take the line of insolence and not of meanness. They are compassionate from supposing all people to be virtuous or *at least* better *than they really are;* for as they estimate their neighbours by their own guilelessness, they regard the evils which befall them as undeserved. Finally, they are fond of laughter and consequently facetious, facetiousness being disciplined insolence.

CHAP. XIII. The character of age.

Such being the character of the young, it may be said generally that elder men who have passed their prime have characters mostly composed of the qualities opposite to these. For as they have lived many years and have been often the victims of deception and error, and as vice is the rule rather than the exception in human affairs, they are never positive about

[1] The maxim of Chilon is the famous rule μηδὲν ἄγαν.

anything and always err on the side of too[1] little excess. They "suppose," they never "know" anything; and in discussion they always add "perhaps" or "possibly," expressing themselves invariably in this guarded manner, but never positively. They are uncharitable too, i.e. they are ready to put the worst construction upon everything. Again, they are suspicious of evil from not trusting anybody, and they do not trust anybody from having had experience of human wickedness. Hence too they have no strong loves or hatreds; but according to the [2]precept of Bias their love is such as may some day be converted into hatred and their hatred such as may some day be converted into love. Their temper of mind is neither grand nor generous; not the former, for they have been so much humiliated by the experience of life as to have no desire of any great or striking object or of anything but the mere appliances of life; nor the latter, for property is a necessity of life, and they have learnt by experience the difficulty of acquiring it and the facility with which it may be lost. They are cowards and perpetual alarmists, their disposition being exactly contrary to that of the young; for as they are not fervent like the young, but have cooled down, their old age has in consequence paved the way for cowardice, fear

[1] The curious phrase ἧττον ἄγαν is an oxymoron; but it is coined to be a negative of ἄγαν.

[2] The precept of Bias, which is again quoted in ch. 21, is best known from the lines of Sophocles, *Ajax*, 678—683. It may be remarked that Ajax was eminently one who had been brought to his cautious or distrustful mood by his sad experience of human life.

itself being a sort of cooling process. They are fond of life, and never so fond of it as on their last day; for it is the absent which is the object of all desire, and that which we *most* lack we are most desirous to possess. They are selfish to a fault, selfishness again being a species of mean-mindedness. And from their selfishness it follows that their standard of life is too apt to be expediency rather than honour; for expediency is what is good to the individual, and honour what is good in an absolute sense. They are apt to be shameless rather than the contrary; for as they pay less regard to honour than to expediency, they are able to disregard appearances. They are despondent too partly from their experience of life—for the generality of things which occur in the world are bad or at least do not turn out so well as they might—and partly from their cowardly disposition. Again, they live by memory rather than by hope; for while the remainder of their life is *necessarily* short, its past is long, and the future is the sphere of hope, the past the sphere of memory. This too is the explanation of their garrulity; they are perpetually talking over what has happened in the past because of the pleasure they feel in recollection. Their fits of passion, although violent, are feeble; their sensual desires have either died away or become enfeebled, so that they are not prone either to desire or to action regulated by their desires but are rather guided in their actions by self-interest. The consequence is that people at this time of life are capable of self-control, as the strength of their desires has abated and self-interest is their mastering passion. Again, it is calculation rather

than character which regulates their lives; for while calculation is directed to expediency, morality is directed to virtue *as its end.* The offences which they commit take the line of petty meanness rather than of insolence. The old are compassionate as well as the young, not however for the same reason; for in the one case the reason is humanity, and in the other infirmity, as the old suppose all manner of suffering to be at their door, and this is a state of mind which, as we have said, excites compassion. Hence p. 152. they are querulous, not facetious nor fond of laughter; for querulousness is opposed to the love of laughter. Such then are the characteristics of youth and age. And as everybody approves such speeches as are framed according to his own character or reflect it, it is easy to see the proper way of treating our speeches in order that we and the speeches we make may assume the requisite character.

CHAP. XIV. **The character of the prime of life.**

As to persons who are in the prime of life, it is evident that in character they will occupy a position intermediate between the young and the old. They will be exempt from the excess of either; they will be neither excessively confident, as excess of confidence is foolhardiness, nor excessively fearful, but will preserve a proper balance of confidence and fear; they will be neither universally trustful nor universally distrustful, but will rather form their judgment in accordance with the facts; their rule of life will be neither honour only nor expediency only but both, and neither parsimony nor extravagance but a proper mean. The same will be true in regard to passion and desire. They will combine

temperance with valour and valour with temperance, these being qualities which are distributed separately among the young and the old; for the young are brave and licentious and the old are temperate and cowardly. It may indeed be said generally that, wherever there are advantages distributed between youth and age, persons in the prime of life enjoy both, and that, wherever there are excesses or defects inherent in youth and age, they observe moderation and propriety in respect to them. The body, I may say, is at its prime from 30 to 35, and the soul about 49.

CHAP. XV. So much for the several characters of youth, old age and the prime of life. We have next to consider the various gifts of Fortune by which the characters of men are shaped and influenced.

The character of nobility. Now it is one characteristic of nobility that the possessor of it is distinguished by his ambition; for everybody who has anything to start with generally makes it a basis of his accumulations, and nobility is inherited distinction. Another is that such people are apt to despise even those who are on an equality with their own ancestors; for the same things confer more distinction and form a better subject of boasting, when they happen at a remote distance than when they happen near at hand. [1]The word "nobility" has reference to family virtue, the word

[1] The distinction here made between the words εὐγενής and γενναῖος occurs again περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι, p. 488 B_{18-20} εὐγενὲς μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γένους, γενναῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. For the meaning of φύσις see note on p. 82 of this translation.

"nobleness" to the non-degeneracy from the *proper* nature *of the individual*, although this is generally not the case with nobles, who are usually insignificant persons; for there is a sort of succession of crops in families as well as in the fruits of the ground, and sometimes, if the family is a good one, there arise distinguished men in it during a certain period of time, and then on the contrary it fails. *It may be remarked that*, while clever families degenerate into the characteristics of insanity, as happened to the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius, staid families like those of Cimon, Pericles and Socrates degenerate into insipidity and dullness.

CHAP. XVI. The character of wealth.

The characteristics which accompany wealth lie on the surface and are easily seen. The wealthy become insolent and overweening, being affected in some degree by their acquisition of wealth. This disposition originates in the idea that they are in possession of every kind of good; for as wealth is in a way a standard of the value of everything else, it seems as if everything else were purchasable by wealth. Again, *the wealthy are* voluptuous and ostentatious, voluptuous from their luxury and the display of their prosperity, ostentatious and ill-mannered from the habit which is common to us all of devoting our time and thought to the objects of our love and admiration and from the idea that everybody else is emulous of the same things as they are themselves. Nor indeed is this state of mind unreasonable; for there are many people who require the services of the rich. It was this which gave rise to the saying of Simonides about wisdom and wealth, when he was asked by

the wife of Hiero whether it were preferable to become a man of property or a philosopher. "A man of property," he said, "for I see the philosophers hanging about the doorsteps of the men of property." Another *characteristic of the wealthy* is a belief in their own title to authority, arising from a belief that they are in possession of the things which make authority worth having. In a word, the character of wealth is prosperity without good sense. There is a difference of character however between people who have only lately acquired wealth and people who have long enjoyed possession of it, in that the defects of wealth are found in a larger measure and in an aggravated form in the *nouveaux riches,* as they have not yet, so to say, been educated to their wealth. The offences which they commit are not of a petty fraudulent character but are offences either of insolence or of licentiousness, such e.g. as assault and battery or adultery.

CHAP. XVII. The character of power.

Similarly, the characteristics of power may be said to be generally evident, being in some cases identical with those of wealth and in others superior to them. Thus the powerful are more ambitious and heroic in their characters than the wealthy, as they aspire to all such actions as they have authority to perform in virtue of their power. They are more energetic, as being always on the alert from the necessity of looking to the conditions of their power. Their air is one of dignity rather than of offensive importance, as their high position by rendering them more conspicuous renders them moderate, and dignity is a soft and graceful air of importance. And their

offences, if they commit any, are never petty but always on a large scale.

The characteristics of good Fortune are determined by [1]its shares of the advantages we have described. For the greatest elements of good Fortune, as they are called, follow these lines; and it may be added that good Fortune ensures superiority in respect of family blessings or of personal gifts. Thus while good Fortune inclines people to be somewhat arrogant and unreasonable, there is one excellent characteristic which it evokes, viz. the godfearing disposition of the fortunate and their general attitude towards religion, as the goods of which Fortune is the mother inspire a feeling of trustfulness in the Gods.

The characters produced by age or Fortune have now been described; for the opposites of those which have been described, i.e. the characters of the poor, the unfortunate and the powerless, are evident from a consideration of their opposites.

CHAP. XVIII. Recapitulation.

We are now in a position to sum up the results obtained. [2]Speeches of which persuasion is the

[1] Reading κατὰ τὰ μόρια.

[2] The long sentence with which the chapter begins stands in need of some little explanation. Rhetoric, whether deliberative or forensic, is always, says Aristotle, addressed to a judge. In the case of a deliberative speech the judge may be either an individual, as when you try to persuade or dissuade a friend in private life, or a number of persons, as when you address the Public Assembly. But nothing is said in the text about addressing a number of persons, the clause corresponding to ἄν τε πρὸς ἕνα κ.τ.λ. is not expressed. Further, a forensic speech may be either an argument against a real antagonist, as in a court of law, or an

The judicial character of an audience. object are invariably intended to be judged; for if we know a thing and have passed judgment upon it, there is no longer occasion for a speech. And this is true, even if it is only an individual whom it is the speaker's aim to encourage or dissuade, as happens *often* in admonition or persuasion; for the individual is as truly a judge as a large audience, inasmuch as anybody who is to be persuaded may be said in general terms to be a judge. It is equally true, whether the speech is directed against a real antagonist or an imaginary case; for *in the latter instance* the orator must employ his speech in upsetting an opposite hypothesis, and against this he argues as against a real antagonist. The case is the same in regard to epideictic oratory, where the composition of the speech has in view the audience as a judge. But as a general rule it is only the person who passes judgment upon questions in political contests that is strictly and properly a judge; for *in political cases* (*which include judicial*) there is a question either as to the truth of the points in dispute or as to the subject of the deliberation. The characters congenial to the different polities have been already discussed under the head of deliberative oratory, so that the means and

pp. 57 sqq.

argument against some theory or abstract case, as in School or College declamations. See Prof. Mayor's note on Juvenal i. 16.

As to the construction of the sentence, it is more than probable that Aristotle has forgotten the need of a regular apodosis. At all events the clause ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. p. 85, l. 13, is an inference only from the preceding clause, not from all the clauses of the protasis.

methods of investing our speeches with [1] an ethical character may be said to be pretty well determined.

We have seen that the ends are different in the several kinds of Rhetoric; we have ascertained the opinions and premisses in each from which proofs are derived in deliberative and epideictic or forensic oratory; and we have determined the means by which it is possible to invest our speeches with an ethical character. It remains for us then to discuss the common topics, *as they may be called;* for *apart from the special topics which have been described* it is always necessary to employ the topic of possibility or impossibility in our speeches and to try to prove either that a thing will be or that it has already occurred. Also the topic of degree is common to all kinds of Rhetoric; for all orators use depreciation or exaggeration, whether in deliberative Rhetoric or in eulogy or censure or in accusation or defence. After determining the common topics, it will be proper to say what we can in general terms about enthymemes and examples, so as to supply the deficiency which still remains and in this way fulfil the original plan of our treatise. Among the common topics exaggeration, as has been said, is especially adapted to epideictic oratory, fact past to forensic oratory, as it is upon facts of the past that

p. 23. pp. 25 sqq. p. 70.

[1] It should be borne in mind that a speech may be called "ethical" either, as here, because it is adapted to the character of the audience to whom it is addressed or because it displays certain ethical qualities in the speaker himself. (Cp. ch. i.) Still it is very strange that Aristotle makes no reference here either to ἦθος in its more usual sense or to the πάθη.

the judicial decision turns, and the possible or future to deliberative oratory.

Let us take first the topic of possibility and impossibility.

CHAP. XIX. The common topics. (1) Possibility.

If there are two opposites, and the existence or production of one of them is possible, so presumably is the existence or production of the other. For instance, if a human being can be cured, he can also fall ill, inasmuch as the potentiality of opposites, [1]*qua* opposites, is identical. Again, if there are two similar things, and one of them is possible, so is the other. Or if the more difficult of two things is possible, so is the easier. Or if the production of a thing in an excellent and noble form is possible, its production generally is possible, as the making of a fine house is harder than the making of a house. Again, if the beginning of a thing is possible, so is the completion of it, as no impossibility ever comes or begins to come into being; the commensurability e.g. of the diagonal of a square with its side cannot begin to come, nor ever does come, into being. Or if the completion of a thing is possible, so is its beginning; for whatever comes into being originates from a beginning. Or if the [2]posterior in essence or in gene-

[1] It is necessary to insert this limiting clause; for although health and sickness, in so far as they are opposites, are equally possible to a human being, yet he may constitutionally be inclined to one rather than to the other. But throughout the chapter it must be remembered that the arguments suggested are only rhetorically useful, not necessarily or presumably valid in logic.

[2] Aristotle lays down in the *Metaphysics* (xiii. ch. 2, p. 1077 A 26) the principle that *τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον*.

ration is capable of coming into being, so is the prior; thus if a man can come into being, so can a boy, the boy being prior in generation, and if a boy can come into being, so can a man, the man being *essentially* a beginning. Again, the objects of natural love or desire are possible, as in general nobody is enamoured or desirous of impossibilities. Again, the existence of any science or art implies the possibility of the existence or production of the objects with which it deals. The same is true of anything, if the origin of its production depends upon things which we can influence by force or persuasion, i.e. upon persons whose superiors or masters or friends we are. Again, if the parts of a thing are possible, so is the whole, and if the whole is possible, so in general are the parts; thus if it is possible to produce an instep, toe-cap and body of a shoe, it is possible also to produce shoes, and if it is possible to produce shoes, it is possible also to produce an instep, toe-cap and body. Again, the possibility of producing the genus as a whole implies the possibility of producing the species, and *vice versa;* the possibility e.g. of producing a vessel implies the possibility of producing a trireme, and the possibility of producing a trireme implies the possibility of producing a vessel. And of two things which are naturally inter-dependent if one is possible, so is the other; if double e.g. is possible, so is half, and if half, so is double. Again, if a thing can be produced without art and preparation, it can *a fortiori* be produced by means of art and careful pains; whence the lines of Agathon

[1]"Of some must art be mother, some accrues
To us of fortune or necessity."

Lastly, if a thing is possible to inferior, weaker and less intelligent people, it is possible *a fortiori* to their opposites, according to the [2]saying of Isocrates that it was strange, if he should himself be unable to discover what a person like Euthynus had learnt.

On the subject of the impossible, it is evident that *the orator* has a stock *of topics* ready to hand in the opposites of those which have been mentioned.

(2) Fact past.

The fact of a thing having occurred or not in the past is to be examined by the light of the following considerations. In the first place, if that which is less likely to have occurred has occurred, it would appear that that which is more likely has also occurred. Or if that which is usually subsequent has occurred, *it may be argued that* that which is usually antecedent has occurred, as e.g., if a person has forgotten something, that he had once learnt it. Or if a person had at once the power and the will to do a certain act, *it may be argued that* he has done it; for everybody acts, when he has the power to do what he wishes, as there is then no impediment to

[1] The point of the lines, which are taken from an unknown play, is that things may be brought about either by art or by fortune, and that, if they are brought about by fortune, they are easier.

[2] There is no passage in the speech of Isocrates πρὸς Ευθύνουν, if indeed it be genuine, or in any other of his extant speeches which suits this allusion. Mr Sandys has suggested that Aristotle may be referring by a slip of memory to an expression in the speech πρὸς Καλλίμαχον.

his action. The same is true, if he had the wish and there was no external obstacle, or if he had the power and was in an angry mood, or if he had the power and with it the desire; for it is a general rule that people, when they are eager to do a thing, actually do it, as soon as they have the power, if they are bad people from the lack of self-control, and if they are good, because the objects of their desire are honourable. Again, if it was a person's intention[1] to do a thing, *it may be argued that he did it*, as there is always a probability that the intention was carried out. Or if all the natural preliminaries or means to a thing have occurred, *it may be argued that the thing itself occurred*, as e.g., if it lightened that it thundered too, and if a thing was attempted, that it was done. Similarly, if the natural sequel or end of anything has occurred, *it may be argued that* the preliminaries and means to it have occurred also, as e.g., if it thundered, that it lightened, and if a thing was done, that it was attempted. In all these cases the rule is sometimes one of necessity, and sometimes one of only general validity.

Arguments against the occurrence of an event in the past may evidently be derived from the topics opposite to these.

As to arguments in regard to the future, it is clear *that they may be derived* from the same sources. *It may be argued* that a thing will be done, if there is both the power and the wish to do it or if there is desire, anger and calculation combined with power. Accordingly it will be done, if (3) Fact future.

[1] Omitting γίγνεσθαι, καὶ.

one has an immediate impulse or an intention to do it; for what is intended is generally more likely to happen than what is not; or if it has been preceded by all its former natural antecedents; if e.g. the sky is clouded, there is a probability of rain. Finally, if the means to an end have happened, there is a probability of the end itself happening; thus the foundation of a house implies the house itself.

(4) Degree. The topic of the greatness and smallness of things, in themselves and in comparison with each other and of great and small things generally is evident from the remarks we have already made, for in our pp. 46 sqq. chapters upon deliberative Rhetoric we have discussed the greatness of goods and comparative greatness or smallness in the abstract. Hence as in each of the three kinds of Rhetoric the end proposed is a good, whether expediency, honour or justice, it is evident that these must be the means of supplying the materials of amplification in each case. It is idle to look for anything more than this in regard to abstract greatness and superiority, particular facts being more important than general truths to the purpose *which we have now in hand.*

So much then for the possible and impossible, for the proof or disproof of facts past or future and also for the greatness and smallness of things[1].

CHAP. XX. The common proofs. It remains then to speak of the proofs which are common to the three kinds of Rhetoric, as the special

[1] There are then four κοινοὶ τόποι, as appears from this chapter, not three, as Mr Cope states in his note on § 26, nor yet the same four as he enumerates in his Introduction, p. 129, but (1) Possibility, (2) Fact past, (3) Fact future, (4) Degree.

proofs have already been discussed. These are two in kind, viz. example and enthymeme; for the maxim is part of an enthymeme. It will be proper to begin with example, as example corresponds to induction, and [1]induction is a beginning *or principle of knowledge.*

(1) The example.

Examples are of two kinds, one consisting in the allegation of historical facts and the other in the invention of facts for oneself. Also invention comprises illustration on the one hand and fables, such as those of Æsop and the [2]Libyan, on the other.

(a) Historical parallels.

An instance of the allegation of historical facts would be the case (let me say) of a person urging the policy of arming against the Persian King and preventing him from subjugating Egypt on the ground that Darius did not cross *the Ægæan sea* until he had made himself master of Egypt, although no sooner was he master of it than he did so, and Xerxes again did not invade *Grecian territory* until he had made himself master of Egypt, although no sooner was he master of it than he crossed the sea, the inference being that the[3] present king will cross,

[1] Aristotle explains his own meaning in other passages, e.g. *Nicom. Eth.* vi. ch. 3; *Analyt. Post.* ii. ch. 19.

[2] It would appear that, besides the fables attributed to Æsop, there was a collection of fables called generally Libyan. They are recognized by Quintilian (*Instit. Orat.* v. 11, 20) among others; and a line is quoted by Hermogenes from the *Myrmidons* of Æschylus

ὡς δ' ἐστὶ μύθων τῶν Λιβυστικῶν λόγος.

[3] It has been thought that Aristotle has in mind the occasion, —it was in the year 350 B.C.—when Artaxerxes III. surnamed Ochus sent ambassadors to the different Greek states to ask for

if he makes himself master of Egypt, and that consequently this must not be allowed.

(b) illustrations.

As an instance of illustration I may cite the Socratic method. Suppose e.g. one were to insist upon the absurdity of entrusting official power to a body of men selected by lot, by urging that we might as well select as our athletes, not the ablest combatants, but any chance people upon whom the lot has fallen, or might as well employ the lot in selecting the pilot from among the crew, on the principle that the right man is the one upon whom the lot has fallen rather than the one who possesses the requisite knowledge.

(c) fables.

The fable may be exemplified by the fables of Stesichorus respecting Phalaris and of Æsop in defence of the demagogue. At the time when the people of Himera had elected Phalaris general, had invested him with absolute powers and were on the point of allowing him a body-guard, Stesichorus at the close of a long argument told them the following fable. There was a horse (he said) which was the sole occupant of a meadow, when a stag came and wasted his pasture; so wishing to wreak his vengeance on the stag, he asked the man whether it would be possible for him with his help to inflict chastisement on the stag. "Oh! yes" said the man, "if you will be bridled and let me mount upon your back, spear in hand." The horse consented, the man mounted, and instead of taking vengeance upon the stag, the horse found himself from that moment the man's slave. "So do you too take care" said Stesi-

auxiliaries in his projected invasion of Egypt. Grote's *History of Greece*, ch. xc. vol. xi. pp. 243—4.

chorus, "lest in your desire to avenge yourselves upon your enemies you experience the same fate as the horse. The bridle is already in your mouth, since you elected a general with absolute powers; give him a body-guard, let him mount upon your back, and from that moment you will be the slaves of Phalaris." Æsop again at Samos, as counsel for a demagogue who was being tried for a capital offence, said that a fox in crossing a river was swept down into a cleft of the rock and, being unable to get out, was for a long time in a sorry plight, and a number of dog-ticks fastened upon her body. A hedgehog strolling about happened to catch sight of her, and was moved by compassionate feeling to inquire if he should remove the dog-ticks from her. The fox however would not allow him to do so, and being asked the reason replied, "Because these have already taken their fill of me and do not now suck much blood; but if you take these away, others will come and in their hunger will drain up all the blood that is left." "Yes and in your case, men of Samos," said Æsop, "my client will not do much further mischief—he has already made his fortune—but, if you put him to death, there will come others who are poor and who will consume all the revenues of the State by their embezzlements."

Fables are suited to popular oratory and have this advantage that, while historical parallels are hard to find, it is comparatively easy to find fables. For fables have to be invented, like illustrations, if one has a faculty of seeing analogies; and the discovery is facilitated by culture. It may be added

that, while it is less difficult to furnish illustrations in the shape of fables, historical illustrations have a higher value in deliberation, inasmuch as history tends to repeat itself.

The use of examples.

It is proper in default of enthymemes to make use of examples as logical proofs, these being the natural means of producing conviction, but otherwise to make use of them as testimonies by way of a supplement to our enthymemes. For if we put them first, they resemble an induction, and induction is something inappropriate to Rhetoric unless in exceptional cases; but if we put them last, they resemble testimonies, and testimony is invariably persuasive. And from this it follows that, if we put them first, it is necessary to employ a considerable number of them, but if last, a single one is sufficient, as even a single credible witness is of service.

The discussion of the different species of examples and of the methods and occasions of using them is now complete.

CHAP. XXI. Maxims.

In regard to the art of maxim-making it will be easiest to see the proper subjects of maxims, the proper occasions of using them and the persons to whom they are appropriate, if we first define the nature of a maxim.

Definition of a maxim.

A maxim is a declaration, not however relating to particulars, as e.g. to the character of Iphicrates, but to universals; nor yet again to all universals indiscriminately, as e.g. that straight is the opposite of crooked, but to all such as are the objects of human action and are to be chosen or eschewed in that regard. Enthymemes then being, as we may

The maxim

say, the form of syllogism appropriate to these matters, if the syllogistic form is done away, the conclusion of an enthymeme or its major premiss is a maxim. For instance, the lines

a part of the enthymeme.

> [1] "No man of common sense
> Should have his children taught to be too clever,"

are a maxim, but add the motive or reason, i.e.

> "For they are idle sluggards and besides
> Gain envious hatred from the citizens,"

and the whole is an enthymeme. Again,

> [2] "No man that lives is altogether happy,"

or,

> [3] "There is no man that is or can be free,"

is a maxim; but it becomes an enthymeme by the addition of the next line

> "For money is his master or else Fortune."

Four kinds of maxims.

Such then being the definition of a maxim, it follows at once that there are four kinds of maxims, as they may either have or not have a logical supplement. Demonstrative proof is requisite in all such maxims as contain a statement which is paradoxical or disputable; but where there is nothing paradoxical, a supplement is unnecessary. It is unnecessary in this case either because the maxims are already familiar, as when it is said:

[1] Euripides *Medea*, 295, sqq.

[2] A fragment of Euripides, said to be the first line of the *Sthenobœa*.

[3] Euripides *Hecuba*, 864—5.

> [1] "For a man, methinks, there is no such wealth
> In the world we live in as excellent health,"

this being a pretty general opinion, or because they are intelligible at a glance, as in the saying

> [2] "True love is love for evermore."

On the other hand, such maxims as have a logical supplement are either parts of an enthymeme like *the lines beginning* "No man of common sense" or, although enthymematic in their form, are not *actually* parts of an enthymeme; and it is these last which are most generally popular. There are maxims in which the reason of the statement made is virtually expressed in the maxim itself as in the line

> [3] "Nurse not immortal anger, being mortal."

For while the prohibition of nursing one's anger for ever is a maxim, the addition of the words "being mortal" conveys the reason. The saying

> [4] "A mortal should think mortal thoughts
> Not thoughts immortal,"

is an instance of the same thing.

[1] The history of the Greek line quoted is unknown, but it closely resembles the beginning of a σκόλιον or drinking-song which Athenæus (*Deipnosoph.* xv. p. 694 E), attributes to Simonides. See Mr Cope's note.

[2] Euripides *Troades*, 1051.

[3] An unknown line; but it exactly corresponds in sentiment with a fragment of the *Philoctetes* of Euripides (Fragment 796 in Dindorf's *Poetae Scenici Græci*). Whoever may have been the author of it, it was borrowed or imitated by Menander.

[4] A line which Bentley in his *Dissertation on Phalaris* attributes, not without some cause, to Epicharmus.

From what has been said then it is evident how many various kinds of maxims there are, and what is the kind of subject to which each is appropriate. Where the statement is disputable or paradoxical, it is never proper to omit the supplement; we must either put it first and make a maxim of the conclusion, as e.g. in the words, "For my own part then, as one is bound not to incur envy and not to waste one's time, I deny the duty of having children educated"; or we must state the conclusion first and append the supplement. But where the statement is obscure although not paradoxical, we must add the reason in as terse a form as possible. In such cases there is a certain appropriateness in Laconic utterances and enigmatical sayings, such as [1]that of Stesichorus at Locri, that "they had better not be insolent, or perhaps the cicalas would chirp upon the ground."

The use of maxims.

The use of maxims is appropriate when the speaker is a person of some age and the subject one of which he has experience; for it is as unbecoming as story-telling in the mouths of the young, and in the absence of experience is a mark of folly and lack of culture, as indeed is sufficiently evident in the case of rustics who are always fond of coining maxims and ready to air them. The practice of unwarranted generalization is most appropriate in bitter complaint and indignation, whether at the beginning of a speech or after the

[1] The point of this saying is explained in Mr Cope's note. As the cicalas, when they chirp, sit in the trees, they would not chirp upon the ground, unless the trees were all cut down, i.e. unless the land had utterly been ravaged.

demonstration. Nor is it right to neglect even trite and commonplace maxims, if they are useful; for their very commonness and general acceptance imparts to them an air of truth, as e.g. if *a general* exhorts *his troops* to face the enemy, although they have not first offered sacrifice, *by quoting the language of Homer*:

[1]"The best of omens is our country's cause,"

or to do so against odds *by reminding them of*

[2]"The even chance of war,"

or to destroy the children of their enemies, although they may not have committed any offence, *by quoting the proverb*

"Fool he who slays the sire and spares the son."

Again, there are some proverbs which are also maxims, e.g. the proverb [3] "An Attic neighbour."

Maxims may be cited too in contradiction of sayings which have become the public property of the world, such e.g. as "Know thyself" and "Avoid excess", when there is a chance of our presenting our character in a more favourable light *by citing them* as they are uttered by us in an emotional state of mind. It would be a case of a maxim uttered under emotion, if one should say in a moment of anger "It is not true that we ought to know ourselves; at least, if this man

[1] *Iliad* xii. 243; and the line is especially appropriate, as being spoken by Hector, when Polydamas has been urging the force of an adverse omen.

[2] *Iliad*, xviii. 309.

[3] "An Attic neighbour" is clearly a neighbour of a restless, troublesome, unscrupulous kind. See e.g. Thucydides i. ch. 70; iv. ch. 92.

knew himself, he would never have had the presumption to be general". And our character would appear in a more favourable light, *if we should say* "It is not right, as we are told, to love as if our love might be converted into hatred; we ought rather to hate as if our hatred might some day be converted into love". We should incidentally exhibit our moral purpose in our language or, if not, should subjoin the reason, saying e.g. either "It is right to love, not as we are told to love *in the proverb*, but as if our love would last for evermore; for there is something insidious in the other kind of love," or else "The adage does not satisfy me, for a true friend should love as though his love would last for evermore;" or again "Neither does the maxim 'Avoid excess' satisfy me, for we ought to have an excessive hatred of evil."

One great service which maxims render to our speeches is owing to the vulgarity of our audience, as they are delighted when a general statement of the speaker hits the opinions of which they have a partial grasp. My meaning, and with it the true method of discovering maxims, will be evident from the following rules. The maxim, as has been said, is a general statement, and people are pleased by a general statement of anything of which they already entertain a partial conviction; thus anybody who has been unfortunate in his neighbours or his children will be glad to hear it said that there is nothing which is so troublesome as a pack of neighbours or nothing so foolish as the procreation of children. It is proper, therefore, to conjecture what are the manner and character of their prepossessions, and, having done so,

to put forward a general statement in regard to them. This is one advantage in the use of maxims; but there is another which is more important, as they impart an ethical character to our speeches. A speech is ethical, if its moral purpose is apparent. But this is the invariable effect of maxims; for a speaker who gives utterance to a maxim makes a statement in general terms about the object of his moral predilection, and hence, if the maxims are virtuous, they give the appearance of a virtuous character to the speaker.

So much then in regard to maxims, their nature, and their various kinds, the manner of using them and the benefit they confer.

CHAP. XXII. (2) The enthymeme.

Coming now to enthymemes, we will discuss in general terms *first* the true method of looking for them and secondly their topics; for these two parts of the subject are generically distinct.

Definition of an enthymeme. pp. 13, 16.

We have already stated that the enthymeme is a species of syllogism, and in what sense it is so, and how it differs from the syllogisms of dialectic, in that its conclusions may not be drawn from remote premisses—for this would be so long a process as to be obscure—nor by the introduction of each particular step *in the argument*, as the statement of self-evident facts would lead us into prolixity. This is in truth the reason why the uneducated have more persuasive power among the masses than the educated; they are the more accomplished speakers, as [1]the poets say, in a mob, for while the educated deal in universal or general statements, such statements as are made by un-

[1] No doubt there is a special reference to Euripides' *Hippolytas*, 988—9.

educated persons are not far-fetched but based upon facts within the experience of their audience. It follows that the proper materials of enthymemes must be not all opinions indiscriminately, but certain definite opinions, defined, I mean, either by our audience or by persons in whom they believe, and *in the latter case* the fact of such an opinion being entertained [1]must be well known to all or the great majority of our audience. Again, the premisses from which our conclusions are drawn must be not only such as are necessary, but such also as are only generally true.

The materials of enthymemes.

It is proper to begin by apprehending the necessity of knowing all or some of the special facts of the case upon which we are to speak or reason, whether the subject of the reasoning be political or any other, as in the absence of such knowledge there will be no materials from which our conclusions may be drawn. How e.g. should we offer counsel to the Athenians as to the policy of declaring war or not, unless we know what is the nature of their forces, whether they are naval or military or both, and what is their strength, what are the revenues of the State and its friends or foes, or again what wars it has been engaged in and with what success and so on? how eulogize them, if we had no knowledge of the sea-fight at Salamis or the battle of Marathon or the services rendered by them to the Heracleidae or anything else of the same kind, seeing that eulogy must always be based upon honourable deeds either actual or supposed? Similarly it is from facts of an oppo-

[1] The infinitive, as Mr Shilleto says, is intelligible, if it is remembered that λεκτέον is equivalent to δεῖ λέγειν.

site kind that we derive our topics of censure, by considering what there is or seems to be that is censurable in them, as e.g. that they [1]reduced the Greeks to subjection and enslaved the [2]Æginetans and [3]Potidaeans who had been the bravest of their allies against the Persians and so on, or any other similar offence which is found in them. And so again it is from a consideration of the facts of the case that we derive our topics of accusation or defence. It makes no difference in this respect whether our subject be the Athenians or the Lacedaemonians or man or God; for whether we are advising Achilles or eulogizing or censuring or accusing or defending him, it is the facts actual or supposed which we have to ascertain, so as to base upon these our statement of what is honourable or shameful, in a speech of eulogy or censure, of what is just or unjust in accusation or defence, and of what is expedient or injurious in deliberation. Similarly as regards any subject, let us say, justice, in considering whether it is or is not a good, we must start with the characteristics of justice or of good. This method of demonstration then is found to be universal, whether in the more exact or in the looser species of reasoning, as it is not from all facts indiscriminately that we derive our premisses but from the characteristic facts of each particular subject, and this is the sole method of proof which is possible by means of the speech. Hence we clearly

[1] Cp. the speech of the Mitylenaean envoys at Olympia, Thuc. iii. ch. 9 seq.

[2] See Thuc. ii. ch. 27; iv. ch. 57.

[3] See Thuc. ii. ch. 70.

see the necessity in Rhetoric as well as in the [1]Topics of Dialectic of having first of all a selection of arguments respecting the possibilities and the most opportune circumstances of each subject and, as to circumstances which arise on the spur of the moment, of possessing the same method of investigation, fixing our eyes not upon vague generalities but upon the special facts of the subject of our speech, and bringing into the sphere of our argument the greatest possible number of facts and of facts as closely connected as possible with the subject; for the more facts we have in our possession, the easier is the proof, and the more nearly they touch the case, the more germane and the less general they are. And when I speak of "general facts," I am referring e.g. to a eulogy of Achilles for being a man or one of the demi-gods or for having taken part in the expedition against Ilium, which facts are all true of many other people, so that to use such language is to eulogize Diomedes as much as Achilles; by "special facts" I mean those which are true of Achilles alone, as e.g. that he slew Hector the bravest of the Trojans and Cycnus the invulnerable who prevented the disembarkation of all the host, or that he was the youngest of those who went to the war, or that he went without being bound by oath, and so on.

This being then one primary principle of selection, viz. the topical *or selection by topics*, let us proceed to the elements of enthymemes, and by an element of

[1] The reference is perhaps to the first book of the *Topics* in general.

enthymeme I mean the same thing as a topic. Let us begin however with the necessary preliminaries.

Two species of enthymemes:

There are two species of enthymemes, viz. demonstrative enthymemes which prove that a thing is or is not so and so, and refutative enthymemes, the difference between the two being the same as between a refutation and a syllogism in dialectics. The demonstrative enthymeme consists in drawing conclusions from admitted propositions, the refutative in drawing conclusions which are inconsistent *with the conclusions of one's adversary.*

(a) demonstrative. (b) refutative.

It may now be said that we have ascertained the topics relating to the several special subjects of a useful and necessary kind; for as the propositions suitable to each have been selected, the topics from which to derive enthymemes regarding what is good or evil, noble or shameful, just or unjust, and similarly the topics of the characters, emotions and habits of mind are known to us by the process of selection already made. We will proceed then in another way to ascertain some general topics applicable to all subjects alike and to indicate side by side the refutative and demonstrative topics and the topics of enthymemes which are apparent but not real, as neither are apparent syllogisms real ones. And having cleared up these points, we will determine the proper sources from which to bring refutations and objections to bear upon our enthymemes.

CHAP. XXIII. Topics of enthymemes.

One topic of demonstrative enthymemes may be derived from a consideration of opposites. *If we take any two things, of which one is said to be predicable of the other,* we have to consider whether the

opposite of the one is predicable of the opposite of the other, upsetting *the original proposition*, if it is not predicable, and confirming *the original proposition*, if it is, as e.g. arguing that self-restraint is expedient on the ground that licentiousness is injurious. There is an example of this topic in [1]the Messenian oration of Alcidamas. "If the war (he says) is the cause of our present troubles, then it is by means of the peace that we must remedy them."

Another example is afforded by the lines

> "If Justice suffers not to rage against
> The involuntary authors of our harm,
> So, whoso is constrained to do us good,
> No thanks are due for services to him[2]."

or by these

> "If falsehood is persuasive i' the world,
> The contrary too must hold, that many things
> I' the world are true, yet unbelievable[3]."

A second topic is derived from the [4]inflexions of the same stem, as that which is or is not predicable of one is or is not predicable of another. Thus *we may argue* that justice is not always good; else the word "justly" would always have a good sense, whereas to be justly put to death is the reverse of desirable.

[1] The Messenian oration has been already mentioned, but in a passage where the text is defective, p. 45, l. 34.

[2] The lines are variously ascribed to Agathon or to Theodectes.

[3] A fragment of the *Thyestes* of Euripides.

[4] This passage should be compared with p. 26, ll. 9—13; p. 30, ll. 25—28.

There is another arising from relative terms. *It may be argued that,* if "honourably" and "justly" are terms which are predicable of the action of the agent, they are predicable also of the suffering of the patient, and that if they are predicable of the command, they are predicable of its execution. It was in this sense that the tax-gatherer Diomedon said of his taxes "If there is no disgrace in your selling them, there is none in my purchasing them." Again, *it may be argued that* if "honourably" or "justly" may be predicated of the patient, they may be predicated also of the agent and *vice versa*."[1] (But there is a possibility of fallacious argument here. A person, let us say, deserved to suffer so and so; [2] but possibly not at your hands. Accordingly what we have to do is to consider separately the appropriateness of the suffering to the patient and of the action to the agent and then apply the result in either way that suits best; for it sometimes happens that there is a discrepancy, and *the justice of the suffering* does not at all prove *that the action is not a wrong one.* It is so in the [3] Alcmaeon of Theodectes.

"Did no man loath thy mother?"

says Alphesiboea. Alcmaeon's answer is

"We must distinguish ere we judge."

[1] This sentence seems to me nothing better than a διττογραφία.

[2] Omitting δικαίως πέπονθεν.

[3] Alphesiboea is the wife of Alcmaeon; and she charges him with the murder of his mother Eriphyle for her guilt in betraying Amphiaraus to death.

"How so?" she says, and he replies

"Her they doomed
To death, not me to be her murderer")[1].

There is a parallel instance in the case [2] of Demosthenes and of the murderers of Nicanor; for as they were judged to have a right to kill him, it was held that he had been rightly killed. It was the same in the case of [3] the man who was put to death at Thebes; *the counsel for the defendants* exhorted the judges merely to consider whether the murdered man had deserved to die, assuming that the murder of one who deserved to die could not be unjust.

Another topic is the argument from degree. Thus *it may be argued that*, if the Gods themselves are not omniscient, much less are men, meaning that if a condition is not realized, where it would be more natural, it will evidently not be realized, where it would be less so. But the argument that a person is capable of striking his neighbours because he actually strikes his father depends upon the principle that, if [4] the rarer fact is true, the commoner fact is

[1] Mr Cope rightly urges that the foregoing clauses should be regarded as parenthetical. The argument proceeds consecutively, when they are so treated.

[2] The incident is not known from other sources.

[3] I cannot feel sure that Buhle, although Mr Cope follows him, has proved his point in connecting this allusion with the story told by Xenophon *Hellen.* vii. ch. 3.

[4] This must clearly be the meaning of τὸ ἧττον and τὸ μᾶλλον, if the reading of the passage is correct. Perhaps however it should be εἰ τὸ ἧττον εἰκὸς ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, as Τοπικά ii. ch. 10 would suggest.

true also. [1] *The argument therefore is one that may be employed*, whether the conclusion which we wish to establish be positive or negative. Again, the topic is applicable to a case of parity, as in the lines

"Thy sire
Is pitiable having lost his sons,
And Œneus, of his noble child bereft,
Is he not pitiable[2]?"

Similarly we may argue that, if Theseus was innocent, so was Alexander (Paris) or, if the sons of Tyndareus were innocent, so was Alexander, or that, if Hector had a right to slay Patroclus, so had Paris a right to slay Achilles, or again that, if other artisans are not contemptible, neither are philosophers, or that, if generals should not be condemned for being often defeated, neither should sophists, or again, [3]"If each individual is bound to study your reputation, you are bound in your turn to study the reputation of all the Greeks."

There is another topic depending upon a consideration of the time. Thus [4]Iphicrates in defending

[1] I cannot help thinking that the clause καθ' ὁπότερον ἂν δέῃ δεῖξαι κ.τ.λ., belongs to both preceding sentences. It would be well then to change the full stops after ἄνθρωπος, l. 18, and ἧττον l. 20 to colons or commas.

[2] A quotation supposed to be taken from the *Meleager* of Antiphon. Œneus was the father of Meleager.

[3] A supposed appeal of an Athenian orator to the Public Assembly for a chivalrous devotion to the interests of Greece.

[4] Harmodius opposed the motion to erect a statue of Iphicrates in commemoration of his victory over the Lacedaemonians, B.C. 392. (Grote's *History of Greece*, ch. 75, vol. IX. pp. 173, sqq.)

himself against Harmodius said "Suppose that before the action I had demanded the statue in case of doing it, you would have granted it; now that the action has been done, will you refuse it? Do not then make a promise in anticipation, and defraud me of it, when you have received the benefit." Again, if the object is to induce the Thebans to [1] afford Philip a passage into Attica, it may be argued that, "if he had preferred the request before giving them assistance against the Phocians, they would have consented; it is a monstrous shame that they should not afford him the passage, because he threw away his opportunity and trusted their honour."

Another topic consists in applying to our adversary's case anything that he has said about ourselves. [2] It is a topic of singular force as may be seen in the [3] *Teucer*. It was employed by Iphicrates in his reply to Aristophon, when he asked him if he would take a bribe to betray the fleet. "No" said Aristophon. "Well, then" he replied "if you an Aristophon would refuse the bribe, shall I an Iphicrates accept it?" It is assumed of course that our adversary is one who would be thought more likely to have been guilty of the crime; otherwise, there would clearly be something ridiculous in such a retort, if it were used as a means of meeting the attack of an Aristeides.

[1] It was a short while only before the battle of Chæronea that Philip applied to the Thebans for a free passage.

[2] Reading ὁ τόπος.

[3] No doubt the *Teucer* of Sophocles; but the precise point of the reference is unknown.

[1] *It is meant on the contrary* to create distrust of the prosecutor, as he generally affects a higher virtue than the defendant, and it is this which [2] requires to be disproved. But the topic is always an absurd one, when a person censures others for doing what he himself does or is capable of doing, or exhorts them to do what he himself does not or is incapable of doing.

There is another topic arising from definition, as e.g. [3] *the argument* that the supernatural must be either God or the work of God; but anybody who believes in the existence of a work of God necessarily believes also in the existence of Gods. Another instance is [4] Iphicrates's argument that the most virtuous person is the noblest, because there was nothing noble in Harmodius and Aristogeiton until they had performed a noble deed; or his argument that he was himself a nearer relation of theirs than *their own descendant*, "at all events my actions are more nearly related to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are." Similarly, in the [5] *Alexander*

[1] It is difficult to believe that Gaisford is right in taking the whole passage from *οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ* l. 8, to *τοῦτό τις εἴπειεν* l. 14 to be parenthetical. The construction is simpler, if some such words as *τοῦτο χρὴ λέγειν* are mentally supplied with *πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου.*

[2] Reading *δεῖ* instead of *ἀεί.*

[3] The reference is plainly to the argument used by Socrates at his trial. See Plato *Apology*, pp. 26, 27.

[4] It may well be supposed that in the speech *πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον,* which is alluded to p. 97, l. 34, Iphicrates had made use of this argument as an answer to the taunts levelled at his humble origin. (Cp. p. 27, l. 8: p. 32, l. 21.)

[5] Some eulogy of Alexander or Paris by an unknown author;

it is said "Everyone will admit that licentious people are not content with the enjoyment of a single love." Socrates's reason for not going to the court of Archelaus is also a case in point; he said it was as ignominious to be without the power of returning a benefit as to be without the power of returning an injury. In all these cases the speaker first defines a term and ascertains its nature and then proceeds to reason from it on the point at issue.

Another topic springs from the various senses of a word; I may refer to the discussion of the right use of words in the [1] *Topics*.

Another from division, as e.g. if there are three possible causes of a crime, and while two of these are out of the question, the third is not alleged even by the prosecution.

Another topic depends upon induction; and of this the [2] Peparethian case supplies an example. It was argued in it that the decision of women about their children is everywhere correct; for in one instance at Athens, in the dispute between Mantias the rhetorician and his son, the declaration of the mother *was regarded as final*, and in another at Thebes, in the dispute between Ismenias and Stilbon, Dodonis *the mother* affirmed that Ismenias was the father of the child, and accordingly *the child* Thettaliscus was always considered to be his son. Or again, to quote

it is apparently quoted several times in this and the next chapter.

[1] Τοπικά i. ch. 15; ii. ch. 3.

[2] This was a *cause célèbre* relating to the parentage of a child.

the [1]"law" of Theodectes, "If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have mismanaged other people's, or our ships to those who have wrecked other people's, it follows that, if this rule is of universal application, we should be wrong in entrusting our own safety to those who have proved themselves inefficient guardians of the safety of others." Such a case too is the statement of Alcidamas that all the world pays honour to the wise, "at least the Parians have honoured Archilochus, reviler as he was, the Chians Homer, although he was not their fellow-countryman, and the Mitylenaeans Sappho despite her sex, the Lacedaemonians, the least literary of all people, bestowed a seat in their senate upon Chilon, as did also the Italian Greeks upon Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes gave Anaxagoras a public burial, although he was an alien, and continue to the present day to pay him honour." [2]*Again, it may be argued that states are always prosperous under the laws of philosophers,* because the Athenians prospered under the laws of Solon and the Lacedæmonians under those of Lycurgus, and at Thebes no sooner did [3]the leading men become philosophers than the state entered upon a career of prosperity.

There is another topic derivable from a judgment already pronounced upon the same or a similar or an

[1] Apparently a speech delivered by Theodectes—it is quoted again p. 101, l. 9—upon a law proposed by himself or somebody else in reference to the position of mercenaries.

[2] It is clear that something has fallen out of the text and must be supplied to make the instances quoted apposite.

[3] "The leading men" are Pelopidas and Epaminondas.

opposite question, especially if it is the judgment of all men and all times, or, failing that, of a large majority or of all or nearly all the wise or good or again of the judges themselves or of those whose authority they admit or whose judgment admits of no contradiction, as e.g. if they are those who are masters of the situation or who cannot be opposed without impropriety, such as the Gods or a parent or one's teachers. This was the point of [1]Autocles's remark against Mixidemides, "The idea of the awful Goddesses (the Eumenides) submitting to be tried before the Court of Areopagus and Mixidemides refusing"; or Sappho's that "it is an ill thing to die, for so have the Gods decided; else would they die themselves"; or Aristippus's reply to Plato who had, he thought, rather assumed an air of dogmatism, "Well, anyhow that was not our friend's way," meaning Socrates. Agesipolis again, after consulting the oracle at Olympia, went on to ask the God at Delphi whether he was of the same mind as his father, implying that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Again [2]in the case of Helen Isocrates contended that she must be virtuous, inasmuch as she was approved by Theseus, and in that of [3]Alexander, *that he must be virtuous,* as he had been the favourite of the Goddesses; [4]Evagoras also (says Isocrates) was virtuous, at all events when Conon found himself in difficulties, he left everybody else and went to Evagoras.

[1] It may be inferred that Mixidemides had denied the authority of the Court of Areopagus in a case concerning himself.

[2] The passage is in the *Helen*, §§ 23—25.

[3] Probably in the *Helen*, § 46.

[4] *Evag.* § 61.

[1]Another topic consists in *taking separately* the parts *of a subject, in considering e.g.*, as is done in the [2]*Topics*, what sort of motion the soul is, as it must be this or that. The [3]*Socrates* of Theodectes will supply an illustration, *where he says* "What temple has he profaned? where is the God, among all the Gods recognized by the State, to whom he has not paid due honour?"

Also, as it happens in the great majority of cases that the same thing has consequences partly good and partly bad, another topic consists in using the attendant circumstances as means of exhortation or dissuasion, accusation or defence, eulogy or censure. Thus education is attended by envy, which is an evil, and by wisdom, which is a good; hence it is possible to argue against education on the ground that envy is a thing to be avoided, and in its favour on the ground that wisdom is a thing to be desired. This is the topic which constitutes the entire rhetorical system of Callippus, if we add to it the topic of possibility and the other topics, [4]as has been said.

There is another topic when in reference to two opposite things it is necessary to employ exhortation or dissuasion and to apply to both the method already

[1] It is not easy to distinguish this topic from the one described p. 98, l. 34, except that the latter is specially forensic in its bearing.

[2] Τοπικά ii. ch. 4, p. 111, B_{4-11}.

[3] An ἀπολογία Σωκράτους or imaginary speech of Socrates in his own defence.

[4] There has been no reference to the τέχνη of Callippus; but perhaps Aristotle means the other "common topics" which have been discussed in ch. 19.

described, the difference being that, whereas in the last case it was any two things, it is here two opposites that are contrasted. Thus there was a certain priestess who forbade her son to go into politics; "for if what you say is just" she said "you will be hated by men, and if it is unjust, by the Gods." But a plea might equally well be advanced for political life, for "if what you say is just, you will be a favourite with the Gods, and if it is unjust, with men." This is the same thing as the proverb "to take the fat with the lean"; [1] "divarication," as it is called, is simply the case of two opposites having each a good and an evil consequence, which are respectively opposite to each other.

Again, as there is a difference between the objects which people praise in public and in secrecy, and, while they make a show of lauding justice and honour above everything else, they prefer expediency in their hearts, another topic consists in trying to use *an adversary's premisses, whichever mode of sentiment he adopts,* to infer the opposite *of his conclusion;* for there is no topic of paradoxes so entirely effective as this [2].

[1] Although it is impossible, I think, to represent the rhetorical βλαίσωσις by any equivalent existing English word, it is comparatively easy to infer its meaning from the example. Honesty and dishonesty (it may be said) are the opposites. Each has a good and an evil attached to it, to honesty the favour of Heaven and the hatred of the world, to dishonesty the favour of the world and the hatred of Heaven, and these goods and evils are "respectively opposite to each other". A metaphor derived from legs irregularly diverging would express as nearly as possible this relation.

[2] The meaning seems to be that, if an adversary takes a high

Another topic is derived from analogy of results. Iphicrates, for instance, resisted an effort to impose a public burden upon his son because of his size, although he was under the legal age, by saying "If you reckon tall boys men, you will have to vote short men boys." Theodectes again in his [1]"law" said "If you enfranchise mercenaries like Strabax and Charidemus in consideration of their respectability, will you not expatriate those of the mercenaries who have been guilty of irreparable crimes?"

Another topic consists in arguing identity of cause from identity of effect. Xenophanes, for instance, contended that it was as impious to affirm the birth of the Gods as to affirm their death; for in either case it follows that there is a time when they do not exist. And under this topic falls the general rule of assuming the result of either of two things to be invariably the same as that of the other, *as in the words* "It is not about Isocrates but about a study that you have to decide *in deciding* whether it is right to practise philosophy." Similarly *it may be argued* that the giving of earth and water is equivalent to slavery and that participation in the [2]general peace is equivalent to allegiance to Alexander. However we may adopt whichever view suits us best.

moral line in his argument, we must prove the facts on which he depends to be consistent with selfish expediency; if on the other hand he argues from the view of expediency, we must contend for the higher morality.

[1] See note on p. 99, l. 10.

[2] "The general peace" was the treaty which the Greek states, except the Lacedaemonians, made with Alexander after the death of Philip in 336 B.C.

There is another topic depending upon the fact that people do not always make the same choice at a later as at an earlier time, but often reverse it. Take e.g. the following enthymeme, [1] "It will be monstrous if during our expatriation we fought for our restoration and, now that we are restored, shall be expatriated rather than fight"; the choice being in the one case to remain at the cost of fighting and in the other to avoid fighting at the cost of exile.

Another topic consists in treating the conceivable as the actual reason of a thing existing or [2]having come into existence, as in the supposition that a person would make a present in order to inflict the pain of taking it away. This is the spirit of the [3]lines

"On some men Heaven in no favouring mood
Bestows large blessings that the after-ills
They shall sustain may be more palpable,"

or the passage in the *Meleager* of Antiphon.

"Not for the slaughter of the boar
The heroes came, but to be witnesses
Of Meleager's bravery to Hellas,"

or the argument in the *Ajax* of Theodectes that Diomedes [4]gave the preference to Odysseus not as honouring him but in order that his companion might

[1] The words which follow are quoted, although incorrectly, from a speech of Lysias in which the Athenians, who had been restored after the expulsion of the Thirty in 403 B.C., are exhorted not to submit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians. It is entitled περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλῦσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν Ἀθήνῃσι. See Mr Cope's note.

[2] Changing εἰ μὴ γένοιτο to ᾗ γένοιτο.

[3] The source of the quotation is unknown.

[4] In the episode known as the Δολωνεία. See *Iliad* x. 218, seq.

be inferior to himself, this being a possible explanation of his conduct.

There is another topic common to forensic and deliberative oratory, viz. to consider the inducements and discouragements and the motives of acting or abstaining from action; for these are the conditions, the presence or the absence of which renders action desirable or the reverse. It is to be considered e.g. whether a thing is possible, easy and advantageous either to oneself or to one's friends or wasteful and detrimental to one's enemies or if the penalty is not adequate to the deed. These are the materials of exhortation, and their opposites of dissuasion. [1] They are also the materials of accusation and defence, the inducements of the former and the discouragements of the latter. In fact it is this topic which constitutes the whole rhetorical systems of Pamphilus and Callippus.

There is yet another topic in the case of things which are supposed to happen but are difficult to believe. *It may be urged* that people would not have [2]supposed these, had they not been true or nearly true; nay, that they are especially *likely to be true*, as everything believed is either actual or probable, and therefore, if a thing is hard to believe and is not probable, it must be true, as at all events it is not the probability or plausibility of it which is the

No doubt in the *Ajax* of Theodectes, there was a passage in which the prowess of Odysseus was rudely handled. Cp. p. 103, ll. 5—7.

[1] The meaning is that an advocate may seek to prove guilt or innocence by pointing to the causes which would naturally tend to induce or to prevent criminality.

[2] Perhaps ἔδοξεν would be better than ἔδοξαν.

reason of its being so supposed. There is an instance of this in the remark of Androcles of Pitthus in his declaration against the law. Being interrupted by expressions of dissent at the words "The laws require a law to set them right," he said "Yes, and so do fish require salt, although it is neither likely nor plausible that they should require it, as their life is spent in the brine, and oil-cakes require oil, incredible as it is that the things which supply oil should require it."

Another topic, which is proper to refutation, consists in examining whether there is any contradiction in the series of dates, actions or words, and this under three separate heads, viz. firstly in reference to your adversary, as e.g. *if you can say*, "Although he pretends to be your friend, he took part in the conspiracy of the Thirty," secondly in reference to yourself, as "Although he calls me litigious, it is beyond his power to prove that I have ever been party to a suit," thirdly in reference to yourself and your adversary, as "While he has never lent you a farthing, there are actually many of you whom I have ransomed."

Another topic, where there is or appears to be a prejudice against particular persons or things, is to state the explanation of the circumstance which is unaccountable, as there is always something which accounts for the appearance. . . . Thus in the *Ajax* of Theodectes Odysseus explains to Ajax how it is that he has not the reputation of being braver than Ajax, although he is so.

Another topic consists in arguing from the presence or absence of the cause the existence or non-ex-

istence of the effect; for cause and effect go always hand in hand, and there is nothing which has not a cause. This was the point of [1]Leodamas's defence, when Thrasybulus had accused him of being one whose name had been posted in the Acropolis and of having erased it under the government of the Thirty. This was impossible (said Leodamas) as the Thirty would have been more disposed to trust him, if there had been this record of his hostility to the people.

Another topic is to consider whether it was or is possible to take a better course than that which the person either recommends or takes or has taken in action; for if this course has not been taken, it is evident that he has not done the deed, as nobody voluntarily and intentionally chooses what is bad. But in this there is a fallacy; for it often happens that the better method of action becomes evident subsequently, but in the first instance was unknown.

Again, if an intended action is inconsistent with some action already performed, there is another topic which consists in viewing them side by side. Thus when the inhabitants of Elea inquired of Xenophanes whether they should sacrifice to [2]Leucothea and lament for her, he gave them as his advice, if they regarded her as a goddess, not to lament, if as a mortal, not to offer sacrifice.

[1] The passage shows that before the era of the Thirty the name of Leodamas, as an enemy of the people, had been inscribed on a pillar in the Acropolis. See Mr Cope's note.

[2] Ino the wife of Athamas, in a fit of madness threw herself into the sea and became (as the story went) a sea goddess named Leucothea.

Another topic is to discover a ground of accusation or defence in any mistake that has been made. In the *Medea* of Carcinus for example, Medea is accused of having murdered her children; at all events (it is urged) they have disappeared, the fact being that Medea made a mistake in sending her children away; and Medea's reply is that it is not her children but Jason whom she would have murdered, as assuming her to have been capable of the other crime, it would have been a mistake in her not to have committed this. This is the topic or species of enthymeme which constitutes the entire earlier system of Theodorus.

Another topic is derivable from a play on names, as in Sophocles

[1] "Sidero, aye and rightly named,"

or as is so common in panegyrics of the Gods or as when Conon called Thrasybulus "rash counsellor" or when Herodicus said to Thrasymachus "You are ever as brave as your name" or to Polus "You are always colt by nature as by name" or of the legislator Draco, that his laws are not the laws of a man but of a dragon, alluding to their severity. So too Hecuba in Euripides says of Aphrodite

[2] "Well may her name
Be first in folly,"

[1] A line from the *Tyro* of Sophocles. Sidero, "iron by name and iron by nature," was Tyro's stepmother.

[2] *Troades* 990. "'Αφροδίτη and ἀφροσύνη have the first half of the word in common" (Cope).

or Chaeremon *has the line*

[1] "Pentheus, prophetic name of ill to come."

Demonstrative and refutative enthymemes.

The reason why refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative is that a refutative enthymeme is a conclusion of opposites within a small space and that things are rendered clearer to an audience by juxtaposition. But of all refutative or demonstrative syllogisms none are so much applauded as those which are understood at once, not however because they are superficial, as the audience are pleased with themselves for anticipating the conclusion, and those with which we can so nearly keep pace as to understand them as soon as they are stated.

CHAP. XXIV. True and apparent enthymemes.

As there may be true syllogisms and syllogisms which are apparent but not true, it follows at once that there are true and apparent enthymemes, because the enthymeme is a species of syllogism.

Topics of apparent enthymemes.

Among topics of apparent enthymemes the first is that which arises from the use of language, and of this there are two divisions. [2] The first is when, as in Dialectic, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of a syllogism without having gone through the process of reasoning, *saying*, "It follows that this is not so and so," or "It must therefore be so and so"; similarly in enthymemes the use of a

[1] In allusion to the connexion of Πενθεὺς with *πένθος*. Cp. Euripides *Bacchae*, 508.

[2] Reading, mainly after Vahlen, *καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα.*

compact and antithetical phrase has the appearance of an enthymeme; for language of this kind is the province of enthymeme. It is apparently the style of the language used which is the occasion of such fallacies. But in order to give our language an air of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of a large number of syllogisms, as "Some he saved; the others he aided; he was the liberator of Greece"; for although the proof of these several assertions was derived from other premisses, their combination appears to produce some new result. Secondly, there is the topic of [1]equivocation, as if one should assert that the mouse is an estimable creature, [2]because it gives its name to the most venerable of all religious rites, viz. the mysteries, or if in a panegyric of a dog one includes the heavenly dog, *viz. the dogstar*, or Pan, because [3]Pindar used the words

"Blessed deity
Whom the Olympians style the dog,
The manifold dog of the great Cybele,"

or *argues* that, [4]as it is a great disgrace to have no dog in the house, it is evident that a dog is honourable. Another instance is the argument that Hermes is the most communicative of all the gods, as he is

[1] The Aristotelian "homonyms" or "equivocables" are things which have the same name. See Κατηγορίαι i. ch. 1 and cp. Quintilian *de Instit. Orat* vii. ch. 9, § 2.

[2] Polycrates wrote a panegyric of mice (p. 106, l. 10); and in it he must have dwelt upon the supposed etymological connexion between μῦς (a mouse) and μυστήριον (a mystery).

[3] The lines are a fragment of Pindar's lost *Parthenia.*

[4] Schrader is perhaps correct in supposing that there is a play upon dogs and the dog-philosophers or Cynics.

the only god who is called [1]"Common Hermes"; or the argument that [2]accounts (λόγος) are excellent things, because it is not of money but of account that good men are worthy, the phrase to be of account (λόγου ἄξιον εἶναι) being one that is capable of a double meaning.

Another topic consists in combining what is separate or separating what is combined; for as a thing appears the same *when so treated*, although it is often not the same, we must represent it in whichever way best serves our purpose. This is the *favourite* argument of Enthydemus, e.g. [3]that he knows there is a trireme in the Piraeus because he knows each of two facts. A second instance is that anybody who knows the letters knows the verse, as it is the same thing. A third that, if a double portion of a certain thing is baneful, the single portion too cannot be wholesome, as it cannot be supposed that two good things make one bad thing. While the topic, if put in this way, is refutative, it is demonstrative, if put

[1] The connexion of κοινωνικός and κοινός is not easily preserved in English. "Common Hermes" or "Hermes in common" (κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς) was a favourite expression of those who claimed to "go shares" with someone in a treasure-trove (ἕρμαιον).

[2] λόγος has two senses (1) speech, (2) account or esteem; but there is no word which corresponds to it in English.

[3] There is no more difficult passage in the *Rhetoric* than this. If it be compared with *Sophist. Elench.* ch. 20, p. 177 B_{12} and illustrated by *Sophist. Elench.* ch. 4, p. 166 A_{22-32}, the inference will, I think, be that the illicit combination lies in combining the clauses "He knows (being) in the Piraeus" and "He knows there is a trireme" into the single clause "He knows there is a trireme in the Piraeus."

as follows, "One good thing cannot be made up of two bad things." The whole topic however is fallacious. [1]Again, we may instance the saying of Polycrates about Thrasybulus that he overthrew thirty tyrants, where he uses combination, or the passage in the *Orestes* of Theodectes, which illustrates division:

"'’Tis just that whoso slays her husband die,'

"and it is just that a father's blood should be avenged by his son; well, this is exactly what has occurred." *But the argument is fallacious*, as, when the two things are combined, it is very likely that the result will no longer be just. This fallacy may also be ascribed to omission, the name of the author of the action being left out.

Another topic is that of indignant asseveration whether in a constructive or destructive sense, as when, without having proved the perpetration of a certain act, we exaggerate the horror of it; for by so doing we produce the impression either that the act has not been perpetrated, if it is the defendant who employs the exaggeration, or the reverse, if it is the prosecutor who is in a passion. This then is no *true* enthymeme; for the audience is only betrayed into concluding that an act has or has not been perpetrated without demonstrative proof having been offered.

Another topic is the use of a mere sign *or single*

[1] The "combination" consists in representing the Thirty Tyrants as being each the victim of Thrasybulus; the "division" in treating the murder of Clytaemnestra by Orestes as simply a case of avenging a father's bloodshed or putting the murderer of her husband to death without considering the relationship between the son who slays and the mother who is slain.

instance as an argument, the conclusion here again not being logically complete. Thus it might be argued that lovers are of service to States, as it was the love of [1]Harmodius and Aristogeiton which overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus; or that [2]Dionysius is a thief, because he is a bad man, such a conclusion again being illogical, as all bad men are not thieves, although all thieves are bad men.

There is another topic, dependent upon accidental circumstances. We may take as an instance of this the remark of Polycrates about the mice, that they gave valuable aid [3]by gnawing the bow-strings. Or it might perhaps be urged that there is no compliment so great as an invitation to dinner, as it was [4]from not receiving an invitation that Achilles got into a passion with the Achaeans at Tenedos; whereas the fact was that his passion was owing to his sense of the dishonour that was done him, and it was only an accident that this took the form of his not being invited to dinner.

There is another topic, [5]which arises from the consequence of an action. In the *Alexander* e.g. it is argued that the hero was a man of elevated mind,

[1] The story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton is told by Thucydides vi. ch. 54 sqq.

[2] The name of Dionysius is taken at random; it is not any individual who is meant.

[3] Cp. Herodotus ii. ch. 141, whether this is or is not the incident which Aristotle had in mind.

[4] The reference is to a scene in a play of Sophocles.

[5] The topic consists in arguing from identity of effect to identity of cause, whereas the same effect may be the result of various causes.

because he disdained the society of numbers and remained on Mount Ida by himself; for as this is conduct natural to persons of elevated minds, he would appear to possess such elevation. Again, *it may be argued that*, because a person dresses well and goes out at night, he is a rake, such being the habits of rakes. Another argument of a similar kind is that beggars sing and dance in the temples and that exiles are allowed to live wherever they choose; for as these are the characteristics of apparent happiness, it may be supposed that anyone who possesses them is happy. There is a difference however in the manner *of doing these things;* and hence the topic falls under the head of omission.

Another topic is to treat that which is not a cause as the cause, because e.g. it has occurred simultaneously or subsequently; for the sequel is here assumed to be the effect, especially in public life, as when Demades pronounced the policy of Demosthenes to be the cause of all the evils, because it was after it that the war occurred.

There is another topic arising from the omission of the time or manner, as *when it is urged* that Alexander had a right to take Helen, because her father allowed her her choice *of a husband.* This is a fallacy; for it was not, we must suppose, perpetually but only at the first that the choice was given her, as after the first choice the authority of her father ceased. It would be a similar case, if one were to say that to strike a free man is a wanton insult; for this is not the case universally, but only when the striker is the aggressor.

Again, it is possible here, as well as in eristical discussions, to derive an apparent syllogism [1]from the interchange of the absolute with that which is not absolute but particular. Such a case in Dialectic is the argument that the non-existent is, on the ground that the non-existent *is* non-existent; or that the unknown is knowable, because the unknown is known to be unknown. Similarly in Rhetoric an apparent enthymeme may be derived from a probability which is not absolute but particular. This *particular probability* however is not universal, as indeed Agathon says in the lines

> "It may be one would call it probable
> That many things improbable occur;"

for as what is contrary to probability sometimes occurs, it follows that what is contrary to probability is itself probable. This being so, the improbable will be probable—[2]not, however, probable in an absolute sense. The truth is that, as in eristical discussions it is by omitting the condition, relation and mode that we create the deception, so here it is the probability which is not absolute but particular that is the occasion of the fallacy. It is this topic of which the rhetorical system of Corax is composed. For if the defendant is not liable to the charge brought against him, if e.g. he is a feeble person and is charged with assault and battery, he defends himself by pleading the improbability of the case; or if he is liable to it, if e.g. it is a strong man against whom the charge is

[1] The word "is" has two senses, one absolute, the other relative or particular, in the following instances.

[2] Changing the full stop after εἰκός to a comma.

brought, he too pleads the improbability of the case on the ground that it was sure to seem probable. The same rule holds equally in other cases. A person must either be liable to a charge or not; and this being so, while both appear probable, in the one case the probability is absolute, and in the other it is not absolute but *particular*, as has been said. This in fact is the meaning of converting the worse argument into the better. Accordingly people were justified in showing their disapproval of [1]Protagoras's profession, as it is a falsehood and not true but only apparent probability and has no place in any art except Rhetoric and Eristic.

CHAP. XXV. Refutation.

So much then for enthymemes both real and apparent. The next subject to be treated is refutation.

Methods of refutation:

There are two ways of refuting an argument, viz. either by a counter-syllogism or by adducing an objection. It is clear that the counter-syllogisms may be constructed out of the same topics as the syllogisms *of which we have spoken;* for it is the common opinions of the world which form the materials of syllogisms, and opinions are often contradictory. Objections on the other hand, [2]as in the *Topics*, may be adduced in four different ways, viz. either from the enthymeme of your adversary himself, or from analogy, or from antithesis, or from a previous decision.

(1) Counter syllogism; (2) Objection. Four different kinds of objection.

As an instance of an objection *derived* from *the enthymeme of* an adversary himself, let us suppose

[1] Protagoras is said to have originated the theory that there were two contradictory arguments possible on any subject.

[2] Τοπικά, viii. ch. 10.

that the subject of his enthymeme is the virtue of love; then it may be objected either generally that *love is a craving and* that every kind of craving is an evil, or in particular that there would be no such proverb as [1]"*Caunian love,*" unless there were evil forms of love as well as good. *It would be an objection* derived from antithesis, if the enthymeme were to show that a good man is the benefactor of all his friends, and it were objected that a bad man on the other hand is not the enemy of all his friends. [2]*It would be an objection* from analogy, if the enthymeme were meant to show that the victims of crime always cherish a feeling of hatred, and *it were objected* that the recipients of benefits on the other hand do not always cherish a feeling of affection. *Lastly,* the decisions *to which I refer* are those of eminent persons. Thus if it were the point of an enthymeme that some allowance shall be made for intoxicated people, as they commit their offences in ignorance, it might be objected that, *if this is so,* Pittacus deserves no commendation, or he would not have ordained heavier penalties for offences committed by a person in a state of intoxication.

Materials of enthymemes: The materials of enthymemes are four, viz. probabilities, examples, demonstrations and signs. They are probabilities, when the conclusion is derived from such facts as either are or are supposed to be generally true; examples, when it is reached [3]by

[1] The love of Byblis for her brother Caunus was a typical instance of disastrous love.

[2] This case is not really different from the preceding.

[3] I should be glad to omit δι' ἐπαγωγῆς.

induction from an analogy of one or several instances, the universal rule being first ascertained and the particulars afterwards inferred from it; demonstrations, when it depends upon a rule which is necessary and absolute; signs, when upon general or particular statements which may be either true or false. A probability then being not an invariable but a general rule, it is clear that enthymemes which are so constructed may invariably be refuted by an objection, although the refutation is apparent and not real; for it is not the probability but only the necessity of the opponent's case which is disproved by the objection alleged. Hence this fallacy always offers an opportunity of gaining an unfair advantage in defence rather than in accusation. For the accuser employs probabilities as his means of proof; but there is a difference between disproving the necessity and disproving the probability of a case, and a general rule, if it is to be only probable and not invariable and necessary, must always admit of objections. Yet if once the necessity of a thing has been disproved, the audience assume either that it is not probable or that they have no business to decide it; although, as I said, their conclusion is wrong, as their decision ought to rest upon probabilities as well as upon necessary truths, such being the meaning of the words "to decide according to the best of our judgment." Hence it is not enough for the defendant to prove that a thing is not necessary; he needs to disprove its probability. But this will be done only if the objection is more generally true than the fact objected to; and it may be more generally true in

(1) probabilities,

respect either of time or of the circumstances of the case, although it will be most convincing, if it is so in both these respects; for if the majority of cases are in our favour, the balance of probability is on our side.

(2) signs,

Signs however and the enthymemes which are based upon them admit of refutation, even if true, as I said at the outset; for we saw in the [1]*Analytics* that fallible signs are always inconclusive.

pp. 18, 19.

(3) examples.

Enthymemes depending upon examples may be refuted in the same way as probabilities; [2]for a single contrary instance disproves at once the necessity of a thing, even although the majority of cases are on the other side; but if the majority of cases make in favour of our opponent, we must contend that the present case is not similar to them in nature or conditions, or at least presents certain points of difference.

(4) demonstrations.

Demonstrations on the other hand and the corresponding enthymemes cannot be refuted on the ground of inconclusiveness, as we saw in the [3]*Analytics*, and there is no resource left us except to disprove the fact.

If however there is no doubt about the fact or about its being a demonstration, the case is one which does not admit of refutation, as here each step is demonstratively proved.

[1] *Analyt. Prior.* ii. ch. 27; cp. *Rhet.* i. ch. 2.

[2] Reading as Mr Cope, *ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμέν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως· ἐάν τε καὶ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*

[3] *Analyt. Prior.* ii. ch. 27.

Chap. XXVI.

Exaggeration and depreciation.

Exaggeration and depreciation is not an element of an enthymeme. An element is in my view the same thing as a topic, being a head under which a number of enthymemes fall. Exaggeration and depreciation are rather enthymemes tending to show that a certain thing is great or small, as there are other enthymemes showing that it is good or bad, just or unjust, and so on. All these being the subjects of syllogisms and enthymemes, it follows that, if none is a topic of an enthymeme, neither is exaggeration and depreciation such a topic. Again, refutative enthymemes do not form a species distinct from constructive. For it is clear that refutation consists either in urging positive proof or in adducing an objection. In the first case we prove the opposite *of our adversary's statement;* I mean that, if he has proved a particular thing to have occurred, we prove the opposite and *vice versa.* The distinction then cannot lie here; for the same means are common to both, as in both enthymemes are advanced either to disprove a fact or to prove it. An objection on the other hand is not an enthymeme but as in the *Topics* the mere statement of an opinion intended to show that the reasoning of our opponent is inconclusive, or that there has been something false in his assumptions.

Refutative enthymemes.

Objections.

Now there are three proper subjects of study in regard to speech; and the remarks we have made may suffice for the means of discovering or refuting examples, maxims, enthymemes and the inventive part of Rhetoric generally. We have still however to consider style and arrangement.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I. The three subjects of a rhetorical treatise.

THERE being three proper subjects of systematic treatment in Rhetoric, viz. (1) the possible sources of proofs (2) style and (3) the right ordering of the parts of the speech, the first of these has been already discussed. We have ascertained the number of the sources of proofs, which are three, the nature of these sources, and the reason why they are not more numerous, viz. that persuasion is invariably effected either by producing a certain emotion in the audience itself or by inspiring the audience with a certain conception of the character of the speaker or *thirdly* by positive demonstration. The sources from which enthymemes are to be derived have also been stated; for these are both special and common topics of enthymemes. We have next to discuss the question of style, as it is not enough to know what to say but is necessary also to know how to say it, and *the art of saying things* is largely influential in imparting a certain colour to the speech.

pp. 191 sqq.

Style.

The first point which was naturally the subject of investigation is that which is first in the natural order, viz. the sources from which facts themselves derive

their persuasiveness, the second is the disposition *or setting out* of the facts by the style, and the third, which has never yet been attempted, although it has the greatest weight, is the art of [1]declamation. *Nor is it surprising that declamation should have been neglected;* for it has only lately been introduced into the tragic art and rhapsody, as poets were themselves originally the declaimers of their own tragedies. It is clear then that there is such a thing as an art of declamation in Rhetoric as well as in Poetry; and indeed it has been systematically treated by Glaucon of Teos among others. [2]The art consists in understanding (1) the proper use of the voice for the expression of the several emotions, i.e. when it should be loud or low or intermediate, (2) the proper use of the accents, [3]i.e. when the tone should be acute or grave or intermediate, and (3) the rhythms suitable to each emotion. For there are three things which are matters of such investigations, viz. magnitude *or volume of sound*, harmony and rhythm. It is people who are careful about these that generally carry off the prizes in the *dramatic*

Declamation.

[1] Aristotle uses ὑπόκρισις in a limited sense, confining it, as he says below, to the management of the voice and especially excluding delivery or gesticulation, which is treated as a part of ὑπόκρισις by Longinus and as a part of *actio* by Cicero and Quintilian.

[2] Reading αὕτη.

[3] The "intermediate" or "middle" accent is the circumflex, which may be regarded as a combination of the others. It is clear that each accent marks a particular *tone* of voice, and that the rhetorical harmony (ἁρμονία) consists in a due variation of the tones.

and rhapsodical competitions, and as in such competitions the influence of the declaimers *or actors* is greater now-a-days than that of the poets, so is it also in political competitions owing to the depraved character of our polities. But up to the present time no scientific treatise upon declamation has been composed; for it was not till a late date that the art of style itself made any progress, and *declamation* is still popularly considered, and indeed is rightly supposed, to be something vulgar. Still as the entire study of Rhetoric has regard to appearance, it is necessary to pay due attention to declamation, not that it is right to do so but because it is inevitable. Strict justice indeed, if applicable to Rhetoric, would confine itself to seeking such a delivery as would cause neither pain nor pleasure. For the right condition is that the battle should be fought out on the facts of the case alone; and therefore everything outside the *direct* proof is *really* superfluous, although extraneous matters are highly effective, as has been said, owing to the depraved character of the audience. pp. 5, 113. Nevertheless attention to style is in some slight degree necessary in every kind of instruction, as the manner of stating a fact has some effect upon the lucidity of the explanation. Still the difference is not so great *as is supposed;* these tricks of style are all merely pretentious and are assumed for the sake of gratifying the audience, and accordingly nobody teaches geometry after this fashion.

The art of rhetorical declamation.

The art of declamation, when it comes into vogue, will produce the same effects as the histrionic art;

and there are some writers, e.g. Thrasymachus in his *Rules of Pathos* (ἔλεοι), who have in a slight measure attempted to treat it. The truth is that a capacity for *declaiming or* acting is a natural gift, comparatively free from artistic regulations, although it may be reduced to an art in its application to style. Hence it is that people who possess this faculty, *viz. the faculty of a histrionic style*, are the winners of prizes in their day, as are also rhetorical actors; for [1]in written speeches the style is more effective than the thought.

History of style.

The origin *of this style* was due, as is natural, to the poets. For not only are all names imitations, but there was the *human* voice, which is the most imitative of all our members, ready to their use. Thus it was that the various arts, rhapsody, the histrionic art and others, as I need not say, were composed. And it was because the poets were thought, despite the simplicity of their sentiments, to have acquired their reputation by their style that *prose* style assumed at first a poetical form, as e.g. [2]the style of Gorgias. Nay even at the present time it is the opinion of most uneducated people that a poetical style is the finest. This however is an erroneous idea, the styles of prose and of poetry being distinct, as is shown by the fact that the writers of tragedies

[1] The reference is to the epideictic style of orators, in which the speeches were more usually written than delivered.

[2] Dr Thompson has excellently shown the poetical nature of Gorgias's style in the Appendix to his edition of Plato's *Gorgias* pp. 175 sqq.

themselves have ceased to use *the poetical style* as once they did, and that, as they passed from the tetrameter to the iambic measure as being the metre which bears the closest resemblance to prose, so too they have abandoned all such words as depart from the usage of *ordinary* conversation and were employed as ornaments by earlier dramatic writers and are still so employed by the writers of hexameter verse. It is absurd then to imitate those who themselves no longer employ their old style.

It clearly results from all this that we should be wrong in entering upon a minute discussion of all the possible points of style, and that we must confine ourselves to those of *rhetorical* style, which is now under our consideration. The other *or poetical* style has been discussed in my treatise on *Poetry*.

CHAP. II. Virtues or graces of style.

We may rest content then with our study of that question, and may take it as settled that one virtue of style is perspicuity. There is an evidence of this in the fact that our speech, unless it makes its meaning clear, will fail to perform its proper function. [1]Again, style should be neither mean nor exaggerated, but appropriate; for a poetical style, although possibly not mean, is still not appropriate to prose. Among nouns and verbs, while perspicuity is produced by such as are proper *or usual*, a character which is not mean but ornate is the result of the various other kinds of nouns enu-

[1] The sentence σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος......τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον is parenthetical and should be marked off from the context by colons.

merated in my [1]treatise on *Poetry*. The reason is that such variation imparts greater dignity to style; for people have the same feeling about style as about foreigners in comparison with their fellow-citizens, *i.e. they admire most what they know least.* Hence it is proper to invest the language with a foreign air, as we all admire anything which is out of the way, and there is a certain pleasure in the object of wonder. It is true that in metrical compositions there are many means of producing this effect, and means which are suitable in such compositions, as the subjects of the story, whether persons or things, are further removed *from common life.* But in prose these means must be used much more sparingly, as the theme *of a prose composition* is less elevated. For in poetry itself there would be a breach of propriety, if the fine language were used by a slave or a mere infant or on a subject of extremely small importance. It is rather in a *due* contraction and exaggeration that propriety consists even in poetry. Hence it is necessary to disguise the means employed, and to avoid the appearance of speaking not naturally, but artificially. For naturalness is persuasive, and artificiality the reverse; for people take offence at an artificial speaker, as if he were practising a design upon them, in the same way as they take offence at mixed wines. *The difference is much the same* as between the voice of [2]Theodorus and those

[1] *Poetic* ch. 21.

[2] Theodorus was a famous tragic actor, of whom a story is told in the *Politics* IV (VII) p. 129 ll. 8 sqq. (p. 220 of my Translation).

of all the other actors; for, while his appears to be the speaker's own voice, theirs have the appearance of being assumed. But the deception *which we have in view* is successfully effected, if words are chosen from ordinary parlance and combined, as is the practice of Euripides and indeed is the practice of which he was the first to set an example.

Words. Nouns and verbs being the component parts of the speech and the nouns being of all the various kinds which have been considered in my [1]treatise on *Poetry*, it is only seldom and in few places that we must make use of [2]rare or foreign words, [3]compound words or words *specially* invented *for the occasion*. The question where they should be used we will discuss at a later time; the reason for using them but rarely has been already stated, viz. that they constitute too wide a departure from propriety. It is only the [4]proper and the special name of a thing and the metaphor that are suited to the style of prose composition. We may infer this from the fact that these alone are of universal use, as everyone in conversation uses metaphors and the special or proper

[1] *Poetic* ch. 21.

[2] Although in the *Poetic*, ch. 21, p. 172, l. 19, Aristotle says λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι, it is clear that in the *Rhetoric* he includes rare and obsolete as well as foreign words under the general term γλῶτται. See the instances given p. 116, ll. 13 sqq.

[3] That διπλᾶ ὀνόματα are "compound words" is clear from ch. 3 in init. p. 116, ll. 4 sqq. Cp. *Poetic*, ch. 21, p. 172, ll. 11—14.

[4] There seems to be practically no difference in meaning between "proper" and "special" names; they are the names employed in ordinary speech.

names of things. It is clear therefore that successful composition will have an air of novelty without betraying its art and a character of lucidity, and these, as we have seen, are the virtues of rhetorical speech. p. 228.
Among nouns, while it is [1]homonymous nouns, *i.e. words which have several meanings,* that are serviceable to a sophist, as being the instruments of logical deception, it is synonyms which are serviceable to a poet. As an instance of proper and synonymous words I may mention e.g. "going" and "proceeding;" for these are both proper and also synonymous.

The nature of these several terms, the number of kinds of [2]metaphor, and the extreme importance of metaphor, both in poetry and in prose, are matters which have been discussed, as we said, in the [3]treatise on *Poetry.* But they deserve the [4]more diligent attention in prose in proportion as prose is dependent upon a smaller number of aids than metrical composition. Perspicuity, too, pleasure and an air of Metaphors.
strangeness are in an especial sense conveyed by means of metaphor, and for his metaphors a speaker must depend upon his own originality. The epithets and metaphors used must alike be appropriate, and

[1] Aristotle's own definitions of a "homonym" and a "synonym" will explain his meaning here: ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος...συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός. Κατηγορίαι 1.

[2] Retaining μεταφορᾶς.

[3] There is no discussion of synonyms in the *Poetic*, perhaps, as Schmidt suggests, because the book in its present form is more or less imperfect.

[4] Reading τοσούτῳ.

the appropriateness will arise from [1]proportion *or analogy;* otherwise there will be a glaring impropriety, as the contrariety of contraries is rendered most evident by juxtaposition. It is our business on the contrary to consider, as a scarlet robe is becoming to a young man, what it is that is becoming to an old man; for the same dress is not appropriate to both.

Propriety in the use of metaphors.

Again, if it is your wish to adorn a subject, the proper means is to borrow your metaphor from things superior to it which fall under the same genus; if to disparage it, from such things as are inferior. An instance of this, as contraries fall under the same genus, is to describe one who begs as a suppliant and to describe one who prays as a beggar, *praying and begging* being both forms of request. It was thus that Iphicrates called Callias a [2]mendicant priest instead of a torchbearer in the Mysteries, and Callias replied that he could never have been initiated or he would not have made such a mistake. The fact is that both are offices of divine worship, but the one is an honourable office and the other an ignoble one. Again, while somebody calls actors mere [3]parasites of

[1] Proportion or analogy (τὸ ἀνάλογον) in the choice of epithets implies that they agree in meaning with the words to which they belong, and in the choice of metaphors that there is no incongruity or confusion in the transference of ideas. See Mr Cope's note.

[2] The δᾳδουχία was a high hereditary office in the ritual of the Eleusinian Demeter. A μητραγύρτης, on the other hand, was no better than a begging friar who collected alms at the festival of Cybele or some other deity. See Lobeck *Aglaophamus*, p. 629.

[3] "Parasites of Dionysus", i.e. hangers-on of the god who was the presiding deity of the drama. It is to be noticed that the

Dionysus, they call themselves artists; both these terms are metaphorical, but one is defamatory and the other the contrary. Again, pirates now-a-days style themselves purveyors; and by the same rule one may describe crime as error, error as crime and stealing as either taking or plundering. Such a phrase as that of Telephus in Euripides

"Lord of the oar and setting forth to Mysia"

is a breach of propriety, as the word "lording" is too pompous for the subject, and accordingly the [1]deception is unsuccessful. A mistake may be made too in the mere syllables of a word, if they are not significant of sweetness in a voice. It is thus that Dionysius the [2]Brazen in his elegies calls poetry "Calliope's screeching," as both *poetry and screeching* are voices *or sounds*; but his metaphor is only a sorry one, as the sounds of screeching, *unlike poetical sounds*, possess no meaning. Again, the metaphors should not be far-fetched, but derived from cognate and homogeneous subjects, giving a name to something which before was nameless, and manifesting

Aristotelian use of μεταφορά is considerably wider than that of "metaphor" in English. Any transference of a word from its proper or ordinary application to another would be a μεταφορά, whether it involved a comparison or not. See the definition given in *Poetic*, ch. 21, p. 172, ll. 22—25, and the illustrations of it which follow; also Mr Cope's *Introduction*, Appendix B to Book iii.

[1] "the deception," i.e. the concealment of art which the speaker or writer has in view. See p. 113, ll. 11 and 24.

[2] Dionysius, an Athenian rhetorician of the 5th century B.C., is said by Athenaeus (*Deipn.* xv. p. 669 D) to have received the name or nickname of "the Brazen", as having first suggested the use of bronze money.

their cognate character as soon as they are uttered. There is a metaphor of this kind in the popular enigma

[1]"A man on a man gluing bronze by the aid of fire I discovered",

for the particular process was nameless, but, as both processes are kinds of application, *the author of the enigma* described the application of the cupping-glass as gluing. It is generally possible in fact to derive good metaphors from well-constructed enigmas; for as every metaphor conveys an enigma, it is clear that a metaphor *derived from a good enigma* is a good one. Again, a metaphor should be derived from something beautiful, and the beauty of a noun, as Licymnius says, and similarly its ugliness, resides either in the sound or in the sense. There is a third point to be observed in regard to metaphors, which upsets the sophistical theory. For it is not true, as Bryson said, that there is no such thing as the use of foul language, because, whether you say one thing or another, your meaning is the same. For one word is more properly applicable to a thing than another and more closely assimilated to it and more akin to it, as setting the thing itself more vividly before our eyes. Nor again is it [2]under the same conditions that a word signifies this or that, and hence on this ground

[1] Athenaeus (*Deipn.* x. p. 452 c.) gives the second line of the enigma or riddle thus:

οὕτω συγκόλλως ὥστε σύναιμα ποιεῖν.

[2] The difference seems to be that, although two words or expressions may have practically the same meaning, yet one may suggest widely different associations from the other.

alone we must regard one word as being fairer or fouler than another; for although both words signify the fairness or foulness of a thing, it is not *merely* in respect of its fairness or foulness that they signify it, or, if so, at least they signify it in different degrees. The sources from which metaphors should be derived are such things as are beautiful either in sound or in suggestiveness or in *the vividness with which they appeal to* the eye or any other sense. Again, one form of expression is preferable to another e.g. "rosy-fingered dawn" to "purple-fingered," while "red-fingered" is worst of all. In regard to [1]epithets again, the applications of them may be derived from a low or foul *aspect of things*, as *when Orestes is called* a matricide, or from the higher aspect, as *when he is called* the avenger of his father. *There is a similar instance in the story of* Simonides who, when the victor in the mule-race offered him only a poor fee, refused to compose *an ode*, pretending to be shocked at the idea of composing it on "semi-asses," but on receipt of a proper fee wrote *the ode beginning*

Sources of metaphors.

Epithets.

"Hail! daughters of storm-footed mares,"

although they were equally daughters of the asses. The same result may be attained by the use of diminutives. [2]By a diminutive I mean that which

[1] Aristotle uses ἐπίθετον to denote any word or words describing or characterizing a "proper noun," not merely a single adjective, as the English "epithet."

[2] ὑποκορισμός may properly be rendered in this place by the neutral word "diminutive," but it would not ordinarily include such diminutives as are of a depreciatory or censorious character.

diminishes either the good or the evil of a word, and I may cite as instances the banter of Aristophanes in the *Babylonians* where he substitutes "goldlet" (χρυσιδάριον) for gold, "tunickin" (ἱματιδάριον) for tunic, "wee little censure" (λοιδορημάτιον) for censure, and "sickiness" (νοσημάτιον) for *sickness*. But in the use both of epithets and of diminutives it is necessary to be cautious and never to lose sight of the mean.

CHAP. III. Faults of taste (τὰ ψυχρά).

Faults of taste occur in four points of style. Firstly, in the use of compound words, such as Lycophron's "many-visaged heaven," "vast-crested earth," and "narrow-passaged strand," or Gorgias's expressions, "a beggar-witted toady," or "forsworn and [1] foreversworn." There are instances too in Alcidamas, e.g. "his soul with passion teeming and his face fire-painted seeming," or "he thought their zeal would prove end-executing," or "his words' persuasiveness he made end-executing," or "steel-gray the ocean's basement;" for all these are terms which, as being compound, have a certain poetical character. A second cause of faults of taste is the use of rare words, as when Lycophron called Xerxes "a vasty man," and Sciron "a man of bale," or when Alcidamas said "baubles in poetry," "the retchlessness of his nature," and "[2]whetted with his mind's unadulterated ire." A third fault lies in the misuse of epithets, i.e. in making them either long or unseasonable or very numerous.

[1] It is apparently the compound κατευορκήσαντας which is objectionable, as the simpler form εὐορκήσαντας would express the meaning.

[2] The γλῶττα here, as Mr Cope says, is the word τεθηγμένον, which is rare and generally poetical in its usage.

For if in poetry it is proper to speak e.g. of "white milk," such epithets in prose are in any case inappropriate, and, if there are too many of them, they expose *the art of the style* and show it to be *simple* poetry. I do not say that epithets should not be used, as they are means of diversifying the ordinary style and giving the language a certain air of strangeness. But it is important to keep the mean ever in view, as *exaggeration* is worse in its effect than carelessness; for while in the latter there is only the absence of a merit, in the former there is a positive defect. Hence the epithets of Alcidamas appear tasteless, being so numerous and prolix and obtrusive as to be used not like a seasoning of the meat so much as like the meat itself. He says e.g. not "sweat" *simply* but "the damp sweat," not "to the Isthmian games" but "to the general assembly of the Isthmian games," not "laws" but "laws the sovereigns of states," not "by running" but "with the impulse of his soul at a run," not "a museum" but "a museum of all Nature that he had inherited." Again, *he says* "the thought of his soul sullen-visaged," "artificer" not "of favour" but "of universal favour," "steward of the pleasure of his audience," "concealed" not "with boughs" but "with the boughs of the wood," "he clothed" not "his body" but "his body's shame," "his soul's ambition counterfeit" (ἀντίμιμος)—a word which is at the same time a compound and an epithet, so that *the prose* is converted into poetry—and "the excess of his villainy so abnormal." The consequence is that this poetical diction by its impropriety is a source of absurdity and tastelessness as well as of obscurity

from its verbiage; for any speaker who accumulates words, where the audience is already cognizant of the subject on which he is speaking, involves it in an obscurity which is fatal to distinctness. People *for the most part* only use compound words when what they want to express is destitute of a name and the word they use is easily compounded, as e.g. pastime (χρονοτριβεῖν); if this is overdone, the effect is wholly poetical. Hence it is that compound words are eminently serviceable to dithyrambic poets, whose style is noisy; rare words to epic poets, as epic poetry is a stately and austere *style of composition;* and metaphors to iambic writers, for the iambic is now the vehicle *of tragic poetry,* as I have remarked.

p. 228. There is a fourth and last fault of taste which is shown in the use of metaphors; for metaphors too may be inappropriate, whether from their absurdity—for they are used by comic as well as by tragic poets —or from an excess of dignity and tragic effect, or again they may be obscure, if they are far-fetched. Take e.g. such expressions as Gorgias's, "a business green and raw" (*a case of obscurity*), or "you sowed in shame and reaped in misery," which is too poetical, or Alcidamas's description of philosophy as "an outpost against the laws," and of the *Odyssey* as "a fair mirror of human life," or his *phrase* "importing no such bauble into poetry," all which for the reasons stated fail in persuasiveness. Gorgias's address to the swallow, when she dropped her leavings on his head, is in the best style of tragic diction, "For shame," he said, "Philomela." The point is that it was not a shame to a bird to have behaved so, but it

was to a maiden. It was a happy thought then in his censure to speak of her as she was rather than as she is.

CHAP. IV. Similes.

The simile too is a metaphor, the difference between them being only slight. Thus when *Homer* says of Achilles that[1] "he rushed on like a lion," it is a simile; but when he says that "he rushed on, a very lion," it is a metaphor, for here, as valour is an attribute common to both, he transfers to Achilles the metaphorical appellation of "a lion." The simile is useful in prose as well as in poetry, although it should not be employed except sparingly, as it has a poetical character. The use of similes must be much the same as that of metaphors; for they are metaphors, but with the difference already stated.

An instance of a simile is e.g. that which Androtion applied to Idrieus when he said that he resembled curs which have been just unchained; for they fly at you and bite you, and so Idrieus was vicious when just unchained. Another is Theodamas's comparison of [2]Archidamus to Euxenus *minus* his knowledge of geometry; which is a [3]proportional simile, for *vice versa* Euxenus will be Archidamus *plus* his geometrical knowledge. Another is the expression in the [4]*Republic* of Plato that people who

[1] The words quoted are not found in the existing poems of Homer, but for the simile see *Iliad*, xx. 164.

[2] Euxenus and Archidamus are unknown, except from this passage.

[3] The "proportional" or "reciprocal" metaphor is illustrated in the *Poetic*, ch. 21, p. 173, ll. 1 sqq. See *infra* l. 29, p. 132, l. 3.

[4] *Republic*, v. p. 469 D.E.

despoil the dead are like curs that bite the stones thrown at them without touching the thrower. Or [1]Plato's comparison of the commons to a ship's captain who is strong but a little deaf. Or the [2]simile which he applies to poets' verses, that they are like blooming faces without beauty; for such faces, when the bloom has faded from them, and poets' verses, when they are broken up, both entirely lose their former appearance. Or the similes of Pericles about the Samians, that they are like children which take their sop but cry while taking it, or about the Boeotians, that they are like their own holm-oaks, for, as these are cut to pieces by axes made of their own wood, so are the Boeotians cut to pieces by civil war. Again, there is [3]Demosthenes's comparison of the commons to seasick passengers on board ship; or Democrates's of the orators to nurses who swallow the bonbon themselves, while they slobber the children with kisses; or Antisthenes's of Cephisodotus the thin to frankincense, as giving pleasure only by wasting away. For

Similes and metaphors.

these may all be expressed either as similes or as metaphors, so that such as are popular, when expressed as metaphors, will be always convertible into similes, and the similes, if the explanatory words are omitted, into metaphors. But the proportional metaphor should be always transferable reciprocally and

[1] *Republic*, VI. p. 488 A.

[2] *Republic*, X. p. 601 B.

[3] It is doubtful whether this is the great orator or not; his name has been mentioned, but not any passage of his speeches, p. 106, l. 28.

to either of the two congeners; e.g. if the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may be properly called the goblet of Ares.

CHAP. V. Style continued. Purity of language.

Such then being the component elements of the speech, the basis of style is purity of language. But purity of language falls under five heads; and of these the first is *the proper use of* connecting words or clauses, i.e. when they are made to correspond in the natural relation of priority or posteriority to one another, as some of them require, e.g. as μὲν and ἐγὼ μὲν require δέ and ὁ δέ *as correlatives.* But the correspondence should take place before the audience has had time to forget *the first of the* words or clauses, and the two should not be too widely separated, nor should another such word or clause be introduced before the one required as a correlative to the first, as such a construction is generally inappropriate. *Take e.g. the sentence* "But I, as soon as he told it me—for Cleon came to me with prayers and expostulations—set out with them in my company." In cases like this there are sometimes a number of connecting words or clauses prematurely introduced before the one which is required *as a correlative.* But if the clauses intervening between *the protasis and* the *verb* "set out" are numerous, *the sentence is rendered* unintelligible. A second point of purity of style consists in calling things by their own proper names rather than by *general or* class-names. A third consists in the avoidance of ambiguous terms, but this only if your purpose is not opposed *to perspicuity.* People use ambiguous terms when they have nothing to say but make a pretence

of saying something, and, if this is their object, they express themselves ambiguously in poetry, as e.g. Empedocles; for the length of their circumlocution imposes upon their audience and affects it as common people are affected in the presence of soothsayers; for they signify their assent to *such* ambiguous phrases *as*

> "If Crœsus pass the Halys, he shall whelm
> A mighty empire."

Again, it is because there is less opportunity of error *in generalities* that soothsayers express themselves in general terms of their subject; for as in the [1] game of "odd and even" you have a better chance of being right if you say simply "odd" or "even" than if you specify the number of things held in the hand, so too *in prophecy you have a better chance if you say* that a thing will be than if you say when it will be, and this is the reason why soothsayers never go so far as to specify the date of an event. All these *circumlocutions, ambiguities and the like* must be classed together *as so many faults*, and must therefore be avoided, unless you have some such object as I have suggested. A fourth point is to observe Protagoras's classification of nouns generically as masculine, feminine and neuter; for it is important that the genders should be properly

[1] The Greek game known as ἀρτιασμός is briefly described by Becker *Charicles*, Excursus III. to Scene VI.; *Gallus*, Excursus II. to Scene X. It was played by two persons, of whom one would hold in his hand a number of counters and the other would guess whether the number was odd or even, or more accurately what the number was.

assigned, [1]as e.g. ἡ δ' ἐλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα ᾤχετο. A fifth is the correct expression *of number, i.e.* many, few or unity, as e.g. οἱ δ' ἐλθόντες ἔτυπτόν με.

It is a general rule that the composition should be such as is easy to read and—which is the same thing—easy to deliver. But this will not be the case where there are many connecting words or clauses or where the punctuation is difficult, as in the writings of Heracleitus. It is no easy task to punctuate his writings, from the difficulty of determining to which of two words, the preceding or the following, a particular word *in his sentences* belongs. There is an example of this difficulty at the beginning of his book, where he says, "Although this divine reason exists for ever men are born into the world without understanding"; it is impossible to tell to which of the words "exists" or "are born" the words "for ever" should be joined by punctuation. Again, you are guilty of a solecism, if in writing two words in a single phrase you fail to assign to them a word appropriate to both. Thus *if you take e.g. the word* "sound" or "colour", the participle "seeing" does not apply to both alike, but "perceiving" does. And you become obscure, if in seeking to introduce a number of details in the middle *of a sentence* you do not complete the sense before you mention them, as

Punctuation.

Zeugma.

Parenthesis.

[1] The point of the illustration is the agreement of the feminine participles with the preceding feminine relative. But Mr Cope is, I think, right in arguing that the "classes" of Protagoras were not the same as the ordinary genders of classical grammar but composed (1) male agents, (2) female agents, (3) all inanimate or inactive things.

16—2

e.g. if you say "I meant, after discussing with him this, that and the other, to proceed" rather than "I meant to proceed after discussing with him, and then this, that and the other occurred."

CHAP. VI. Dignity.

We will pass now to dignity of style. The following are the causes which contribute to it. *Firstly*, to use a definition instead of the simple name of a thing, *to say* e.g. not "a circle" but "a plane figure which is at all points equidistant from the centre." (If brevity is the object, the contrary should be the rule, viz. the substitution of the simple name for the definition.) *Secondly*, where the subject is one that is foul or indecorous, if the foulness lies in the definition, to use the name, and if in the name, to use the definition. *Thirdly*, to employ metaphors and epithets as means of elucidating the subject, being on your guard at the same time against a poetical style. *Fourthly*, to put the plural for the singular, as the poets do when they say e.g.

"Unto Achaean harbours,"

when there is only one harbour, or

"Lo! here the manifold tablet-leaves,"

meaning a single leaf. *Fifthly*, [1]not to combine *two cases by a single article but* to give each case its own article, as in τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας. (But here again for brevity's sake the contrary τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός). *Sixthly*, to use connecting particles or, if for brevity's sake you omit the connecting particle, to

[1] The instance given shows that Victorius, whom Mr Cope follows, is right in understanding the rule to mean *non copulare vincireque uno articulo duos casus, sed utrique suum assignare.*

preserve the connexion, *saying e.g.* πορευθεὶς καὶ διαλεχθείς or πορευθεὶς διελέχθην, *not* πορευθεὶς διαλεχθείς. Another useful practice is Antimachus's device of describing a thing by attributes it does not possess, as he does in the case of Teumessus *in the* [1]*lines beginning*

"There is a low and wind-swept crest,"

for there is no limit to this method of amplification. This mode of treatment by negation is one that is applicable indifferently to things both good and bad, as occasion may require. It is the source of the epithets which poets use *such as* "stringless, lyreless music"; for they add privative epithets, as these are popular in proportional metaphors[2], as e.g. in calling the trumpet-blast "a lyreless music."

CHAP. VII. Propriety.

The conditions of propriety in a speech are that the style should be emotional and ethical, and *at the same time* proportionate to the subject-matter. By a proportionate style I mean that the manner of the composition should not be slovenly if the subject is pompous, or dignified if it is humble; and that there should be no ornamental epithets attached to unimportant words; otherwise *the composition* has the air of a comedy, like [3]Cleophon's poetry, which contains

[1] The quotation is from the *Thebais* of Antimachus, an epic poem on the theme of the ἑπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας. Teumessus was a hut or village in Boeotia.

[2] The "proportional" metaphor has been already illustrated; see marginal reference. Here the "proportion" would apparently be this:

Trumpet : trumpet-blast :: lyre : music of lyre (μέλος).

[3] A tragic poet, whose name occurs more than once in the *Poetic*.

some expressions as *ridiculous as* [1]it would be to say e.g. "a sovereign fig." The means of expressing emotion, if the matter is an insult, is the language of anger; if it is impiety or foulness, that of indignation and of a shrinking from the very mention of such a thing; if it is something laudable, that of admiration; if something pitiable, that of depression, and so on. This appropriateness of language is one means of giving an air of probability to the case, as the minds of the audience draw a wrong inference of the speaker's truthfulness from the similarity of their own feelings in similar circumstances, and are thus led to suppose that the facts are as he represents him, [2]even if this is not really so. It should be added that a listener is always in sympathy with an emotional speaker, even though what he says is wholly worthless. This is the reason why a good many speakers try to overwhelm the audience by their clamour. This method of proof depending on *external* signs is ethical, as the appropriate characteristics are assigned to any particular class or moral state. I understand under "class" the different periods of life, boyhood, manhood and old age, *the sexes*, male and female, or nationalities such as the Lacedaemonian or Thessalian; and under "moral states" such as determine the character of a person's life, as it is not every such state which influences the characters of lives. If then the words which the speaker uses are also appropriate to the moral state, he will produce this ethical effect; for

[1] Omitting *ἂν* or perhaps better *εἰ* before *εἴπειεν*.

[2] There is no good reason for omitting the clause *εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων*.

there will be a difference both in the language and in the pronunciation of a clown and an educated person. Another means of moving an audience is the trick which is used *ad nauseam* by speech writers, viz. *the introduction of such phrases as* "Who is not aware?", "Everybody is aware", where a listener is shamed into an admission of the fact for the sake of participating in the knowledge which everybody else *is said to possess.*

Opportuneness.

The question of opportuneness or inopportuneness in the use of any rhetorical device is one that belongs equally to all the species of Rhetoric. There is one remedy for exaggeration of every sort in the popular rule, that a speaker should [1]anticipate censure by pronouncing it on himself, as *the exaggeration* is then regarded as correct, since the speaker is aware of what he is doing. Let me add the rule of not employing simultaneously all the different means of proportion *or correspondence*, as this is one way to deceive the audience. What I mean is e.g. if the words used are harsh in sound, not to carry the harshness into the voice and countenance and the other appropriate *means of expression;* for the result of so doing is that the nature of each becomes conspicuous, whereas, if you use some and omit others, although you equally make use of art, you succeed in escaping detection.

It is a *general* result *of these considerations* that, if a tender subject is expressed in harsh language or a harsh subject in tender language, there is a certain loss of persuasiveness. The multiplication of com-

[1] Reading προεπιπλήττειν.

pound words or epithets and the use of strange words are most appropriate to the language of emotion; for a person in a state of passion may be pardoned, if he speaks of an evil as "heaven-high" or "colossal." *The same excuse holds good* when the speaker has mastered his audience and has roused them to enthusiasm by praise or blame or passion or devotion, as [1] Isocrates e.g. does in his panegyrical speech, where he says at the end "sentence and sense" (φήμη καὶ γνώμη), and again "seeing that they brooked it" (οἵτινες ἔτλησαν). For this is the language of enthusiasm and is consequently acceptable to an audience in a state of enthusiasm. It is suitable to poetry for the same reason, as poetry is inspired. It must be used thus or else ironically, as by Gorgias and in the [2] *Phaedrus* of Plato.

CHAP. VIII. Structure of the style. The structure of the style should be neither metrical nor wholly unrhythmical. If it is the former, it lacks persuasiveness from its appearance of artificiality, and at the same time diverts the minds of the audience from the subject by fixing their attention upon the return of the similar cadence, so that they anticipate its coming as children anticipate the answer to the herald's summons, "Whom chooses the freedman for his attorney?" *and the answer is*

[1] Of the expressions cited from Isocrates, the first is a misquotation; and as the point seems to consist in the jingle of words, the original φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν (*Paneg.* § 220) would be more appropriate. In the second (*Paneg.* § 110, not at the end of the speech), it is the poetical word ἔτλησαν which gives it colour, although the MSS. of Isocrates have ἐτόλμησαν.

[2] See e.g. *Phaedrus* pp. 238 D. 241 E.

"[1]Cleon." If on the other hand the composition is wholly unrhythmical, it has no definiteness, whereas it ought to be definitely limited, although not by metre, as what is indefinite is disagreeable and incapable of being known. It is [2]number which is the defining *or limiting* principle of all things, and the number of the structure of style is rhythm, of which metres are so many sections. Hence a prose composition should have rhythm but not metre, or it will be a poem. But the rhythm should not be elaborately finished, or in other words it should not be carried too far. Rhythm.

I pass now to the three kinds of rhythm. The heroic rhythm is too dignified, and is deficient in conversational harmony. The iambic rhythm on the other hand is the very diction of ordinary life, and is therefore of all metres the most frequent in conversation; but it is deficient in dignity and impressiveness. The trochaic rhythm approximates too much to broad comedy, as appears in *trochaic* tetrameters; for the tetrameter is a tripping rhythm (τροχερὸς ῥυθμός). There remains the paean, which has been used by prose writers from Thrasymachus Kinds of rhythm.

[1] It was part of Cleon's policy to pose as the champion of those who, like freedmen, could not appear for themselves in Court, and the children, whether in Aristotle's own day or later, seem to have caught up his invariable name.

[2] This is the well-known Pythagorean principle; see Ritter and Preller *Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae* §§ 52 sqq. Aristotle, in applying it to style, means that words which are themselves formless and incoherent are reduced to order by number, i.e. by rhythm. There is a very similar remark relating to music in Plato *Philebus*, p. 26 A.

downwards, although they did not understand the definition of it. [1]The paean is the third rhythm, and is closely connected with the preceding ones, having in itself the ratio of 3 to 2, while they have the ratios of 1 to 1 and 2 to 1 respectively. The ratio of 3 to 2 is connected with both of these, *and is in fact the mean between them;* and this is the ratio of the paean.

While the other rhythms should be discarded, partly for the reasons which have been already given and partly because of their metrical character, the paean should be adopted *in prose compositions*, as it is the only one of the rhythms named which cannot form a regular metre and is therefore the most likely to escape detection. It is the fashion—a wrong fashion, as I think—at the present time to use the same paean both at the beginning and [2] at the end of sentences. There are two opposite kinds of paean, of which one is suitable to the beginning of a sentence and in fact is so employed; it is the one beginning with a long syllable and ending with three short ones, *as in*

Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν,

or χρυσεοκόμα Ἕκατε παῖ Διός.

[1] It is clear, on the principle of a long syllable being equivalent to two short ones, that the parts of the spondee (– –) or the dactyl (– ⏑ ⏑), which are the admissible feet in hexameter verse, have the ratio of 1 to 1, those of the iambus (⏑ –) or the trochee (– ⏑) have the ratio of 2 to 1, and those of the paean (– ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ or ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ –) have the ratio of 3 to 2.

[2] It is very doubtful whether the words καὶ τελευτῶντες need be inserted in the text; Mr Cope justly says Aristotle would be likely to let them be mentally understood.

The other, which is opposite to it, has three short syllables at the beginning and the long syllable at the end, as

μετὰ δὲ γᾶν ὕδατά τ' ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ.

This is the paean which *properly* terminates a sentence; for the short syllable from its incompleteness has a mutilated effect, whereas the sentence should be cut off by the *final* long syllable, and its end be marked not by the scribe nor by the [1] marginal annotation but by the *natural* rhythm.

So much for the proof that the style should be rhythmical and for the nature and structure of the rhythms which make it so.

The style must be either jointed, i.e. united only by its connecting particles, after the manner of *modern* dithyrambic preludes, or compact, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The jointed style is the original one, *as in* [2] *Herodotus, e.g.* "The following is a statement of the researches of Herodotus of Thurii"; it was formerly universal but is now confined to a few writers. By a "jointed style" I mean one which has no end in itself except the completion of the subject under discussion. It is disagreeable from its *endlessness or* indefiniteness,

CHAP. IX. Two kinds of style.

(1) jointed,

[1] The "marginal annotation" (Gk. παραγραφή, Lat. *interductus librarii*) would answer to the modern full-stop.

[2] The opening passage of Herodotus's History, Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἥδ' ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις, is cited as a case of writing where there is no attempt to build up a sentence of parts subordinated to each other, but the sentence is a simple clause or consists of clauses which are merely pieced or jointed by connecting particles.

as everybody likes to have the end clearly in view. This is the reason why *people in a race* do not gasp and faint until they reach the goal; for while they have the finishing-point before their eyes, they are insensible of fatigue. The compact style on the other
(2) periodic. hand is the periodic; and I mean by a "period" a sentence having a beginning and an end in itself, and a magnitude which admits of being easily comprehended at a glance. Such a style is agreeable and can be easily [1] learnt. It is agreeable, as being the opposite of the indefinite style and because the hearer is constantly imagining himself to have got hold of something from constantly finding a definite conclusion *of the sentence*, whereas *in the other style* there is something disagreeable in having nothing to look forward to or accomplish. It is easily learnt too, as being easily recollected, and this because a periodic style can be numbered, and number is the easiest thing in the world to recollect. It is thus that everybody recollects [2] verses better than irregular *or prose* compositions, as they contain number and are measured by it. But the period should be completed by the sense as well as by the rhythm and not be abruptly broken off like the iambics of [3] Sophocles

"This land is Calydon of Pelops' soil,"

[1] It is to be remembered that the Greek and Roman orators were in the habit of getting their speeches by heart; hence the importance of *μνήμη* or *memoria* in a treatise on rhetoric.

[2] The reason alleged depends in part upon the etymological connexion of *μέτρα* with *μετρεῖσθαι*.

[3] The line belongs really to the *Meleager* of Euripides, not to

for a wholly erroneous supposition is rendered possible by such a division, as e.g. in the instance quoted, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period may be (1) divided into members *or clauses,* (2) simple. If it is the former, it should be complete in itself, properly divided and capable of being easily pronounced at a single breath, not so however at the *arbitrary* division *of the speaker* but as a whole. A member *or clause* is one of the two parts of a period. A simple period on the other hand is a period consisting of a single member. **Periods.**

The members *or clauses* and the periods themselves should be neither truncated nor too long. If they are too short, they often make a hearer stumble; for if, while he is hurrying on to *the completion of* the measure *or rhythm,* of which he has a definite notion in his mind, he is suddenly pulled up by a pause on the part of the speaker, there will necessarily follow a sort of stumble in consequence of the sudden check. If on the other hand they are too long, they produce in the hearer a feeling of being left behind, as when people who are taking a walk do not turn back until they have passed the usual limit; for they too leave their fellow-walkers behind. Similarly periods of undue length become *actual* speeches and resemble a dithyrambic prelude *in their discursiveness.* The result is what Democritus of Chios

any play of Sophocles. It is objectionable in Aristotle's view, because the rhythmical pause comes after χθονός but the pause in the sense after γαία, the words Πελοπείας χθονός being connected with the next line

ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πέδι' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα.

quoted as a taunt against Melanippides for writing dithyrambic preludes instead of regular *stanzas or* antistrophes :

[1] "A man worketh ill to himself in working ill to his neighbour,
And there is nought to its author so ill as a—long-winded prelude ;"

for a similar taunt may be suitably applied to the patrons of long-winded clauses. Periods in which the clauses are too short are not periods at all ; hence *such a period* drags the audience with it headlong.

The periodic style.

The *periodic* style, which is divided into clauses, is of two kinds, according as the clauses are simply divided, as in the sentence [2] "I have often wondered at those who convened the public assemblies and instituted the gymnastic games," or opposed, where in each of the two clauses either one of two contraries is placed beside the other, or the two contraries are connected together by the same word, as [3] "Both parties they helped, those who stayed behind and those who went with them ; for the latter they won a new land larger than that which they possessed at home, and to the former they left sufficient in that which was theirs at home." Here the words "staying behind" and "going with them," the ideas "sufficient" and "larger", are contrasted. *An-*

Antithesis.

[1] The second line is a parody of Hesiod's,

ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη.

Ἔργα κ. Ἡμέραι, 263.

[2] A quotation from Isocrates *Paneg.* § 1.

[3] *Ibid.* § 37 ; but the words are not quoted exactly. The connexion (*ἐπίζευξις*) lies in the verb *ὤνησαν*, which governs both *τοὺς ὑπομείναντας* and *τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας* (comp. p. 120, l. 6) ; the juxtaposition of opposites is explained in the text.

other instance is [1]"to those who wanted money and to those who desired enjoyment," where *sensual* enjoyment is opposed to the acquisition *of money*. Again, "It often happens in these cases that the wise are unfortunate and the fools are successful"; or "They were immediately presented with the prize of valour and not long afterwards acquired the empire of the sea"; or "To sail through the mainland and march through the ocean, by bridging the Hellespont and digging through Athos"; or "Citizens by nature but divested by law of their citizenship"; or "Some of them had a miserable end, and others a shameful deliverance"; or "In private life using foreigners as domestic servants and in public life suffering many of the allies to be slaves"; or "Either to bring them alive or to leave them dead." Another instance is, the remark which somebody made about Pitholaus and Lycophron in the Court of Law, "These fellows, who when at home used to sell you, now that they have come here, have purchased you." All these are instances of an antithetical style. The agreeableness of such a style lies in the fact that contraries are so easily known, especially when they are set in juxtaposition, and that it *is a style which* has a resemblance to a syllogism, the refutative syllogism being a bringing together of opposites. Such then is the explanation of antithesis. [2]Parisosis is Parisosis.

[1] The following quotations are all taken (although sometimes inexactly) from the same panegyrical oration of Isocrates. Mr Cope gives the references.

[2] It is, I fear, impossible to help importing Aristotle's own terms into English.

Paro-moiosis.

the equality of the members *or clauses*, paromoiosis the similarity of the extremities, i.e. either the beginnings or the ends of the sentences. When it is at the beginning, *the similarity is* always one of *whole* words, when at the end, it is one of the final syllables, as of *different* inflexions of the same word or *a repetition of* the same word[1].

But the same sentence may combine all these points, being at once a case of antithesis, of balance of clauses (parisosis) and of similarity of terminations.

The beginnings of periods have been pretty fully enumerated in the [2]Theodectea.

There are not only true but false antitheses, as in [3]Epicharmus.

CHAP. X. Clever sayings (τὰ ἀστεῖα).

Having discussed and determined these points, we have next to consider the sources of clever and popular sayings. The invention of such sayings is the work of natural ability or of long practice; but

[1] Aristotle in the text cites the following instances: (1) of initial paromoiosis, ἄγρον γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ and δωρητοί τ' ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ' ἐπέεσσιν, (2) of final paromoiosis ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι, and ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν, (3) of varied inflexion ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ, (4) of repetition σὺ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς, (5) of syllabic parallelism τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ' εἶδες ἀργόν;

[2] Upon the Aristotelian *Theodectea*, see Mr Cope's *Introduction*, pp. 55 sqq.

[3] The line quoted is

τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών,

where there is no true antithesis between τόκα μὲν and τόκα δὲ or between ἐν τήνων and παρὰ τήνοις.

the explanation of them belongs to the present treatise. Let us enter then upon a complete enumeration of them. We may start with the assumption that learning without trouble is naturally agreeable to everybody, and that, as names *or words* possess a certain significance, those which impart instruction to us are most agreeable. Now rare words are unintelligible to us, and the proper *or ordinary* names of things we know already. It is metaphor which is in the highest degree instructive; for when e.g. [1]Homer calls old age "the sere, the yellow leaf," he imparts instruction and knowledge through the medium of the genus, as both old age and the sere leaf are withered. The similes of poetry again produce the same effect, and hence a simile, if it is well constructed, shows cleverness. For the simile, as has been already said, is a metaphor with a difference only in the mode of statement. Hence it is less agreeable, being couched in longer terms; also it does not *directly* say that one thing is another, and, as this is not said, it is not looked for by the minds *of the audience, and accordingly there is no opportunity of instruction.* It follows in regard to enthymemes as in regard to style that they are clever, if they convey to us rapid instruction. And hence it is that the enthymemes which are popular are not such as are superficial, i.e. such as are perspicuous to everybody and need no research, nor such as are unintelligible when stated, but those which are either

Metaphor and simile.

p. 239.

Enthymemes.

[1] *Odyssey,* XIV. 214. The "sere leaf" will perhaps represent Homer's καλάμη, although it is used in a somewhat different train of thought.

apprehended at the moment of delivery, even though there was no previously existing knowledge of them, or which are followed at little interval by the minds of the audience. For what is virtually instruction, whether immediate or subsequent, takes place in these cases, but not otherwise. These being then the species of enthymemes which are popular, if considered relatively to the meaning they convey, relatively to style they may be considered in respect either of their structure or of the *single* words *employed in them.* Enthymemes are popular from their structure, if it is antithetical, as e.g. *in* [1]*Isocrates,* "considering the peace which all the world enjoyed as a war against their own private interests," where there is an antithesis between war and peace; and from their single words, if the words are such as contain a metaphor, and this a metaphor which is neither farfetched nor superficial (for in the former case it is difficult to comprehend at a glance, and in the latter it leaves no impression), or again, if they vividly represent *the subject* to the eye, as it is desirable that the things should be seen in actual performance and not merely in intention. There are then these three objects to be ever kept in view, viz. metaphor, antithesis, and vividness of representation.

Metaphors. [2]Metaphors are of four kinds, and of these the

p. 232. proportional are the most popular. An instance of a proportional metaphor is the [3]saying of Pericles,

[1] *Phil.* § 82.

[2] The four kinds of metaphor are enumerated in the definition given in the *Poetic,* ch. 21, p. 172, §§ 22—25.

[3] Already quoted p. 27, l. 12.

that "the blotting out of the youth who had perished in the war from the state was like the taking of the spring out of the year." Another is the saying of Leptines about the Lacedaemonians, that he "would not have *the Athenians* look on quietly, when Greece had lost one of her eyes." Again, Cephisodotus expressed his indignation at the eagerness of Chares for the audit of his accounts in the Olynthiac war, by saying that he had [1] "driven the people into a choking fit by trying to get his accounts audited." The same Cephisodotus in one of his exhortations to the Athenians told them they ought to "march to Euboea[2] with the decree of Miltiades for their commissariat." Again, Iphicrates showed his indignation at the truce which the Athenians had made with Epidaurus and the maritime states by saying that they had "stripped themselves of their journey-money for the war." Pitholaus called the [3] Paralian trireme the "people's bludgeon" and Sestos a [4] "corn-stall of the Piraeus." Pericles exhorted the Athenians to sweep away

[1] Reading ἀγαγόντα.

[2] This difficult expression seems to mean that the Athenians were to march without any regard to the commissariat, but in the spirit of the resolution which Miltiades proposed at the crisis of the first Persian War. It is the use of ἐπισιτίζεσθαι in conjunction with such a word as ψήφισμα which is in Aristotle's language "metaphorical."

[3] The Paralus or State galley, as being used in carrying prisoners of state, might be called the people's bludgeon or weapon against their enemies.

[4] It is clear that Sestos must have been an emporium of the corn which was exported from the coasts of the Euxine Sea to Greece.

Aegina, that "eyesore of the Piraeus." Moerocles said he was every whit as virtuous as a certain respectable citizen whom he named, as the respectable citizen "got 33 per cent. for his roguery and he himself got only 10 per cent." There is an instance too in the iambic line of Anaxandrides in pleading the cause of *somebody's* daughters who had been a very long time in getting married:

[1] "The ladies' marriage-day is overdue."

Similarly Polyeuctus made the remark about a certain paralytic person named Speusippus that he could not keep himself quiet, "although Fortune had set him fast in the pillory of disease." Cephisodotus again called the triremes [2] "painted millstones," and the Cynic *Diogenes* called the wine-shops the "Athenian [3] public messes." Aesion said that *the Athenians* had "drained their whole city into Sicily" (which is a metaphor and a metaphor of a vivid kind); and again "so that Greece cried aloud" (which is also in some sense a vivid metaphor). I may instance too the advice of Cephisodotus *to the Athenians* to beware of converting many of their [4] mob-*meetings*

[1] The point lies in the legal term *ὑπερήμερος*, which is strictly applicable to somebody who has failed to pay a fine imposed upon him within the time prescribed.

[2] It must have been the grinding exactions in which the triremes were employed against the subject States of Athens that gave this name its appropriateness.

[3] *φιδίτια* was the Spartan term for the *συσσίτια* which were so characteristic a feature of the Lycurgean legislation. See *Politics*, ii. ch. 9.

[4] The word *συνδρομὰς* is substituted for *συγκλήτους* (*ἐκκλησίας*) "extraordinary assemblies."

into assemblies; or the address of [1] Isocrates to those "who flock together at the general festivals." Another example is the one in the [2] Funeral Oration, that "Greece might well have her hair cut off at the tomb of those who had perished at Salamis, as her liberty was buried in the tomb with their valour;" for had he only said that she "might well weep for the valour that lay buried with them," *his expression* would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, but the addition of the words "her liberty with their valour" contains a sort of antithesis. Similarly Iphicrates said, "The course of my argument runs through the heart of Chares's conduct;" this is a [3] proportional metaphor, and the phrase "through the heart" sets the thing vividly before our eyes. Again, the phrase "to invite dangers to the help of dangers" is a vivid metaphor. The same is true of the phrase used by [4] Lycoleon in behalf of Chabrias, "not awed even by that symbol of his supplication, the bronze image," which was a metaphor at the time when it was used, although not a permanent one, as it

[1] *Phil.* § 14. It is the strange use of συντρέχοντας, as of συνδρομὰς in the last example, that makes the "metaphor."

[2] The Funeral Oration, which seems to be here ascribed to Isocrates, is usually regarded as the composition of Lysias, although its genuineness has been much disputed.

[3] The "proportion" may perhaps be expressed thus:

A road : a country :: the speech : Chares's conduct.

[4] A statue of Chabrias with his shield resting on his knee and his spear advanced, had been erected in honour of his victory over Agesilaus B.C. 378. Twelve years later, when Chabrias himself was standing his trial, his advocate Lycoleon must have pointed to this statue.

is only in the hour of his peril that the statue can be said to supplicate, but a vivid metaphor, *arising from* [1] the supposed animation of the inanimate memorial of the services he had rendered to the State. Or again "practising in every way meanness of spirit" is a metaphor, as practising is a species of increasing. Or *the saying* that "God lit up the light of reason in the soul," both light and reason being means of illumination. Or again [2] "we are not putting an end to the wars but only putting them off," *which is a metaphor*, as postponement and such a peace as is described are both merely means of delay. Or again, if we say that [3] "the treaty is a very far finer trophy than those won in war; for that is commemorative of a trifling success and a single chance, whereas the treaty commemorates *the issue of* a whole war;" for both are signals of victory. Or *lastly if we say* that States [4] "pay a heavy reckoning in the censure of mankind;" for the *audit or* reckoning is a sort of legal damage.

CHAP. XI. It has been stated then that the sources of clever sayings are proportional metaphor and *vivid or*

[1] Reading τὸ ἄψυχον δὲ.

[2] Isocrates *Paneg.* § 200. The "metaphor" is, I think, the use of ἀναβάλλεσθαι, as a peace would properly be said not to "postpone" but to "terminate" a war.

[3] *Ibid.* § 211.

[4] The word εὔθυνα, meaning properly the audit, to which officers of State were called to submit at the expiration of their term of office, is applied metaphorically to the audit which states or nations undergo at the bar of history.

A reference to the *Poetic*, ch. 21, is necessary for the understanding of the "metaphors" cited in the present chapter.

ocular representation of the facts; but we have still to say what we understand by such representation and what are the means of producing it.

I mean that expressions represent a thing to the eye, when they show it in a state of activity. For instance; to describe a good man as [1]"square" is a metaphor, as a good man and a square are both perfect *of their kind*; but it does not signify a state of activity. On the other hand such a phrase as [2]"with his vigour all in bloom" or [3]"thee like as sacred kine that roam at large" or in the [4]line Vividness.

"Then the Greeks bounding forwards,"

the expression "bounding" is energetic as well as metaphorical. It is the same in Homer's favourite treatment of inanimate objects as animate by the use of metaphor. But it is always by representing things as in action that he wins applause, as e.g.

"[5]Down down again to the valley the shameless boulder came bounding,"

or

"[6]the arrow flew,"

or [7]the arrow

"yearning for its mark"

or [8]the spears

"stood fixed in earth all panting to taste blood,"

[1] Perhaps "an all-round man" would better give the idea in English.

[2] Isocrates *Phil.* § 12. [3] *Ibid.* § 150.

[4] Euripides, *Iphig. in Aul.* 80. [5] *Odyssey*, xi. 598.

[6] *Iliad*, xiii. 587. [7] *Ibid.* iv. 126. [8] *Ibid.* xi. 573.

or

> "[1] through the breast
> The point sped quivering,"

for in all these instances the living character of the expressions invests the objects with an appearance of activity, shamelessness, quivering eagerness and the like being so many forms of activity. These expressions Homer applied to the objects by means of proportional metaphor; for [2] as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is a shameless person to the victim of his shamelessness. But in his most approved similes too he treats inanimate things in the same way, *e.g. in the line*

> "*Waves that are* arched, foam-crested, some foremost, others pursuing;"

for he represents them all as moving and living, and activity is a form of motion.

Sources of metaphor. p. 232.

It is proper to derive metaphors, as has been said before, from objects which are closely related to *the thing itself* but which are not *immediately* obvious. Similarly in philosophy it is a mark of sagacity to discern resemblances even in things which are widely different, as when Archytas said that an arbitrator and an altar were identical; for both are refuges of the injured; or if one should say that an anchor and a hook were identical; for they are both the same kind of thing, only they differ *in position*, [3] one being

[1] *Ibid.* xv. 542.

[2] It is certainly noticeable that Aristotle understands Homer's ἀναιδής as an epithet of a stone to mean literally "shameless".

[3] The meaning is that an anchor holds fast something which is above it, and a hook something which is below it.

above and the other below. The [1]equalization of states in regard to things very dissimilar, *as e.g.* equality in area and in perogatives, would be another case.

Deception (παρὰ προσδοκίαν).

While metaphor is a very frequent instrument of clever sayings, another or an additional instrument is deception, as people are more clearly conscious of having learnt something from their sense of surprise *at the way in which the sentence ends*, and their soul seems to say "Quite true, and I had missed the point." Again, the characteristic of clever apophthegms is that the speaker means something more than he says, as e.g. the [2]apophthegm of Stesichorus that the cicalas will have to sing to themselves on the ground. This too is the reason of the pleasure afforded by clever riddles; they are instructive and metaphorical in their expression. And the same is true of what Theodorus calls "novel phrases", i.e. phrases in which *the sequel* is unexpected and not, as he expresses it, "according to previous expectation", but such as comic writers use when they alter the forms of words. The effect of jokes depending upon changes of letters is the same; they deceive the expectation. *Nor are these jokes found only in prose,* they occur also in verses, where *the conclusion is* not such as the audience had expected, e.g.

> And as he walked, beneath his feet
> Were—chilblains,

[1] The cleverness or originality lies I think, in the comparison of things so different as superficial area and political privilege (or perhaps military strength).

[2] Cp. p. 92, l. 2.

whereas the audience expected *the writer* to say "sandals". But *in all such cases* the point must be clear at the moment of making the joke. A play upon the letters of a word arises not from using it in its direct meaning but from giving the meaning a new turn[1].

Clever sayings as ornaments of style.

A proper enunciation is requisite in all such sayings. Take e.g. the remark that Athens did not find the [2]rule of the sea a rule of misery, as it was a source of profit to her, or as [3]Isocrates put it, that the rule of the sea was a rule of misery to the state. For in both these cases there is something said which one would not have expected to be said, and *yet* it is recognized as true; for there is no cleverness in calling the rule a rule *in the second example*, but the word "rule" is employed in different senses, and *in the first example* it is not "rule" in the sense in which it has been used before, but "rule" in a different sense which is contradicted. But in all these cases the merit consists in the proper applica-

[1] Aristotle illustrates the "literal joke" by two expressions which would be untranslateable, even if it were possible to be sure of their meaning. The first of them (for the σε of l. 33 should be omitted) may apparently be pronounced either as *θράττει* "it confounds you" or as Θρᾶττ' εἶ "you are a Thracian slave girl." "This is amusing (he says) when its point is understood, for if you do not know the person to be a Thracian, it will seem silly." The second, *βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι*, has never been explained. "Both (he adds) need a proper enunciation."

[2] *ἀρχή* has the meaning first of "empire" and then of "beginning" in this expression.

[3] The passage which Aristotle has in mind is apparently either *Phil.* § 69, or *de Pace* § 125.

tion of the term employed, *i.e. in the appropriateness of it to the thing described*, whether it is employed in a *double-entendre* or in a metaphor. Such an expression e.g. as "Mr [1] Bearable unbearable" is a contradiction only of the *double-entendre*; but it is appropriate enough, if the person in question is a bore. So too the line

[2]"You should not be more stranger than a stranger,"

or in other words, not stranger than you are bound to be, which is the same thing. Or again, "A stranger must not always be a stranger"; for here too there is change of signification. The same is the case in the much lauded line of Anaxandrides

"'Tis well to die ere meriting the death;"

for this is equivalent to saying "Tis a worthy thing to die unworthily" or [3]"to die not being worthy of death" or "doing nothing worthy of death". The species of style is the same in all these instances; but the more concisely and antithetically it is expressed, the more popular is the saying. The reason of this is that its instructiveness is enhanced by the antithesis and accelerated by the conciseness of its terms. But there should always be the additional element of some personal appositeness or propriety of expression, if what is said is to be true and not superficial. For

[1] Plainly Ἀνάσχετος is a proper name, which lends itself to a play upon its meaning.

[2] Vahlen's reading of the line

οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ ξένος ξένος,

gives the best sense and is supported by the context.

[3] The clause is probably spurious.

truth and depth are not always combined, as e.g. *in the phrases* "One should die void of offence" or "A worthy man should wed a worthy wife", where there is no point at all. It is only when you combine the two *that you make a pointed phrase*, e.g. "It is a worthy thing to die unworthily." But the greater the number of such elements in a sentence, the more cleverly pointed it appears, as e.g. if its words convey a metaphor, and a metaphor of a particular kind, *i.e. a proportional metaphor*, an antithesis, a *parisosis or* balance of clauses and a vividness of action.

Similes. p. 240.

Successful similes too, as has been said above, are always in a certain sense popular metaphors, being invariably composed of two terms, like the proportional metaphor. For instance, the shield, as we say, is Ares's goblet, and a bow a stringless lyre. Such a form of expression is not a [1]simple one; but to call the bow a lyre or the shield a goblet is so.

A simile is formed e.g. by the comparison of a flute player to a monkey or of a [2]shortsighted person to a lamp with water dripping upon it, as both [3]keep shrinking. A successful simile is one which is *virtually* a metaphor. For we may compare the shield to "Ares's goblet" or the ruin to a "tatter of a house"; or we may describe [4]Niceratus as a "Philoctetes stung

[1] It is "not simple" because e.g. the comparison is not merely between shield and goblet but between the shield and Ares on the one hand and Dionysus and the goblet on the other. Cp. p. 118, l. 30.

[2] Omitting εἰς.

[3] The winking of the shortsighted person and the sputtering of the lamp are both describable by the verb συνάγεσθαι.

[4] Niceratus seems to have engaged in a rhapsodical contest with Pratys.

by Pratys", using the simile of Thrasymachus when he saw Niceratus after his defeat by Pratys in the rhapsody with his hair still dishevelled and his face unwashed. It is here that poets are most loudly condemned for failure and most warmly applauded for success, when *they so form their simile that* the two members of it correspond, as e.g.

"Like parsley curled his legs he bears"

or

"Just as [1] Philammon tilting at the quintain."

These expressions and all others like them are similes; and that similes are metaphors is a truth which has been already stated more than once.

Proverbs again are metaphors from one species to another, e.g. when somebody has invited a person's help in the hope of gaining by it and has afterwards found it to be a source of injury, [2] "'Tis as the Carpathian says of the hare"; for they are both the victims of this fate. **Proverbs.**

The sources of clever sayings and the reasons of their cleverness have now been pretty fully discussed.

All approved hyperboles are also metaphors, as when it is said of a man whose face is bruised, "You might have taken him for a basket of mulberries". For a bruise *like a mulberry* is something purple; but it is the number of the bruises supposed which makes the hyperbole. But there are other phrases resembling those given above which are hyperboles **Hyperboles.**

[1] Philammon was a celebrated athlete.

[2] It is supposed that some Carpathian had brought some hares or rabbits into his island and that they had multiplied and devoured all his crops.

with only a difference of expression, as if you change

"Just as Philammon tilting at the quintain"

to "You would have thought he was Philammon fighting with the quintain" or

"Like parsley curled his legs he bears"

to "You might have thought he had not legs but parsley; they were so curly".

There is a character of juvenility in hyperboles as showing vehemence. Hence people generally employ them in moments of passion, *as in the* [1]*lines*

"Not tho' he gave me gifts
As many as the sand-grains or the dust."

. . . .

"But Agamemnon's daughter wed I not,
Tho' Aphrodite's beauty were her own
And all Athene's art."

This is a favourite figure of the Attic orators. But, *as being juvenile*, it is unbecoming to elder people.

CHAP. XII. Propriety.

It must not be forgotten that every kind of Rhetoric has its own appropriate style. For there is a difference between the literary and controversial styles and *in the controversial style* between the political and forensic styles. But the orator should be familiar with both; for the one (the controversial style) implies a power of expressing oneself in pure and accurate Greek, and the other (the literary style) a deliverance from the necessity of holding one's tongue, if one has anything that he wishes to impart to the world, as is the case of those who have no skill in composition.

[1] *Iliad* ix. 385 sqq.

Literary and controversial styles.

It is the literary style which is the most finished and the controversial which is the best suited to declamation. Controversial oratory again is of two kinds, ethical and emotional. This is the reason why actors are fond of such dramas and poets of such *dramatis personæ* as lend themselves to the treatment of character or emotion. But it is poets who write to be read whose works are in everybody's hands, such as Chaeremon who is as finished as a [1]professional speech-writer and Licymnius among the dithyrambic poets. Also a comparison of the speeches of literary men and those of rhetoricians shows that the former are found in actual contests to be meagre, and the latter, although highly commended, to be inartistic, when taken in the hands *and closely studied.* The reason is that they are adapted to an actual contest; hence the speeches which are intended to be declaimed, when the declamation is removed, appear ridiculous, as failing to discharge their proper function. Thus the use of asyndeta and the frequent repetition of the same word are rightly reprobated in the literary style, but are actually sought by orators in the controversial style for their dramatic effect. [2](But in such repetitions there must be some variety *of expression,* which paves the way, if I may so speak,

[1] The term λογογράφος is fully discussed by Mr Cope in his note on ii. ch. 11 § 7. It means here not so much one who composed speeches to be delivered by others in a Court of Law as one who wrote panegyrical or epideictic speeches, meaning them not to be delivered at all but to be read and studied at home.

[2] The sentences placed in brackets contain remarks which are rather incidental than necessary to the subject of the chapter.

for declamation, *as e.g. in the words* "Here is he who robbed you; here is he who cheated you; here is he who at the last essayed to betray you." We may instance too the [1]trick of the actor Philemon in Anaxandrides's play *The Old Man's Dotage* at the passage *beginning* "Rhadamanthys and Palamedes", or his repetition of the personal pronoun in the prologue of the *Devotees*; for unless such passages are dramatically declaimed, the case is like that of [2]a man who has swallowed a poker. And the same is true of asyndeta, e.g. "I came, I met, I implored"; it is necessary to declaim the words dramatically and not to utter them, as if they were all one thing, with the same character and intonation. There is this especial property also in asyndeta, that they make it possible to present an appearance of saying several things in the time which would otherwise be required for saying one. For the effect of the connecting particle is to convert several things into one; hence, if the connecting particle is taken away, the consequence will clearly be the opposite effect of converting a single thing into several. The asyndeton is thus a means of amplification. *Take for instance the words,* "I came, I conversed, I entreated"; the audience seems to survey several things, as many things in fact

[1] The allusion is admittedly obscure; but it seems most probable that these were well-known passages in which the art of the actor Philemon had emphasized slight varieties of expression, where several similar clauses occurred together.

[2] "The porter who carried the beam" was a typical Greek instance of stiffness like "the man who has swallowed a poker" in English.

as the speaker mentioned. And this is Homer's purpose *in the reiteration of the name Nireus in the successive* [1]*lines*

"Nireus of Syme,
"Nireus Aglaia's son,
"Nireus the fairest man,"

for as a person of whom several things are said will necessarily be mentioned several times, it follows that, if a person is mentioned several times, it seems as if several things had been said of him. So that Homer by a single mention of Nireus exaggerated his importance through this fallacy and makes him famous, although he never alludes to him again).

Political rhetoric.

The style of political oratory is precisely similar to scene-painting. For the greater the crowd, the more distant is the view: hence it is that in both a finished style appears superfluous and unsuccessful. The forensic style on the other hand is more finished, especially when addressed to a single judge; for he is least subject to rhetorical influences, as he can take a more comprehensive view of what is germane to the case or alien to it and, as there is no actual contest, is not prejudiced in his judgment. Accordingly it is not the same orators who succeed in all the different styles of Rhetoric; but, where there is most opportunity for declamation, there is the least possibility of finish. And this is the case where voice, and especially where a loud voice, is required.

Epideictic and forensic Rhetoric.

The epideictic style is best suited to literary purposes, as its proper function is to be read; and next to it the forensic style. It is superfluous to add such

[1] *Iliad*, ii. 671—3.

distinctions as that the style should be pleasant and stately; we might as well say that it must be chastened and liberal and characterized by any other ethical virtue. For it is clear that the [1]qualities enumerated above will render it pleasant, if we have been right in our definition of virtue of style. What *other* reason is there why it should be clear and not commonplace but appropriate? For it will not be clear, if it is prolix or too concise. But it is evident that it is the intermediate style which is the appropriate one. Pleasantness will result from the elements above enumerated, if successfully combined, viz. familiar and foreign words, rhythm and the persuasiveness which is the outcome of propriety.

We have now concluded our remarks upon style whether as belonging equally to all kinds of Rhetoric or as peculiar to the several kinds; it remains to consider arrangement.

CHAP. XIII. Parts of a speech.

A speech has two parts. It is necessary first to state the case and then to prove it. It is [2]impossible therefore to state your case without proceeding to prove it or to prove it without having first stated it; for a proof is *necessarily* a proof of something, and a preliminary statement is not made except in order to be proved.

There is then the exposition of the case on the one hand and the proof on the other, like a problem and its demonstration, according to the natural distinction

[1] Purity, propriety, vividness, rhythm and the like, as Mr Cope justly says. See p. 135. l. 2.

[2] The impossibility arises not from the nature of the case but from the necessary conditions of Rhetoric.

in Dialectic. The division which is current among modern writers upon Rhetoric is a ridiculous one; for a [1]narrative of the facts clearly belongs to forensic oratory alone, but where is the possibility in epideictic or political speeches of such a narrative as they describe or of a reply to an adversary or in demonstrative speeches of a [2]peroration? Again, an exordium, a comparison of cases and a recapitulation occur in political speeches only when there is a controversy. *It might as well be said that accusation and defence are proper parts of political speeches*; for it is true that they often occur in them, but not [3]so far as they are deliberative. [4]Nor again is the peroration in all cases a part even of forensic speeches, as e.g. where the speech is a short one and the subject such as can be easily remembered, as something is then subtracted from the length of the speech.

It appears then that the only indispensable parts *of a speech* are the statement of the case and the proof.

These are the only proper *or characteristic* parts; but if more are added, they must not exceed four, viz. exordium, exposition, proof and peroration. For the reply to one's adversary falls under the head

[1] It would hardly be correct to say that "narrative" is confined to the forensic kind of Rhetoric, unless it were taken in a limited sense as meaning a set argumentative statement of a case.

[2] The peroration (ἐπίλογος) is the subject of ch. 19. It would be out of place (says Aristotle) in demonstrative or closely-reasoned speeches.

[3] Reading ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ συμβουλή.

[4] There should be no stop after ἐπίλογος.

of proof, and the comparison of cases, being an amplification of one's own case, is a branch of proof, as there is in some sense a process of proof in such a comparison, although not in the exordium or in the peroration which serves only to refresh the memory. If one adopts then such divisions as these, one will come to the inventions of Theodorus and his school, distinguishing narrative, post-narrative and pre-narrative, refutation and re-refutation. But a special name should not be used unless to express a species or *specific* distinction; otherwise it proves to be idle and frivolous, like the [1]terms invented by Licymnius in his handbook, "impetus" (*ἐπούρασις*), "digression" (*ἀποπλάνησις*) and "ramification" (*ὄζοι*).

CHAP. XIV. Exordium.

The exordium is the beginning of a speech and corresponds to a prologue in poetry and a prelude in a musical performance, all the three being beginnings and, as it were, preparations for what follows. Now the musical prelude resembles the exordium in epideictic speeches; for as musicians, when they have anything that they can play well, open their performance with it and then unite it *with the subject* by the [2]introductory bars, so it is proper to adopt the same style in epideictic speeches, i.e. to say at the outset anything that one may wish to say and then insert the introductory or connecting sentences. This is in fact a universal practice, of which the exordium

[1] The reading is very doubtful, some editors giving *ἐπόρουσις* or *ἐπέρωσις* or *ἐπέρρωσις*; but assuming that *ἐπούρωσις* is right, I should connect it, as Mr Cope does, with *οὖρος*.

[2] The *ἐνδόσιμον*, as Spengel says, seems to be here "non ipsum exordium, sed id quod exordium cum oratione connectit."

of Isocrates's *Helen* is an example, as there is no connexion between the disputatious dialecticians and Helen. It may be added that such a flight of the orator into a new region has the pleasing effect of relieving the uniform character of the speech.

The exordia of epideictic speeches are derived from praise or censure. Thus Gorgias opens his [1]Olympic speech *with the words*, "It is from many lips that you obtain admiration, men of Hellas" praising those who first convened the great assemblies. But [2]Isocrates blames them for having rewarded physical excellences with presents and yet not having offered any reward to wisdom. Another source of such exordia is counsel. *It may be urged* e.g. that it is our duty to honour the good, and accordingly the orator praises Aristides, or to honour those who are not famous and yet not vicious but whose virtues are buried in obscurity, such people e.g. as Priam's son Alexander; for the use of such language is a species of counsel. Again, such exordia may be taken from the exordia of forensic speeches, i.e. from appeals to the audience, when the subject of the speech is paradoxical or difficult or very trite, in the hope of winning a favourable hearing from them, as in *the* [3]*lines of* Choerilus *beginning*

"But now when all is spent."

[1] A speech delivered at the Olympic games with the view of uniting the peoples of Greece against the Persians.

[2] The reference is to *Paneg. in init.*

[3] The lines of Choerilus as quoted by the Scholiast, form a lament that the field of poesy which was once so rich is all worked out, and that every theme is now hackneyed or unpoetical.

Such are then the sources of exordia in epideictic speeches, viz. eulogy, censure, exhortation, dissuasion and appeals to the audience. The introductory sentences of the speech should be either foreign or closely connected with the speech itself.

As to the exordia of forensic speeches, it must be understood that they are equivalent to the prologues of dramatic or the proems of epic poetry; for the proems of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia, as e.g.

> [1] "For thee and thy gifts or spoils."

In Rhetoric as in epic poetry *the exordium* is a sample of the subject, being intended to supply the audience with some previous knowledge of it and to prevent their minds from being kept in suspense. For indefiniteness is a cause of distraction; hence the speaker or writer who places the beginning as it were in their hands gives them *a clue* by which, if they hold it, they will be able to follow the course of the argument. This is the purport *of such exordia as*

> [2] "Sing Muse the wrath,"
> [3] "Tell me the man,"
> [4] "Teach me another strain, how Asia's soil,"

or

> [4] "To Europe came a mighty war."

So too the tragic poets explain the subjects of their dramas, if not at the opening, like Euripides, yet

[1] The source of the quotation is unknown.

[2] *Iliad*, i. 1.

[3] *Odyssey*, i. 1.

[4] The quotations are said to be lines of Choerilus.

somewhere or other in the [1]prologue, [2]as Sophocles himself *in the lines beginning*

"My sire was Polybus,"

and the same is true of comedy. The most essential function then or characteristic of the exordium is to explain the end or object of the speech; hence if the subject is itself clear and unimportant, there is no need of employing an exordium.

There are other kinds of exordia which are employed; but they are merely means of remedying defects[3] in the audience and are not distinctively exordia. They may be derived from the speaker himself or from the audience or from the subject or from the adversary. They refer to the speaker and his opponent, when their object is the removal or creation of a prejudice. But there is this difference, that in apology the prejudicing circumstances should be placed first and in accusation they should be reserved for the peroration. Nor is the ground of this difference hard to see; for the defendant, when about to introduce himself, will necessarily dissipate the force of such circumstances as stand in his way and will therefore begin by removing the prejudice conceived against him, but the accuser, whose object it is to excite prejudice, will be led to state the

[1] Aristotle himself defines the prologue of a tragedy as *μέρος ὅλον τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ παρόδου* (*Poetic*, ch. 12); but he must give it a still wider meaning here, if it strictly includes the passage quoted, which does not begin until v. 774 of the *Oedipus Tyrannus*.

[2] Omitting δηλοῖ.

[3] "defects, such as inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like" (Cope).

prejudicing circumstances in the peroration, that they may be more easily remembered. An appeal to the audience consists in gaining their goodwill and exciting their indignation, sometimes too in arresting their attention or the contrary; for it is not always well to make them attentive, and this is the reason why so many speakers try to move them to laughter.

Means of exciting attention. There is not one *of the topics belonging to the exordium*, nor indeed the appearance of high character, which may not be employed, if one chooses, as a means of creating receptivity in the audience; for it is character which most commands attention. The things to which an audience is most attentive are things which are important in themselves or specially interesting to them or wonderful or pleasant to hear; hence it is proper for the speaker to produce the impression that the subjects with which his speech is concerned are of this kind. If on the other hand he wishes that they should be inattentive, he should try to convey the impression that his subject is trifling, irrelevant to the audience or disagreeable. It must not however be forgotten that all such things are extraneous to the speech, being addressed to the audience because it is corrupt and ready to listen to what is foreign to the subject; for if this is not the character of the audience, there is no need of an exordium, except for the mere purpose of stating the case summarily, that it may not be, as it were, a body without a head. For the art of exciting attention is one that belongs equally to all the parts of a speech, if it is needed, *and perhaps especially to the other parts;* for people are apt to become inattentive at

any other part rather than at the beginning. It is absurd then to speak of the beginning as its proper place, when every one is listening most attentively. Hence, whenever there is occasion, it is proper to employ such phrases as "Pray give me your attention. It concerns you every whit as much as myself" or

> "A strange thing, such as never you have heard,
> I'll tell you,"

or "a thing so marvellous." This is like Prodicus's rule, whenever his audience was drowsy, "of slipping in a taste of the Fifty Drachm speech[1]."

It is evident however that *such tricks as I have described* are addressed to the audience not *qua* audience, *i.e. not as impartial and unemotional hearers of the facts;* for it is the universal practice of orators to use their exordia as means of creating a prejudice *against their adversaries* or of removing apprehensions *entertained in regard to themselves. Let me instance the prologue beginning*

> [2] "My lord I will not say how hastily,"

or *the interruption of Thoas*

> [3] "Why all this preluding?"

[1] The Fifty Drachm speech, which was apparently so called as being purchasable at the price of 50 δραχμαί, must have been one of Prodicus's favourite and most effective speeches. Cp. Plato, *Cratylus* p. 384 B.

[2] Sophocles, *Antigone* 223.

[3] Euripides, *Iphig. in Taur.* 1162. The first passage is an instance of a speaker apologizing for his own apparent fault; the second one of a speaker who is trying to throw suspicion or blame on somebody else.

Again, exordia are the devices of those whose case is or is supposed by them to be a bad one, as it is better for them to dwell upon anything than upon the case itself. This is the reason why servants, who are accused of something wrong, never give a direct answer to the questions but beat about the bush and make *long* prefaces *before they come to the point.*

The means of conciliating goodwill and of exciting the various other emotions have been already described. But as there is an appropriateness in the lines

pp. 114 sqq.

[1] "Oh! let me drift to the Phaeacian land
Beloved and pitied,"

it follows that *love and pity* are the two objects at which we ought to aim.

In the exordia of epideictic speeches the hearers should be led to fancy themselves participators in the eulogy, whether personally or in respect of their families or pursuits or somehow or other; for it is a true [2]remark of Socrates in his funeral oration that there is no difficulty in lauding the Athenians at Athens, the difficulty is to laud them at Sparta.

The exordia of political oratory are taken from the same sources as those of forensic oratory, but are naturally very rare, as the subject is one which is familiar to the audience, and there is no occasion for an exordium, except—if at all—for the sake of recommending the speaker himself or meeting his adversaries, or if the estimate which the audience entertains of the importance of the case is either greater

[1] *Odyssey*, vii. 327.

[2] Plato, *Menexenus*, p. 235 D.

or less than you think right. Hence the necessity of either creating or removing prejudice and of either exaggerating or depreciating the importance of a subject. It is for this purpose that an exordium is necessary, or for ornament, as without it a speech has an extemporaneous air. The encomium pronounced by Gorgias on the men of Elis is a case in point; he uses no preliminary sparring or flourishing, but begins abruptly *with the words* "Elis, blessed city."

CHAP. XV. Calumny or prejudice. Means of combating it.

As to [1]calumny *or prejudice and the means of combating it,* there is one topic which consists in using all the possible means of getting rid of unpleasant suspicion; for as it makes no difference whether the suspicion has been expressed or not, the rule is one of universal application. Another topic[2] consists in meeting the points at issue either by denying the fact alleged or by asserting that it is not injurious or not injurious to the particular person *who complains of it* or that its magnitude has been exaggerated or that it is not criminal or that it is not serious or not disgraceful or not of much importance. For these are the points upon which the issue of a case turns, as in the speech of Iphicrates in reply to Nausicrates, when he admitted the action alleged and its injuriousness but denied its criminality. Another topic is, while one admits the criminality, to allege some compensating circumstance, as that it was injurious but at the same time honourable, or painful but at the same time beneficial, and so on. Another

[1] The meaning of διαβολή hovers between "calumny" and "prejudice" which is the natural result of calumnious malice.

[2] Reading τόπος with Spengel, and so *infra.*

is to plead that *the crime* was a mistake or a misfortune or that it was committed under compulsion, as when [1]Sophocles said that his trembling was not assumed, as his calumniator alleged, for the sake of presenting an appearance of old age, but arose from necessity, as it was no fault of his that he was eighty years old. Or again, to urge the motive of the act as a compensating circumstance, saying that it was not your intention to inflict an injury but something else, not what was calumniously alleged against you, and that the injury was only an accidental consequence. "I should deserve to be hated," *you may add*, "if I had had this intention in so acting." Another topic arises, if your calumniator has been involved *in a similar charge*, whether now or on some previous occasion and whether personally or in the persons of his relations or friends. Another, if others are involved in the calumny, who are admitted to be innocent; thus if *it is argued* that a [2]person is an adulterer because he is a dandy, *it may be replied that* then Mr So-and-So must be an adulterer. A third, if your accuser has ever alleged the same calumny against others or if somebody else has ever alleged it against yourself or if without a directly calumnious accusation others, who have been proved to be innocent, were ever exposed to the same suspicion as you are now. A fourth is the topic of recrimination, where you urge that it is monstrous

[1] If the Sophocles, of whom this story is told, was the poet, the "calumniator" can hardly have been his son Iophon, as it was Iophon's object to prove him to be in his dotage.

[2] Reading εἰ ὅτι καθάριος, μοιχός.

that a man's allegations should be trusted, when he is wholly untrustworthy himself. Another is the appeal to a previous decision, as in the reply of Euripides to Hygiaenon, who in the action for an exchange of properties accused him of impiety for the line he wrote in recommendation of perjury

[1] "The tongue hath sworn, the mind is still unsworn,"

when he replied that Hygiaenon had no right to transfer cases from the Dionysiac contests to the Courts of Law, as he had already given an account of his language there or was ready to give it, if Hygiaenon chose to accuse him. Another topic consists in inveighing against calumny, showing its enormity and how it raises points which are foreign to the issue and places no reliance on the strength of the case. A topic which belongs equally to the prosecutor and the defendant is the use of signs *or probabilities*, as when Odysseus in the *Teucer* of Sophocles argues that *Teucer is friendly to the enemy* because of his relationship to Priam, his mother Hesione having been Priam's sister, and Teucer answers that *this is impossible, because* his father Telamon was Priam's enemy and he did not betray the spies to Priam. There is another topic which a calumniator may use with advantage, viz. to eulogize some trifle at great length and then introduce some serious censure in a few words, or to begin by mentioning a number of good points and then to mention one point only which is censurable but that a point which has a

[1] *Hippolytus*, 612.

direct bearing on the case. It is topics like these which are the most artful and unfair, as people who use them try to convert what are *really* good points into means of injury by intermingling with them such as are bad. Lastly, there is another topic of which both the prosecutor and the defendant may avail themselves, viz. to utilize the various possible motives of the same action and, if your object is to excite prejudice, to depreciate an action by putting a bad construction upon it, and, if it is to remove it, *to extol the same action* by interpreting it in the most favourable sense, e.g. by urging that [1]Diomedes preferred Odysseus as his companion either on the one hand because he thought him the bravest of the Greeks or on the other because Odysseus was such a craven fellow as to be the one man of whose rivalry he was not afraid.

CHAP. XVI. So much then it may suffice to say in regard to calumny.

Narrative (1) in epideictic speeches,

Narrative in epideictic speeches is not continuous but fragmentary. *Still it is an indispensable part of such speeches*, as the facts which form the subjects of an epideictic speech must be related. For in the composition of the speech there are two elements, one which is inartistic *or which does not admit of artistic treatment*, as the orator does not invent his own facts, the other artistic, i.e. the proof that the fact is true, if it is incredible, or that it is of a particular quality or magnitude or all three. Accordingly it sometimes happens that it is not proper to relate all the facts

[1] The reference is to the episode known as the Δολώνεια, *Iliad*, x. See especially vv. 242—247.

seriatim, as such a proof would be difficult to remember. Thus there are certain facts which tend to prove that a person is brave, certain other facts which prove that he is wise or just; *and these should not be confused*. Also there is a greater simplicity in the speech, if so divided, whereas in the other case it is involved and deficient in smoothness. If the facts are notorious, it is proper merely to recall them to the memory of the audience. Hence in such cases ordinary people do not need a narrative, e.g. if it is your wish to eulogize Achilles; for everybody knows his exploits, and you have only to comment upon them. But if it is Critias *whom you wish to eulogize, a narrative* is necessary, as his actions are not generally known....[1]The popular doctrine that the narrative should be rapid is an absurd one. Surely the case is like that of the man kneading dough who asked if he should knead it hard or soft and received the answer "Why? is it impossible to knead it well?" The narrative should not be prolix any more than the exordium or the statement of proofs; for in them as well as in the narrative it is not rapidity or conciseness which constitutes excellence but the due observation of the mean i.e. the using just so many words as will explain the facts of the case or will produce in the minds of the audience the impression that they have occurred or have been injurious or criminal or of such importance as you wish them to

(2) in forensic speeches,

[1] There is clearly a lacuna in the text before this sentence. For not only is the remark about rapidity introduced abruptly; but the sentences which follow are found to relate to forensic oratory, which has not yet been mentioned in the chapter.

be considered; or an opposite impression, if you are taking the opposite side.

You may properly slip into your narrative anything that tends to show your own virtue, i.e. *such a remark as* "I was for ever admonishing him, urging the injustice of leaving his children in the lurch", or anything that tends to show the wickedness of your adversary, e.g. "But he said in reply that, wherever he himself was, he would find other children"—the answer of the revolted Egyptians according to [1]Herodotus *to the king who besought them to return.* You may slip in also anything that gratifies the jury.

On the side of the defence the narrative part of the speech may be briefer, as the issues raised are the contentions that *the circumstance which is alleged* has not occurred or is not injurious or not criminal or not so serious as has been supposed. Hence there is no need to waste time in proving facts already admitted, unless they bear upon the issue which has been raised, as e.g. when the fact is allowed but the criminality of it is denied. Again, it is proper to speak of events as already past, except when the actual representation of them excites either compassion or indignation. An example of this is the [2]story of Alcinous *in the Odyssey*; for it is told to

[1] Herodotus, ii. ch. 30.

[2] The four books, *Odyssey*, ix—xii, in which Odysseus recites to the Phaeacian king Alcinous the story of his wanderings, seem to have formed a single "rhapsody" under the title Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος. This long story is condensed into 60, or more exactly 55 lines, when Odysseus repeats it to Penelope as a mere narrative of past events (*ibid.* xxiii. 264—284, 310—343).

Penelope in only sixty lines. Other examples are Phayllus's *summary of* the Epic Cycle and Euripides's prologue in the *Œneus*.

But the narrative should be ethical; and in order that it may be thus, we must know what it is that imparts an ethical character. The first thing is the indication of a moral purpose. It is upon the quality of this purpose that the quality of the character imparted will depend, and the quality of the purpose will be determined by its end. Hence there is no moral character in mathematical treatises, as they have no moral purpose; for they have no moral *or practical* end in view. But the [1]Socratic dialogues *are ethical*, as dealing with ethical subjects. There is another source of ethical effect in such characteristic marks as are the concomitants of particular characters; e.g. "*So-and-so* kept walking as he talked", for this is a sign of audacity and boorishness of character. Another is to seem to speak not from policy, like the speakers of the present day, but from the heart, as e.g. "That was my wish; it was my purpose; true, I gained nothing by it; but still it was best." Here you have the difference between prudence and virtue, prudence consisting in the pursuit of self-interest and virtue in the pursuit of nobleness. If *a trait of character* is incredible, then it is proper to add the explanation of it, as in the example that Sophocles supplies in his [2]*Antigone*, where she says that she cared more for her brother than for husband or

[1] For the "Socratic dialogues" (Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, Socratici Sermones) see Grote's *Plato* vol. III. pp. 469—473.

[2] The passage quoted is *Antigone* 911—2. It illustrates

children; "for husband and children, if they were lost, might be replaced,

> "But they being dead, my father and my mother,
> I never could have brother born anew."

If you have no explanation to give, you must at any rate say that "you know you will not induce anybody to believe you, but it is your nature to be disinterested; for the world does not believe in any motive of action except self-interest".

Again, topics may be derived from emotional signs by describing the usual accompaniments and familiar features of emotion and the special characteristics of your opponent or yourself, as e.g. "He departed with a scowl at me"[1] or "hissing and shaking his fists" as Aeschines says of Cratylus; for there is a certain persuasiveness in such language, because the facts which are familiar to the audience are treated as signs of facts with which they are not familiar. There are a great number of such instances in Homer, e.g.

> "[2] He spake, and in her hands she clasped her brow",

for people when beginning to weep are apt to clasp their eyes.

Present yourself to the audience from the outset in a certain moral light, that they may form a proper view of yourself and of your adversary; only do not betray your design. That it is easy to do this is evident in the case of messengers; for without know-

Aristotle's rule, as the sentiment, which seems so strange, is justified by the reasoning which follows.

[1] Changing the full stop after ὑποβλέψας to a comma.

[2] *Odyssey* xix. 361.

ing anything of the message we *often* conceive an idea of it *from the aspect of the messenger*.

The narrative should be distributed over the speech, and should sometimes not occur *in its natural place*, at the beginning.

It is in political oratory that there is least room for narration, as no one ever narrates what lies in the future. Narrative, if it occurs at all, must refer to the past, that with the facts of the past in their recollection the audience may be better fitted to deliberate on the future. Or it may be employed in disparagement or in eulogy, but in that case the speaker is not really discharging the function of a counsellor. [1]If there is anything incredible in the narrative, *it is proper* to promise that you will add an explanation of it immediately and to set it forth to the satisfaction of the audience, as the Jocasta of Carcinus in his *Œdipus* perpetually promises in answer to the man who is looking for her son, or as the Hæmon of Sophocles. (3) in political speeches.

The proofs should be demonstrative in their nature. But as there are four points on which the issue may possibly turn, the one to which the proof should be directed is the particular point at issue in the case. Thus if it is the question of fact which is at issue, it is the proof of this especially that should be urged in the trial; but if it is the question of injury, then the proof of this, and *similarly* if it is CHAP. XVII. Proofs.

[1] The sentence is hardly intelligible, as it stands, especially as the instances cited are unknown. But it must, I think, express some rule for recommending to the audience a statement which in itself is incredible or improbable.

a question of magnitude or of criminality, *the process of proof being essentially* the same as if the question at issue were one of the fact. But it must not be forgotten that the issue of fact is the only one in which one or other of the two parties must be a rogue; for it is impossible here to plead ignorance, as it might be pleaded, if the question were the justice of the action. Accordingly it is in such cases, but in such only, that it is right to dwell upon *this particular topic.* In epideictic speeches it will be generally amplification that is used to prove the moral or utilitarian nature of the facts; the facts themselves must be taken on trust, as it seldom happens that epideictic orators adduce proofs of them, *and only* when they are themselves incredible or [1]somebody else has got the credit of them. In political speeches it may be contended that the policy *of one's adversary* is impossible or that it is possible but unjust or inexpedient or that it will not have the important results which he anticipates. But at the same time the orator must be on the look out for any fallacy outside the actual issue, as such a fallacy *in the statement of extraneous matters* is taken for a proof of fallacy in the statement of the case itself.

Examples. Examples are especially appropriate to political, and enthymemes on the other hand to forensic oratory. For the former, being occupied with the future demands examples drawn from the history of the past; the latter turns upon matters of fact, which admit to a larger extent of demonstrative and necessary con-

[1] Reading ἄλλος.

clusions, as there is a sort of necessity in the past, *i.e. the past is irrevocable.*

Enthy-memes.

The enthymemes should not be stated in an unbroken series, but should be intermingled *with various other topics;* else one enthymeme destroys the effect of another. For there is a limit of quantity *in such things, as Homer shows in the* [1]*line*

> "Dear friend, thy words are many as a man
> May speak, being prudent."

"*as many words,*" *be it observed,* not "such words", *in reference not to their quality but to their quantity.*

Nor is it proper to search for enthymemes on all subjects; otherwise you will be acting like some professing philosophers, whose conclusions are more familiar and more credible than the premisses from which they deduce them. And further, avoid the use of an enthymeme in exciting emotion; for the enthymeme will either expel the emotion, or, if not, will have been constructed in vain, as simultaneous motions are mutually exclusive, and the one obliterates or else enfeebles the other. Nor again should you resort to an enthymeme at a time when you are seeking to invest your speech with an ethical character; for there is nothing of character or moral purpose in demonstrative argument.

Maxims.

Maxims on the other hand in virtue of their ethical character should be used both in narrative and in proof. *The ethical force of a maxim is evident, if you say e.g.,* "I have given it, and that though I

[1] *Odyssey* IV. 204. It is Menelaus who is addressing Pisistratus the son of Nestor.

know it is folly to trust anybody". *If you wish however* to work upon the emotions *of your audience, you may put it thus* "And I do not regret it, although I have been injured; for if my enemy has the advantage in profit, it is I who have the advantage in justice."

Comparison of political and forensic Rhetoric.

Political oratory is more difficult than forensic, for the sufficient reason that it relates to the future, whereas forensic oratory relates to the past, which, as Epimenides the Cretan said, may be known even to diviners; for he himself was not in the habit of divining the future but only the obscurities of the past. (Besides this, the law itself forms a subject in forensic speeches; and when you have a starting-point, it is not difficult to find a proof.)[1] Nor does *political oratory* allow of many diversions such as attacks upon your opponent and apologies for yourself, or again of appeals to the emotions. There is less room for them in political than in any other kind of oratory, unless the orator departs from his proper subject. Accordingly the orator, when at a loss for something to say, should follow the example of the rhetoricians at Athens and of Isocrates who in a deliberative speech introduces an accusation, as e.g. of the [2]Lacedæmonians in his *Panegyric* and of

[1] This remark upon the law as a rhetorical subject is parenthetical.

[2] The Panegyrical speech of Isocrates is properly a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, its object being to unite the forces of Athens and Sparta against the Persians; but there are certain passages, §§ 140—147, which reflect in bitter terms upon the policy of Sparta.

[1]Chares in his speech on the Alliance, *i.e. he should import alien subjects.*

Epideictic Rhetoric.

In epideictic speeches it is proper to introduce eulogies by way of episodes, as is the practice of Isocrates, who is always bringing in somebody. It is this that Gorgias meant when he declared that he was never at a loss for something to say, for in speaking e.g. of Achilles, he eulogizes Peleus, then Æacus, then the God, *i.e. Zeus the father of Æacus*, and similarly valour, and so on. This is just what I have been describing.

If you have proofs to adduce, your language should be both ethical and demonstrative, but if you have no enthymemes, it should be exclusively ethical; in fact to a person of good character it is more appropriate that his virtue should display itself *in his speech* than that his speech should be accurately reasoned.

Demonstrative and refutative enthymemes.

Among enthymemes the refutative are more popular than the demonstrative, as a refutation brings out the syllogistic conclusion more clearly, the opposites being more easily recognizable by juxtaposition.

The reply to an adversary is not a separate branch of the speech; it is rather a part of the proofs to refute his arguments either by objection or by counter-syllogism.

Arrangement of a speech.

In deliberative and in forensic speaking alike it is right, if you are the first speaker, to begin with a statement of your own proofs and

[1] The συμμαχικὸς λόγος must be the speech known as *de Pace*, where an indirect attack is made upon Chares the Athenian general for his conduct in the Social War.

then to meet the arguments on the other side by *directly* refuting them and by pulling them to pieces in anticipation. But if the opposition is of a varied character, it is right *to deal* first *with* the opposing arguments, as Callistratus did in the Messenian Assembly, when he first disposed of the arguments which would be urged by his adversaries and then made his own statement of the case. If you speak last, you should begin with the answer to your adversary's arguments, by refutation and counter-syllogism, especially if they have been well received. For as the mind does not give a favourable reception to a person against whom it has conceived a prejudice, so neither does it receive a speech favourably, if the speech on the other side is considered to have been successful. You have to make room then in the minds of the audience for the speech you are about to deliver, and the way to do this is to dispose of your adversary's speech. Accordingly you must first contend against all or the most important or the most popular or the most easily refuted of his arguments and then proceed to establish the credibility of your own case. *This is what Euripides has done in the* [1] *lines*

> "First will I prove the goddesses' ally,
> Methinks not Hera;"

here he begins by touching on the weakest argument.

Ethical effect.

So much then for the consideration of proofs. As to character, since there are some things which, if

[1] The lines quoted are 969 and 971 of the *Troades*, from the beginning of Hecuba's reply to a long preceding speech of Helen.

you say them of yourself, are either invidious or tedious or highly disputable and which, if you say them of others, imply either calumny or coarseness, it is as well to put them into the mouth of a third person, as in the example of Isocrates in his [1]*Philip* and in his [2]Speech on the Exchange of Properties and as in the lampoons of Archilochus, who represents the [3]father as using the line about his daughter,

"Nought is improbable, nought can never be"

or Charon the carpenter uttering the line beginning

"Not mine the wealth of Gyges."

Similarly [4]Sophocles makes Hæmon plead with his father for Antigone in language quoted from the lips of others.

Enthymemes and maxims.

Again, you should occasionally change the form of your enthymemes and express them as maxims. Thus *the maxim* "Sensible men should patch up their quarrels in the hour of prosperity, as they will then be likely to get the best terms" may be expressed enthymematically in the form "If it is right to patch up one's quarrels, when it is possible to get most beneficial and advantageous terms, you should do so in the hour of prosperity."

[1] Probably Spengel is right in thinking that the passage referred to is §§ 4—7.

[2] §§ 149 sqq.

[3] Archilochus, it is meant, in attacking the lady who had rejected him put his lampoon into the mouth of her own father. Similarly in inveighing against the vanity of riches he ascribes his own sentiments to the contented carpenter, Charon.

[4] *Antigone* 688—700.

CHAP. XVIII. Interrogation.

We come now to the interrogation *of one's adversary.* It is a device which may be most opportunely used, when your adversary has already said the opposite, and when therefore an absurdity results from a single additional question. Thus Pericles interrogated *the soothsayer* Lampon as to the sacrificial ritual of the [1]Saving Goddess and, when he answered that it could not be told to one who had not been initiated, inquired if it was known to Lampon himself; Lampon said "Yes," and then he rejoined, "How can it be, when you have not been initiated?" *It may be used* secondly, when there are two points of which one is self-evident and the other will clearly be admitted as soon as the question is put. For in such a case, when you have obtained one of your premisses in reply to your question, you should not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question but should state the conclusion *immediately.* Thus [2]Socrates, when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of gods asked if there was anything which he (Socrates) called divine; when Meletus admitted this, he inquired if divine things were not either children of the gods or something divine, and on his answering "Yes" said, "Is there anyone then who believes in the existence of children of the gods

[1] The saving goddess is Demeter; cp. Aristophanes, *Ranae* 378.

[2] The passage of Plato *Apology*, p. 27 does not exactly correspond with the text. Apparently the point is that, instead of obtaining a minor premiss by putting a second question, the speaker should abruptly present the conclusion itself in the form of a question.

but denies the existence of the gods themselves?" Thirdly, interrogation may be used, when it is your intention to display your adversary in a self-contradiction or a paradox. Or fourthly, when it is impossible for him to meet the question without giving a sophistical answer; for if he replies that a thing "is so and yet is not so," or "is partly so and partly not," or "so in one sense but not in another," the audience shows its perplexity by loud disapprobation. These are the only conditions in which interrogation should be attempted; for if your adversary interposes an objection, you are thought to have been defeated, as it is impossible to put a series of questions owing to the *intellectual* weakness of the audience. Hence your enthymemes should be condensed as far as possible.

In replying to questions, if they are of an ambiguous kind, you should proceed by *distinction or* definition, and should not express yourself too concisely. Where on the other hand the questions are such as seem to land you in a contradiction, you should give your explanation at the outset of your answer before your adversary puts his next question or draws his conclusion; for it is not hard to see what is the point of his argument. But a reference to the [1] *Topics* will explain this as well as the means of refutation. **Reply.**

In drawing a conclusion, if your adversary puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you should state *at once* the explanation *of your conduct*. For

[1] Τοπικά, Bk. VIII.

instance, [1]Sophocles being asked by Pisander if he had agreed with the other members of the Council in recommending the appointment of the Four Hundred said, "Yes." "Why? did not you think it wrong?" was the reply. "Yes," he said. "So you committed this wrong action." "Yes," he rejoined, "for it was the best thing possible." Similarly the Lacedæmonian, being called to account for his administration of the ephoral office, in answer to the question whether he thought that the other ephors had deserved to be executed, said "Yes." "Well, did not you act in concert with them?" was the reply, and he assented. "Well then, do not you equally deserve to be executed?" "No," he said, "for they acted so for a bribe, and I on the contrary from conviction." It is a mistake then to put a further question after the conclusion, or to express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth is superabundantly clear.

Jokes. We come now to the subject of jokes. As it appears that they have a certain value in controversy and Gorgias laid it down rightly enough as a sound maxim to confound the seriousness of one's adversary by jocularity and his jocularity by seriousness, the various kinds of jokes have been stated in the [2]treatise on *Poetry*. Some of these are suited to gentlemen, but not all. You must be careful then to

[1] Not the poet, but the politician who was one of the πρόβουλοι appointed at Athens after the Sicilian disaster in 413 B.C. (See Thucydides VIII. ch. 1). It was by them that the oligarchy of the Four Hundred was set up.

[2] Cp. *Rhet.* i. ch. 11. *ad fin.* and the note there given.

make use of none but such as are appropriate to your character. Irony, it may be observed, is more gentlemanly than buffoonery, as the former is used simply for its own sake and the latter for some ulterior object.

There are four elements *or objects* of the peroration, viz. to inspire the audience with a favourable opinion of yourself and an unfavourable one of your adversary, to amplify or depreciate the subject, to excite the emotions of the audience and to recall the facts to their memory. For it is the natural order first to prove the truth of your own case and the falsity of your adversary's and, when this is done, to introduce the eulogy or censure and to elaborate *these topics*. In all this you should aim at one of two objects, viz. to prove either your own virtue or the wickedness of your adversary either absolutely or in relation to the audience. The topics which you may properly employ in representing yourself as virtuous or your adversary as vicious have been already enumerated. The next step in the natural order is to amplify or depreciate what has been already proved *by yourself or your adversary;* for facts must be admitted, if one is to discuss the question of degree, just as the growth of a body implies that it already exists. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been exhibited in an earlier part of this treatise. When this has been done and the quality and magnitude of the facts are clearly seen, the next thing is to work upon the emotions of the audience, such as compassion, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, jealousy and contentiousness. The topics suited to this purpose have also

CHAP. XIX. Peroration.

pp. 60 sqq.

pp. 46 sqq. 63 sqq.

pp. 115 sqq.

been described. There remains then the recapitulation of the statements already made in the speech. And here it is appropriate to do what has been sometimes urged, wrongly enough, as proper to be done in the exordia i.e. to repeat your points several times for the sake of intelligibility. In the exordium you should simply state the subject, so as to elucidate the matter at issue, but in the peroration you should summarily mention the steps by which your case has been proved. And in so doing the first thing is *to show* that you have performed all that you promised; hence you must state the points you have made and your reason for making them. One species of recapitulation consists in a comparison of one's own case with one's adversary's. We may either put side by side all that he said and that you said on the same subject e.g. "My opponent said this, and I that, on the subject, and this was my reason"; or you may proceed indirectly. Or again you may use irony, e.g. "My opponent said that, and I this. I wonder what he would have done, if he had proved this instead of that." Or interrogation e.g. "What have I failed to prove?" or "What has my adversary proved?" You may proceed thus or by comparison or in the natural order, as was said, stating your own points and then, if you like, your adversary's points separately.

An asyndeton forms an appropriate conclusion, to make it a true peroration and not an oration, e.g. "I have spoken, you have heard me; the case is in your hands, pronounce your judgment".

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A. M. Dale

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED

WITH AN ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL NOTES

BY

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PREFACE.

THE Translation of the *Politics* of Aristotle, which is now given to the world, is, I hope, only an instalment of a larger work. It has always seemed to me that anyone who would do full justice to the *Politics* has indeed a threefold task, viz. to translate it, to write a commentary upon it, and finally to publish a series of essays on subjects connected with it. It is only the first, and perhaps the easiest part of the task that I have now undertaken. For the second I have already made much preparation; but I am not unaware that other scholars, more distinguished than I can hope to be, are labourers in the same field, and it is possible that the materials which I have already collected in order to an edition will

not at present or for a long time see the light.

The text of the present Translation is that of Bekker's octavo edition published in 1878. No other text of the *Politics* is at once so accurate and so accessible to ordinary readers. The variations from it which I have adopted are generally such as are justified by the best MSS. authority, but sometimes conjectural emendations of previous editors or translators, and in two or three instances my own. Following Bekker's text, I follow also his order of the Books. There is much to be said for it, and it is advisable not to burden a mere Translation with the discussion of a problem which belongs properly to critical scholarship.

I have had many helps in preparing this Translation. I trust I have made some use of all the recent, and most of the more ancient works which throw any light upon the interpretation of the text. A modern translator of the *Politics* need hardly express his primary obligation to the labours of Suse-

mihl. But apart from the general sources of information, I enjoyed the privilege, as an undergraduate, of attending the Lectures of Professor Jebb and Mr Henry Jackson upon this book; no doubt they will pardon me, if I have sometimes made their thoughts and even their words my own. Many friends in Cambridge and elsewhere have supplied me with critical opinions on particular passages, and I am grateful to them all. But there are two especial acknowledgments which I must make; the first to Mr Henry Jackson, Fellow and Praelector in Ancient Philosophy in Trinity College, Cambridge, who not only introduced me to the *Politics*, as I have already said, by his Lectures several years ago, but has done me the signal kindness of reading my whole Translation, as it was passing through the press, and aiding me with suggestions which I have often accepted, and never neglected without remembering Hermann's remark about Lachmann; and the second to my relation, the Rev. M. B. Cowell, Vicar of Ashbocking in Suffolk, whose plea-

sant home has been to me a haven of rest during many weeks that I have devoted to the study of Aristotle.

It only remains to add that corrections or criticisms of the Translation will be gratefully and gladly received.

KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
March 31, 1883.

N.B. The marginal references are to the pages of the Translation, the references in the foot-notes to the pages and lines of Bekker's text.

The words italicized, except in a few self-evident instances, are inserted in order to make the original fully intelligible.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN revising the Translation I have taken advantage of a good many criticisms, whether private or public, and especially of two Reviews in the *Academy* of December 1, 1883, and the *Guardian* of August 6, 1884. I have also added an Index and a Table showing the common order of the Books, and Bekker's order which I have followed. It is unfortunate that Mr Newman's important work was not published soon enough to enable me to make such use of it as I could wish.

J. E. C. W.

HARROW SCHOOL,
April 6, 1888.

Common order of the Books.	Bekker's order.
I	I
II	II
III	III
IV	VII
V	VIII
VI	IV
VII	VI
VIII	V

ANALYSIS.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

EVERY State (πόλις) is an association (κοινωνία). The object of every association is some Good. But the State is the supreme association; therefore the object (τέλος) of the State is the supreme Good.

The functions of a statesman, a king, a householder and a slavemaster are not identical, the unit of the household being different from the unit of the State.

CHAPTER II.

There are two primary essential associations, viz.:

(1) Of male and female, for the procreation of children;

(2) Of natural ruler and natural subject, for safety.

(Among non-Greek peoples (βάρβαροι) the second of these associations disappears, as there are no natural rulers.)

These two associations constitute the household in its primary or simplest form (οἰκία πρώτη).

The simplest association of several households for something more than ephemeral purposes is a village (κώμη).

The association composed of several villages in its complete form is the State.

The criterion of a State is independence (αὐτάρκεια).

(It is because a household is governed by its eldest member like a king, and the State is an outgrowth of the household, that all States were originally under regal government.)

Proof that the State has in all cases a natural existence (*πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν*):

The State is the complete development (*τέλος*) of the earlier associations, the household and the village. But nature implies or denotes complete development, as by the nature of anything we mean its condition when the process of production is complete.

Or again: The object or complete development of a thing is its highest good. But independence, which is first attained in the State, is a condition of complete development and is therefore natural.

Hence man is naturally a political animal.

Proof that man is a political animal in a higher sense than a bee or any other gregarious creature:

Nature creates nothing without a purpose (*μάτην*). Man is the only animal possessing articulate speech (*λόγος*) as distinguished from mere sounds (*φωνή*). Sounds serve to indicate sensations of pleasure and pain, but speech is indicative of advantage and disadvantage, and therefore also of justice and injustice. Man alone then enjoys perception of moral qualities, and it is upon a common interest in a common morality that the household and the State alike depend.

The State is prior in Nature (*πρότερον τῇ φύσει*) to the household or the individual; for any whole is prior in Nature or conception to its parts.

Political association is not only natural but in the highest degree beneficial to Man, who in his condition of complete development is the noblest of animals but apart from law and justice is the vilest. For it is only in the State that justice is capable of realization, as judicial procedure (*δίκη*), by which justice is practically determined, is an ordinance of the State.

CHAPTER III.

As the State is composed of households, we have first to consider Domestic Economy (*οἰκονομία*).

Domestic Economy includes,

(1) the relations of a slavemaster to his slaves (δεσποτική),
(2) the relations of husband and wife (γαμική),
(3) the relations of a parent to his children (τεκνοποιητική or, as it is afterwards called, πατρική),
and (4) the Art of Finance (χρηματιστική), the nature and scope of which are disputed.

We consider first the relations of master and slave.

CHAPTER IV.

Property (ἡ κτῆσις) is a part or element of the household, and the Art of Acquisition (ἡ κτητική) a part of Domestic Economy. For a householder, like any artist, must have his proper instruments, and every property (κτῆμα) is an instrument conducing to life (ὄργανον πρὸς ζωήν).

Instruments are either animate or inanimate; they are also either instruments of production (ποιητικά) or of action (πρακτικά).

A property is an instrument of action, and a slave is an animate property.

A slave then is an animate instrument or an assistant in the sphere of action (ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν).

As a property is not only the property of its owner but wholly belongs to or depends upon him, so a slave is not only the slave of his master but wholly belongs to him. And thus a natural slave is a human being who is naturally not his own master but belongs to someone else.

CHAPTER V.

Are there then natural slaves, persons for whom a condition of slavery is expedient and just?

The principle of rule and subjection pervades all Nature. We may instance the natural subordination of body to soul (ψυχή) and within the soul itself of appetite (ὄρεξις) to intellect (νοῦς), of the lower animals to man and of females to males. We infer that the same principle is true of human beings generally. Where we

find persons as far inferior to others as the body to the soul or as beasts to man, these are natural slaves.

(The slave differs from his master in not possessing reason and from the lower animals in being able to understand it. There is little or no difference between the uses of domestic animals and slaves.)

But this natural absolute distinction between slaves and free persons—a distinction which should be equally conspicuous in their bodies and souls—is not always apparent; hence a dispute as to the justice of slavery.

CHAPTER VI.

There are two kinds of slavery, natural (φύσει) and conventional (νόμῳ) which are properly distinct but are popularly confused. The reasons of this confusion are (1) that none are so well able to employ force as the virtuous, if they possess adequate external means, and thus virtue appears to imply force, (2) that the stronger are always superior in respect of some Good which is wrongly identified with virtue, and thus force appears to imply virtue. Not perceiving that the existing state of things is partly right and partly wrong, people either identify justice with benevolence and thereby reprobate all slavery, or define justice as the rule of the stronger and thereby justify all slavery. A third theory—a sort of compromise—according to which all such slavery as is the result of war is just, is clearly illogical, as a war may be unjust in its origin.

We conclude that slavery is in itself an institution natural and right, its justification consisting in the intrinsic moral superiority of the master, although the doctrine is not capable of universal application. Where the true relations exist, the institution of slavery is equally beneficial to master and slave.

CHAPTER VII.

It is now clear that the functions of a slavemaster and a constitutional statesman are not the same, as Plato supposed; for in the one case the subjects are slaves and in the other free persons.

It is not a particular science (ἐπιστήμη) but the possession of particular qualities (τῷ τοιόσδ' εἶναι) that constitutes the slavemaster. At the same time we may speak of a science proper to the slavemaster, meaning by it the science of using slaves, i.e. of giving them orders about their regular duties.

CHAPTER VIII.

Coming to Finance (χρηματιστική) we have first to consider the true relation of Finance to Domestic Economy.

They are not identical; for it is the business of the former to provide and of the latter to use what is so provided.

Is Finance then a part of Domestic Economy?

As Finance is concerned with the means of acquiring property and property is of various kinds, it is possible that some branches of Finance are parts of Domestic Economy, while others are not. Let us take one main branch of Finance, viz. agriculture or the acquisition of food generally, and examine its relation to Domestic Economy.

(The different kinds of food produce varieties in the lives of animals and human beings. Men live either by grazing, as nomads, or by the chase, whether as brigands, fishers or sportsmen, or by agriculture and the cultivation of fruits, or by a combination of two or more of these pursuits.)

It is the intention of Nature to supply Man with the means of subsistence, or in other words with property, so far as it is necessary to his life. Therefore the Finance by which man appropriates Nature's gifts, i.e. such articles as are necessary to life or useful to persons associated in a State or household, is naturally a part of Domestic Economy. And it is these which constitute genuine wealth.

CHAPTER IX.

There is however a second or unnatural kind of Finance which arises in the following way.

Every commodity admits of two uses (1) its proper use, (2) its use as an article of exchange. The Art of Exchange (ἡ μεταβλη-

τική) was originally limited to the barter of one commodity against another for the mutual supply of wants, and so far it is not unnatural nor is it a species of Finance in the bad sense. But at a later date it was developed by the invention of a currency (νόμισμα) and took the form of Retail Trading (ἡ καπηλική).

(The idea that Finance is mainly concerned with the acquisition of money arises from the common confusion of money with wealth.)

In a word, the first kind of Finance is natural and necessary, it is a branch of Domestic Economy, and money is only its means; the second is unnatural and unnecessary, and the unlimited acquisition of money is its end.

The two kinds of Finance are apt to be more or less confused, as they both make use of the same material, viz. money, although not in the same way. But the desire of constantly accumulating money arises from an anxiety about the means of living rather than of living well or from an inadequate conception of living well.

CHAPTER X.

We are now in a position to determine more exactly the relation of the good or natural Finance to Domestic Economy. In one sense it is and in another it is not a part of Domestic Economy. The householder or statesman is in a certain sense concerned with the financial means, as he is also with the health, of his household or State; but in either case there is a subordinate art—the Art of Finance or the Art of Medicine—which deals directly and specially with the subject. In strictness however financial means are pre-requisites which it is the business of Nature to provide and of the householder or statesman to use.

Of all the forms of unnatural Finance none is so objectionable as petty usury (ἡ ὀβολοστατική); for in it money is put to a wholly unnatural use, being employed not as a medium of exchange but as a direct means of gain. Hence the name τόκος (lit. offspring); for children are like their parents, and interest is money born of money.

CHAPTER XI.

Finance regarded from the practical side.

(A) The subdivisions of Finance in the natural or proper sense are

(1) Stockfarming.

(2) Husbandry, including both agriculture and the cultivation of trees.

(3) Beekeeping.

(4) The management of fish and fowls.

(B) Unnatural Finance, i.e. Finance which consists in exchange, comprises

(1) Commerce, including marine trade (ναυκληρία) inland trade (φορτηγία) and shopkeeping (παράστασις).

(2) Usury (τοκισμός).

(3) Hired labour (μισθαρνία).

(C) Between these lies a third kind of Finance, to which belong all such arts as depend upon the earth or those products of the earth which are useful, although they do not yield fruit, e.g. wood-cutting (ὑλοτομία) and mining (μεταλλευτική) generally.

The various subdivisions of practical Finance have been treated by particular writers. Among financial schemes the advantage of a monopoly is illustrated by anecdotes of Thales and a Sicilian speculator.

CHAPTER XII.

Of the divisions of Domestic Economy two, viz. the relations of a master to his slaves and Finance, have now been considered. There remain the relations of a father to his children and of a husband to his wife. The rule of a husband over his wife is like the rule of a statesman over the citizens of a constitutional State (πολιτική) except that it is permanent. That of a father over his children is like the rule of a king over his subjects (βασιλική).

CHAPTER XIII.

A question arises as to the capacity of slaves and of women and children for virtue. Is the virtue of master and slave, husband and wife, father and child and generally of natural ruler and natural subject the same or different? The answer is that they are all capable of virtue, but there are different kinds or degrees of virtue, and each must possess it in such a manner as is suitable to the performance of his proper functions.

We have still to consider whether a certain virtue is necessary to the mechanical artisan (*βάναυσος τεχνίτης*).

The position of the artisan differs from that of the slave. He lives in a state of limited slavery, not sharing his master's life nor having a natural existence, as the slave. Hence his virtue is but a fraction of the slave's virtue.

The virtue of which a slave is capable must be produced in him by his master, not by the mere teacher who instructs him in his duties. And as slaves are capable of a certain virtue and are able to understand reason, it is right to advise them rather than always to order them, as Socrates suggests.

Conclusion :

We have considered Slavery and Finance. The right relations of husband and wife, father and children can only be determined with reference to the polity under which they live. It is necessary therefore to describe the best polity. And a review of celebrated polities whether projected or actually existing will form a natural preface to this description.

BOOK II.

Examination of polities projected by individual thinkers or existing in States.

CHAPTER I.

The citizens of a State must have
either (1) nothing in common,
or (2) everything in common,
or (3) some things in common and not others.

But the first case is clearly an impossibility, as a polity implies community or association (*κοινωνία*), and the citizens must at least live in a common locality.

The second is proposed in the *Republic* of Plato, where Socrates argues for a community of wives, children and property.

CHAPTERS II—V.

Criticism of the *Republic* of Plato.

CHAPTER II.

The objections may be ranged under three general heads, viz.

(I) The unification of the State, which Socrates regards as his end, is not proved to be desirable.

(II) Unification, if it were desirable, would not be produced by community of wives, children and property.

(III) The proper limits of this community are not stated.

We take these heads in order.

(I) The unification of the State is not the true end.

For

(1) a State implies a number of people, and as a State approaches unity, it ceases to be a State and becomes first a household and then an individual; so that the unification of a State means its destruction.

(2) The members of a State are not only numerous but different in kind. For it is just this diversity of the component elements which distinguishes an organic whole such as a State from a military confederation.

(N.B. Hence the true preservative principle of States is reciprocal equality (*τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*) which among unequals leads to perpetuity of rule or subjection and among equals to alternation of office.)

(3) A condition of more independence is preferable to one of less, and a household is a more independent body (*αὐταρκέστερον*) than an individual, a State than a household.

CHAPTER III.

(II) Even if it be granted that the unification of the State is the true end, it will not be attained by the means proposed.

According to Socrates the test of unity is that "all simultaneously term the same object *mine* or *not mine*" (*ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμόν*).

But the word "all" is ambiguous.

"All" may mean either "each individually" or "all collectively."

If in this case it has the first meaning, the formula, however specious, is incapable of realization; if the latter, it is far from conducive to harmony.

After this verbal criticism Aristotle proceeds to objections of fact.

(A) Community of wives and children.

(1) The sense of individual possession will be absent. People love what is their own; what belongs to everybody belongs in fact to nobody. But every citizen in the *Republic* is supposed to have 1000 sons, who are as much the sons of any other citizen as his own; hence no parent will feel more than a remote fractional interest in any child. Besides, no citizen will be able to feel sure that even one of the 1000 sons is really his; for it will always be possible that no child was born to him or that his child did not survive.

(2) Despite the community of wives and children, it will be impossible to prevent suspicions of relationship arising from the personal likeness of certain children to certain parents.

CHAPTER IV.

(3) If the relationships *are* unknown, it will be difficult to prevent murders of kinsfolk and other impieties; nor will the proper atonements be made after such deeds.

(4) The community of wives and children will tend to weaken mutual affection in the class among which it prevails. It is therefore a system better suited to the Husbandmen (γεωργοί) or subject class of the *Republic* than to the Guardians (φύλακες) or rulers for whom it is instituted by Socrates.

(5) There will be a difficulty in providing for the transference of children, as Socrates ordains, from one class in the State to another e.g. from the Husbandmen to the Guardians; and in the case of children so transferred there will be especial danger of the impieties above described.

CHAPTER V.

(B) Community of property.

(The question may be considered without reference to the community of wives and children.)

(1) It will occasion constant disputes as to the relation between the labour done and the amount of produce to be enjoyed. The existing system of private tenure would be far preferable, as it gives every man an interest in his own possessions, if a generous disposition were fostered in the citizens. We shall thus gain the benefits of both principles.

(2) It will destroy the pleasure arising from the sense of private property.

(3) Without private property the virtue of liberality is impossible; as also is continence, where there is community of wives.

In a word, the community proposed by Socrates would make life impossible.

His mistake lies in not perceiving that it is a *moral* unity of the State which is alone desirable, and that this unity must be effected by moral, not by mechanical means, i.e. by education rather than by community of property.

Further, the evidence of History is an argument against the Socratic community of wives, children and property; for had it been a beneficial institution, it would have been already devised.

And lastly, the attempt to create a polity of the Socratic type, were it once made, would demonstrate the impossibility of complete unification.

(III) The incompleteness of the polity proposed in the *Republic*.

(1) It is not stated whether the community of wives, children and property is to extend to the Husbandmen as well as to the Guardians. If it is, how will they differ from the Guardians? If it is not, there will be two opposing principles within the State, in fact two States in one, and mutual recrimination, law suits &c. will be as frequent in this State as elsewhere.

(2) The theory of Socrates that his citizens will be so educated as to need few legal regulations is unjustifiable, as he assigns the education to the Guardians alone.

(3) Nothing is said about the political constitution, laws and education of the Husbandmen, although their character is

important to the maintenance of the community among the Guardians.

(4) The Husbandmen, as having an absolute ownership of their estates on condition only of paying rent to the Guardians, will be arrogant and intractable.

(5) If there is to be community of wives, and at the same time private possession of property, among the Husbandmen, who will attend to the domestic affairs, while the men work in the fields?

(IV) Minor objections.

(1) The illustration which Socrates draws from the lower animals, to show that the pursuits of men and women should be the same, is inapposite, as the lower animals are incapable of Domestic Economy.

(2) The proposed perpetuity of rulers, which is a necessary feature of the Socratic polity, will be a cause of political disturbance.

(3) Socrates denies happiness to the Guardians, and yet teaches that the State as a whole ought to be happy. But this is impossible; for if the Guardians are unhappy, *à fortiori* happiness will be impossible to the other classes, and the happiness of the whole State is incompatible with the unhappiness of all its parts.

CHAPTER VI.

Criticism of the *Laws* of Plato.

The polity of the *Laws* is in numerous respects open to the same strictures as that of the *Republic*. For although it professes to have more affinity to existing States, it is gradually assimilated to the polity of the *Republic*, except in regard to the community of wives, children and property.

The objections are as follows:

(1) Socrates assumes the number of citizens who possess heavy arms to be five thousand, a number preposterously large.

(2) He argues that the legislator ought in his laws "to have regard to the country and the people." It would have been proper to add "to neighbouring lands also."

(3) The amount of property to be held by any citizen is defined as "enough for living temperately" (τοσαύτην ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως). But the word "temperately" is ambiguous, it does not exclude penurious living. A better definition would be "temperately and liberally" (σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως).

(4) While equalizing all properties, Socrates fails to provide against an increase of population.

(5) The points of distinction between rulers and subjects are not stated.

(6) As a fivefold increase of a citizen's total property is allowed, why should not a similar increase of his landed estate be allowable?

(7) The proposal to assign each citizen two separate homesteads in different parts of the country would be fatal to Domestic Economy.

The polity of the *Laws* is as a whole neither a Democracy nor an Oligarchy but intermediate, i.e. a Polity in the strict sense. This may be the polity which has most affinity to existing States; but it is not the ideal polity, nor is it so good as the Lacedaemonian or a more aristocratical polity.

It is a gross error to assert, as in the *Laws*, that the best polity is a compound of Democracy and Tyranny, the most debased of all polities, if indeed they deserve the name of polities at all. Nor is there any monarchical element in the polity of the *Laws*; it is a compound of oligarchical and democratical elements with an inclination to Oligarchy, as appears from the method of electing the officers of State and the Council.

It may be added that the election of the officers of State by voting from a body previously elected in the same manner is calculated to place great power in the hands of a small knot of people, if they act in combination.

CHAPTER VII.

Among other projectors of polities, whether statesmen and philosophers or ordinary people, no one has shown such originality as Plato in the *Republic* and *Laws;* no one else e.g. has suggested a community of wives and children.

The polity proposed by Phaleas of Chalcedon.

Phaleas held that, as questions of property are the occasions of civil disturbances, the remedy would lie in an equality of possessions.

But

(1) It is useless to define the amount of a citizen's property without defining also the number of his children.

(2) It is not enough merely to establish an equality of property; the legislator must see that the amount fixed is the right one.

(3) Nor is it enough even to fix the proper moderate amount of property. Men's desires need levelling more than their properties; hence the paramount importance of a true education.

(4) Inequality of property is not the only cause of civil disturbance. Inequality of honours is an equally potent cause; indeed it is not the desire of the mere necessaries of life which is the motive of the greatest crimes.

(N.B. The objects of human desire are

(1) necessaries of life—food, clothing, &c.

(2) gratifications which are not necessary, but still are desired, e.g. honour.

(3) pleasures which are not preceded by desire and yet afford satisfaction when they are obtained, e.g. intellectual pleasures.)

We conclude then that the equality of property, which is the characteristic of Phaleas's polity, is efficacious only as a preventive of petty crimes.

It may be added that he neglects the external relations of the State, although these affect not only the military system but also

the amount of property. Perhaps the true limit of property in a State is that it should not be so large as to afford in itself a sufficient inducement to stronger Powers to declare war.

Further objections to the equality of property proposed by Phaleas:

(5) It will produce a feeling of indignation in the upper classes, who consider themselves entitled to a certain superiority.

(6) The mere institution of an equality will not restrain men's desires. The only true remedy consists in some such social arrangement that the higher natures may be unwilling, and the lower unable, to aggrandize themselves.

(7) Phaleas in his equalization of properties has regard to landed estate alone; of a citizen's personal estate he takes no account.

Finally, the position of the Artisans, who are to be public slaves in Phaleas's polity, is unsatisfactory.

CHAPTER VIII.

The polity proposed by Hippodamus of Miletus.

The State to consist of ten thousand citizens, divided into three classes, viz.

(1) Artisans (*τεχνῖται*)

(2) Husbandmen (*γεωργοί*)

(3) The Military Class (*τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος*).

The land to be divided into three parts, viz.

(1) sacred, for the maintenance of religious services,

(2) public, for the support of the Military Class.

(3) private, belonging to the Husbandmen.

Also he held that the subjects of judicial procedure were only three, viz.

(1) Assault (*ὕβρις*)

(2) Trespass (*βλάβη*)

(3) Homicide (*θάνατος*).

Further proposals of Hippodamus:

(1) That there should be a single supreme Court of Appeal, constituted of certain Elders appointed by voting.

(2) That jurors should have the power of returning qualified verdicts.

(3) That public honour should be conferred upon anyone who made a discovery beneficial to the State, and that the children of those who fell in war should be supported at the public expense.

(4) That all the officers of State should be elected by the three classes of citizens, and that the officers elected should be entrusted with the conduct of public affairs and with the protection of foreigners and orphans.

Aristotle's criticisms of the polity.

(1) As the Husbandmen are to possess no arms, and the Artisans are to possess neither land nor arms, they will both be practically slaves of the Military Class. They will therefore be excluded from the highest offices of State. The result will be that they will be ill-disposed to the polity.

(2) The place of the Husbandmen in the State is hard to understand. For they are to possess land of their own and cultivate it for themselves. But if the public land is to be cultivated by the Military Class, there will be no such distinction as Hippodamus intends between the Soldiery and the Husbandmen; if by a class distinct from both, it will be a fourth class in the State destitute of political rights; if by the Husbandmen, who at the same time cultivate their own private land, how is each of them to raise produce enough for the support of two households? and what is the good of this elaborate distinction between public and private land?

(3) The provision for a qualified verdict will have the effect of converting the juror (δικαστής) into an arbitrator (διαιτητής) and of producing inevitable confusion in the verdicts returned.

(4) The proposal to reward the authors of discoveries beneficial to the State will lead to intrigues and even disturbances of the polity.

Question raised—Is it injurious or advantageous to States to alter their ancestral laws and customs, where another better law or custom is possible?

Arguments in favour of alteration:

(1) Such change has proved beneficial in other sciences.

(2) Ancient customs are generally rude and barbarous.

(3) As a law is necessarily general, it cannot meet all individual cases that occur.

Arguments against alteration:

(1) It is necessary to weigh the good derivable from a change of the laws against the evil of accustoming the citizens lightly to repeal their laws.

(2) There is no true parallel between altering an art and altering a law, as the efficacy of the law is wholly dependent upon the habit of obedience among the citizens, and habit can only be the work of time.

Further, even assuming the propriety of altering the laws, we have still to enquire when and under what conditions and by what agency the alteration should be effected.

CHAPTER IX.

We come now to existing polities.

Every such polity must be considered

(1) relatively to the best possible system,

(2) relatively to the principle of the polity which the citizens propose to themselves.

The Lacedaemonian polity.

Its principal defects:

(1) The condition of the Helots, who have always been hostile to their masters and ready for revolt.

(2) The licence of the women, which is not only indecorous in itself but contributes to produce an avaricious disposition in the citizens.

(N.B. The explanation of this licence is to be found in the long-continued absence of the husbands from home in early times on military expeditions.)

(3) The inequality of property;

for (*a*) although the sale of patrimonial estates is discouraged, yet, as there is absolute liberty of presentation and bequest, the ownership of the soil has fallen into the hands of a few persons.

(*b*) owing to the number of heiresses and the practice of giving large dowries, nearly two-fifths of the whole soil belongs to women. Nor is there any law regulating the betrothal of heiresses.

The result is that the civic population capable of bearing arms has gradually dwindled from fifteen hundred knights and thirty thousand heavy-armed men to less than a thousand soldiers in all.

(There was an ancient practice of conferring the Lacedaemonian citizenship upon foreigners and thereby preventing depopulation; but it has been abandoned.)

The evil is aggravated by the law encouraging the citizens to beget as many children as possible, many of whom, as the landed estates are in the hands of a few persons, are necessarily reduced to poverty.

(4) The institution of the Ephoralty.

It is true that the Ephoral office, as supplying the commons with some sort of representation, tends to the preservation of the polity. But

(*a*) as all classes of citizens are equally eligible to the Ephoralty, it often happens that the Ephors are poor and therefore venal.

(*b*) the high prerogatives of the Ephors degrade and depress the regal authority.

(*c*) the existing method of election to the Ephoralty is puerile.

(*d*) the judicial authority of the Ephors should be exercised, not arbitrarily, as in fact it is, but in accordance with written formulae or laws.

(*e*) the lax and dissolute life of the Ephors is inconsistent with the spirit of the State.

(5) The conditions of the Senate.

As the Senators are irresponsible (ἀνεύθυνοι) and hold office for life, they are apt to be corrupt, and their authority remains when they are past the period of intellectual vigour. Also the method of their election is puerile, and their personal canvass for office highly undesirable.

(6) The hereditary character of the Kingship.

Kings, if they exist at all, should be appointed on the score of virtue; whereas the Lacedaemonian legislator clearly distrusts the virtue of the Kings.

(7) The organization of the common meals (συσσίτια) or Phiditia:

for (*a*) the expense of them is borne by the individual citizens, and not, as it should be, by the State.

(*b*) as citizenship depends upon payment of a tax for the maintenance of the common meals, and the poor are unable to pay it, the institution is practically exclusive, instead of being democratical.

(8) The Admiralty which, being an office held for life, tends to become a second and opposing Kingship.

(9) The end (τέλος) of the whole polity being military strength, the result has been that the Lacedaemonians were successful, so long as they were engaged in war, but, when their empire was established, came to grief.

(10) The spirit of the polity is in this respect defective, that Virtue is not regarded as the supreme Good.

(11) The financial system is bad. For there is no reserve fund in the Exchequer, and, as all the land is in the hands of the Spartiates, who wink at each other's evasion of the law, the extraordinary taxes (εἰσφοραί) are irregularly paid.

In a word, the Lacedaemonian State as a whole is pauperized, but the individual citizens are avaricious.

CHAPTER X.

The Cretan polity.

It is closely parallel to the Lacedaemonian, although generally less elaborated.

(The story is that Lycurgus lived some time in Crete and afterwards adopted the Cretan polity as the model of his own.)

Comparison of the Cretan and Lacedaemonian polities.

There is in both a subject agricultural class, the Perioeci in Crete, the Helots in Lacedaemon;

and in both the institution of common meals, which in Crete were called Andria and in Lacedaemon Phiditia.

Also the ten Cretan Cosmi correspond to the five Ephors,

and the Council (βουλή) in Crete to the Senate (γερουσία) in Lacedaemon.

Kingship existed formerly in Crete, but was abolished; and military command belongs now to the Cosmi.

Lastly, in Crete as at Lacedaemon all the citizens may attend the Public Assembly (ἐκκλησία), but the power of the Cretan Public Assembly is limited to confirming the resolutions of the Senate and Cosmi.

In the Cretan polity Aristotle eulogizes

(1) the system of the common meals, which are maintained at the cost of the State rather than by the contributions of individuals.

(2) the abstemiousness.

(3) the provision against an excessive increase of population.

He censures

(1) the institution of the Cosmi, which is open to the same objection as the Ephoralty, viz. the eligibility of persons who possess no special qualification, without the same compensating advantage in assuring the goodwill of the commons to the polity; for the Cosmi are elected not from the whole body of citizens, but only from certain privileged families.

(2) the Senate, which, as at Lacedaemon, is an irresponsible body, holding office for life and exercising arbitrary power, and which at the same time consists entirely of ex-Cosmi.

(3) the general tendency to lawlessness, especially among the influential citizens.

The Cretans, despite these causes of weakness, have been hitherto preserved from subjection by their isolation.

CHAPTER XI.

The Carthaginian polity.

The Cretan, Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian polities form a distinct group.

Comparison of the Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian polities:

The common meals of the Clubs (*τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν*) answer to the Phiditia;

the office of the Hundred-and-Four (*ἡ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχή*) to the Ephoralty;

the Kings and Senate to the Kings and Senate.

But there are these two points of superiority at Carthage,

(1) that the Hundred-and-Four are not elected from any ordinary people, but on the score of personal merit,

(2) that the Kings do not belong to a single family, and do not succeed to the throne by seniority.

Aristotle passes the following criticisms upon the Carthaginian polity:

(1) It provides that, if the Kings and Senate agree upon a matter, they need not lay it before the Public Assembly; if they disagree, they must refer it to the commons. But the Public Assembly has full power of discussing and deciding all such matters as are laid before it—a greater power than any which exists at Lacedaemon or in Crete. This is an error on the side of Democracy.

There are other errors on the side of Oligarchy, e.g.

(2) The authority of the Pentarchies is excessive; for not only do they enjoy the right of cooption to their own body, but

they elect the highest officers of State, viz. the Hundred, and their tenure of official power both begins before and continues after their actual term of office.

(3) There is practically a disposition in the election of the officers of State to pay regard to wealth as well as to merit.

(4) The highest offices of State, viz. the Kingship and Generalship, are put up to sale.

(5) Several offices are often concentrated in the hands of an individual; the result being that the duties are ill performed.

Despite the oligarchical character of the polity the Carthaginians avoid civil disturbance by a system of emigration. This however is a result that is due to Fortune rather than to the skill of the legislator.

CHAPTER XII.

Notes upon various polities.

(1) Solon is sometimes eulogized as having founded a tempered Democracy in place of an unqualified Oligarchy, by leaving, as he found them, the oligarchical Council of Areopagus and the aristocratical system of election to the offices of State, but establishing the popular Courts of Law (δικαστήρια) in which all the citizens were allowed to sit.

At other times he is censured for having virtually destroyed the non-democratical element in the State by assigning the supreme judicial power to the Courts of Law, which were chosen by lot.

Aristotle's view is that the progress of Democracy at Athens was due not so much to the policy of Solon as to the importance acquired by the commons in the Persian wars and to the unscrupulous conduct of the demagogues. Solon gave the commons no more than the necessary *minimum* of political power (τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην δύναμιν) viz. the right of electing officers of State and holding them responsible (τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν); the lowest or Thetic class in his constitution he deliberately excluded from office.

(2) Philolaus, the Theban legislator, is famous for his laws of adoption (νόμοι θετικοί) which were intended to preserve the original number of the allotments.

(3) Charondas instituted the solemn indictment for perjury (ἐπίσκηψις).

(4) In the laws of Phaleas the peculiar feature is the equalization of properties.

(5) Plato alone devised the community of wives, children and property, the common meals of the women, the law regulating convivial meetings, and the law of military exercises intended to make the citizens equally dexterous in the use of both hands.

(6) The laws of Draco, which were made for a polity already existing, are chiefly characterized by their severity.

(7) It was a law of Pittacus that drunken people, if they committed a breach of order, should be punished more severely than sober.

(8) Androdamas of Rhegium, who was the legislator of the Chalcidians in the Thracian peninsula, was the author of laws relating to homicide and to the treatment of heiresses.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

In an inquiry into the nature of particular polities it is necessary to begin by considering the nature of a State,

and, as a State is a whole composed of a number of citizens, it is necessary to inquire the nature of a citizen.

Putting out of sight then persons who acquire the citizenship in some exceptional way, e.g. honorary citizens, we have to determine what it is that constitutes a citizen.

(1) It is not residence; for slaves and aliens (μέτοικοι) are resident in the State as much as the citizens.

(2) Nor is it participation in legal rights; for this is a qualification possessed by members of different States who associate on the basis of commercial treaties (οἱ ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦντες).

It must be participation in judicial power and public office (τὸ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς) i.e. the right of acting as a member of the Public Assembly and the Courts of Law.

(N.B. The offices of State (ἀρχαί) are either determinate in point of time or perpetual.)

This definition of a citizen is strictly applicable only to Democracies; in polities in which there is no democratical element, or no regular meetings of the Public Assembly, or in which the administration of justice is entrusted to various special boards, it applies, but with a certain limitation.

A State then may be defined as such a number of citizens as is sufficient for independence of life, the word "citizens" being defined as above.

CHAPTER II.

This being the theoretical definition of a citizen,

a citizen is defined for practical purposes as one who is descended from citizens on both sides, although it is sometimes required that his ancestors in the third or a higher degree should have been citizens.

(Parenthetically it is remarked

(1) that in any case the citizenship must in the first instance be dependent upon the qualification stated in Chap. I.

(2) that persons, who obtain political rights in consequence of a revolution, are undoubtedly to be regarded as citizens, even if their title to the citizenship appears to be unjust.)

CHAPTER III.

It is sometimes doubted, especially after a revolution, whether a particular action, performed by the preexisting government, has been the action of the State or only of certain individuals in the State.

We are therefore led to inquire: What is it in which the identity of a State consists?

Not (1) in its enclosure within certain walls. The fact of circumvallation does not in itself constitute a State at all; for a State cannot exceed a reasonable magnitude, and yet it would be possible to enclose a whole country within walls.

Nor (2) in the identity of the race inhabiting it.

The identity of a State depends upon the identity of its polity.

CHAPTER IV.

Question raised: Is the virtue of a good man and of a virtuous citizen identical or different?

In order to answer it, we must ascertain what the virtue of a citizen is.

A citizen is a member of a society. But the members of any society have always a common object; and the object of all the citizens is the safety of their association, i.e. of the polity to which they belong. It follows that the virtue of a citizen is necessarily relative to the polity.

If then the virtue of a citizen is relative to his polity, and there are varieties of polity, the virtue of citizens cannot always be one and the same;

therefore the virtue of a good citizen is not always identical with that of a good man, for the virtue of a good man is a uniform perfect virtue.

Or again, Even if all the members of a State are assumed to be virtuous citizens, yet they have different functions to discharge; hence they cannot all be alike, i.e. they cannot all be good men.

Or to put the same argument in another way,

A State consists of dissimilar members, some superior, others subordinate;

therefore they cannot all possess a uniform virtue.

But if it is now clear that the virtue of a virtuous citizen and of a virtuous man is not absolutely (ἁπλῶς) and in all cases the

same, we have yet to ask whether there are certain cases in which the virtue of both is the same.

Let us consider the matter thus:

The virtuous ruler is admitted to combine goodness and prudence;

but prudence (φρόνησις) is not a necessary attribute of the citizen.

Assuming then that the virtue of a good ruler and a good man is identical, we see that, as the subject no less than the ruler is a citizen, it will only be in certain cases, i. e. when the citizen is a ruler, that the virtue of a good citizen and a good man will be identical.

But it may be objected that the capacity for rule and subjection alike is commonly regarded as laudable.

The solution of the difficulty is as follows:

There are two kinds of rule, viz.

(1) despotic, in which the functions of ruler and subject are absolutely distinct.

(2) political or constitutional, in which the ruler learns to rule by being first a subject.

Thus in a State, of which the citizens are free and equal, a good man will be capable alike of rule and subjection. All virtues except prudence he will be able to exercise, although in different degrees, both as ruler and as subject; prudence alone he will exercise only as ruler. Yet, because the time must come when he will be ruler, he will possess prudence, although it be latent, when he is a subject.

CHAPTER V.

The position of mechanics (*οἱ βάναυσοι*). Are they citizens?

If they are citizens, it follows that, as they are ineligible to office, the ability to hold office cannot be characteristic of all citizens.

If they are not citizens, what is their position?

The truth is that in any State there are classes of people, e.g. slaves and freedmen, who are indispensable to its existence (ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) and yet are not citizens; and the mechanics constitute such a class.

But their position is variable.

In the best State, and indeed in any aristocratical State, the citizenship will not be conferred upon any mechanic, as mechanics are incapable of a life of virtue. In the extreme Democracy mechanics will be citizens. In an Oligarchy a mechanic, who has acquired great wealth, will obtain the citizenship. For the limits of the citizenship are different in different States.

We conclude then that there are some States in which the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen are combined in the same individual, and others in which they are distinct, and that in the former they are not combined in every citizen, but only in one who is capable of exercising, whether individually or conjointly with others, an influence upon the conduct of public affairs.

CHAPTER VI.

A polity may be defined as an order of the State in respect of its offices generally and especially of the supreme office.

The nature of the polity is determined by the governing class (πολίτευμά ἐστιν ἡ πολιτεία).

(1) The object for which a State is framed (τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις).

Man, as has been said, is a political animal; hence independently of personal advantage men are anxious to live together. But life itself, and, still more, the higher life (τὸ ζῆν καλῶς) are also objects of the political association.

(2) The various kinds of rule.

It is possible to rule either for the good of the ruler, as in the government of slaves, or for the good of the subjects, as in the direction of a family.

All such polities as regard the good of the community are normal (ὀρθαί); all such as regard the good of the rulers are corruptions or perversions of the normal polities (ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν).

CHAPTER VII.

Having divided polities into normal polities and their perversions, we have now to consider the number and nature of each.

The supreme power in a State must be vested
either in an individual
or in a Few
or in the Many.

Thus where the rule of the individual or the Few or the Many is directed to the benefit of the community at large, the polities are normal; where it is directed to the private interest of the individual or the Few or the Many, they are perversions.

We arrive then at the following classification:

Species of polity.	Normal form.	Perversion.
Government of an individual	Kingship	Tyranny
Government of the Few	Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Government of the Many	Polity	Democracy

N.B. The meaning of the term Aristocracy is uncertain; it may be either that the rule is in the hands of the best citizens, or that it is exercised for the best interests of the community.

The Polity (in the strict sense of the word) is the government in which the military class is supreme.

CHAPTER VIII.

A difficulty arises however as to the definition of the perversions (παρεκβάσεις).

Suppose that the rich ruling in the interest of the rich form a majority, or the poor ruling in the interest of the poor form a minority, of the civic population, how are the polities to be defined?

The answer is that the number of the ruling class is unimportant.

The polity is an Oligarchy, whenever the rich, few or many, rule in their own interest. It is a Democracy, whenever the poor, many or few, rule in their own interest. That the rich are few, or the poor many, is an accidental circumstance.

CHAPTER IX.

The oligarchical and democratical conceptions of justice.

Oligarchs and Democrats are both representatives of a certain partial justice, but not of justice in the full or proper sense of the word. The oligarchical view, that justice consists in inequality, and the democratical view, that it consists in equality, are only partially true. It is forgotten that justice is a relative term, that it implies a constant ratio between the recipients of certain things and the things themselves.

In the case of political power, there is no dispute about the equality of the thing; it is the equality of the recipients which is disputed.

Thus the Oligarchs contend that superiority in one point, viz. in wealth, constitutes absolute superiority; the Democrats that equality in one point, viz. in personal freedom, constitutes absolute equality.

The solution of the difficulty seems to lie in a consideration of the true object of the State.

A State is not an association formed exclusively for the acquisition of wealth, or for military strength, or for the encouragement of commerce. The object of the State is the promotion of the higher life. Accordingly virtue is a matter of primary importance

to the statesman. It is the promotion of virtue—not locality nor intermarriage nor commerce nor military confederation nor the participation of the citizens in common legal rights—which constitutes a State. A State is an association of families and villages in a complete and independent existence, i.e. in a life of felicity and moral elevation.

Virtue then being the true object of a State, it follows that the degree of political power should be regulated not by personal freedom, rank or wealth, but by virtue.

CHAPTER X.

Question raised; What ought to be the supreme authority in the State? (τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως).

It must be either the masses,
or the rich,
or the respectable classes,
or an individual of preeminent merit,
or a tyrant.

But there are difficulties in each case.

If it is the supremacy of the masses which we regard as just, do we not thereby justify the spoliation of the rich or the minority by the poor or the majority?

If it is the supremacy of the minority or the propertied class, do we not justify the spoliation of the masses?

If the supremacy of the respectable classes, we exclude the rest of the citizens from the honours of State.

If the supremacy of the most virtuous individual, we render the polity still more exclusive.

(N.B. The iniquity of Tyranny is assumed to be self-evident.)

Nor is it any solution of the difficulty to assert that the law, rather than any individual or number of individuals, ought to be supreme; for the law may have an oligarchical or democratical bias.

CHAPTER XI.

We confine ourselves for the present to the question whether it is better that the Few or the Many should be supreme.

We decide (although not without qualification) in favour of the Many. For although individually the Many may be morally inferior to the select Few, yet collectively they will be wiser and more virtuous.

(In asserting this principle, we assume that the Many have attained a certain standard of morality, as it would be absurd to pretend that a number of the lower animals are morally superior to a few men, and there are human beings who are little better than animals.)

But granting that the supreme authority in the State is to rest with the masses, we have yet to inquire the limits of its exercise.

It is dangerous to admit them to the highest offices of the State; yet to exclude them from office is to alienate them from the polity.

We must fall back upon the system described in Chap. I. viz. the participation of the masses not in the highest executive offices but in all deliberative and judicial functions.

It is in this view that Solon, while denying the commons individual tenure of office, empowered them to elect officers of State and to hold them responsible (*ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων.*)

But even here an objection may be raised.

Take the parallel instance of the medical art.

Would not a physician (*ἰατρός*)—it may be said—demand that his treatment of a case should be criticized not by ordinary people but by other physicians?

The answer is that the word "physician" may mean

(1) an ordinary medical practitioner (*ὁ δημιουργός*).

(2) a scientific student of medicine (*ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικός*).

(3) one who has merely learnt the principles of the medical art (ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην),

and that the right of criticism belongs as much to the third class as to the second. To this third class correspond the Many in political affairs.

It may be added

(1) that the Many, although individually inferior, are collectively superior, as judges, to the select Few; as has been already shown.

(2) that there are some arts of which the artist himself is not so good a judge as the person who uses the product of the art, e.g. the art of building; and Politics, it is implied, is such an art.

We repeat that it is not the individual members of the commons, but the collective body of commons, who are invested with supreme authority in political affairs of the highest moment, such as the election of the officers of State and the scrutiny of their official conduct.

It is clear however that the laws, if enacted on right principles, ought to be supreme, and that the officers of State ought not to enjoy supreme authority except where the laws necessarily fail through their generality. What is the character of right laws is a point we have still to consider.

CHAPTER XII.

(In this and the next Chapter Aristotle resumes and continues several topics which have been already treated.)

As in every science and art the end proposed (τὸ τέλος) is some Good, as in the highest science or art, viz. the political, the end is the highest Good, viz. justice or the interest of the community, and as justice is a species of equality, we have now to ascertain what it is that constitutes personal equality or inequality.

It is clear that the question of superiority must always be considered relatively to the end proposed. For instance, it is the best flute-player, not the person of greatest beauty or highest rank, who is entitled to the best flutes. Similarly a claim to poli-

tical power can only be justified by the possession of some quality which enters into the constitution of a State.

Accordingly we recognize the claims of birth, freedom and wealth, as these are elements indispensable to a State's existence;

but we recognize also the claims of justice and military virtue, as being essential to its good administration.

CHAPTER XIII.

If then we take a good life as the end or object of a State's existence, it seems that virtue has the strongest claim to political power.

But it will be worth while to consider the case a little more closely.

The title of the rich to political power is that they have a larger interest in the soil, and a higher commercial character.

That of the free population consists in their mere citizenship.

That of the nobles is that they are citizens in a higher sense, and that rank is a certain guarantee of virtue.

That of the virtuous rests upon the primary importance of virtue to a State.

That of the numerical majority consists in their collective superiority of strength and virtue to the select minority.

The question arises then: If all these different classes exist simultaneously in a State, who shall be supreme?

Whichever view we take, a difficulty meets us.

The claim of the wealthy or the noble or the virtuous would logically justify the claim of an individual to absolute power, if he were richer or nobler or more virtuous than all the rest of the citizens.

The claim of the masses to power on the score of superior strength would justify Tyranny or Oligarchy, if the individual or the Few were stronger than all the rest of the citizens.

And lastly, the claim of the Few to power on the score of virtue or wealth may be met by the masses with the reply that they are collectively more virtuous or wealthier than the Few.

Aristotle lays down the rule that the legislator ought to regard the interest of the State as a whole, i.e. the common interest of all the citizens. But legislation implies equality (within certain limits) among the persons affected by it.

It is in order to remove an individual, vastly superior to the rest of the citizens in wealth or power, that the institution of Ostracism exists in democratical States. It must not be supposed that the conduct of a tyrant, in putting the most conspicuous citizens out of the way, is wholly exceptional. He is but following the practice of Democracies in ostracizing individuals who are dangerous to the polity, of imperial States, e.g. the Athenians, in crushing their rivals, nay of any artist in avoiding whatever seems to be exaggerated or disproportionate. This principle is not less true of the normal than of the perverted polities, except that in the former case it is the good of the community, and in the latter the good of an individual or individuals, which is the motive of action.

Still it must be admitted

(1) that Ostracism is at the best a remedial measure, and that it would be better, if possible, so to order the polity as to leave no occasion for such a remedy.

(2) that Ostracism has in fact been often employed not remedially and for the good of the State, but to effect the objects of a political party.

One difficult case however still remains. What is to be done with an individual who is preeminent not in power nor in wealth nor in the number of his *clientèle*, but in virtue?

Aristotle's answer is that it is impossible to legislate for a person or persons of incomparable virtue or political capacity, that they are above law and are in fact a law in themselves, that they are like deities on earth, and that nothing remains but to invest them with absolute and irresponsible authority.

CHAPTER XIV.

It is now time to consider the normal polities, and first Kingship (*βασιλεία*).

The various forms of Kingship:

(1) The Lacedaemonian—an absolute and perpetual generalship, with the superintendence of religious observances.

It is only when commanding an army in the field that the Lacedaemonian King has the power of life and death.

N.B. This species of Kingship may be either hereditary or elective.

(2) The non-Greek (ἡ βαρβαρική)—a sort of hereditary, constitutional Tyranny.

While the slavish character of the subjects renders this species of Kingship an approximation to Tyranny, it is distinguished from Tyranny by their voluntary obedience, by its constitutional limitation and by its hereditary transmission. Also the non-Greek King has a bodyguard of citizens, and not, like the tyrant, of mercenaries.

(3) The Æsymneteia—which may be described as an elective Tyranny.

It differs from Tyranny

(1) in its elective character (2) in its constitutional limitation (3) in the voluntary obedience of the subjects;

and from the non-Greek form of Kingship in being elective.

N.B. Æsymnetes were elected sometimes for life, and sometimes for definite periods of time or until the performance of definite actions.

(4) The heroic—i.e. the hereditary and constitutional kingly authority exercised over willing subjects in the heroic times.

It seems that the heroic kings acquired their power originally as the reward of services rendered to their peoples and afterwards transmitted it to their sons by inheritance. They were at once generals, high priests and judges, whether they pronounced judgment under oath or not.

N.B. At first the authority of the heroic Kings was universal in affairs of State; but it was gradually encroached upon until

the Kings became mere hierophants, as at Athens, or mere generals, as at Lacedaemon.

(5) Absolute Kingship (ἡ παμβασιλεία—the counterpart of Domestic Economy.

CHAPTER XV.

The five species of Kingship which we have enumerated may be reduced practically to two, viz. Absolute Kingship and the Lacedaemonian, as the other species lie between these.

We have therefore to inquire:

(1) whether a perpetual generalship is advantageous to States

(2) whether the absolute and universal power of an individual is advantageous.

As to (1), the institution of a perpetual generalship does not constitute a separate form of polity, but may exist in any polity.

But (2) the Absolute Kingship, being a distinct polity, deserves investigation.

Preliminary question: Is it better to be subject to the best man or to the best laws?

It is argued on the one hand that laws are necessarily general in their terms and cannot meet particular cases,

and on the other hand,

(1) that officers of State must proceed according to some general principle, i.e. according to law.

(2) that it is desirable to avoid the emotional element in human nature.

Aristotle's conclusion is in favour of having a code of laws, but of allowing the officers of State to act independently, wherever the laws fail to deal adequately with a case.

Further question: In cases which it is impossible for the laws to decide rightly, ought the authority to reside in an individual of supreme merit or in the whole body of citizens?

The Many are collectively wiser, less liable to passion than the Few, as has been shewn Chap. xi.

The rule of several virtuous persons is preferable to that of a virtuous individual, i.e. Aristocracy is preferable to Kingship.

But it is not easy to find a number of persons equally virtuous.

Chronological succession of Governments:

The reason why Monarchy was the usual form of Government in early times is that States were then small, persons of eminent virtue were rare, and accordingly kingly power could be conferred upon the few signal benefactors of the State.

Next, the spread of virtue among a larger class led to the establishment of a *commune* (*κοινόν τι*) or constitutional government (*πολιτεία*).

Thirdly, the creation of Oligarchies was the result of an increasing degeneracy and avarice among the citizens.

Fourthly, the Oligarchy was gradually contracted by the avarice of the Oligarchs to a Tyranny.

Finally, as the power of the commons was increased by the contraction of the Oligarchy, they rose in revolt and founded a Democracy.

Democracy appears to be the only form of government compatible with the large dimensions of modern States.

But to revert to Kingship:

Even if Kingship is the best form of government, there is a danger in making it hereditary.

The military force placed at the disposal of the King ought to be so large that he can enforce obedience to the law, yet not so large that he can coerce the mass of the people.

CHAPTER XVI.

Absolute or universal Kingship.

(1) It is unnatural in a State composed of persons who are equal and similar. In such a State the alternation of rule and subjection is just, and such alternation implies law. Law should be supreme; the officers of State should be its guardians and ministers.

(If it is urged that there are many cases which can be better decided by an individual than by law, the answer is that it is the express function of law so to educate the officers of State that they may be competent themselves to decide matters beyond the province of law.)

(2) Further, Law is intelligence without passion, whereas there is a bestial element, an element of passion, in the most virtuous of men.

(The illustration drawn from the medical art in favour of personal rule is fallacious, as physicians in the exercise of their art are not liable to the corrupting influence of passion.)

Observe also that there are laws of custom (*οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη νόμοι*) still more important and authoritative than those embodied in written formulae.

(3) The absolute King will find it necessary in the discharge of his duties to invite the assistance of subordinate officers; it would be as well therefore to appoint several officers, instead of one, in the first instance.

(4) Assuming equality of virtue, we may assert that two good men are better than one.

(5) Experience shows that monarchs generally associate their friends with themselves in power. But a man's friend is his equal and peer. Monarchs themselves then tacitly admit the equal right of their peers to kingly rule.

CHAPTER XVII.

We conclude therefore that the existence of an Absolute Kingship can never be justified in a society, of which all the members are equal and similar, nor indeed in any case except where the virtue of a particular family or of an individual exceeds that of all the other citizens of the State.

The character of the people suited to different polities:

To Kingship—a people naturally qualified to submit to a family of eminent virtue.

To Aristocracy—a people capable of yielding a loyal and liberal obedience to their superiors in virtue.

To a Polity—a people capable alike of rule and subjection.

We have now fully considered the different species of Kingship.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The virtue of a good man and of a citizen of the best State being, as we have already seen, identical, it is evident that the education, which produces a good man, will serve also to constitute a State governed by an Aristocracy or a King.

We proceed now to the origin and constitution of the best polity.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Any adequate inquiry into the nature of the best polity presupposes a determination of the most desirable life.

There are therefore two questions:

(1) what is the nature of the most desirable life (*τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βιός*).

(2) whether this life is the same for the commonwealth as for the individual or different (*πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος*).

We consider then

(1) the best or most desirable life.

Goods being divisible into three classes, viz. external Goods, Goods of the body and Goods of the soul, the man who is happy (*μακάριος*) must possess all three;

but it is Goods of the soul which are supremely important,

for (*a*) experience shows that persons of high moral and intel-

lectual culture, even if not possessed of large external Goods, are happier than persons who have abundant external Goods but not much intelligence or virtue.

(*b*) all external Goods have a limit, i.e. are only so far valuable as they subserve a particular purpose, whereas, the more wisdom or virtue a person has, the better.

(*c*) as the soul is a thing more honourable than property or the body, it follows that the best condition of the soul is superior to the best condition of property or of the body.

(*d*) perfect happiness is found in God alone; and in Him it is due not to external Goods, but to His own intrinsic qualities.

The best life then is one which possesses virtue furnished with external advantages to such a degree as to be capable of actions according to virtue (*ὁ μετὰ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεων*).

CHAPTER II.

(2) The identity of the happiness of a State and of an individual.

Aristotle appeals to the popular judgment.

Whatever definition of happiness we accept, whether we regard it as consisting in wealth, power or virtue, it is universally admitted that the same is true of the State as of the individual.

But there are two points which require consideration:

(A) whether the practical and political, or the contemplative and isolated life is preferable for individuals.

(B) what is the best kind of political organization.

As to (A),

it is sometimes held that the power of ruling others, which is assumed to be the end of political life, if it is despotic, is absolutely unjust, and, if it is constitutional, is still opposed to the felicity of the ruler; on the other hand it is sometimes maintained that, as public life affords a larger opportunity of virtuous action, it is the only life which is truly worthy of a man.

A similar discrepancy of views is found in regard to States.

There are countries in which the sole object of the law is foreign conquest. Yet it cannot be the duty of a statesman (we may urge) to acquire external dominion for his State without regard to the feelings or capacities of the subjects. Indiscriminate compulsion is out of place as much in Politics as in Medicine or Navigation. It is only natural slaves who deserve to be ruled at any cost. And if we suppose the case of a State enjoying a good polity but situated in an isolated position, we see at once that a State is capable of happiness apart from military discipline or foreign conquest.

The legislator's true function is to promote goodness and happiness; military preparations are not the end, but means to the end.

CHAPTER III.

Aristotle reverts to the comparison of the political and the philosophical lives. The advocates of both are partly right and partly wrong.

If it be urged that political authority, being despotic, is necessarily ignoble, the answer is that despotic rule is not the only type of rule. Also it is clearly a mistake to prefer a life of inactivity as (*a*) happiness consists in action (*ἡ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν*).

(*b*) there is much nobility in the actions of the just and temperate.

But it will be said perhaps that, if happiness consists in action, as supreme power offers an opportunity of performing the largest possible number of noble actions, it is right to seize and retain power at any cost.

We reply that one who acquires power by gross injustice precludes himself from virtuous action, unless indeed his natural superiority to his subjects is as great as that of a parent to his children or of a slavemaster to his slave.

Aristotle's conclusion is that, happiness being defined as well-doing (*εἰ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον*), the practical life is best for States and for individuals. But the practical life need not

imply relations to others (τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους). Intellectual and speculative processes are practical in the highest sense of the word, even if they have no ulterior object, and in the field of actions having an external effect the architect is not less practical than the builder. Similarly States are not condemned to inactivity by isolation. Internal activity, the mutual action and re-action of the different parts, is possible to a State, as to an individual; for God is perfect and the Universe is perfect, although their actions are all internal and self-contained.

CHAPTER IV.

Coming now (B) to the question of the best polity, we must state at the outset the nature of the assumptions to be made in reference to the ideal State.

Our rule is that the State shall be ideally (κατ' εὐχήν) constructed, but that none of the assumptions shall exceed the bounds of possibility.

(1) The size of the State.

The greatness of a State consists not so much in the number of its population as in its power. Good law (εὐνομία) is practically impossible in an over-populous State.

A State then should be large enough to be independent (αὐτάρκης), yet so small that one general can command its forces, one crier be heard by all the citizens, and the citizens themselves have personal knowledge of each other. In a word the number of citizens should be the largest possible in order to insure independence of life, but not so large that it cannot be comprehended in a single view.

CHAPTER V.

(2) The nature of the country.

It should be as independent as possible; and, in order to be so, should be

(*a*) productive of all kinds of fruits (παντοφόρος).

(*b*) large enough to enable the citizens to live in the enjoyment of leisure with equal liberality and temperance.

(*c*) inaccessible to enemies, but easy of egress to the citizens themselves.

(*d*) easily comprehended in a single view (εὐσύνοπτος), i.e. such that military succour can be brought to any point at a short notice (εὐβοήθητος).

(3) The situation of the city.

It should command both sea and land for military and commercial purposes.

CHAPTER VI.

A parenthetical chapter upon the question whether communication with the sea is advantageous or injurious to a State.

Against such communication may be urged the evil arising not only from the necessary increase of population but from the presence of a large alien element.

In favour of it are the evident military and commercial advantages, although Aristotle strictly limits the commerce of his State to the satisfaction of its own requirements (αὑτῇ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν).

The solution of the difficulty is that the city and harbour should be situated so far apart as to prevent injurious intercourse between the inhabitants.

While an imperial State demands a naval force, as a means of inspiring awe in neighbouring peoples, the dangerous increase of the civic population will be prevented, if the marines are free citizens taken from the army, and the sailors belong to the subject agricultural class.

CHAPTER VII.

(4) The character of the citizens.

The Greeks, occupying a territorial position intermediate between the northern peoples of Europe and the Asiatics, have also an intermediate character, as they combine the spirit of the former with the intellectuality of the latter, and such a character is the best.

(A criticism of the Socratic theory that the Guardians in the *Republic* should be affectionate towards their friends and savage towards strangers :

It is wrong to behave savagely to anyone except enemies.)

CHAPTER VIII.

(5) The parts of a State.

Things which are indispensable to the existence of a whole (ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη) are not all in the strict sense its parts (μέρη).

Property e.g. is indispensable to a State, but it is not a part of a State.

In order to ascertain then the parts of a State, it is desirable to begin by considering the number of things indispensable to its existence, as the former will be included in the latter.

The indispensable requisites of a State are

(*a*)	food	which	implies	husbandmen
(*b*)	arts	"	"	artisans,
(*c*)	arms	"	"	soldiers,
(*d*)	wealth	"	"	capitalists,
(*e*)	ritual	"	"	a priesthood,
(*f*)	legal and deliberative procedure	"	"	judges and politicians.

CHAPTER IX.

Such being the different functions (ἔργα) of the State, are they all to be open to all the citizens, as in a Democracy, or is each to be reserved to a special class, or are some of them to be reserved and others open?

The answer is that, as the best polity is the polity best adapted to the attainment of happiness, and happiness is impossible without virtue, in the best polity then no citizen will be a mechanic or tradesman, for their lives are ignoble and incompatible with virtue, nor again a husbandman, for the agricultural life is incapable of the leisure necessary to virtue.

There remain the military, political and judicial functions.

Of these the first will naturally be assigned to the younger citizens, the others to the citizens of maturer years.

(N.B. It is to these three classes, viz. the soldiers, the politicians and the judges, that all the landed property in the State will belong, as these comprise the whole civic population, and the wealth of the State ought to be in the hands of the citizens.)

The priesthood will consist of citizens who are too old for military, deliberative or judicial duties.

Having now enumerated the classes which compose a State, we see that although husbandmen, artisans and hired labourers generally are indispensable to its existence, yet the only parts of a State are the soldiery, the deliberative class and (although Aristotle does not say so) the judicial class.

Between the indispensable elements of a State and its parts the separation is perpetual; between the military and the deliberative (or judicial) class it is only temporary.

CHAPTER X.

Certain desultory remarks upon political questions.

Caste is a system which seems to have originated in Egypt; it is of high antiquity, and there is much to be said for it, especially for the distinction of the military from the agricultural class.

The institution of common meals is popularly ascribed to the Œnotrian king Italus; Aristotle himself regards it as beneficial. But then the expense of the common meals, as well as of divine worship, should fall not upon individuals but upon the State.

Let the land then be divided into two parts (*a*) public, (*b*) private property. And further let the public land be devoted half to the service of the Gods, and half to the cost of the common meals; and of the land which is private property let each citizen's share lie half upon the frontier, and half close to the city, so that there may be unanimity of judgment upon questions of peace and war.

The cultivators of the soil should be slaves, although not all of one stock or of spirited temper, or, if not slaves, members of a slavish non-Greek people.

CHAPTER XI.

To revert to the best State:

(6) The site of the city considered relatively to internal purposes.

There are four points to which it is necessary to have regard:

(*a*) healthiness, which is mainly dependent upon a favourable aspect—an Eastward aspect being the best—and upon a good supply of water.

(*b*) convenience for military and political purposes.

(It is remarked parenthetically that a citadel is suited to an Oligarchy or Monarchy, level ground to a Democracy, and a number of different strongholds to an Aristocracy.)

(*c*) the architectural plan of the city, which should be so far regular (*εὔτομος*) as to have a pleasing effect, and yet to some extent irregular, so as to puzzle an invading force.

(*d*) its walls, which are indispensable as a defence against military attacks.

CHAPTER XII.

Detail arrangements of the city.

(*a*) Some of the common meals (*συσσίτια*) may conveniently be held in the guard-houses (*φυλακτήρια*) which are placed at intervals along the walls.

(*b*) The buildings appropriated to the worship of the Gods and to the common meals of the priests and the supreme boards of magistrates should be placed close together.

(*c*) There should be a free market (*ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά*) distinct from the market of commerce.

Detail arrangements of the country.

It is well to adopt the same principle of distribution as in the city in regard to the guard-houses and common meals of the commissioners of woods and forests (ὑλωροί) and to the sanctuaries of Gods and heroes.

CHAPTER XIII.

In order to determine the character of the citizens who are proper to compose the best State, it is necessary to begin with a definition of happiness.

Success of any kind (τὸ εὖ) depends upon choosing the right goal and employing the right means to attain it.

All men are evidently desirous of happiness (εὐδαιμονία).

What is then the nature of happiness?

It has been defined in the *Ethics* to be "a complete activity and practice of virtue, and this not conditionally but in an absolute sense" (ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, καὶ αὕτη οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς) i.e. the unimpeded practice of such conduct as is virtuous *per se* and not merely necessary owing to certain existing conditions.

Of the elements of happiness some must be preexistent, others must be provided by the legislator. External Goods e.g. which are conditions, although not causes, of happiness are the gifts of Fortune alone. It is the right use of them which constitutes a State virtuous (σπουδαία). But a State cannot be virtuous, unless the citizens composing it are virtuous. We are thus brought face to face with the question, How is virtue produced in an individual? Answer—The means are threefold, nature (φύσις), habit (ἔθος), reason (λόγος).

Nature is necessary; the person must be a human being and must possess certain qualities of body and soul.

Habit is the means by which the ambiguous tendencies of nature are directed to a higher or a lower end.

Reason is the distinctive characteristic of man.

Natural qualities and gifts are beyond our power; we can only pray for them. Habit and reason are formed by education (παιδεία).

CHAPTER XIV.

Education.

The first point to be decided is whether the same persons shall always be rulers, and the same persons always subjects, or the rulers of one time shall be the subjects of another and *vice versa;* for upon this the character of their education will depend.

In default of an absolute and unmistakeable natural preeminence, separating the ruling from the subject class, an alternation of rule and subjection is clearly just. At the same time it is proper that the rulers should be superior to their subjects. Let the same persons then be rulers and subjects, but subjects in their youth and rulers in their later years; so will both conditions be fulfilled.

Hence their education too will be in one sense the same and in another sense will be different. But subjection, unless it is servile, is not incompatible with liberal culture; and as the subject of to-day is destined to be the ruler of to-morrow, it will always be the object of the legislator in his educational system to study the attainment of goodness or a noble life.

The soul (ψυχή) is divided into two parts,

(1) the part which contains reason in itself (τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὑτό).

(2) the part which, although not containing reason in itself, is yet capable of obeying it. (τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον).

Again, reason is (*a*) speculative (θεωρητικός).

(*b*) practical (πρακτικός).

According to the universal law by which the lower in Nature or Art always exists for the sake of the higher, it follows that the actions of the rational part of the soul are more estimable than those of the irrational part, and that the actions of the speculative are more estimable than those of the practical reason. Akin to this is the subordination of business to leisure, of war to peace, and of such actions as at best are only indispensable to such as are intrinsically virtuous.

This law of subordination is ignored in many polities, notably in the Lacedaemonian, in which foreign conquest has been regarded as the paramount end of legislation. It is a mistake to consider despotic rule the object of a State. The principles of morality are the same for States as for individuals, and it is these which the legislator should implant in the minds of the citizens.

War is justifiable in three cases only,

(1) if it is defensive.

(2) if the power so acquired is for the good of the subject population.

(3) if the subjects are natural slaves and deserve to be ruled.

History shows that States which have aimed exclusively at military success have collapsed as soon as they had attained their primary object.

CHAPTER XV.

The citizens then must possess all the virtues; not only those e.g. valour and endurance, which are necessary to business or war, but also those which are necessary to leisure, such as intellectual culture (φιλοσοφία), and those which are necessary to both, but especially to leisure, such as temperance and justice.

But how shall they attain these virtues? Shall their education begin with the reason or with the habits! (*πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν*).

Any process of production starts from a beginning and tends to an end. In education, the beginning is nature, the process of production is the training of habits, the end is reason. The training of the habits therefore must precede reason. Similarly, the care of the body must precede that of the soul, and in the soul itself the care of the irrational part must precede that of the rational. Nor must we ever forget the proper subordination of body to soul, and of the irrational part of soul to the rational.

CHAPTER XVI.

The importance of a good physical condition to the citizens necessitates a discussion of marriage.

We have to consider

(1) the proper seasons for marrying,

(2) the proper persons to marry.

It is desirable so to order the ages of the husband and wife that the failure of their generative powers may occur simultaneously, and that the children may be strong and healthy and may be ready in due time to succeed to their parents' places.

Aristotle is strongly opposed to very youthful marriages.

He would have a man marry about 37 and beget children until 50, and a woman marry about 18.

The winter is the best time of year for the matrimonial union.

The best physical condition for men and women alike is one that is neither athletic nor valetudinarian, but intermediate.

The women are to take great care of their health during pregnancy.

It should be forbidden to rear a crippled child; but the exposure of children simply on the ground of their number will be unnecessary in a State in which the number of children a man may beget is limited by law.

Adultery is to be severely punished.

CHAPTER XVII.

The education of the young.

(1) Infancy.

Diet is important in the early days of life; Aristotle recommends plenty of milk and as little wine as possible.

The children should be allowed free movement, and should be gradually inured to cold.

(2) From infancy to the age of five.

No compulsory study or violent exercise, but enough movement in games to prevent a sluggish habit of body. The overseers of youth (παιδονόμοι) are to take care that the children do not hear any improper tales and legends and to keep them from associating much with slaves.

All foul language to be prohibited. No indecent pictures to be exhibited. No one who is not of full age to be present at the performance of satirical plays or comedies.

(3) From five years to seven.

These years are to be spent by the young in observation of the lessons which they will be required in future to learn themselves (*θεωροὶ τῶν μαθήσεων ἃς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς*).

The education of the first seven years has now been described.

Education in the strict sense of the word, which does not begin until after seven years, may be divided into two periods:

(1) from seven years to puberty,

(2) from puberty to twenty-one.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

Three questions proposed:

(1) whether it is desirable to have a definite educational system.

(2) whether education should be regulated by the State or committed to the care of private individuals.

(3) if there is to be a system of education, what should be its nature.

(1) That the education of the young is a matter which has a paramount claim upon the attention of the legislator is undeniable

For (*a*) as there is a certain character (ἦθος) proper to each polity, the nature of the polity will determine the educational system.

(*b*) virtue, like any art or faculty, can only be acquired by education.

(2) Education must be regulated by the State.

For as the end (τέλος) of the State as a whole is one, the education of all the citizens must be one and the same, and must therefore be an affair of the State.

Every citizen should remember that he is not his own master (αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ) but a part of the State.

CHAPTER II.

(3) The educational system.

At present much uncertainty attaches to the subjects of education.

Are they to be

such studies as are merely useful as means of livelihood (τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βιόν),

or, such as tend to the promotion of virtue (τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν),

or, the higher studies (τὰ περιττά)?

Nor is "virtue" itself an unambiguous term.

According to Aristotle,

(*a*) it is right to teach those useful subjects which are indispensable (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν χρησίμων), but not such as have a degrading effect upon the learner by reducing him to the level of a mechanic (βάναυσος).

(A mechanical occupation (βάναυσον ἔργον) is defined as one which renders the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for the practice of virtue.)

(*b*) there are some sciences which are liberal in themselves but illiberal in their effect upon the mind, if studied with excessive assiduity.

It is not so much the study itself as the object with which it is undertaken which constitutes it liberal or the reverse.

CHAPTER III.

The ordinary branches of education are four, viz.

(1) Reading and Writing (γράμματα).

(2) Gymnastic (γυμναστική).

(3) Music (μουσική).

(4) The Art of Design (γραφική).

Of these

(1) Reading and Writing and (4) Design are taught for their practical utility.

(2) Gymnastic as promoting valour.

(3) Music—for a purpose which has not been clearly defined.

What is then the purpose of Music as an educational instrument?

It is generally taught in our own day for no other reason than the pleasure it affords; but it had originally a higher function.

For that men should spend their leisure (σχολή) nobly is in Nature's intention even more important than that they should do their business rightly.

We have to consider then the right employment of leisure.

It should not be spent in amusement; for amusement, far from being the end (τέλος) of human life, is only a resource by which a busy man is enabled to do a greater amount of business.

Amusement is a temporary relaxation of the soul; leisure on the other hand implies happiness (εὐδαιμονία), which is an end or final state.

The conclusion is that there are certain subjects in which education is necessary with a view to leisure, and that these subjects are the highest parts of education.

Thus the true use of Music is that it promotes the rational enjoyment of leisure (ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή). It is an element of the education which should be given not as being indispensable or practically useful but as liberal and noble. Nobility is a better end educationally than mere utility.

(Aristotle remarks that some subjects besides their practical utility possess a higher value, e.g. the Art of design, which not only protects men against imposture in their private purchases but renders them scientific observers of physical beauty.)

The order of natural development suggests that the education of the body should precede that of the intellect, or in other words, that education should begin with Gymnastic.

CHAPTER IV.

Gymnastic (γυμναστική).

The practice of Gymnastic has frequently been carried too far, resulting either in an athletic habit of body to the detriment of natural growth and grace, or, as at Lacedaemon, in a brutality which is supposed to imply and represent valour.

Valour however is neither the sole nor the chief end of education; nor, if it were, would it be produced by severe Gymnastic. Ferocity oftener denotes lack of true courage. The explanation of the Lacedaemonian victories in old days is not that their gymnastic exercises were so severe, but that they were the only people who employed Gymnastic at all; since they have had rivals who have adopted the same discipline, their supremacy has disappeared.

Not brutality, but nobleness should hold the first place in our educational system.

Aristotle's own plan is as follows:

Up to puberty light exercises; no hard diet, lest the growth be injured. For three years after puberty other pursuits; afterwards hard diet and severe exercise.

The principle is that body and mind should not be subjected to severe exertion simultaneously.

CHAPTER V.

Music.

The discussion which was begun in Chap. III. resumed and concluded.

What is the object with which music ought to be studied?

Various answers are given:

(1) For amusement and relaxation (παιδιὰ καὶ ἀνάπαυσις).

(2) For its moral effect (ὡς δυναμένη τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν).

(3) As a means of rational enjoyment (διαγωγή).

Aristotle's decision is that Music is capable of all these different effects,

(1) of amusement, as being pleasant and producing relaxation,

(3) of rational enjoyment, because happiness (εὐδαιμονία) can only be attained in rational enjoyment, and happiness implies an element of pleasure as well as of nobleness.

(It is remarked that for two reasons the world often regards its amusements as the end (τέλος) or *summum bonum* of life,

(*a*) because there is a certain pleasure in the end itself as well as in amusement.

(*b*) because the end has this in common with amusement, that it is not sought as a means to any future object; for the end is *ex hypothesi* complete in itself, and the reason of amusement lies not in the future but in the past, i.e. amusement is the relief of previous toil.)

But (2) Music has also a moral power.

Of this the proofs are

(*a*) that Music is able to produce certain moods, e.g. enthusiasm, in our souls,

(*b*) that Music supplies us with representations of states of mind, such as anger, courage, gentleness &c., and a feeling of sympathy with these representations ensures a sympathy with the actual states so represented.

(N.B. This power of moral imitation or representation is almost peculiar to the sense of hearing; it is not found in the objects of touch and taste, and only to a small extent in the objects of sight.)

Different moods are produced by different harmonies,

e.g. melancholy by the mixed Lydian (ἡ μιξολυδιστί),

sedateness ,, ,, Dorian (ἡ δωριστί),

enthusiasm ,, ,, Phrygian (ἡ φρυγιστί).

There is in fact an apparent relationship between the soul on the one hand and harmonies and rhythms on the other.

Music then, having a moral effect, is a subject of instruction appropriate to the young, as they like everything to be sweetened, and there is a natural sweetness in Music.

CHAPTER VI.

The question is started: As it has been shewn that the young ought to receive instruction in Music, are they to be performers themselves or merely to listen to the performances of professionals?

It may be urged

(*a*) that it is pretty well impossible to become good critics without such practical experience.

(*b*) that the practice of Music is one way of keeping children occupied.

Yet it is always necessary to remember that the sole object of the musical performances is to enable the young to form a correct musical judgment.

They should perform therefore, but should perform only in youth. Also great care should be taken in the choice of the melodies and rhythms which they practise, and of their musical instruments. Performances of an extraordinary and exceptional kind, suitable only to professional musicians, are to be forbidden. The flute, harp and cithern are undesirable instruments, as de-

manding professional skill; the flute too, as strongly exciting (ὀργιαστικόν).

In a word all professional education, whether in regard to the instruments or to the execution, is to be rejected.

CHAPTER VII.

Melodies (μέλη) have been appropriately classified as ethical, practical or enthusiastic, according as they affect the character, incite to action, or produce enthusiasm.

Music (says Aristotle) should be used for three distinct purposes, viz. (1) as a means of education (παιδείας ἕνεκεν), (2) for the purging of the emotions (πρὸς κάθαρσιν), and (3) for the relaxation of the tense condition of the soul (πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν).

Also different harmonies are suited to these different purposes, e.g. ethical harmonies to the first, practical and enthusiastic harmonies to the second and third.

(The purging of the emotions (κάθαρσις) is explained as follows:

A person—let us say—is liable to the emotion of enthusiasm. He listens to melodies which rouse the soul to ecstasy. The after-result is that he relapses into his proper normal condition; he has, so to speak, obtained a medical or purgative treatment (ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχὼν καὶ καθάρσεως). The same is true of all emotional persons).

Socrates is wrong in admitting the Phrygian harmony into his *Republic*, as it is exciting and emotional in its effects.

The Dorian harmony, being especially staid and valorous, is suited to the education of the young.

The Lydian harmony combines propriety with culture, and may therefore be regarded as fit for the age of childhood.

N.B. Possibility and propriety are the two objects which must be always kept in view in education.

In regard to Music the three canons are that it should be of an intermediate character, within the capacity of the learner, and appropriate to his age.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

The scientific politician ought to know

(1) the absolutely best polity (ἡ ἁπλῶς ἀρίστη).

(2) the best polity under the actual conditions (ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη).

(3) the best polity under certain supposed conditions (ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀρίστη).

(4) the polity which is most appropriate to the mass of States (ἡ μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁρμόττουσα), or which is comparatively easy of attainment and has a closer affinity to the polities of all existing States (ἡ ῥᾴων καὶ κοινοτέρα ἁπάσαις).

In order to reform existing polities as well as to call new polities into being, he must be familiar with all the different kinds of polity and with all the specific varieties of each kind. It is this knowledge alone which will be his guide in the enactment of laws; for law is always relative to the polity in which it exists.

N.B. A polity is defined as the general system of any State in regard to the distribution of the executive offices, the supreme political authority and the end which the citizens propose to themselves; laws, on the other hand, are only the conditions by which the tenure of office is regulated.

CHAPTER II.

Upon the arrangement of the work.

Polities having been divided (Book iii. Chap. 7) into three normal, viz. Kingship, Aristocracy and Polity in the narrow sense, and three perversions (παρεκβάσεις), viz. Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy,

Kingship and Aristocracy have been virtually discussed in the delineation of the best polity;

There remain then Polity, Oligarchy, Democracy, Tyranny.

Of the perverted forms of polity, Tyranny is the worst, Democracy the least bad.

(Plato's theory in the *Politicus* that there is a good and a bad form of every polity differs from ours, as we hold that the perversions are always vitiated.)

CHAPTER III.

The reason of the existence of a number of polities is that a State necessarily consists of numerous parts; there are differences of race, character, wealth, &c., and the nature of the polity is determined by the distribution of the offices of state among these parts.

Practically however the different polities may be reduced to two, viz. Democracy, which includes Polity, and Oligarchy, which includes Aristocracy.

Aristotle himself prefers to speak of a single noble or ideal polity, regarding all the rest as the perversions of it.

CHAPTER IV.

Democracy is commonly defined as a polity in which the masses are supreme, Oligarchy as a polity in which the Few are supreme. But these definitions are inadequate. For it may happen that the rich, who are predominant in the State, are a majority, or that the poor, who are predominant, are a minority of the whole population.

The amended definition of Democracy is that it is a polity in which the poor are supreme, being a majority; that of Oligarchy, that it is a polity in which the rich are supreme, being a minority.

In order to determine the varieties of polity, it is necessary to ascertain all the constituent parts of a State, for the number of

combinations of these parts will give the possible varieties of State.

The parts are:

(1) husbandmen.

(2) mechanics.

(3) men of business (ἀγοραῖοι).

(4) hired labourers (τὸ θητικόν).

(5) the military class.

(6) the propertied class, upon which the public burdens fall (τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν).

(7) the executive magistrates, who hold the different offices of State (τὸ δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν).

(8) the deliberative body.

(9) the judicial body.

(To the statement of Socrates in the *Republic* that the four indispensable elements of a State are a weaver, a husbandman, a cobbler and a builder, it is objected that no State can exist without soldiers, or senators, or judges).

Although there are these distinct parts of a State, yet the one ineffaceable distinction is that between the rich and the poor. Hence the habit of regarding the rich and the poor as in a preeminent sense parts of a State, and the theory that there are two polities only, viz. Oligarchy and Democracy.

Classification of Democracies.

(The commons (δῆμος) may consist of husbandmen or artisans, or merchants and so on; and the differences of the commons will produce corresponding differences in the polity.)

Democracy in the abstract is the polity which is preeminently based upon equality.

There are four species of Democracy:

(1) in which eligibility to the offices of State is dependent upon a property qualification, but the qualification is a low one,

and any one who acquires the amount of property becomes eligible.

(2) in which eligibility to office is the privilege of every citizen to whom no objection can be made on the score of birth.

(3) in which everybody who is actually in the enjoyment of civic rights (whether entitled to them by birth or not) is eligible to office.

In all these polities the law is supreme.

(4) in which the condition of eligibility to office is the same as in (3), but the people rather than the law is supreme. This is the extreme or ultimate Democracy, created by the influence of demagogues; it is not strictly a constitutional government at all.

CHAPTER V.

Classification of Oligarchies.

There are four species:

(1) in which a property qualification is necessary for eligibility to office, but it is only just so high as to exclude a majority of the population, and everybody who acquires the amount of property becomes eligible.

(2) in which a high property qualification is necessary for eligibility to office and the officers themselves supply the vacancies on their board whether (*a*) from the whole body of qualified citizens, or (*b*) from particular classes.

(3) in which political power is in the hands of a hereditary nobility.

(4) in which the power of the nobles is hereditary as in (3), and is also superior to the laws. This is the form of Oligarchy called a Dynasty (δυναστεία).

It is to be added that the political tendency of the citizens often affects and modifies the actual polity, making e.g. a Democracy less democratical, an Oligarchy less oligarchical and so on.

CHAPTER VI.

Aristotle enlarges upon the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy.

(1) Where the population is agricultural, the Democracy is characterized by an observance of law; for the tillers of the soil, as they have to work for their living, are content with few meetings of the Public Assembly. Yet it is necessary that political privileges should be open to anybody who acquires the legal property qualification, as the absolute exclusion of any individual from political privileges is itself a characteristic of Oligarchy.

(2) In the second species of Democracy, although political privileges are theoretically open to anybody whose right of birth is incontestable, yet want of means will prevent the majority of people from exercising them, and the law will consequently be supreme.

(3) The third species (here described as one in which political privileges are open to all persons of free birth) will be marked like (2) by the supremacy of the law, and for the same reason.

(4) The extreme Democracy arises from the large increase of States in size, and still more from the accession of great wealth, enabling the mass of the people actually to exercise the political privileges which they possess.

Coming to the species of Oligarchy, we may say that

(1) in the first, the governing class is numerous, the property qualification is low and the supremacy resides in the law.

(2) in the second, the property qualification being larger the governing class is smaller and more powerful, and by its privilege of supplying vacancies aspires to a preponderant influence in the State.

(3) in the third, there is a still further concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of wealthy persons, who transmit it to their children by inheritance.

(4) in the fourth, wealth, influence and heredity combined have enabled the Oligarchs to set themselves above the law.

CHAPTER VII.

Aristocracy.

The name is properly limited to the best polity as described in an earlier part of the treatise (Books iii—v.), i.e. to the polity in which the good man and the good citizen are identical.

But it is popularly applied to a class of polities which are different from Oligarchy on the one hand, and from Polity in the strict sense on the other. These are

(1) the polity in which regard is paid to wealth, virtue and numbers.

(2) the polity in which regard is paid to virtue and numbers only.

(3) any Polity which has an inclination to Oligarchy.

CHAPTER VIII.

Polity.

Any fusion of Democracy and Oligarchy is properly a Polity, although it is the fashion to limit the name to such forms of the fusion as incline to Democracy. Aristocracies and Polities are often popularly confused. The true distinction is that an Aristocracy represents personal freedom, wealth and virtue, a Polity only personal freedom and wealth.

CHAPTER IX.

A Polity, being a fusion of Oligarchy and Democracy, may be constituted in three several ways,

(1) by adopting and combining the institutions both of Oligarchy and Democracy.

(2) by striking a mean between the institutions of Oligarchy and Democracy.

(3) by adopting part of the oligarchical and part of the democratical institutions.

The criterion of a successful fusion is the possibility of describing the Polity equally as an Oligarchy and as a Democracy.

The Lacedæmonian polity is a case in point, being democratical in the system of education &c., and oligarchical in the appointment of officers of State by suffrage, &c.

CHAPTER X.

Tyranny.

Two species of Tyranny, which approximate to Kingship by their constitutional character, have been distinguished in the discussion of Kingship (Book iii. Chap. 14), viz., the non-Greek and the Aesymneteia.

There remains the species which is the counterpart of absolute Kingship (*ἀντίστροφος τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ*), i. e. the irresponsible rule over subjects equal or superior to the ruler against their will and for the benefit of the ruler himself.

CHAPTER XI.

The question now suggests itself: What is the best polity and the best life for the great majority of States and persons?

In the endeavour to find an answer to it we start with the doctrine of the *Ethics* that the happy life is a life unimpeded in the exercise of virtue, and that virtue is a mean between two extremes.

Now every State comprises three parts, viz. the very rich, the very poor, and the intermediate or middle class.

Aristotle assigns the preference to the middle class on the ground (1) that it is the most conformable to reason, (2) that it is the most capable of constitutional action, (3) that it has the most permanent life.

The best political constitution therefore is one which is in the hands of the middle class, i. e. in which the middle class is stronger than both the other classes, or at least than either of them. None is so free from political disturbances. It is the importance of the middle class which affords stability to large States as compared with small, and to Democracies as compared with Oligarchies. Perhaps the fact that many of the best legislators have belonged to the middle class may be taken to be an evidence of its political superiority.

The reasons why the great majority of polities have been either Democracies or Oligarchies, and a true Polity has seldom been seen, are

(1) that the middle class has generally been small, and one of the other classes has determined the character of the polity.

(2) that political power has been the prize of a victorious party, which has used its victory to oppress its antagonists.

(3) that the two imperial States of Greece, Athens and Sparta, have forced their own forms of polity on their subject States.

As to the comparative excellence of the different polities, it is clear that the nearer a State is to the best polity, which has been already described, the better it is, and the further a State is from the best polity, the worse it is.

CHAPTER XII.

The polities suitable to particular States.

It is a sound general principle that the part of the State which desires the continuance of the polity should be stronger than that which does not.

But a State consists of

(1) a qualitative element, viz., freedom, wealth, culture, nobility.

(2) a quantitative element, viz. numbers.

Where the numerical superiority of the poor outweighs the qualitative superiority of the rich, the result is Democracy.

Where the qualitative superiority of the rich outweighs the quantitative superiority of the poor, the result is Oligarchy.

The kind of Democracy or Oligarchy is determined by the character of the population. Aristotle repeats that it will always be the legislator's duty to secure the support of the middle class. The middle class is an arbitrator between rich and poor.

CHAPTER XIII.

The artifices (σοφίσματα), appropriate to particular polities may be ranged under five heads:

(1) The Public Assembly.

(2) The offices of State.

(3) The Courts of Law.

(4) The possession of arms.

(5) Gymnastic exercises.

(A) Oligarchical artifices.

(1) To fine the rich, but not the poor, or to fine the rich heavily and the poor only lightly, for non-attendance in the Public Assembly.

(2) To allow the rich, but not the poor, the privilege of declining public office.

(3) To fine the rich, but not the poor, or to fine the rich heavily and the poor only lightly, for neglect of their judicial duties.

(4) To fine the rich, but not the poor, for being without arms.

(5) To fine the rich, but not the poor, for omitting their gymnastic exercises.

(B) Democratical artifices.

These will be the opposites of the oligarchical, e.g. to pay the poor for attendance in the Assembly and the Courts of Law, but not to fine the rich for non-attendance.

(C) Artifices of a fusion of Democracy and Oligarchy.

It will be necessary to combine the characteristics of both polities, e.g. to pay the poor for attendance and fine the rich for non-attendance.

In a Polity it is the heavy-armed class which should be supreme. The property qualification should be fixed as high as possible, provided always that a majority of the population enjoy full political privileges.

In the history of Greece the early Kingships were succeeded by constitutional polities resting upon the military class, upon the cavalry at first and afterwards upon the heavy infantry.

CHAPTER XIV.

Every polity comprises three departments (μόρια), viz.

(A) The Deliberative Body.

(B) The Executive.

(C) The Judicial Body.

(A) The functions of the Deliberative Body are the determination of war and peace, the formation and dissolution of alliances, the enactment of laws, the power of death, exile and confiscation of property, the power of electing officers of State and of holding them responsible for their conduct in office.

But these functions may be variously ordered.

(1) The rule in Democracy is that the power of deliberation upon all subjects is enjoyed and exercised by all the citizens.

Yet the rule admits of four different applications:

(*a*) When the citizens exercise their deliberative power not collectively but by alternation, and assemble collectively only in order to enact laws, to settle constitutional questions and to receive the reports of the officers of State.

(*b*) When the citizens assemble collectively only in order to elect officers of State, to enact laws, to determine questions of war and peace, and to conduct the audit of the officers' accounts; upon all other matters the power of deliberation is vested in particular officers.

(*c*) When the citizens assemble collectively for the election of officers of State, for the audit of their accounts, and for deliberation upon questions of war and alliance; all other matters are administered by the officers of State.

(*d*) When the citizens meet collectively to deliberate upon all questions, and the officers of State possess only the power of

preliminary examination (*προανάκρισις*). This is the system characteristic of the latest or extreme Democracy.

(2) The principle of Oligarchy is that deliberation upon all matters is confined to certain citizens.

But again there are various applications of the principle:

(*a*) When the Deliberative Body is large, the property qualification being low, when everyone who acquires the amount of property is admitted to the Deliberative Body, and the law is supreme.

(*b*) When deliberation is limited to an elected body, and the law is supreme.

(*c*) When the Deliberative Body has the power of cooption and is superior to the laws.

(*d*) When the Deliberative Body is hereditary and superior to the laws.

(3) If certain matters, e. g. questions of war and peace and the audit of the officers' accounts, come before the citizens collectively, and everything else is left to executive officers appointed by suffrage, the system is aristocratical.

(4) If the subjects of deliberation come in some cases before persons appointed by suffrage, and in others before persons appointed by lot, or before persons appointed partly by suffrage and partly by lot, the system is a mixture of Aristocracy and Polity.

Expedients appropriate to the extreme Democracy:

(1) To impose a fine upon any citizen for non-attendance in the Public Assembly.

(2) To appoint an equal number of the members of the Deliberative Body from each division of the citizens.

(3) If the Democrats have a vast numerical preponderance, either to pay a certain number only of the citizens, and not all, for attendance in the Public Assembly or to exclude by lot all who are in excess of the proper number.

Expedients appropriate to Oligarchy:

(1) To elect certain representatives of the commons as members of the Deliberative Body, or to allow the commons to consider all such matters as have already passed a board of Preliminary Councillors (πρόβουλοι), or Guardians of the Laws (νομοφύλακες).

(2) To invest the commons with the right of simply confirming the resolutions of the Preliminary Council, or the Guardians of the Laws, or to allow the privilege of giving advice to all the citizens, but an actual vote to none but the officers of State.

(3) To give the commons an absolute power of veto, but not of positive resolution, and to let a bill which has been rejected by the commons be referred back to the executive officers.

CHAPTER XV.

(B) The Executive.

The offices of State are all positions to which are assigned the functions of deliberation, decision and command, more especially of command.

In large States it is possible and proper to have a separate officer for every function. In small States it is often necessary to concentrate a number of offices in a few hands.

There are certain officers peculiar to particular polities;

e. g. a Preliminary Council (πρόβουλοι) is oligarchical,

a Council (βουλή) is democratical,

a Censorship of women and children is aristocratical.

In regard to the appointment of the officers of State generally, three questions arise;

(1) Who are the persons that appoint?

(2) Who are eligible to office?

(3) What is the mode of election?

The electing body may be all the citizens or some only;
the persons eligible may be all the citizens or some only ;
the appointment may be made by suffrage or by lot.

The appointment by all the citizens from all, by suffrage or lot or both, is democratical.

The appointment by some of the citizens from all, or in some cases from all and in others from some, by lot or suffrage or both, is suited to a Polity.

The appointment by some of the citizens partly from all and partly from some, by lot or suffrage or both, is suited to an aristocratical type of Polity.

The appointment by some of the citizens from some, by lot or suffrage or both, is oligarchical.

The appointment by some of the citizens from all, or by all from some, by suffrage is aristocratical.

CHAPTER XVI.

(C) The Judicial Body.

The points to be considered are

(1) The persons eligible to the Courts of Law.

(2) The extent of their jurisdiction.

(3) The manner of their appointment.

Let us first determine the different kinds of Court.

They are

(*a*) a Court of scrutiny (τὸ εὐθυντικόν).

(*b*) a Court for offences committed against the State.

(*c*) a Court for constitutional questions.

(*d*) a Court for cases arising between officers of State and individuals in regard to fines.

(*e*) a Court to deal with important cases of private contract.

(*f*) a Court of homicide (τὸ φονικόν).

(*g*) a Court of aliens (τὸ ξενικόν).

(*h*) a Court for the trial of petty contracts.

A system of universal eligibility and universal jurisdiction is democratical.

A system of limited eligibility and universal jurisdiction is oligarchical.

A combination of universal and limited eligibility is characteristic of Aristocracy or Polity.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

There are two reasons for a plurality of Democracies, viz.

(1) the varieties in the character of the populations. One population is agricultural, another mechanical, and so on, or there may be a combination of two or more different populations.

(2) the various combinations of the institutions characteristic of Democracy. It is not necessary that all such institutions should be found in every Democracy.

CHAPTER II.

The primary principle of a Democracy is personal liberty (ὑπόθεσις τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία). And liberty implies two features, (1) alternation of rule and subjection among all the citizens, (2) the freedom of every citizen to live according to his own pleasure.

Hence the characteristics of popular government are as follows:

(1) the eligibility of all the citizens to the offices of State and their appointment by all.

(2) the rule of all over each individual and of each individual in his turn over all.

(3) the appointment of officers of State by lot.

(4) the absence of a property qualification for office or the requirement of as low a qualification as possible.

(5) the regulation that the same person shall never or only in exceptional circumstances hold the same office twice.

(6) short tenure of office.

(7) the endowment of all the citizens or of a body chosen from all with judicial powers in all or the most important cases.

(8) the supreme authority of the Public Assembly in all or the most important questions.

(9) the payment of the members of the Public Assembly and the Courts of Law and of the executive officers.

As birth, wealth and culture are characteristics of Oligarchy, so the characteristics of Democracy are low birth, poverty and intellectual degradation (*βαναυσία*).

Universal arithmetical equality is the democratical principle of justice; and from it flows the rule of the majority, i.e. of the poor.

CHAPTER III.

That the decision of the majority then is just is the argument of Democrats; that the decision of the wealthier is just, of Oligarchs. But in either case a difficulty arises.

The democratical argument would justify the spoliation of the wealthy minority by the poor; the oligarchical argument on the other hand would justify Tyranny, if there were an individual wealthier than all the other members of his class.

It may be suggested that, as a State is composed of two elements, viz. rich and poor, the decision of the majority of both, if they agree, and, if they disagree, of the absolute majority i.e. of the party, comprising both rich and poor, which has the higher collective property assessment, should be supreme.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the four species of Democracy,

The best is one in which the population lives by agriculture. For an agricultural population, not possessing great wealth, occupies itself in business and takes no large interest in politics; nor is it obliged to seek office as a means of livelihood or to enrich itself by spoliation of the wealthy. Such a population is often content, if it enjoys only the power of electing officers of State and of holding them to account for their conduct in office. Agriculture may be encouraged by law, e.g. by the prohibition of holding more than a certain amount of land or of taking a mortgage upon a certain part of the land belonging to a citizen.

The next best population is one of graziers, as they have many points of resemblance to agriculturists and are well disciplined physically.

A population of mechanics, tradesmen or labourers is morally low, not to say that it is always ready to interfere collectively in political matters.

The latest development of Democracy, which is its worst form, is one in which civic rights are widely extended without regard to legitimacy (γνησιότης), and the commons exercise supreme and arbitrary power.

N.B. For a good form of Democracy it is desirable that the country should lie at a considerable distance from the city itself, as the citizens, dwelling then upon the fields, will be unable to meet often in the Public Assembly.

CHAPTER V.

It is not enough for a legislator to establish a polity; he must provide for its continued existence.

Rules for preserving Democracies:

(1) To ordain that all fines imposed shall be devoted to the service of the Gods, in order to prevent unjust condemnations.

(2) To impose heavy penalties upon the authors of wanton and baseless prosecutions, so that the wealthy class may not be rendered inimical to the polity.

(3) If the revenues of the State are small, to allow only few sessions of the Assembly and Courts of Law, lest the citizens be tempted to provide themselves with payment for attendance at the expense of the wealthy class.

(4) To alleviate the poverty of the masses,

(*a*) by affording them out of the public revenues an opportunity of starting in business or agriculture, whether all at once or, if means are insufficient, by tribes or otherwise.

(*b*) by making the rich supply the payment for the necessary meetings of the Public Assembly and the Courts of Law, on condition of being released from useless public burdens.

(*c*) by encouraging wealthy persons to furnish individual members of the poorer class with the means of setting themselves up in business.

(*d*) by opening some at least of the offices of State to the commons through the ballot.

CHAPTER VI.

The forms of Oligarchy.

The primary form of Oligarchy approximates to Polity; in it there are two kinds of property qualification, a lower which is requisite for the ordinary, and a higher which is requisite for the more important, offices of State, and the better elements of the commons are admitted from time to time to political privileges in such number as to ensure the predominance of the enfranchised over the unenfranchised class.

A slight intensification of the oligarchical principle produces the second form of Oligarchy.

The form of Oligarchy, which approximates to Tyranny, is the most corrupt, and requires the strongest precautionary measures.

The best safeguard of Democracy is a large population (*πολυανθρωπία*), of Oligarchy good discipline (*εὐταξία*).

CHAPTER VII.

The military service may be divided into four branches, viz. cavalry, heavy infantry, light-armed troops and marines.

A country suited to cavalry invites a pronounced form of Oligarchy, as it is only the rich who can afford to keep horses.

A country suited to heavy infantry invites a more temperate form of Oligarchy, but still an Oligarchy, as heavy infantry service is appropriate to the rich rather than to the poor.

Light-armed soldiers or marines are suited to Democracy.

(N.B. As Oligarchies have often been overthrown by means of light-armed soldiers, it is advisable that the Oligarchs should allow their children, while they are young, to be instructed in light-armed exercises.)

Admission to the governing class in an Oligarchy should be open either to all who acquire the requisite amount of property, or to all such persons after a stated period of abstinence from mechanical occupations, or to selected individuals who deserve the honour.

In order to prevent dissatisfaction among the commons at their exclusion from the most important offices of State, the officers should be liable to heavy public burdens.

CHAPTER VIII.

The offices of State (*ἀρχαί*) may be classified as (A) political, (B) religious, (C) extraordinary.

(A) Political officers.

(1) controllers of the market (*ἀγορανόμοι*).

(2) commissioners of the city (*ἀστυνόμοι*).

(3) commissioners of public lands (*ἀγρονόμοι*), or of woods and forests (*ὑλωροί*).

(4) receivers (*ἀποδέκται*) or treasurers (*ταμίαι*).

(5) recorders (*ἱερομνήμονες*), presidents (*ἐπιστάται*), or remembrancers (*μνήμονες*), who register contracts, legal decisions &c.

(6) persons who levy the fines imposed by the Courts of Law (*πράκτορες*),

(7) the police.

Officers of less importance are

(8) warders of the city gates and walls (*ἐπιμεληταὶ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς*),

(9) generals (*στρατηγοί*) or members of the Council of War (*πολέμαρχοι*), &c.

(10) auditors (*εὔθυνοι*), accountants (*λογισταί*), inspectors of accounts (*ἐξετασταί*) or public prosecutors (*συνήγοροι*),

(11) the supreme legislative office, whether called a Preliminary Council (*πρόβουλοι*) or a Council (*βουλή*).

(B) Religious officers,

(1) priests.

(2) superintendents of the ordinances of religion (*ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερά*) whose duty it is to maintain the temples in good repair, &c.

(3) directors of public sacrifices, whether called archons, kings or presidents (*πρυτάνεις*).

(C) Extraordinary officers, not found in all States.

(1) censors of women (*γυναικονόμοι*),

(2) guardians of the laws (*νομοφύλακες*),

(3) censors of boys (*παιδονόμοι*),

(4) presidents of gymnastic exercises (*γυμνασίαρχοι*),

(5) superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests, &c.

N.B. The office of Guardians of the Laws is aristocratical,

a Preliminary Council is oligarchical,

a Council is democratical.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

Political revolutions.

The general cause of sedition (στάσις) is inequality. The Many raise sedition in an Oligarchy, if they consider themselves to be deprived of the equality which is their right. The upper classes raise sedition in a Democracy, if they consider themselves to be merely equals despite their natural superiority.

But a revolution may take various forms;

it may be either a complete revolution of polity, or a change of the holders of political power, the polity itself remaining the same, or an intensification or mitigation of the existing polity, or an innovation in some single department of the polity.

As inequality is the productive cause of seditions, it is to be noticed that equality is of two kinds, arithmetical (ἀριθμῷ), and proportional (κατ' ἀξίαν), or in other words equality determined by numbers and by merit.

Numbers and wealth being facts of universal occurrence, whereas virtue, e.g. which is the characteristic of Aristocracy, is rarely found, it follows that the only common polities are Democracy and Oligarchy.

But neither of these polities is sound or permanent, although Democracy is more stable than Oligarchy. For an Oligarchy may be destroyed by disturbances arising either within the oligarchical body itself or between the Oligarchs and the commons; whereas Democracy is liable only to attacks of the commons upon the Oligarchs who aspire to exclusive power, not to say that it is nearer to the polity which rests upon the middle class.

CHAPTER II.

In the investigation of seditions and political revolutions, it is necessary to ascertain

(A) The conditions which lead to sedition (πῶς ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι).

(B). The objects or final causes of sedition (τίνων ἕνεκεν στασιάζουσι).

(C). The predisposing occasions (τίνες ἀρχαί).

(A). The principal condition favourable to sedition is the aspiration after equality in the Many or after superiority in the Few.

(B). The objects of sedition are gain, honour, or the desire to avoid their opposites, loss and dishonour.

(C). The predisposing occasions are

(1) gain.

(2) honour.

not however, as before, from the desire of acquiring them for ourselves, but from indignation at the larger share of them possessed by others.

CHAPTER III.

(3) insolence on the part of persons holding an official status.

(4) fear among persons who have committed crimes and are afraid of punishment, or who expect to be the victims of injustice and seek to anticipate it.

(5) predominant influence (ὑπεροχή), i.e. the excessive and intolerable power of some individual or party in the State.

(6) contempt of the subordinate class for its masters.

(7) the disproportionate increase of one class in the State (αὔξησις ἡ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον).

(8) party-spirit (ἐριθεία).

(9) neglect (ὀλιγωρία) in allowing persons disloyal to the polity to be admitted to the supreme offices of State.

(10) insignificant changes (τὸ παρὰ μικρόν).

(11) diversity of race (τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον) among the citizens.

(12) locality, when the natural divisions of the country divide the citizens into parties.

CHAPTER IV.

It is not the objects of sedition that are unimportant but the occasions (γίγνονται αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων).

Further predisposing occasions:

(13) quarrels arising among influential persons, as is shewn by many instances.

(14) the accession of high repute or power to some one office or class in the State, which is also exemplified.

(15) an even balance of the two antagonistic classes, the rich and the poor, and the weakness of the middle class.

Political disturbance may be effected either by force or by fraud, and, if in the first way, by force employed either at the initial or at a later stage.

Having thus considered the causes of revolution in polities generally, we come now to consider them in regard to particular polities.

CHAPTER V.

Revolutions in Democracies.

The main cause of revolutions in Democracies is the intemperate and unprincipled conduct of demagogues, compelling the propertied class to combine.

A Democracy may be revolutionized

(1) into an Oligarchy, from the cause already mentioned.

(2) into a Tyranny, as in ancient times, when the functions of demagogue and general were united in the same hands, when official positions of immense importance were entrusted to individuals, and when the commons being busily engaged in their occupations did not keep a sharp eye upon the ambition of their leaders.

(3) from a moderate to an extreme form of Democracy.

CHAPTER VI.

Revolutions in Oligarchies.

There are two general causes of revolution:

(1) Oppression of the masses by the Oligarchs.

(2) Dissension among the Oligarchs themselves, which may take various forms,

(*a*) when the limitation of the honours of State to a narrow clique inspires persons who are members of the propertied class, although not of the official body, with revolutionary ideas.

(*b*) when personal rivalry among the Oligarchs induces some of them to play the part of demagogues, whether it is to the mob or to other members of the oligarchical body that they pay court.

(*c*) when an attempt is made to narrow the Oligarchy still further than has been the rule.

(*d*) when some of the Oligarchs have wasted their fortunes in dissipation and are consequently eager for change.

(*e*) when some members of the oligarchical body are subjected to a repulse or affront at the hands of others.

(*f*) in consequence of the over-despotic character of the Oligarchy.

(*g*) when there is a smaller Oligarchy enjoying exceptional privileges, within the Oligarchy itself.

(*h*) in time of war, if the Oligarchs from fear of the commons are obliged to employ mercenary troops, and the commander of these troops establishes himself as tyrant.

(*i*) in time of peace, if the mutual distrustfulness of the Oligarchs leads them to put the police of the city into the hands of mercenary troops and an arbiter between the two factions, who succeeds in making himself master of both.

(*j*) from accidental circumstances, e.g. if the value of landed estates rises so much that nearly the whole population comes to possess the property qualification for office.

N.B. It is to be observed that both Democracies and Oligarchies are sometimes revolutionized not to the antagonistic polities but to other polities, whether more or less pronounced, of the same kind.

CHAPTER VII.

Revolutions in Aristocracies.

The causes are as follows:

(1) the limitation in the number of persons admitted to the honours of State.

(2) the discontent or ambition of some powerful individual.

(3) great inequality of wealth.

(4) self-aggrandisement on the part of the nobles.

(5) gradual and almost imperceptible innovation.

But the main cause of revolution both in Aristocracies and in Polities is a departure from their proper principles of justice, i.e. the unsuccessful fusion of virtue, wealth and numbers in Aristocracies, of wealth and numbers in Polities.

The comparative stability of Polities as contrasted with Aristocracies arises from the greater importance of the numerical majority in Polities.

A polity is usually revolutionized in the direction of its own bias, i.e. a Polity to Democracy and an Aristocracy to Oligarchy, but may also be revolutionized to its opposite.

The only conditions of permanence are proportionate equality (*τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον*). and security of rights (*τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν*).

N.B. Polities in general are liable to dissolution,

(*a*) from within, as has been shewn.

(*b*) from without, i.e. by the influence of another antagonistic polity.

CHAPTER VIII.

Having described the causes of revolutions and seditions, we come now to the preservatives of polities both generally and individually.

The means of preservation will be clearly the opposites of the means of destruction.

In order to preserve a polity, it is advisable

(1) to take strict precautions against illegality, especially in matters insignificant.

(2) in an Oligarchy to have no faith in artifices (*σοφίσματα*) intended to impose upon the masses.

(3) in an Aristocracy or Oligarchy to cultivate a good understanding between the persons who hold official positions and the non-privileged or partly privileged classes.

(4) to prevent abuse of power on the part of the officers of State, e.g. by establishing short tenure of office.

(5) to live in constant fear of such influences as corrupt the polity.

(6) to check the feuds and rivalries arising in the upper classes.

(7) in an Oligarchy or Polity to revise the census frequently and adapt the property qualification to the circumstances of the State.

(8) to avoid investing any individual with disproportionate authority.

(9) to institute a censorship of the manners and morals of the citizens.

(10) to prevent a monopoly of power in the hands of a single class or order.

(11) in all polities, and especially in an Oligarchy, to afford the officers of State no opportunity of personal gain.

(12) in a Democracy to abstain from oppression of the rich.

(13) in an Oligarchy to treat the poor with signal consideration.

(14) to allow equality or even precedence in many respects to the classes debarred from supreme political power.

CHAPTER IX.

Three qualifications are requisite in the holders of the supreme officers of State, viz.

(1) loyalty to the polity.

(2) capacity for their offices.

(3) virtue and justice in the sense appropriate to the polity.

Where these three qualifications are not found in the same individual, it is the qualification which is rarer and more important to the office in question that should carry the day.

One rule of great value, as preservative of polities, is the observance of the proper mean, i. e. the avoidance of extreme measures whether democratical or oligarchical.

But the best of all preservatives is the education of the citizens in the spirit of the polity (τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας). Without this education the wisest laws are futile.

CHAPTER X.

The natural destructives and preservatives of Monarchy.

Monarchy is, as we have seen, the generic name, including Kingship and Tyranny as its species. The king is generally chosen from the better classes (οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς), to protect them

against the commons; the tyrant from the commons to act against the nobles. But a tyrant may have been

either a successful demagogue,
or an encroaching hereditary king,
or a high officer of State,
or the nominee of an Oligarchy.

Kingship, on the other hand, may be based

either upon the personal virtue of the king,
or upon the virtue of his family,
or upon eminent public services,
or upon the combination of these with power.

Further, the king is in theory the protector of the propertied class from spoliation, and of the commons from insolence; but the tyrant pays no regard to the public weal. The object of the tyrant is his personal pleasure (τὸ ἡδύ), that of the king moral elevation (τὸ καλόν). The tyrant is ambitious of gain, and his body-guard consists of mercenaries; the king is ambitious of distinction, and his body-guard consists of citizens.

Tyranny combines in itself the evils of Oligarchy and Democracy; for from the former it borrows the pursuit of wealth and the absolute distrust of the masses, from the latter the hostility to the upper classes.

In Monarchies then as in constitutional polities—for Aristotle here distinguishes the two—the predisposing causes of revolution are injustice (which oftenest shews itself in insolence), fear and contempt, the object is the acquisition of wealth and honour.

But an insurrection may take the form of an attack (*a*) upon the person, (*b*) upon the authority of the rulers.

It takes the first form, when it is occasioned by insolence (ὕβρις), as is shewn by numerous examples.

Instances are also given of conspiracies arising from fear and contempt.

Also of these three predisposing causes, two or more may exist in combination.

Lastly, the mere desire of notoriety is itself, although only in rare cases, a motive of insurrection.

A Tyranny like any other polity is liable to destruction,

(*a*) from without, by contact with an antagonistic polity of superior strength.

(*b*) from within, by a feud among the associates of the tyrant.

Contempt is more frequently a cause of the destruction of Tyrannies than hatred.

A Tyranny in short may be destroyed by any of the causes of destruction which exist in the extreme form of Oligarchy or of Democracy.

A Kingship is seldom destroyed from without. It is liable to destruction from within,

(*a*) if sedition arises among the members of the royal family.

(*b*) if the king arrogates to himself unconstitutional and tyrannical powers.

Monarchy is comparatively rare in modern times, and, if it exists at all, it generally takes the form not of Kingship but of Tyranny. For the characteristics of Kingship, viz., the voluntary obedience of the subjects, and the high authority of the ruler, are incompatible with the existing social condition, which produces a large number of similar persons rather than an individual of preeminent distinction.

Hereditary Kingship is exposed to an additional peril owing to the frequent incapacity of the kings.

CHAPTER XI.

The preservatives of Monarchy.

(1) of Kingship,

Moderation in the exercise of power.

(2) of Tyranny,

(*a*) The repressive method, e. g. by removing eminent individuals, prohibiting clubs, creating mutual distrust among the

citizens, establishing a system of espionage, keeping the citizens poor and always occupied, taxing them heavily, &c. It is characteristic too of a tyrant that he regards his friends with suspicion, encourages the influence of women and the licence of slaves, treats sycophants with honour, likes low companions, and prefers the society of foreigners to that of citizens.

There are in fact three objects of Tyranny, viz.:

(1) to degrade and reduce the spirit of the subjects.

(2) to prevent them from placing confidence in each other.

(3) to produce in them an incapacity for affairs (*ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων*).

(*b*) the conciliatory method, by imitating the temper and conduct of a king. Such a tyrant will be economical in his management of the public revenues, will be dignified (*σεμνός*), but not stern (*χαλεπός*) in his address, will be, or affect to be, virtuous and moderate in life, will show a zeal for religious ordinances, will pay especial honour to distinguished citizens, will dispense rewards himself, while he inflicts punishments by the agency of subordinates, will not humiliate a powerful subject except in rare instances and by gradual measures, and, while abstaining from all forms of insolence, will abstain most carefully from the infliction of corporal punishment and from indecency. Lastly, as there are two elements in every State, viz. the rich and the poor, it is desirable that both, if possible, should see the basis of their security in the exercise of the tyrant's power, or at least that the stronger party of the two should be his creature.

CHAPTER XII.

The duration of polities.

Of all polities none have so short a life as Oligarchy and Tyranny. The most permanent Tyrannies were those of the Orthagoridae at Sicyon, which lasted 100 years, of the Cypselidae at Corinth which lasted 73 years and 6 months, of the Pisistratidae at Athens which lasted 35 years.

Conclusion.—A criticism of the theory of revolutions put forward by Socrates in the *Republic*.

(1) He omits to treat particularly the form of revolution which is incident to his best or primary polity.

(2) His account of the sequence of polities is incomplete.

(3) He does not consider the liability of Tyranny to revolution or the nature of its revolutions.

(4) His explanation of the cause of revolutions in Oligarchy, which he defines to be avarice, is insufficient.

(5) It is not more true that Oligarchy, as he alleges, than any other polity contains in itself two different States, one of the rich and another of the poor.

(6) Without the impoverishment of any citizen a polity may be revolutionized from Oligarchy to Democracy, or from Democracy to Oligarchy.

(7) Socrates mentions one only out of many causes of revolutions in Oligarchies, viz. the impoverishment of the citizens by profligacy and usurious interest.

(8) Although there are various forms of Oligarchy and Democracy, Socrates in describing the revolutions of each speaks as though there were only one.

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

BOOK I.

* A. puts his conclusions first.

CHAP. I. The object of the State.

SEEING that every State is a sort of association and every association is formed for the attainment of some Good—for some presumed Good is the end of all action—it is evident that, as some Good is the object of all associations, so in the highest degree is the supreme Good the object of that association which is supreme and embraces all the rest, in other words, of the State or political association.

Distinction between various forms of rule.

Now it is wrong to confound, as some[1] do, the functions of the constitutional statesman, king, householder and slavemaster. They hold that the difference between them is not one of kind, but depends simply upon the number of persons ruled, i.e. that a man is a slavemaster, if he has but few subjects; if he has more, a householder; if still more, a constitutional statesman or king, there being no distinction between a large household and a small

[1] The reference is to Plato *Politicus*, pp. 258 sqq.

State; also that a man is either a king or a constitutional statesman according as he governs absolutely or in conformity to the laws of political science, being alternately ruler and subject. Such an opinion is erroneous. Our meaning will be clear, however, if we follow our usual method of investigation. For as in other cases we have to analyse a compound whole into the uncompounded elements which are its least parts, so in examining the constituents of a State we shall incidentally best ascertain the points of difference between the above-mentioned forms of government and the possibility of arriving at a scientific conclusion in regard to each of them.

CHAP. II. Here, as elsewhere, the best system of examination will be to begin at the beginning and observe things in their growth.

Genesis of the State. There are certain primary essential combinations of those who cannot exist independently one of another. Thus male and female must combine in order to the procreation of children, nor is there anything deliberate or arbitrary in their so doing; on the contrary, the desire of leaving an offspring like oneself is natural to man as to the whole animal and vegetable world. Again, natural rulers and subjects combine for safety—*and when I say "natural,"* I mean that there are some persons qualified intellectually to form projects, and these are natural rulers or natural masters; while there are others qualified physically to carry them out, and these are subjects or natural slaves, so that the interests of master and slave are coincident.

Now Nature has differentiated females from slaves. None of Nature's products wears a poverty-stricken look like the Delphian[1] knife as it is called that cutlers make; each has a single definite object on the principle that any instrument admits of the highest finish, only if it subserves a single purpose rather than several. Among non-Greek peoples on the other hand females and slaves stand on one and the same footing. The reason is that natural rulers do not exist among them, and the association they form consists of none but slaves male and female; hence the poets say[2]

"'Tis meet Greeks rule barbarians,"

implying the natural identity of barbarians or non-Greeks and slaves.

But to resume: the associations of male and female, master and slave constitute the primary form of household, and Hesiod was right when he[3] wrote — The Household.

"Get thee
First house and wife and ox to plough withal,"

for an ox is to the poor what a servant is to the rich.

Thus the association naturally formed for the supply of everyday wants is a household; its members, according to Charondas, are "those who eat of

[1] The Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα was evidently a knife intended to serve more purposes than one, and therefore not especially suited to any, as the ὀβελισκολύχνιον mentioned below, p. 173, l. 19, and περὶ ζῴων μορίων, p. 683 A_{22}, seems to have been a spit which could on occasion be used as a candlestick.

[2] Euripides, *Iph. in Aul.* 1400.

[3] Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι, 403.

the same store," or, according to the Cretan Epimenides[1] "those who sit around the same hearth."

The Village.

Again, the simplest association of several households for something more than ephemeral purposes is a village. It seems that the village in its most natural form is[2] derived from the household, including all the children of certain parents and the children's children, or, as the phrase sometimes is, "all who are suckled upon the same milk."

This is the reason why States were originally governed by kings as is still the case with uncivilized peoples; they were composed of units accustomed to this form of government. For as each household is under the kingly government of its eldest member, so were also the offshoot-households as comprising none but blood-relations. It is this condition of things that Homer means when he describes *the Cyclopes* as

> "law-givers each
> Of his own wives and children,"

in allusion to their want of corporate life. This patriarchal government was universal in primitive times; in fact the reason why all nations represent the polity of the Gods as monarchical is that such originally was, if it is not still, their own polity, and men assimilate the lives no less than the bodily forms of the Gods to their own.

The State.

Lastly, the association composed of several villages

[1] Reading ὁμοκάπνους.

[2] I have adopted—although not without hesitation—Mr Heitland's ingenious suggestion, ἀπ' οἰκίας for ἀποικία οἰκίας.

in its complete form is the State, in[1] which the goal of full independence may be said to be first attained. For as the State was formed to make life possible, so it exists to make life good. Consequently if it be allowed that the simple associations, *i.e. the household and the village*, have a natural existence, so has the State in all cases; for in the State they attain complete development, and Nature implies complete development, as the nature of anything, e.g. of a man, a house or a horse, may be defined to be its condition when the process of production is complete. Or *the naturalness of the State may be proved in another way:* the object proposed or the complete development of a thing is its highest Good; but independence *which is first attained in the State* is a complete development or the highest Good *and is therefore natural.*

The State a natural institution. Man a political animal.

Thus we see that the State is a natural institution, that Man is naturally a political animal and that one who is not a citizen of any State, if the cause of his isolation be natural and not accidental, is either a superhuman being or low *in the scale of civilization,* as he stands alone like a "blot" on the backgammon board[2]. The "clanless, lawless, hearthless" man so bitterly described by Homer is a case in point; for he is naturally a citizen of no state and a lover of war. Also that Man is a political animal in a higher sense than a bee or any other gregarious creature is evident from the fact that Nature,

[1] Reading ἤδη.

[2] The words ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὁμήρου...πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής are best regarded as parenthetical. The passage of Homer referred to is *Iliad* IX. 63, 64.

* The a sense of right & wrong are the only things that make it possible for men to live together.

as we are fond of asserting, creates nothing without a purpose and Man is the only animal endowed with speech. Now mere sounds serve to indicate sensations of pain and pleasure and are therefore assigned to other animals as well as to Man; for their nature does not advance beyond the point of perceiving pain and pleasure and signifying these perceptions to one another. The object of speech on the other hand is to indicate advantage and disadvantage and therefore also justice and injustice. For it is a special characteristic which distinguishes Man from all other animals that he alone enjoys perception of good and evil, justice and injustice and the like. But these are the principles of that association which constitutes a household or a State.

The State prior in Nature to the household or the individual.

Again, in the order of Nature the State is prior to the household or the individual. For the whole must needs be prior to its part. For instance, if you take away *the body which is* the whole, there will not remain any such thing as a foot or a hand, unless we use the same word in a different sense as when we speak of a stone hand as a hand. For a hand separated from the body will be a disabled hand; whereas it is the function or faculty of a thing which makes it what it is, and therefore when things lose their function or faculty it is not correct to call them the same things but rather homonymous, *i.e. different things having the same name.*

We see then that the State is a natural institution, and also that it is prior to the individual. For if the individual as a separate unit is not independent, he must be a part and must bear the same relation to

the State as other parts to their wholes; and one who is incapable of association with others or is independent and has no need of such association is no member of a State, in other words he is either a brute or a God. Now the impulse to political association is innate in all men. Nevertheless the author of the first combination whoever he was was a great benefactor of human kind. For man, as in his condition of complete development, *i.e. in the State*, he is the noblest of all animals, so apart from law and justice he is the vilest of all. For injustice is always most formidable when it is armed; and Nature[1] has endowed Man with arms which are intended to subserve the purposes of prudence and virtue but are capable of being wholly turned to contrary ends. Hence if Man be devoid of virtue, no animal is so unscrupulous or savage, none so sensual, none so gluttonous. Just action on the other hand is bound up with the existence of a State; for the administration of justice is an ordinance of the political association and the administration of justice is nothing else than the decision of what is just. **Benefits of political association.**

Having now ascertained the constituent elements of the State, as every State is composed of households we must begin with a discussion of Domestic Economy[2]. **CHAP. III.**

There are various parts of Domestic Economy[3] corresponding to the constituent parts of a household, which in its complete form comprises slaves and free persons. But as the right method of investigating **Domestic Economy.**

[1] Reading *ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται ἐπὶ φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ.*

[2] Reading *περὶ οἰκονομίας.*

[3] Reading *οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη.*

anything is to reduce it to its elements and the primary or elementary parts of a household are master and slave, husband and wife, parent and children, we have to examine the true nature and character of these three relations, i.e. the relations of a slavemaster[1] to his slaves, of a husband to his wife and of a parent to his children. These three we may lay down as certain. But there is another part which is sometimes regarded as equivalent to the whole of Domestic Economy and sometimes as its principal part, and the truth is well worthy of investigation. I mean the so-called Art of Finance.

Its parts.

Slavery.

We will first consider the relations of master and slave in order to arrive at a practical conclusion and also, if possible, to frame some theory of the subject better than those now in vogue. There are some thinkers, as I said at the beginning of this treatise, who hold that the ownership of slaves is a science and identify the functions of the householder, the slavemaster, the constitutional statesman and the king. Others again regard slaveowning as doing violence to Nature on the ground that the distinction of slave and free man is wholly conventional and has no place in Nature, and is therefore void of justice, as resting on mere force.

p. 1.

CHAP. IV.

The slave a property.

Property then is a part of the household and the Art of acquiring property a part of Domestic Economy, inasmuch as without certain necessaries it is impossible

[1] The clauses ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις and καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι relate solely to the novelty of the Greek terms γαμική and τεκνοποιητική, and are omitted in the translation.

to live happily or indeed to live at all. Nor can the[1] art of the householder any more than any definite art dispense with its proper instruments, if its work is to be adequately performed. Instruments however may be animate or inanimate. In the case e.g. of a pilot, the tiller is an inanimate instrument, the "look-out" an animate one; in fact in every art an assistant is virtually an instrument. Thus we conclude that any given property is an instrument conducing to life, property as a whole is a mass of instruments, a slave is an animate property, and every assistant may be described as a single instrument doing the work of several. For suppose that every instrument could obey a person's orders or anticipate his wishes and so fulfil its proper function like[2] the legendary figures of Daedalus or[3] the tripods of Hephaestus which, if we may believe the poet,

"Entered self-moved the conclave of the Gods,"

suppose, I say, that in like manner combs were in the habit of combing and quills of playing the cithern of themselves, mastercraftsmen would have no need of assistants nor masters of slaves. While then instruments in the common use of the term are instruments of production, a property is an instrument of action; that is to say, while a comb is not only used but produces something else, a coat or a bed can only be used. And as there is this difference of kind between

[1] Reading ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις, and below, τῷ οἰκονομικῷ.

[2] See Plato, *Menon*, p. 97. *Euthyphron*, p. 11.

[3] *Iliad* XVIII. 369 sqq.

production and action, and instruments are necessary to both, it follows that there must be a corresponding difference in the instruments. Now life consists not in production but in action; and as *every property is an instrument conducing to existence, and a slave is an animate property*, it follows that a slave is an assistant in the sphere of action.

The term 'property' may be compared to the term 'member,' in that a member is not only a member of something else but belongs wholly to that something, and the same is true of a property. Thus while a master is master of his slave but in no sense belongs to him, a slave[1] is not only the slave of a certain master but belongs wholly to his master.

These facts clearly prove the nature and faculty of the slave. A natural slave is one who, although a human being, is naturally not his own master but belongs to someone else. Now this is the case with a human being when he is nothing more than a property[2], and a property means any instrument of action which has a separate existence, *i.e. is not a mere part of the person who uses it.*

CHAP. V.

Natural Slavery.

We have now to consider whether there are any persons naturally answering to this description, persons for whom a life of slavery is advantageous and just or on the contrary all slavery is a violation of Nature. Nor is the truth hard to discover theoretically or to infer from actual experience. The principle of rule and subjection is equally inevitable and beneficent; indeed there are some things which from

Its justification in Nature.

[1] ἡ δὲ δοῦλος in Bekker's text is a misprint for ὁ δὲ δοῦλος.

[2] Omitting ἄνθρωπος ὤν.

their very birth take different lines and tend either to a position of rule or the reverse. Also rulers and subjects are both of various kinds, and the superiority of the rule corresponds in all cases to the superiority of the subjects, e.g. the rule of one man over another is superior to the rule of a man over a beast. For the relation of ruler and subject always implies a common work to be performed, and the excellence of the work is proportionate to that of the person performing it. *That there are various kinds of subjects and rulers is evident,* because wherever several parts combine to form one common whole, whether they are connected *like the limbs of the human body* or separate *like the citizens of a State,* the relation of ruler and subject invariably manifests itself. And this fact which is characteristic of animate things is true of Nature generally; for even in inanimate things there is a sort of rule *and subordination,* e.g. in harmony, although perhaps this subject is proper to a less scientific investigation than the present.

But to confine ourselves to the case of animals: an animal consists primarily of soul and body, of which the former is natural master and the latter natural subject. Observe however that in order to discover the law of Nature we must choose instances in a natural and not a corrupt condition. Thus we must examine a man whose body and soul are both in a perfectly healthy state, and in his case the natural supremacy of the soul is evident enough; for in depraved persons or persons whose condition at the time is depraved the soul will often appear to be under the rule of the body, but the reason is that their condition is corrupt

and unnatural. However it is possible, as we say, in the first place to observe in an animal the two forms of rule, despotic and constitutional; for the soul rules the body like a slavemaster, while the intellect rules the appetite like a constitutional statesman or king. Nor can we doubt in these instances that it is natural and expedient for the body to be ruled by the soul and for the emotional part of the soul to be ruled by the intellect or the part in which the reason resides, and that if the two are put on an equality, or the relations are reversed, the consequence is injurious to both. Again, the same is true in regard to man and the other animals. Domestic animals are superior in nature to wild ones, and for all domestic animals subjection to man is advantageous, as their safety is thereby secured. Also a comparison of males and females shows that the former are naturally stronger and dominant, the latter naturally weaker and subject. And the same law *of subordination* must hold good in respect of human beings generally.

Hence wherever there are two classes of persons, and the one are as far inferior to the other as the body to the soul or a beast to a man—and this is the condition of all whose function is mere physical service and who are incapable of anything better—these persons are natural slaves and for them as truly as for the body or for beasts a life of slavish subjection is advantageous. For the natural slave is one who is qualified to be and therefore in fact is the property of another, or who is only so far a rational being as to understand reason without himself possessing it. *And herein the slave is different from other animals,* as

they neither understand reason[1] nor obey it but obey their instincts only. As for the uses to which they are put there is little distinction; for slaves and domestic animals alike render us physical help towards acquiring the necessaries of life.

Now in accordance with these facts it is Nature's purpose to differentiate the bodies as well as the souls of slaves and free persons, making the former sturdy for the satisfaction of our necessary wants, and the latter upright and suited not to employments of this kind but to political life in both its departments civil and military. But it frequently results contrary to the intention of Nature that those who possess the bodies do not possess the souls of free men and vice versa. For assuredly were there to be found certain persons as superior even physically to the rest as are the images of the Gods to ordinary men, it would be universally admitted that their inferiors deserved to be their slaves. But if this is true of mere physical superiority, with far more justice may it be determined of the soul; only it is not so easy to discern beauty of soul as physical beauty. Its practical limitation.

It is evident then that there is a class of persons, some of whom are naturally free and the others naturally slaves, persons for whom the condition of slavery is alike expedient and just. Yet it is easy to see that there is some truth also in the opposite theory. The fact is that the terms "slavery" and "slave" are used in two distinct senses. There are not only natural but also legal slaves, or persons in a state of legal slavery, the law being a sort of convention CHAP. VI. Legal slavery.

[1] Reading λόγῳ.

according[1] to which all conquests in war are the property of the conqueror. It is this principle of legal justice that many jurists impeach as if they were impeaching a statesman for illegality, insisting on the monstrous nature of the doctrine that anyone who has been the victim of force is to be the slave or subject of anyone who is able to employ force, in other words of the stronger party. Upon this point there is a difference of opinion even among philosophic thinkers. Now the ground of this disagreement, the reason why the two theories overlap each other *so to say* is *firstly* that in a certain sense nothing is so well able to employ force as virtue, if possessed of external means, and *secondly* that the conqueror is always superior in respect of some Good or other; hence it appears as though force were never dissociated from virtue, and the only question at issue were the principle of justice. Accordingly one school identifies justice with benevolence, *thereby excluding slavery altogether;* the other defines it simply as the rule of the stronger. Whereas if only we take these theories by themselves, and contrast them, *viz.* (1) *that some slavery is natural,* (2) *that slavery based on mere force is unjust,* there is no strength or plausibility in the latter as against the right of the superior in virtue to exercise rule and mastery. Other thinkers there are, who while they keep absolutely, as they suppose, to a certain principle of justice—for such is the law—lay it down that all slavery which is the result of war, *as having the sanction of*

Theories of slavery.

[1] Reading ἐφ' ᾧ for ἐν ᾧ and omitting φασίν.

law, is therefore just, although in the same breath they contradict themselves. For wars may be unjust in their origin, and if a man is not deserving of slavery, nobody would call him slave; else persons who are esteemed the noblest of mankind will turn out to be but slaves and children of slaves, if they or their parents chance to be taken prisoners and sold into servitude. Accordingly the advocates of this opinion do not mean to apply the term "slaves" to themselves *or other Greeks*, but only to non-Greeks. Yet herein what they have in view is simply the class of natural slaves as we described it at the beginning of our remarks; p. 10. for they are constrained to admit the existence of people, some of whom are slaves universally and the rest are not slaves in any circumstances. So too as regards nobility, they consider themselves *and other Greeks* to be noble not in Greece alone but universally, whereas non-Greeks are noble nowhere but at home, implying the existence of a class of persons, some only conditionally or relatively noble and free, and others absolutely, as when Helen in the play of Theodectes says

> "Who should presume to term me serf,
> The offspring of a twofold stock divine?"

Now to use this language is to make the distinction of slave and free, noble and ignoble depend on virtue and vice alone. It is assumed that, as the offspring of men are men and of beasts beasts, so the offspring of good men are good. And indeed[1] it is

[1] Reading ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ δύναται.

Nature's object to bring about this result, although not infrequently she fails.

Thus we see that there is some reason in the controversy and that in[1] some cases actual slaves or free persons are not so naturally, yet on the other hand that there are cases where this distinction does exist, where the relation of master and slave is mutually advantageous and just and where the form of rule natural to the circumstances i.e. despotic rule is right both for ruler and subject. Any abuse of this rule is prejudicial to both parties, inasmuch as the interests of part and whole, body and soul are coincident, and the slave is a part of his master, a sort of animate and self-existent part of his body.

Thus there is a mutual helpfulness and friendship of master and slave wherever the relation is in accordance with Nature's ordinance; just the contrary is the case where it is unnatural and depends upon law or force.

CHAP. VII.

The government of slaves.

These facts taken by themselves clearly prove that the government of slaves and of a constitutional State is not the same, nor are all the forms of rule the same, as[2] is sometimes said. For in the case of the State the subjects are naturally free, while in the other they are naturally slaves; also the government of a household is a Monarchy, all households being monarchically ruled, whereas in constitutional government the subjects are free and equal to their rulers.

Now when we use the term "slavemaster," we do not mean that a person has learnt a certain science but that he possesses certain qualities, and the same

[1] Omitting εἰσὶ καί.

[2] The reference is again to the *Politicus* of Plato. See Chap. I.

is true of the terms "slave" or "free person." Still we may speak of a science of slavemasters or slaves, meaning e.g. by a science proper to slaves such as was once taught at Syracuse by a man who for a fee gave young slaves instruction in their routine duties; or rather this kind of teaching might be carried even further and include such things as the culinary art and all such kinds of menial work, as there are various slavish functions some of a more honourable and others of a more indispensable character according to the proverb[1]

"One slave before his fellow-slave, one lord before another."

All such sciences as we have specified are proper to slaves, while the science of the slavemaster is that of using slaves, as it is the use rather than the acquisition of slaves which constitutes the slavemaster. There is nothing grand or dignified in this science; it implies no more than that the master should know how to order whatever the slave should know how to perform. Accordingly wherever people are rich enough to relieve themselves from personal inconvenience, this office is devolved upon a steward and the master devotes himself to politics or philosophy. Distinct alike from the science of the slavemaster and of the slave is the science of acquiring slaves (i.e. so far as there is a just science of the kind), which is in a sense a science of war or of the chase.

CHAP. VIII. The Art of Finance.

We may now consider our discussion of slavemaster and slave to be complete and, as we have seen that slaves like other things fall under the head of property, may proceed after our usual manner to examine property as a whole or the Art of Finance.

[1] A line of the comic poet Philemon.

It is evident then that property in this sense, *i.e. so far as it is necessary to existence*, is assigned by Nature herself to all animals not only at the moment of their birth but after they have reached maturity. Thus there are some animals which at the moment of delivery produce food enough to last until the young one can supply itself, as in the case of all vermiparous or oviparous animals; while viviparous animals contain in themselves food for their young during a certain period, i.e. the natural product we call milk. On the same principle we must clearly suppose that at a later stage of existence plants are intended for the use of animals and all the other animals for the service of man, domestic animals for employment and food alike, wild animals all or almost all for food and other purposes, e.g. for the supply of clothing and other instruments. Assuming then that none of Nature's products is incomplete or purposeless, *as man requires food and the other animals are suited to his consumption*, we are driven to the conclusion that all these animals have been created by Nature for the use of man. And hence the art of war so far as it is natural is in a sense a branch of the Art of Acquisition; for it includes the art of the chase which we are bound to use against beasts and human beings who will not submit to the rule ordained for them by Nature, as war of this kind is naturally just.

Relation of the Art of Acquisition to Domestic Economy.

It appears then that there is at least one species of the Art of Acquisition which is naturally part of Domestic Economy, inasmuch[1] as the latter is bound to provide, if it does not find already provided,

[1] Reading καθό.

such articles as are necessary to life or useful to persons associated in a State or household and at the same time are not incapable of accumulation. It may be said that these and these alone constitute genuine wealth. For the amount of such possessions which is enough for independence and a good life is not unlimited like the wealth described by Solon in the line

> "No bound is set to riches i' the world."

To these there is a definite limit as much as in any other art; for in none are there any instruments limitless in number or size, and true wealth consists simply in a number of instruments suited to the purposes of a household or a State.

The fact then that there is a certain Art of Acquisition which falls naturally within the sphere of the householder or statesman, as well as its reason, are now evident. But there is another kind of Art of Acquisition which is in an especial sense known as Finance, as it rightly may be; and it is this which gives rise to the opinion that there is no limit to wealth or property. This second kind is so nearly allied to the first as to be often considered one and the same with it. It is not the same however, although on the other hand it is not widely different; but whereas the first has a natural existence, it has not, but is rather the product of what may be termed experience or art.

CHAP. IX. Unnatural Finance.

In coming to the discussion of it the first remark to be made is that every article of property admits of two uses, both of which are inherent in it though not inherent in the same degree, one being proper to the article and the other not. To take e.g. a shoe, there

The Art of Exchange.

is its use as a covering of the foot, and also its use as an article of exchange; both are uses of a shoe, for if you barter it to someone who wants a shoe in exchange for money or food, you use the shoe *qua* shoe just as much as if you wear it, but the use you make of it in this case is not its proper use, inasmuch as barter is not the object of its production. The same is true of all other articles of property; there is none that does not admit of use in exchange. This use arose in the first instance from natural circumstances, as people had more of some things and fewer of others than they required. And *as the true Art of Exchange was the outcome of natural wants*, so conversely it is plain that Retail Trading is no natural part of Finance; else the barter would not be carried beyond the point of satisfying mere requirements. Now it is obvious that in the primary association, viz. the household, there is no room for the Art of Exchange; it is not possible until the association is already enlarged. For in the household the members shared everything alike, while in the larger associations, *viz. the village or the State*, where they lived separately[1], they experienced various wants and having these wants were forced to interchange their properties by barter, as is still the common way of non-Greek nations, who never go beyond bartering actual commodities one against another, e.g. giving or receiving wine in exchange for corn and so on. Accordingly the Art of Exchange when thus limited is not unnatural, nor is it a species of Finance *in the bad sense*, as its object is no more than the completion of that independence which

Retail Trade.

[1] Reading οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐδέοντο.

Nature herself requires. However the bad Art of Finance was a logical outcome from it. For as the benefits of commerce were more widely extended by importing commodities of which there was a deficiency and exporting those of which there was an excess, the use of a currency was an indispensable device. As the necessaries of Nature were not all easily portable, people agreed for purposes of barter mutually to give and receive some article which, while it was itself a commodity, was practically easy to handle in the business of life, some such article as iron or silver, which was at first defined simply by size and weight; although finally they went further and set a stamp upon every coin to relieve them from the trouble of weighing it, as the stamp impressed upon the coin was an indication of quantity. Thus it was after the invention of a currency as the result of necessary barter that the second species of Finance, viz. Retail Trading, came into existence, at first probably as a simple process, and afterwards, as experience progressed, more and more as a scientific system of the most profitable means and manner of monetary exchange. Hence it is a common opinion that Finance has to do almost exclusively with the currency, and that its function consists in the ability to discover the means of getting a quantity of money—an opinion resting on the assumption that it is productive of wealth or in other words of money. For wealth is often defined as a quantity of current coin, as it is with the currency that Finance *in the bad sense* or the Art of Retail Trading has to do. Sometimes on the other hand the currency is regarded as

The origin of a currency.

mere trash and as having only a current or conventional and not in any sense a natural value, because, if the people by whom it is used give it up and adopt another, it is wholly valueless, it does not serve to supply any want, and a person may have abundance of this currency and yet lack the means of bare subsistence; although it is a paradox to identify wealth with anything of such a nature that one may have plenty of it and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the old story when his insatiable prayer had been granted and everything which was set before him turned to gold. Accordingly people look for another definition of true wealth and of true Finance, and they are right. Finance in the natural sense, like natural wealth, is something different and belongs to the sphere of Domestic Economy, whereas the[1] other is a part of Trade and produces money not indiscriminately but exclusively by means of exchange. It is this last which may be said to be occupied solely with current coin, for the currency is the alpha and omega of such barter. Also it is wealth of this kind, viz. wealth produced by unnatural Finance, which is unlimited. As in the medical art there is no limit to the degree of health it seeks to produce, nor in any other art to the end it has in view—for they all endeavour to realize their end to the fullest possible extent—whereas the reverse is true of the means which in every art are limited by the end, so in the case of unnatural Finance there is no limit to the end proposed which is the wealth appropriate to it or the

Characteristics of natural and unnatural Finance.

[1] Reading ᾗ δὲ καπηλική, ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ᾗ διὰ μεταβολῆς.

acquisition of money. [1]On the other hand in that species of Finance which belongs to Domestic Economy there is a limit; for the mere acquisition of money is not its function. Hence from this point of view there appears to be necessarily a limit to wealth of every kind, although in experience the actual fact is quite the contrary, as all financiers seek to accumulate an unlimited amount of current coin. The explanation is to be found in the close connexion of the two species of Finance. As they both[2] make use of the same material, *viz. money*, the uses practically overlap; for the property[3] which they use is the same, although they use it in different ways, one finding its end in something beyond mere accumulation and the other in accumulation alone. Consequently there are some people who take the accumulation of money to be the function of the economical Finance, *i.e. the Finance which is proper to Domestic Economy*, and are always under the impression that they ought either to preserve or infinitely augment their property in money. This disposition of mind arises from their anxiety about mere living rather than about living well. The consequence is that, as their desire of life is infinitely great, they desire an infinite amount of all that is conducive to life; nay even people who do aspire to live well set their minds solely on the means of sensual gratification, and, as these like other things are apparently bound up with the possession of property, all their efforts are directed to moneymaking, and thus the bad species of

[1] Reading τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς αὖ χρηματιστικῆς.

[2] Reading ἑκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

[3] Reading κτήσεως χρῆσις.

Finance has come into vogue. For as sensual gratification implies superfluity, they are eager to find an art productive of the superfluity indispensable to gratification, and, if they fail to attain their object by means of Finance, they try to compass it by other means, putting all their faculties to an unnatural use. Thus although it is the function of valour to produce not money but intrepid action and of strategy or medicine to produce not money but victory or health, they convert all these arts into arts of Finance, assuming that money is the one end to be attained, and to this end everything else is bound to conspire.

We have now considered both the species of Finance, the unnecessary and the indispensable; we have described the nature of the first and the ground of its necessity and have shown that the second which is concerned with the supply of food is distinct from the first, that it is in its nature economic, and that it is not unlimited like the[1] first but strictly bounded *in respect of the wealth it seeks to produce.*

CHAP. X.

Answer to the question: What is the relation of Finance to Domestic Economy? p. 18.

We see also the answer to the question propounded at the outset: does Finance fall within the province of the householder or statesman or are financial means on the contrary pre-requisites to the exercise of his functions? *According to the latter view,* as statesmanship does not create men but receives them from Nature's hand and makes use of them, so it is Nature's business to supply the means of sustenance in the shape of land or sea or anything else; while the householder or statesman starting with these means has merely to dispose of the produce aright. Simi-

[1] Reading αὕτη.

larly the business of the art of weaving, it may be urged, is not to produce various kinds of wool but to make use of them, distinguishing the good and serviceable kinds from the bad and unserviceable. Otherwise it would be a difficult question why Finance is a part of Domestic Economy and Medicine is not, although health is as indispensable to the members of a household as life or any other necessary. The truth is that, as[1] in one sense it is the business of a householder or ruler to include the health of those he governs among the objects of his care, and in another sense it is not his business but the physician's, so in the case of financial means there is one sense in which the care of them belongs to the householder, and another in which it belongs not to his but to the proper subordinate art. Strictly speaking however, as I have already said, financial means are pre-requisites which Nature ought to provide. For it is Nature's function to supply every creature that is born with food in the residuum of the substance of which the creature itself is formed. Hence Finance so far as it follows Nature depends universally upon the fruits of the earth and animals.

Now, as we said, there are two species of Finance, one belonging to Domestic Economy and the other to Trade. The former is indispensable and laudable; whereas the latter which is an art of exchange is justly disparaged as being contrary to Nature and enriching one party at the expense of the other. But *of all forms of bad Finance* there is none which so well p. 24. Usury.

[1] Reading *περὶ ὑγιείας ἰδεῖν ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ*, and below, *τοῦ οἰκονόμου ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς.*

deserves abhorrence as petty usury, because in it [1]it is money itself which produces the gain instead of serving the purpose for which it was devised. For it was invented simply as a medium of exchange, whereas interest multiplies the money itself. Indeed it is to this fact that it owes its name (τόκος *or offspring*), as children bear a likeness to their parents, and interest is [2]money born of money. It may be concluded therefore that no form of moneymaking does so much violence to Nature as this.

CHAP. XI. Practical Finance. Its divisions and subdivisions.

Having now sufficiently discussed the theory of Finance we have next to describe its practical application. It is to be observed however that in all such matters speculation is free, while in practice there are limiting conditions.

Among the practical subdivisions of Finance the first is an experimental knowledge of [3]live stock. A person must know what are the most profitable kinds of live stock, and in what locality and under what conditions they are the most profitable, e.g. what is the most profitable kind of property in horses, cattle, sheep or other animals. He must know which kinds are most profitable not only as compared with others but in particular places; for they do not all thrive in the same country. Next he must be practically acquainted with farming, both agriculture and the cultivation of trees, as well as with the management of bees and all such kinds of fish or fowls as are capable of supplying human wants. These are the principal parts

[1] Reading *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος.*

[2] Reading *νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος.*

[3] Reading *κτήνη.*

of Finance in the strictest sense of the term. The other species of Finance which consists in exchange comprises first and mainly commerce, of which there are three divisions, viz. marine trade, inland trade, and shopkeeping, differing one from another in relative security and the amount of profit they bring in. It includes also usury and hired labour, whether the labour of mechanical [1] artisans or of persons who are not artisans in any sense and are fit only for physical labour. There is yet a third species of Finance which lies midway between these two, having something in common both with natural Finance and with the Finance which consists in exchange and including all such subordinate arts as depend upon the earth or those products of the earth which are practically useful, although they do not yield fruit, e.g. wood-cutting and mining of all kinds. This species has come to include a large variety of subordinate arts corresponding to the various kinds of mineral products.

This wholly general description of the three species of Finance must suffice for the present; a minute and particular account of them, such as would be useful in business occupations, is unworthy to occupy the time of a philosopher. It may be observed however that the most scientific occupations are those which leave least room for chance, the most mechanical those which do most injury to the body, the most slavish those which demand most physical labour, the most degraded those in which there is least need of a high degree of virtue.

To return however to practical Finance: its vari-

[1] Reading τεχνιτῶν.

ous subdivisions have been treated by particular writers, e.g. farming in both its branches by Charetides[1] of Paros and Apollodoros of Lemnos and similarly other branches by different writers, and I may refer anyone who is interested in the matter to their treatises. It is proper too to collect the scattered notices of the means by which individuals have achieved success in financial operations. Such notices are of value to all votaries of Finance.

Monopoly. The plan attributed to Thales of Miletus is a case in point; it is a financial device of universal application, although ascribed to him as an instance of his practical shrewdness. Being upbraided one day—so the story runs—with his poverty as showing the uselessness of philosophy, he discovered by his knowledge of astronomy the prospect of an abundant crop of olives. Accordingly before the winter was over he got together a small amount of cash and engaged all the oil-presses in Miletus and Chios, paying down the earnest-money. The price he paid for them was low, as no one made a higher bid. When the olive-season arrived and there was all at once a general demand for the oil-presses, by letting them out on his own terms he amassed a vast sum of money, proving that it is easy enough for philosophers to be wealthy if they choose, only their hearts are not set upon riches. Now although Thales gets the credit of having made this display of his shrewdness, the endeavour to secure oneself a monopoly is, as we said, a general principle of Finance. Accordingly there are States which, whenever they find themselves in financial

[1] Reading Χαρητίδῃ.

difficulties, adopt this expedient of establishing a monopoly of commodities. *There was a case similar to that of Thales* in Sicily where a person with whom a sum of money had been deposited bought up all the iron in the manufactories, and upon the arrival of the merchants from the centres of commerce his monopoly enabled him without raising the price much to realize 200 per cent. on all his outlay. Dionysius hearing of the circumstance bade him take his money with him but not stay another day in Syracuse, on the ground that he was the inventor of financial expedients prejudicial to Dionysius's own interests. However that may be, his device and that of Thales are identical; both contrived to secure themselves a monopoly. These are facts which deserve the attention even of statesmen; for States like households, although in a higher degree, often require financial expedients and similar sources of revenue. That is why there are some statesmen whose whole statesmanship is limited to Finance.

CHAP. XII. Marital and parental rule. p. 8.

There are, as we have seen, three branches of Domestic Economy, viz. the relations of a slavemaster to his slaves, which have been discussed already, the relations of a father to his children, and thirdly the relations of a husband to his wife. *I distinguish the paternal from the marital form of rule;* for[1] although the head of the family rules both his wife and children and rules them in both cases as free persons, yet the kind of rule is different, being constitutional in the wife's case, while in the children's it is regal. *The justification of these forms of rule*

[1] Reading ἄρχει.

lies in the fact that males are by Nature better qualified to command than females, wherever the union is not unnaturally constituted, and those who are elder and more mature than those who are younger and immature. It is true that in most cases of political or constitutional rule there is an interchange of the functions of rulers and subject, as it is assumed that they are naturally equal and indistinguishable. Nevertheless at any particular time an effort is made to distinguish the rulers from the subjects by insignia of office, forms of address and acts of respect according to the remark[1] Amasis made about his footpan. Now the relation *which rulers in a constitutional country bear during their term of office to their subjects* is the relation which the male at all times bears to the female. The rule of a father over his children on the other hand is like that of a king over his subjects; for the parental rule rests upon affection and respect, and this is precisely the character of kingly rule. Hence Homer was right in giving Zeus the title[2] "Father of Gods and men," Zeus who is the king of all. For the ideal of a king is that he should be distinct from his subjects in nature but one with them in race; and this is exactly the relation of a senior to a junior or of a parent to his child.

CHAP. XIII. It appears then that in Domestic Economy more attention is devoted to human beings than to inanimate property, more to their virtue or excellence than to that of property, or as we term it to wealth, and more to the virtue of free persons than to that of slaves.

[1] Herodotus II. 172.

[2] *Iliad* I. 544.

As to slaves the first question which arises is whether a slave is capable of any virtue beyond that of a mere instrument or menial, i.e. of any more honourable virtue, such as temperance, courage, justice or any similar moral habit; or on the contrary there is no virtue of which he is capable apart from acts of bodily service. Whichever view we take we are met by a difficulty. If we affirm the capacity of the slave for the higher virtues, we may be asked wherein the difference between slaves and free persons will consist; if we deny it, the denial is a paradox in the case of human and rational beings as slaves are. The same question or one very similar is raised in regard to women and children. Are they capable like men of virtues? is a woman bound to be temperate, brave and just? may a child be called licentious or temperate? Indeed it is a general question worthy of consideration whether the virtue of natural rulers and natural subjects is identical or different. For if we say that both are to possess high moral qualities, why should there be this absolute distinction of ruler and subject? It cannot be answered that the difference lies in the more or less *of moral nobleness that they possess;* for the difference between rule and subjection is one of kind—not so the difference between more or less *which is one of degree.* On the other hand the theory that moral nobleness is necessary to the one and not to the other is a strange one. Unless he is temperate and just, how shall a ruler be a good ruler or a subject a good subject? for if he is licentious and cowardly, he will fail to perform any of his duties. It seems clear then that they must both

The capacity of slaves for virtue,

and of women and children.

The virtue of natural rulers and natural subjects generally.

possess virtue but that there must be different kinds of virtue corresponding to the difference between *natural rulers and* natural subjects. In fact, to take an obvious illustration, this relation of rule and subjection is shewn in the soul. There is one part of the soul which naturally rules and another which naturally obeys; and the virtue we ascribe to them, i.e. to the rational part and the irrational, is different. We see clearly then the same is true of the other cases. [1]Hence, as there are naturally various kinds of rulers and subjects—the rule of a free person over a slave is one kind, that of male over female another and that of a man over a child a third—and as the parts of the soul are innate in all, although in different manners (for the slave is wholly destitute of the deliberative part, whereas it exists in the female and child but in the former has no authority and in the latter is imperfectly developed); on the same principle, if we take the moral virtues, the right view is that they must be possessed by all, not however in the same manner but by each in the degree essential to the discharge of his function. It follows that the ruler must possess moral virtue in its full development. For *in any handicraft* the work to be

[1] It seems necessary to make some alteration of the text. The reading which I have translated is as follows: *ὥστ' ἐπεὶ φύσει πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα (ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός) καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἀτελές) ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλ' ὅσον ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον.*

performed depends altogether upon the mastercraftsman, and reason is the mastercraftsman *of the soul; therefore in order to perform his work the ruler must needs possess perfect reason which implies fully-developed moral virtue.* The various classes of subjects on the other hand require only such a degree of virtue as is proper to the part they have to play.

These considerations shew clearly (1) that all the persons mentioned above are capable of moral virtue; (2) that *this virtue is not the same in all cases, e.g.* the temperance of a man and a woman is not the same nor their courage and justice, as Socrates[1] supposed, but a man's courage is of a ruling and a woman's of a subordinate kind, and so with all the other virtues. We shall discover the same truth by examining the subject more in detail. For people merely deceive themselves by such general definitions of virtue as "a good condition of the soul," "uprightness of conduct," and so forth; it is far more sensible to follow Gorgias in drawing up catalogues of the virtues *appropriate to each class.* Thus we must suppose that what the poet[2] says of woman,

"Silence is woman's crown,"

is applicable to all the subject classes; but the truth does not extend to men. Also, as a child is not yet completely developed, it is clear that his virtue is not the virtue of an independent being but has reference to one [3]in whom he finds complete development and

[1] The reference is to Plato *Menon*, p. 73 A sqq.
[2] Sophocles *Ajax*, 293.
[3] Reading πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

guidance, *viz. his father.* So too the virtue of a slave has reference to his master. And further, from the principle we laid down, viz. that a slave is useful merely in providing us with the bare necessaries of life, it is evident that he needs no high degree of virtue but only just so much as will prevent his failing in his duties from licentiousness or timidity.

The capacity of artisans for virtue.

And here the question may be raised, If our present statement is true, will it be necessary for artisans also to possess a certain virtue, as licentiousness often leads them to fail in their duties? It seems however that there is a wide difference between the cases. The slave and his master have a common existence; whereas the artisan stands to his master in a relation far less close and participates in virtue only so far as he participates in slavery. For the mechanical artisan lives in a condition of what may be called limited slavery. *Another reason why virtue is impossible or hardly possible to the artisan* is that cobblers and all other artisans, unlike slaves, are in no sense creations of Nature.

The means of producing virtue in slaves.

It is evident therefore that the virtue appropriate to a slave must be produced in him by his master and not by [1]anyone who is acquainted with that art of slaveowning which merely gives a slave instruction in his duties. [2]They are wrong therefore who deny reason to slaves and affect to employ commands only *in dealing with them*; for advice is more suitable to slaves than to children.

But this discussion of the whole subject must

[1] Reading οὐ τὸν τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα.

[2] The reference is to Plato *Laws*, p. 777 E.

suffice. As regards husband and wife, father and children, the moral laws determining the virtue of each and their intercourse one with another and the true method of following the good and eschewing the bad, all this it will be necessary to consider when we come to treat of the different forms of polity. For as every household is a part of a State, and man and wife, father and children are parts of a household, and the excellence of any part must have reference to that of the whole, it is essential to educate our women and children with constant reference to the polity, if indeed the virtue of the women and children is of any importance in its bearing upon the virtue of the State. Nor indeed can this be doubtful, when we consider that women form half the free population and the children grow up to be the citizens of the State.

Having fully discussed then one part of the subject and deferred for the present our consideration of the rest, we may leave our present arguments as complete and start afresh upon a new topic. We will begin by examining the theories of those authors who have put forward their views of the best polity.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Examination of polities projected or existing.

As our purpose is to investigate what[1] is the best of all forms of political association for persons whose life is capable of approximating most nearly to an ideal, we are bound to examine all other forms of polity, not only such as exist in states which are reputed to be well-ordered but such others also as have been proposed by individual thinkers and are popularly considered to be successful. In this way we shall be likely to discover what is right and what is expedient; and instead of our endeavour to find some new form of polity seeming to indicate a desire to display our own cleverness at any cost, the inquiry we undertake will seem to be due to the imperfection of all polities now existing or proposed.

We must begin with the natural beginning of an investigation like the present. The collective citizens of a State must of necessity either have everything in common or nothing in common or some things in common and not others. It is plainly impossible that they should have nothing in common. For the polity is a species of association; and, if we go no further,

[1] Reading τίς κρατίστη.

its members must live in a common locality, as the locality of a single State is necessarily single, and *from the nature of the case* the fellow-citizens are members of a single State. Is it desirable however that in a State which is to be rightly ordered they should have the greatest possible number of things in common or only some things and not others? It is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and property in common, as is proposed in the *Republic* of Plato where Socrates argues for a community of all three. Is it better to follow the existing system in this respect or the order of things described in the *Republic?*

The *Republic* of Plato.

Not to speak of many difficulties inherent in a general community of wives, the reason alleged by Socrates in behalf of such an institution is clearly not a legitimate consequence of his arguments. Nor again is the institution as portrayed in the *Republic* effectual as a means to the end which according to him ought to be realized in the State. And, *thirdly*, he has wholly omitted to lay down its proper limitations. By the end I mean the doctrine that it is best for the whole State to be as nearly as possible a unit; for this is the fundamental position assumed by Socrates.

CHAP. II.

It is evident however that as a State advances and becomes more a unit it will cease to be a State at all. A State essentially implies a number of people; and as it becomes more and more a unit it will cease to be a State and be a household and will cease to be a household and be an individual, for it will be admitted that a household is more a unit than a State and an individual than a household. Hence even if one were able to effect this unification it would not be right

(1) Objections to the proposed unification of the State.

to do so, as it would mean the destruction of the State.

Again, not only does a State consist of a number of individuals but the individuals are different in kind. It is impossible to form a State all the members of which are alike. This is just the distinction between a State and a confederation. [1]A confederation, the object of which is military strength, derives its efficiency from its size, even if all the constituent parts are of one kind, just as if one weight is heavier than another, *it turns the scale.* There will be much the same difference between a State and a tribe in all cases where the members of the tribe are not scattered in different villages but *have a collective organization* like [2]the Arcadians. On the other hand the parts which are to constitute a single organic whole must be different in kind. And thus it is the principle of reciprocal equality which is the preservative of States, as [3]I have already stated in the *Ethics*; for this principle necessarily obtains even in a society of free and equal persons. In this case they cannot all rule simultaneously but must follow a system of yearly rotation or some other order of succession or period of office; and in this way all become rulers *in turn,* just as if cobblers and carpenters changed places instead of the same people being always one or

[1] Reading *τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν) ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἑλκύσῃ.*

[2] "Like the Arcadians," i.e. since the foundation of Megalopolis.

[3] *Nicom. Eth.* v. ch. 5.

the other. But[1] as it is best that this should be the case, *i.e. that a man who is a cobbler or carpenter should be so always,* so too in the political association it is obviously best that the same persons should, if possible, be perpetual rulers. Where however this is impossible owing to the natural equality of all *the members of the State,* and at the same time justice demands that rule, whether it be a privilege or a burden, should be shared by all alike, [2]in these cases an attempt is made to imitate the condition of original dissimilarity by the alternate *rule and* submission of those who are equals. Here there are always some persons in a position of rule and others of subjection; [3]*but the rulers of one time are the subjects of another and vice versâ,* as though their actual personality had been changed. The same principle *of alternation* during the period of their rule regulates the distribution of the different offices among different persons. It is clear then from these facts that the kind of unification proposed by some thinkers is not the natural condition of a State, and that what has been described as the highest good of which States are capable means their destruction; *it cannot there-*

[1] Reading *ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βέλτιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν.*

[2] Reading *οὕτω δὴ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν τὸ ἀνομοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς.*

[3] The words *παρὰ μέρος* or *κατὰ μέρος* do not seem to have the support of the best MSS.; in their absence it is necessary to supply some clause from the context to explain the meaning of *ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι.*

fore be a Good, for the Good of anything acts as its preservative.

But it may be demonstrated also in another way that the endeavour after an excessive unification of the State is no advantage. A household is a more independent body than an individual and a State than a household; in fact the true conception of a State is not realized until the association of people composing it has attained independence. Assuming then that a condition of more independence is preferable to one of less, we must conclude that a condition of less is preferable to one of greater unification.

CHAP. III. (2) Objections to the test and means of unification.

But to come to the second point. Even granting that it is best to reduce the association as far as possible to a unit, the existence of this unity does not appear to be proved by the formula "[1]where all simultaneously term the same object *mine* or not *mine*," which Socrates takes to be an evidence of the complete unification of a State. The word "all" is ambiguous. If it means "each individually," it is possible that the result which Socrates seeks to compass would be in a fair way to be realized, i.e. each individual will call the same child his son and even the same woman his wife, and so with his property and every casual incident of life. But in the case supposed this will not be the sense in which the word will be used by persons who have a community of wives and children; *they will all call the wives and children theirs,* but it will be "all" in the sense of "all collectively," not of "each individually." So too with the

[1] Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 462 C.

property; it will belong to all collectively, not to each as an individual.

It appears then that the formula "All call the same thing *mine*" is virtually a quibble. The fact is that words like *all, both, odd, even,* by their ambiguity give rise to fallacious reasonings even in regular disputations; and our conclusion must be that "All call the same thing *mine*," if it means "each individually," is specious but chimerical, whereas if it means "all collectively," it is very far from conducive to harmony.

Community of wives and children.

But besides this the formula involves a further evil. The more numerous the joint-owners of anything, the less it is cared for. People pay most attention to their own private property and less to that in which they have but a part interest, or at the best they only attend to it so far as it concerns them personally; for, apart from other reasons, they are disposed to neglect it by the idea that somebody else is looking after it, as in domestic service a number of attendants sometimes do their work less efficiently than a few. Now *in the Republic of Plato* every citizen is supposed to have a thousand sons, not in the sense of sons who are his and no one else's; on the contrary, any child is equally the son of any parent, and the result will be that all the parents will be equally neglectful of all the children. Again, *in the Republic* when any citizen is prosperous or unsuccessful everybody speaks of him as "mine" in a restricted sense corresponding to the fraction he himself is of the whole population, i.e. *when he calls him "mine"* he means "mine or so-and-so's," the "so-

and-so" being each of the thousand citizens or however many the State includes. Nay even here he is in doubt, as it is impossible to tell who had a son born to him or whose son, if he were born, was spared to grow up. But I ask, which is the better state of things, that the term 'mine' should be used [1]without any distinctive appellation by each of two thousand or ten thousand persons as the case may be or should be used as it actually is in existing States, where the same person is called by A his son, by B his brother, by C his cousin or whatever the relationship may be, whether one of consanguinity or connexion and affinity direct or indirect, and [2]by others again fellow-clansman or fellow-tribesman? Surely it is better to be a person's own cousin than his son in Plato's sense.

At the same time, *even where there is a community of wives and children*, it is impossible to prevent persons suspecting their own brothers, children, fathers and mothers; they are sure to derive their proofs of mutual relationship from the likenesses which the children bear to their parents. Indeed some authors of Voyages round the world assert that this is actually the case, as in some tribes of [3]Upper Libya there exists community of wives, but the children born are assigned to different parents according to their personal likenesses. So too there are also some females among the lower animals, e.g.

[1] Reading τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύοντας, δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων.

[2] Reading ἕτεροι.

[3] See e. g. Herodotus IV. 180.

mares and cows, which naturally produce an offspring closely resembling their parents, as in the case of the Pharsalian mare called Dicæa.

Further, if we establish this community *of wives and children*, it is difficult to provide against the untoward events which naturally follow, such as cases of outrage, involuntary or even voluntary homicide, assault and vituperation which are innocent perhaps in the case of strangers but involve pollution in the case of parents or near relations. Nay such proceedings will inevitably be more frequent if the relationships are unknown than if they are known; and upon their occurrence, if this knowledge exists, it is possible to make the proper atonements, whereas otherwise it is quite out of the question. CHAP. IV.

It is strange too that after introducing a community of sons the only thing which Socrates prohibits should be the actual intercourse of lovers, while he does not prohibit the passion of love itself or those other kinds of intimacy which cannot exist between father and son or between two brothers without the grossest breach of decency, as in fact is true even of the passion of love itself. Another remarkable point is that the sole reason assigned by Socrates for prohibiting this intercourse is the vehemence of the pleasure it affords, while the fact that the parties to it are father and son or two brothers is in his opinion of no importance whatsoever.

Again, it would seem to be more expedient *for the State* that this community of wives and children should exist among the Husbandmen *or subjects in Plato's Republic* than among his "Guardians" *or*

rulers; for such a community will tend to weaken mutual affection, and the affection existing among the members of the subject class ought to be weak, if they are to be obedient and not revolutionary.

Speaking generally too we may say that this institution will necessarily result in the very opposite of that state of things which should be produced by a wisely-ordered legislation and of the object which Socrates has in view in so regulating the status of the children and wives. Mutual affection, as we hold, is the greatest of all blessings in a State, as it affords the best guarantee against sedition; and it is the unity of a State that Socrates eulogizes so highly. But according to the general opinion of men as well as the doctrine of Socrates himself this unity is the result of mutual affection; witness Aristophanes's description in the [1]Erotic Dialogue of lovers in their strong affection desiring to be united and to be no longer two but one flesh. In the case of these lovers such a union necessarily involves the destruction of one, if not of both. In the State, on the other hand, the result of a community of wives and children is that the affection is inevitably reduced to a watery kind, and it is only in an extremely feeble sense that a son terms a father or a father a son *mine.* Just as when a little sugar is melted in a quantity of water the admixture is imperceptible, so [2]will it be with

[1] The reference is to Plato *Symposium*, p. 191 C, D.

[2] Reading *οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὂν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρὸς ἢ ὡς ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων.*

the mutual relationships implied in these names; for in a polity so constructed there is no reason why a parent should devote himself to any child as his son or a son to any parent as a father or any citizens to each other as brothers. For there are two principal causes of attachment and affection in the world, viz. the exclusive possession of anything and its preciousness, neither of which can be found among the citizens in the Socratic polity.

Again, as regards the transference of the children that are born, whether from the class of Husbandmen or Artisans to that of Guardians or *vice versâ*, one has much difficulty in seeing how it is to be carried out, not to say that the persons engaged in the work of consignment and transference will of course know to whom they consign particular children, *and hence a child cannot be absolutely separated from the class to which he belongs.* Also the evils specified before, viz. instances of outrage or sensual love or homicide, will be more likely to occur in the case of the children so transferred. For the Guardians cease *ex hypothesi* to be addressed as brothers, children, fathers or mothers by the members of their class who are consigned to the rank of ordinary citizens, and the ordinary citizens by those who are placed in the Guardian class; hence it is impossible for them to be on their guard against actions of the kind described, as a sense of their relationship would suggest.

Having thus settled the question of a community of wives and children we proceed to the consideration of property. What is the right system of property for people who are to live as citizens of the best polity?

CHAP. V. Community of property.

is it to be held in common or not? This is a question which may be considered quite irrespectively of the legislative enactments in regard to wives and children. I mean that, even assuming the separate possession of wives and children as is now the universal rule, we may still inquire respecting property [1]whether the best state of things is a community of produce or of landed property or of both, i.e. whether it is best that the estates should be held separately, while the fruits are brought into the common store to be consumed, as is the manner of some uncivilized tribes, or conversely that the land should be common property and cultivated in common, while the produce is divided for the use of individuals—a sort of community which is reported to obtain among some non-Greek peoples—or, thirdly, that both the estates and the produce should be common.

Where the agricultural population forms a class distinct from the citizens, a different and less complex system is possible; but where the citizens live altogether by their own labour, the conditions of property will involve various difficulties. Thus if the shares of enjoyment or labour are unequal, those who get less and work more are sure to raise complaints against those who enjoy or get much and labour little. In fact as a general rule it is no easy matter for people to live together and enjoy any worldly goods in common, more especially such things as land and landed produce. This is evident from the case of people who travel together and keep a common purse;

[1] Reading *τὰς χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τάς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις.*

they almost invariably come to quarrels and collisions arising from common and unimportant causes. So too we are most likely to come into collision with those servants with whom we have most to do, as they wait upon us in the affairs of everyday life.

There are then these and other similar inconveniences inherent in a community of property. The existing system, if embellished by the moral tone of those who live under it and by a code of wise laws, would be far superior, as it would combine the advantages of both principles, viz. of common and individual possession. For property ought to be common in a certain sense, although in its general character it should be private. Thus the division of superintendence will prevent mutual recriminations; and all will succeed better, as each devotes himself to his own private possessions, while in practice virtue will render "friends' goods common goods" according to the proverb. The outlines of such a system are actually found in some states, so that it is not wholly chimerical, and in well-ordered states especially it is in some respects already realized and in others easily attainable. For every citizen, although he holds his property in private possession, uses part of it for the benefit of his friends and shares part of it with them, as e.g. in Lacedaemon the citizens use each other's slaves as virtually their own and so too their horses, dogs and provisions, if they require them in their [1]hunting expeditions through the country. Plainly then it is desirable that the tenure of property should be private but that practically it should be made

[1] Reading ἐν ταῖς ἄγραις.

common. To produce in the citizens a disposition to make this use of their property is a task proper to the legislator.

Again, if we take account of personal gratification, there is an unspeakable advantage in the sense of private property. No doubt the love each individual bears to himself is not purposeless; it is a natural feeling. Self-love on the contrary is justly censured; but self-love does not mean loving oneself but loving oneself more than is right, just as the love of money *means an excessive love of money,* for a certain love of all such things is pretty well universal. On the other hand there is nothing pleasanter than to afford gratification or help to friends, guests or companions, and this is impossible unless our property is ours exclusively.

Such are the [1]ill results of the endeavour after an undue unification of the State. I may add that it undoubtedly does away with the exercise of two virtues, viz. of continence in regard to women—for it is a noble act to abstain from adultery in virtue of continence—and of liberality in regard to property; for *where property is held in common* nobody will shew a liberal spirit or perform any liberal action, as the exercise of liberality consists in the use a person makes of his own possessions.

Legislation then of the kind proposed in Plato's *Republic* has a specious and philanthropic appearance; it is eagerly embraced by people at the first hearing under the impression that a sort of marvellous universal love will be its result, especially if one

[1] Omitting *οὐ*.

inveighs against the actual evils of existing polities as arising from the want of a community of property—such evils, I mean, as civil law-suits, trials for false witness and the habit of toadying to the rich. All these evils however are due not to the want of community of property but to the depravity of human nature. For experience teaches that disputes are far more likely to occur among people who possess property in common and live as partners than among those who hold their estates in separate tenure, although the instances we observe of litigants among whom this community exists are few absolutely as compared with the number of those among whom the private tenure of property is the rule. And further it is fair to state the benefits as well as the evils we shall lose by establishing such a community. But life appears wholly impossible *on such principles.*

The cause of Socrates's mistake is to be found in the falsity of his fundamental position. It is true that in a certain sense both the household and the State ought to be units, but not absolutely. For a State as it progresses towards unity may altogether cease to be a State or, although it remains a State, may nearly cease to be one and so become a worse State; just as you would spoil a harmony or a rhythm by reducing it to unison or to a single metrical foot. The right course, as has been already remarked, is to p. 40. retain the essential plurality of the State and to make it a community or a unit by education; and we may well be surprised that Socrates, of all persons, whose purpose was to introduce education and who looked upon education as the means of making the State

virtuous, should think to order it aright by such means as he proposes rather than by moral discipline, intellectual culture and legislation, after the example of the legislators who in Lacedaemon and Crete effected a certain community of property by the institution of common meals.

Nor again can we rightly shut our eyes to the duty of paying regard to history, to all the ages of the past in which the system proposed by Socrates, were it a wise one, would not have failed to be discovered; for it may be said that all discoveries have been already made, although in some cases they have not been combined and in others when made are not acted upon.

However *the impossibility of complete unification* would be most conspicuous, could we once see a polity of the Socratic type in actual process of construction. It will be found impossible to create the State without [1]immediately making divisions and separations whether into common tables, *as at Sparta*, or into clans and tribes, *as at Athens*. Hence the sole result of the legislation *proposed in the Republic* will be the prohibition of an agricultural life to the Guardians, a result which the Lacedaemonians even under existing conditions try to effect.

(3) Incompleteness of the polity proposed in the *Republic*.

But *to come to the third main objection:* Socrates has not stated, nor is it easy to state what is to be the character of his polity as a whole in respect of its members. Yet it may be said that certainly the main body of the State consists *not in the Guardians but* in the mass of other citizens, about whom nothing is

[1] Reading *μερίζων αὐτίκα καὶ χωρίζων*.

determined, e.g. whether property is to be held in common by the Husbandmen as well as by the Guardians or to be separate and individual, and again whether their wives and children are to belong to them separately or in common. If there is a general community of everything as in the first case, how will they differ from the Guardians as above described? [1]and what is to induce them to submit to the rule of the Guardian class, unless some such artifice is devised as by the Cretans who, while they allow all other rights to their slaves as much as to freemen, have merely denied them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms? If on the other hand the system of property and of the family relations among the Husbandmen is to be the same as exists in ordinary States, how is the association of the two classes to be constituted? The necessary consequence is that there will be two States in one and these States mutually hostile. For Socrates divides his State into the Guardians on the one hand who form a sort of military garrison and on the other the Husbandmen, Artisans, and the rest of the population who constitute the ordinary citizens; and among these two classes recriminations, lawsuits and all the other evils he describes as existing in States will be just as prevalent as elsewhere. Yet according to Socrates his citizens will be so educated as to require but few legal regulations, such as police regulations of the city and market or the like, although he assigns the education to the Guardian class alone.

Again Socrates gives his Husbandmen an absolute ownership of their estates on condition of paying a

[1] Omitting ἢ τί πλεῖον τοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν;

fixed rent to the Guardians. But *if they are absolute owners,* they are likely to be far more intractable and arrogant than the classes of Helots, Penestae or Serfs which exist in some countries.

However, whether ordinances *as to the conditions of property and of the family* among the Husbandmen are as important as among the Guardians or not, certain it is that no definite statement on the subject has been actually made by Socrates. [1]Nor again has he said anything about the questions which next suggest themselves, viz., the political constitution, education and laws of the Husbandmen. Yet these are points of considerable difficulty, and at the same time the character of the Husbandmen is highly important to the maintenance of the association existing among the Guardians. Again if it is the intention of Socrates to establish community of wives and individual possession of property *among the Husbandmen, it is natural to raise the objection,* Where will be the women to devote the same attention to domestic as their husbands to agricultural affairs?[2]

(4) Minor objections.

...It is strange too that Socrates, when he is arguing that the pursuits of women should be the same as those of men, should draw his illustration from the

[1] Reading νῦν γ' οὐδὲν διώρισται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, κ.τ.λ.

[2] The imperfect sentence κἂν εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες is necessarily omitted in translation. It seems probable that some words have dropped out of the text after γυναῖκες, as Aristotle having considered the case where there is community of wives and separateness of property would naturally proceed to the case where both wives and property are common.

lower animals, among whom no such thing as Domestic Economy exists.

There is a danger also in the system of rulers proposed by Socrates. He would have the same persons rulers in perpetuity. But this perpetuity of rule is the cause of political disturbance even among people who possess no sense of self-respect and *à fortiori* among men of spirit and martial temper *like his Warriors*[1]. Yet we see at once that he could not help creating perpetual rulers. For [2]the divine gold is not infused into the souls now of some and again of others but of the same persons for ever. His theory is that at the moment of birth God infused gold into some people, silver into others and brass or iron into those who should be Artisans or Husbandmen.

Finally, while denying happiness to the Guardians, Socrates teaches that it is the legislator's duty to make the State as a whole happy. Yet how can the whole State be happy unless[3], if not all its parts, yet most or at least some enjoy happiness? Happiness is not like evenness in numbers; it cannot belong to the whole without belonging to either of the parts, as evenness can. But if the Guardians are not happy, who else will be? certainly not the Artisans and the multitude of mere Mechanics.

In the polity described by Socrates *in the Republic* these difficulties and others not less serious are inherent. The same or nearly the same is true of Plato's later work, the *Laws*. It is worth while then to devote

CHAP. VI. The *Laws* of Plato.

[1] It is the ἐπίκουροι of the *Republic* who are here meant.

[2] See Plato *Republic*, III. p. 415.

[3] Reading μὴ τῶν πλείστων εἰ μὴ πάντων.

a brief consideration to the polity delineated in the *Laws*. For the points determined by Socrates in the *Republic* are extremely few, viz. the right conditions of the community of wives and children and of property and the general system of the polity. The mass of the population he divides into two parts, the Husbandmen and the military class, with a third class formed from members of the second, viz. the deliberative class which is supreme in the State. As to the Husbandmen and Artisans, whether they are not to be eligible to any offices or only to particular offices, whether they are to possess arms like the Guardians and fight in the wars with them or not, Socrates has left wholly undetermined; he merely lays it down that the wives of the Guardians ought to fight in the wars and receive the same education as the Guardians themselves, while for the rest he has filled his discourse with extraneous topics and with a discussion of the education to be given to the Guardian class.

Comparison of the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

The *Laws* consists mainly of legislative enactments with but few remarks on the subject of the polity. And although the purpose of Plato *in the Laws* is to create such a polity as shall have more affinity to existing States, he gradually brings it round again to the old polity *described in the Republic*. For if we except the community of wives and property, all his regulations are the same for both; there is the same education, the same rule of abstinence from menial labours, the same institution of common meals. The only points of difference are that in the polity of the *Laws* he insists upon common meals for women as well as men and that the number of citizens possess-

ing arms is supposed to be five thousand instead of one thousand, as in the *Republic*.

Criticism of the polity of the *Laws*.

Now although all the Socratic dialogues are characterized by brilliancy, grace, originality and research, it is perhaps difficult to succeed in every detail. Thus if we take e.g. the number just mentioned, we must not conceal from ourselves that a country as large as the Babylonian or some other of boundless extent will be required, if it is to support five thousand citizens in idleness and [1]with them a host of women and attendants many times as numerous as themselves. Impossible assumptions *of this kind* however are inadmissible *in constructing an ideal State*, although arbitrary ones are allowable.

Further it is the duty of the legislator according to Socrates in enacting his laws to have regard to two things, viz. the country and the people. He might properly have added "to neighbouring lands also," [2]especially if the State is to lead a social life *as a member of the family of States*; for in that case it will need to use such means of offence and defence in war as are serviceable in dealing with foreign lands no less than within the country itself. In fact even if we do not accept this social life either for the individual or for the State as a body, it is none the less necessary to inspire our enemies with fear not only when they have invaded the country but even after their retreat.

Again, it is a question whether it would not be

[1] Reading παρὰ τούτοις.

[2] Reading πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν, κ.τ.λ., and substituting a colon for the full stop after τοὺς ἔξω τόπους.

better to adopt a different, i.e. a less ambiguous definition, of the amount of property the citizens are to hold. Socrates *in the Laws* says it should be "large enough for living temperately," which is like saying "large enough for living well." The definition is too vague, not to say that a person may "live temperately" when he is living penuriously. A better definition would be "temperately and liberally"; for if the two are separated, liberality of life may be compatible with luxury and temperance with hardship. *The reason for naming liberality and temperance is* that these are the only moral habits[1] which have to do with the use of property. It is impossible, I mean, to make a mild or valorous use of property but possible to make a temperate or liberal use of it, and consequently temperance and liberality must be the [2]moral habits which have to do with property.

One may well be surprised too that, while equalizing all properties, Socrates should omit to regulate the number of citizens and should set no limit to the procreation of children, assuming that, however large the number of children born, it [3]will be sufficiently reduced to the original standard of population by cases of unfruitful marriage, because this seems to be actually the case in existing States. Greater exactness however will be necessary in States where the Socratic polity exists than at present. At present there is no destitution, as the estates are subdivided according to the number of citizens, however large it

[1] Omitting αἱρεταί.

[2] Reading ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἕξεις.

[3] Reading ὡς ἱκανῶς ἀνομαλισθησομένην.

may be; but in the polity of the *Laws*, where estates are indivisible, the supernumerary citizens, whether few or many, must be wholly without the means of subsistence. It might be supposed that there was more need of a fixed limit to the procreation of children than to the amount of property, so that no one should beget more than a certain number, and that this total should be fixed with reference to the chances of human life, viz. to the probability of some of the children not living to grow up and to the infertility of a certain number of marriages. The absence of all regulations, as is the case in the generality of States, will necessarily prove a cause of pauperism among the citizens, and pauperism is the parent of sedition and crime. The Corinthian Pheidon, a very early legislator, held that the number of households and citizens ought to be constant, even if their allotments were all originally unequal in size, just the opposite of which is the case in Plato's *Laws*. Upon this point however we must defer for the present the statement of the system which in our judgment would be preferable.

One omission in the *Laws* is that Socrates in describing the rulers has not stated the points of distinction between them and the subjects. [1]He merely remarks that, as the warp is composed of a different wool from the woof, there should be a corresponding difference between the rulers and subjects.

Again, as he allows the whole property of a citizen to be increased up to fivefold, why should

[1] Reading φησὶ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ, κ.τ.λ.

not a similar increase be allowed up to a certain point in his landed estate?

Again, it is a question whether the proposed separation of the homesteads is not inexpedient in the interests of Domestic Economy. For Socrates assigned to each citizen two separate homesteads in different parts of the country; and it is no easy matter to manage two households at once.

Character of the polity.

As a whole the constitution *of the Laws* purports to be neither a Democracy nor an Oligarchy but an intermediate form or, to use the common phrase, a Polity, as the citizens are all who serve as heavy-armed soldiers. If in establishing this polity Socrates regards it as the one which has more affinity than any other to existing States, he is probably right; not so however, if he regards it as the best with the exception of the ideal polity. The preference may perhaps be given to the polity of the Lacedaemonians, or to some other polity of a more aristocratic type. There are some who hold that the best polity should be composed of all the polities blended together. Hence they eulogize the Lacedaemonian polity, some regarding it as a compound of Oligarchy, Monarchy and Democracy, as the kingship according to them forms a monarchical element and the office of the Senate an oligarchical, while there is a democratical element in the Ephoralty, as the Ephors are elected from the commons; whereas others again regard the Ephoralty as a tyranny and find the democratical element in the common meals and the ordinary daily life *of the Lacedaemonians*. In the *Laws* of Plato however it is laid down that the best polity should be

composed of Democracy and Tyranny which may be regarded as the most debased of all polities, if indeed they are polities at all. There is more truth then in the view of those who advocate a blending of a larger number of polities; for the larger the number of component polities, the better will be the polity so composed. Further it is evident that there is no monarchical element at all in the polity of the *Laws* but only oligarchical and democratical elements with an inclination towards Oligarchy, as is clearly seen in the method of appointing the officers of State. For the appointment of the officers by lot from a body of citizens elected by suffrage is a system partly oligarchical and partly democratical. But that the wealthier classes should be compelled to attend the assembly, to vote for officers of State or to discharge any other political function, while the poorer are excused, is characteristic of an Oligarchy. So too is the effort to ensure that among the officers of State there shall be a majority of the rich and that the highest offices shall be filled by members of the wealthiest classes. Also the manner of electing the Council proposed by Socrates is oligarchical. [1] All the citizens are compelled to elect a certain number from the wealthiest and an equal number from the second class. In electing from the third, not all the classes but only the first

[1] In order to bring the present passage into harmony with Plato, *Laws*, VI. p. 756, it seems necessary to read *αἱροῦνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἴσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου· εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες πλὴν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριῶν· εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις.*

three are compelled to vote. Finally, in electing from the fourth, none but the first and second classes are compelled. Of the persons so elected an equal number are afterwards to be appointed from each class. The result will be that a majority *of the electors* will always belong to the wealthiest or upper classes, as some of the democrats not being compelled will abstain from voting.

The error of attempting to create the best polity by a combination of Democracy and Monarchy is plain from these facts and from others that will be adduced when we come to the discussion of such a polity. In the election of the officers of State also the system by which they are elected by suffrage from a body previously elected in the same manner is a dangerous feature *of the polity described in the Laws*, as even a comparatively small knot of people, if they choose to combine, will always be able to control the election.

Such is the system of polity proposed in the *Laws*.

CHAP. VII. There are certain other polities, some put forward by philosophers or statesmen and others by ordinary people, but none so far removed from the established polities of actual States as Plato's in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. No one else has been so original as to suggest a community of wives and children or the institution of common meals for the women; they rather take the absolute requisites of a State as their starting point.

The polity proposed by Phaleas. Equality of property.

Thus there are some who lay the chief stress upon a right system of property, holding that questions of property are the occasions of all civil disturbances.

Accordingly Phaleas of Chalcedon set the example by advocating equality in the possessions of the citizens. This he thought although easily attainable by States at the time of their foundation was more difficult in the case of States already organized; still the equalization of properties would be soonest effected, if dowries were given but not received by the rich and received but not given by the poor. Plato, when he wrote the *Laws*, held that inequality of property up to a certain point should be allowed, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more than five times the minimum, as has been already p. 59.
remarked. But it ought not to escape the attention of legislators who adopt these principles, as in fact it does, that, if they define the amount of property, it is incumbent upon them also to define the number of children. For if the quantity of children becomes too great for the total amount of the property, the law will inevitably be broken; and not only is it broken but there is an evil in reducing a number of people from affluence to poverty, as they are almost certain to display a revolutionary temper. The importance of an equality of property to the political association is a truth which seems to have been fully discerned by some of the ancients, as may be inferred from the legislation of Solon and the fact that in some countries there exists a law prohibiting the indefinite acquisition of property at pleasure. It is on the same principle that the laws *in some States* forbid the sale of property—among the Locrians, e.g. a man may not legally sell his property unless he has proved himself to have been the victim of a notorious

misfortune[1]—and in others enjoin the perpetual maintenance of the original allotments. It was the violation of this last rule which at Leucas e.g. gave a democratical bias to the polity; for the result *of splitting up the patrimonies* was that the offices of State ceased to be filled exclusively by persons possessing the legal property qualification.

However this equality of property may exist and yet the amount of property be too large, so as to occasion luxury, or too small, so as to be a cause of penurious living. We see then that it is not enough for the legislator to equalize properties; he must aim at the right mean *in the amount fixed.* Nor again is it any good merely to fix the proper moderate amount of property for all the citizens. Men's desires need to be levelled more than their properties, and this is impossible unless they are adequately educated by the laws. Perhaps however Phaleas would rejoin that this is precisely his own point; for his theory is that there are two things which ought to be equalized in all States, viz. property and education. But it is necessary to define the education. The mere fact that it is one and the same for all is no good; it may be one and the same, and yet of such a kind as to dispose people to seek an undue share of money or honour or both. Again inequality of honours is as much a cause of civil disturbance as inequality of property, although the cases are just reversed; for the commons *are moved to disturb the peace* by inequality of property, and the upper

[1] There should be only a comma after συμβεβηκυῖαν.

classes for honours, if they have only an equal share. Hence *Achilles e.g. complains:*

[1]"Like honour hath the coward and the brave."

Further it is not only the necessaries of life that are the objects of human crime, for which Phaleas thinks to find a remedy in the equality of property, so that people may not be made pickpockets by cold or hunger; but another object is to get gratification and be relieved from desire. For if people have a desire of something more than the bare necessaries of life, they will commit crimes to satisfy it, and not so only but, even when [2]there is no previous desire, in order to enjoy the gratification of those pleasures which are not preceded by pains. How then are these three classes of crime to be remedied? For the first the remedy is a small amount of property and industry; for the second, temperance; and for the third, all who would be independent of others for their gratification will seek a remedy in philosophy alone, as it is the only pleasure which does not depend upon our fellow-men. As a matter of fact it is the superfluities rather than the bare necessaries of life which are the motives of the most heinous crimes. Thus tyranny is occasioned by something more than the desire to escape freezing; and it is because the crime of tyranny is so great that the honours paid to a murderer are so high, when his victim is not a thief but a tyrant. The conclusion to which we are led then is that it is solely as a preventive of petty crimes that the principle of Phaleas's polity is efficacious.

[1] *Iliad* IX. 319.

[2] Reading ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν.

External relations of the State.

Again, the object of his institutions generally is to place the internal relations of the citizens to one another upon a satisfactory footing. But it is important also that their relations to their neighbours and to all foreign Powers should be satisfactory. Hence the system of the polity must be framed with a view to military strength, which is wholly passed over by Phaleas. It is the same with property. There should be such an amount of property in a State as is sufficient not only to serve the purposes of political life but also to meet perils from without; hence on the one hand it ought not to be so large as to be coveted by neighbouring Powers of superior strength, whose attack its possessors will be unable to resist, nor on the other hand so small as to incapacitate them for supporting a war even with a Power equal or similar to themselves. It follows that, although Phaleas has made no definite statement *on the subject,* we ought not to leave out of sight the question, what[1] amount of property is expedient to a State. Perhaps then the best limit is that it should not be worth the while of stronger Powers to go to war simply because of the superabundant riches of the State, but that they should go to war only in cases where they would do so, even if the property of the citizens were less than it actually is. Thus, to give an illustration, when Autophradates was preparing to blockade Atarneus, Eubulus recommended him to consider how long it would take him to capture the fortress and to calculate the expense he would meanwhile incur, "as I will take a smaller sum" he added, "to evacuate Atarneus

[1] Reading *ὅ τι συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας.*

without a struggle." His words induced Autophradates to reflect and eventually abandon the blockade.

Inadequacy of the system of property.

No doubt there is a certain advantage in an equality of properties among the citizens as a safeguard against civil discord; but it is not in fact very great. For *in the first place* it will produce a feeling of indignation among the upper classes, as they consider themselves entitled to more than mere equality, and consequently, as experience teaches, often become the authors of conspiracies and seditions. And secondly there is no satisfying men's depravity: they are content at first with two obols *as an allowance for the theatre*, but no sooner is this the constitutional sum than they crave a larger one and so on *ad infinitum*. For desire is in its nature limitless; and the satisfaction of desire is the sole object of most men's lives. The [1]remedy of these evils lies not so much in reducing all properties to the same level as in so disposing the higher natures that they are unwilling and the lower that they are unable to aggrandize themselves. But this last result can only be attained where the lower classes are weaker and are not the victims of injustice.

But even the equality of property proposed by Phaleas is open to objection. It is in the landed estate alone that he makes an equality, whereas there is also such a thing as wealth which consists in slaves, cattle and money or a large stock of what is called household furniture. It is right then either to aim at an equalization or a moderate fixed maximum of all such goods or else to put no restriction upon any.

[1] Reading ἄκη.

Position of the Artisan class.

Lastly it is evident from the legislation of Phaleas that the State he proposes to construct is a small one, since the Artisans *according to his theory* are all to be public slaves and not to contribute to the complement of the State. [1]If however there are to be public slaves, the slavery ought to be confined to the persons engaged upon public works, as is the case at Epidamnus and in the system which Diophantus once tried to establish at Athens.

These considerations will enable us to form a tolerable judgment how far Phaleas has been successful or unsuccessful in his proposals for a polity.

CHAP. VIII. The polity proposed by Hippodamus.

The first person, not being a practical politician, who set himself to make a statement of the best polity, was Hippodamus the son of Euryphon of Miletus, the same who invented the method of partitioning cities and laid out the Piraeus with intersecting streets—a man who in his love of ostentation made himself rather eccentric in his general life, so that to some people his manner of living appeared extravagant from his thick flowing locks and the [2] adornments of his dress, which although simple was warm not only in winter but in the summer months as well, yet who at the same time aspired to be a man of learning in all the domain of physical science. His projected State comprised ten thousand citizens and was divided into three parts, the first consisting of Artisans, the second of Husbandmen, and the third of the Military or

[1] Reading *ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ, καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε καὶ Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήνησι, τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.*

[2] Reading *τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ κοσμήσεσιν ἐσθῆτος.*

Armed Class. The land too he wished to divide into three parts, viz., sacred, public and private; the sacred being that which was to supply the cost of the customary religious services, the public all that was devoted to the support of the Military Class, and the private the land of the Husbandmen. Further he held that there were but three kinds of laws, as the possible subjects of judicial procedure were but three, viz., assault, trespass and homicide. He proposed to institute also one supreme Court of Appeal for all cases in which there seemed to have been a failure of justice, and to constitute the court of certain Elders appointed by voting. Judicial verdicts according to him ought not to be returned by balloting; but each juryman should bring a tablet on which to inscribe his verdict, if it were one of simple condemnation[1], while, if it were one of simple acquittal, he was to leave the tablet blank, and, if it were a qualified one, he was to specify the fact. For he disapproved of the system at present established by law on the ground that the jurors are compelled to perjure themselves by returning an absolute verdict one way or the other. Also he proposed a law to confer honour upon anyone who made a discovery beneficial to the State and to provide support at the public expense for the children of those who fell in war—a fact from which we may infer that no such custom had as yet been legally instituted in other countries, although at the present time this law exists both at Athens and in other States as well. He proposed too that all the officers of State should be elected by the commons, meaning by

[1] Omitting τὴν δίκην.

the commons the three classes in the State, and that the officers elected should undertake the conduct of affairs of State and the protection of foreigners and orphans.

Criticism of (1) the classification of the citizens,

Such are the most numerous and important features of the system proposed by Hippodamus. The first difficulty which might be raised is as to the division of the civic population. The Artisans, the Husbandmen and the Military Class are all alike members of the polity; but the Husbandmen do not possess arms, and the Artisans possess neither land nor arms, so that they both become practically slaves of the Military Class. Hence it is impossible that they should be eligible to all the honours of State, as generals, guardians of the citizens and, I may say, the supreme officers generally will necessarily be taken from the Military Class. But if they do not enjoy full civic rights, how can they cherish a friendly disposition to the polity? It may be answered that the Military Class ought certainly to be stronger than the other two together. But this cannot well be the case, unless it is numerous, and, if so, why should the other classes enjoy civic rights and have the appointment of the officers of State in their control? Again, what is the use of the Husbandmen in this State? An Artisan population is of course indispensable, as no State can do without Artisans, and they can support themselves *in the State of Hippodamus* as in any other State by their art. But the case of the Husbandmen is different. There would be good reason why they should form a separate class in the State, if they *merely* supplied the military class with their sustenance; but in the polity of Hippodamus

they possess land of their own and cultivate it for their own private interest. And as to the public land from which the military defenders of the State are to derive their sustenance, if they cultivate it themselves, there will be no distinction between the Soldiery and the Husbandmen, although it is the intention of the legislator to create one; while if the cultivators of it are distinct from the class which cultivates the private estates and from the Soldiery, instead of two classes coinciding there will be here a fourth class in the State not enjoying civic rights but alien to the polity. On the other hand, if Hippodamus makes the same persons cultivators both of the private and the public land, how is each of them to raise produce enough [1]for the support of two households? and why in the world should they not simply get their own sustenance and supply the soldiery [2]from the same allotments of land *without distinguishing the land at all as public or private?* All these are points which involve much confusion.

Again, there is a defect in the proposed law of judicial procedure [3]by which a divided verdict is required, whereas the terms of the suit are simple, and the juror is converted into an arbitrator. Although in arbitration this is possible, even where there are several arbitrators, as they consult together on the verdict to be returned, it is impossible in Courts of Law; on the contrary, most legislators ex- (2) the judicial procedure,

[1] Reading *ὑπουργήσει δύο οἰκίαις.*

[2] Reading *ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων.*

[3] Reading *τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντας τῆς δίκης ἁπλῶς γεγραμμένης.*

pressly provide against consultation among the jurors. Further will there not be inevitable confusion in the verdict whenever it is the opinion of the juror that the defendant is liable but not to the full amount alleged by the plaintiff? Suppose e.g. the plaintiff demands twenty minae, whereas the juror awards[1] him ten, or one juror rather more than ten, a second rather less, a third five, and another four; it is evident that they will fix various fractions in this way, while some again will mulct him in the full sum demanded and others will let him off scot-free. What is to be the method of reckoning these votes? And further no one compels a juror to perjure himself if he returns a verdict of simple acquittal or condemnation, where the accusation is duly preferred in simple terms. For a juror who votes acquittal decides not that the defendant owes nothing but that he does not owe the twenty minae claimed; and the only person guilty of perjury is a juror who returns a verdict for the plaintiff, when he does not believe that the defendant owes the twenty minae.

(3) the rewards conferred upon public benefactors.

Again, as to the propriety of conferring some distinction upon persons who make a discovery beneficial to the State, such legislation is not free from peril and has merely a specious sound, involving as it does intrigues and possibly disturbances of the polity. But this is a question which merges itself in a different problem and a distinct inquiry. It is a difficult question to some people whether it is injurious or advantageous to States to alter their ancestral laws and customs where another better law or custom is

[1] Reading κρίνει.

possible. Hence it is not easy to yield an offhand assent to the proposal of Hippodamus, if we assume the inexpediency of such alteration. People may move the abolition of old laws and customs or of the political constitution as a public benefit.

Arguments for and against the alteration of ancestral laws and customs.

But as we have alluded to the subject, it will be worth while to discuss it a little more fully. There is room, as we said, for a difference of opinion. At first sight there would seem to be an advantage in alteration, as it has certainly proved beneficial in the other Sciences. Thus there has been a benefit in the departure from ancestral rules in Medicine, Gymnastic and the arts and faculties generally; and as Politics deserves to be placed in this category, it is evident that the same must be true also of Politics. It may be said that there is an indication of this truth in the facts of History, as ancient customs are exceedingly rude and barbarous. For instance, the Greeks always carried daggers and purchased their wives from one another; in fact all such primitive institutions as survive in the world are quite absurd, as e.g. the law at Cumae in cases of homicide that the defendant is held to have been guilty of the murder, if the prosecutor produces a certain number of his own kinsmen as witnesses. As a general rule it is not what is ancient but what is good that the world wants. Nor is it likely that our first parents, whether they were the children of earth or the survivors of some catastrophe, were any better than ordinary or unwise people, as in fact is the common notion of the Earth-children *or Giants*. It is absurd therefore to abide by their decrees. We may add that it is

not desirable to leave even the written laws unaltered. For as in the arts generally, so in the political system it is impossible that everything should be precisely specified in writing. The terms of the written law are necessarily general, whereas its practical application is to individual cases. It is evident then that an alteration is right in the case of certain laws and on particular occasions. From another point of view however such alterations seem to require no little caution. Where the improvement is but slight compared with the evil of accustoming the citizens lightly to repeal the laws, it is undoubtedly our duty to pass over some mistakes whether of the legislature or the executive, as the benefit we shall derive from the alteration will not be equal to the harm we shall get by accustoming ourselves to disobey authority. The illustration from the arts is fallacious. There is no parallel between altering an art and altering a law. For all the potency of the law to secure obedience depends upon habit, and habit can only be formed by lapse of time; so that the ready transition from the existing laws to others that are new is a weakening of the efficacy of law itself. And further even if we assume that it is right to alter laws, we have still to ask whether this is true of all laws and in every form of polity, and whether the alteration should be the work of any one who chooses or only of certain definite people. These are points of great importance, and in view of them we may now abandon this inquiry as being rather suited to another occasion.

CHAP. IX. In the polity of Lacedaemon or Crete, and indeed, we may say, in any polity whatever there are two

points to be considered, viz. firstly, how far it is successful or the reverse in its legislative enactments considered relatively to the best system, and secondly, how far it runs counter to the general principle or plan of the polity which the citizens propose to themselves.

The Lacedaemonian polity.

Now it is allowed on all hands that in a State which is to enjoy a noble polity the citizens must be relieved from anxiety about the bare necessaries of life. But the means of securing this relief are not easy to apprehend. *The natural suggestion is that there should be a large subject population, but it is one which is not free from danger.* For the Penestae in Thessaly made frequent attacks upon the Thessalians, as did also the Helots upon the Lacedaemonians; indeed they may be described as perpetually lying in wait to take advantage of their masters' misfortunes. And if the same result has not yet occurred in the case of the Cretans, the reason is probably that, although the neighbouring States are at war among themselves, none has allied itself with the revolted serfs of another; for to do so would be prejudicial to their own interests, as they are themselves too the masters of a surrounding subject populace. Whereas, if we look at the Lacedaemonians, we find that their neighbours without exception were their enemies, Argives, Messenians and Arcadians, *so that the Helots were encouraged to revolt.* For the reason why the Thessalians themselves originally suffered from such revolts was that they were still at war with the nations upon their frontiers, viz. the Achaeans, Perrhaebians and Magnesians. And even apart from

The Helots.

further trouble the mere supervision *of a subject populace* in itself seems to be troublesome enough. What is the right way of dealing with them? If they are left without restraint, they grow insolent and claim equality with their masters; while, if they are harshly treated, they are in a state of conspiracy and bitter illwill. It is evident then that the Lacedaemonians, whose experience in respect of the Helots is such as I have described, are not the discoverers of the best system *of governing subjects.*

The licence of the women.

Again, the licence of the women *at Lacedaemon* is equally fatal to the spirit of the polity and to the happiness of the State. For as husband and wife are constituent elements of a household, it is evidently right to regard a State also as divided nearly equally into the male and female population; and accordingly in any polity where the condition of the women is unsatisfactory, one-half of the State must be regarded as destitute of legislative regulations. And this is actually the case at Lacedaemon. For the legislator in his desire to impart a character of hardiness to the State as a whole, although[1] true to his principle as regards the men, has been guilty of serious oversights in his treatment of the women, as their life is one of unrestrained and indiscriminate licence and luxury. A necessary result then in a polity so constituted is the worship of wealth, especially if the citizens are under the thumb of the women, as is generally the case with military and warlike races, if we except the Celts and any others who have openly attached themselves to men. It was in fact with good reason, as it

[1] Reading κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας τοιοῦτός ἐστιν.

appears, that the author of the myth made Ares the paramour of Aphrodite; for experience shews that military nations are all strongly inclined to the passion of love. Accordingly the influence of women prevailed at Lacedaemon; and while the Lacedaemonian empire lasted a great deal of business passed through their hands. But what difference does it make whether women actually hold office or the officers of State are ruled by the women? The result is in either case the same. And whereas bravery is of no use in any of the routine duties of life [1] but at the best is useful only in the conduct of war, the Lacedaemonian women were the greatest nuisance even in military matters, as they proved at the time of the Theban invasion, when not only were they wholly useless like the women in other States but they were the cause of more confusion than the enemy. There seems to have been originally a reason for the licence of the women at Lacedaemon. Living always beyond the borders, as their military expeditions required, the Lacedaemonians were long strangers to their own land during their wars with the Argives and afterwards with the Arcadians and Messenians. And when the turmoil of war was over, the legislator, into whose hands they put themselves, found them already disciplined by their military life—for a soldier's life has many elements of virtue—whereas Lycurgus, as the story goes, made an effort to reduce the women to conformity with the laws, but they resisted so stoutly that he abandoned the at-

[1] Reading ἀλλ' εἴπερ, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.

tempt. These considerations will account for the actual events and therefore no doubt for the defective discipline of the women. But the point we are investigating is not what is or is not excusable, but what is or is not right. And the unsatisfactory condition of the women seems, as was before remarked, not only to create a certain indecorum in [1]the polity itself but to contribute something to the avarice of the citizens.

Property. *And this brings me to another point;* for it is a natural sequel of these remarks to take exception to the inequality of property. Things have come to this, that there are some Lacedaemonians who possess vast estates and others who possess extremely little; so that the ownership of the soil has fallen gradually into the hands of a few persons. This is a point upon which the legal regulations too are unsatisfactory. For the legislature, while setting and rightly setting a stigma upon the purchase or sale of patrimonies, allowed absolute liberty of presentation or bequest. Yet the result will of course be the same in the one case as in the other. *Another defect is that* owing to the number of heiresses and the practice of giving large dowries nearly two-fifths of the whole soil belongs to women[2]. *But rather than this should be the case* it were better that dowries should be prohibited altogether, or a small or at most a moderate dowry permitted by law. [3]*Again there ought to be laws*

[1] Reading τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτήν.

[2] Omitting καὶ before τῶν γυναικῶν.

[3] The sequence of thought shows that there is a lacuna in the text, probably after τετάχθαι. Perhaps the true reading

regulating the betrothal of heiresses; whereas now *a father* is at liberty to give his daughter and heiress in marriage to any one he chooses, and if he dies without disposing of her by his will, whoever is left heir *to the residue of his property* gives her in marriage to anyone he likes. The result is that, although the country is capable of maintaining fifteen hundred knights and thirty thousand heavy-armed troops, the total number came to be less than one thousand. The evil of this system at Lacedaemon has been proved by actual experience; for the State could not sustain a single blow[1] but perished from the paucity of its population. It is said that under the earlier kings the Lacedaemonians were in the habit of admitting non-citizens to civic rights, thereby preventing depopulation in those days despite the long wars in which they were engaged, and that the Spartiates[2] themselves were at one time as many as ten thousand. However, whether this is true or false, it is better that the State should have a large population secured to it by an equalization of property *than by an extension of civic rights.* But the law relating to the procreation of children is also an obstacle in the way of this reform. The legislator in his desire to multiply as much as possible the number of Spartiates encourages the citizens to beget the largest possible number of children. There is a law

was something like the following: *νῦν δ' ἔξεστι δοῦναι ὁπόσην ἂν τις θέλῃ· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἔξεστι δοῦναι τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται, κἂν ἀποθάνῃ μὴ διαθέμενος, κ.τ.λ.*

[1] The "single blow" is the battle of Leuctra.

[2] Reading *τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.*

at Lacedaemon that the parent of three sons is relieved of military service and the parent of four sons enjoys an immunity from all public burdens. But it is evident that if population increases greatly, while the soil remains divided in the way I have described, there will inevitably be a large body of poor.

The Ephoralty.

Again the conditions of the Ephoralty are unsatisfactory. [1]Although it is an office which controls issues of the highest importance to the Lacedaemonian State, all the Ephors are elected from the commons, and the result is that very poor people often find their way into the Ephoral College, and their impecuniousness, as experience teaches, makes them venal. Their venality was displayed as on many previous occasions, so quite recently in the Andrian[2] case, where a certain number of the Ephors were corrupted by bribes and did all that in them lay to work the ruin of the State. *Nor is this all;* the dignity, the almost despotic nature of the office compelled the kings themselves to pay court to the Ephors and in this among other ways tended to injure the polity, as it gradually ceased to be an Aristocracy and became a Democracy. It is true that the Ephoral College is the keystone of the polity. For the commons are kept quiet by their eligibility to the highest office of State; and thus, whether the result is due to the legislator or to fortune, *the institution of the Ephoralty* is practically

[1] *κυρίαν* is a mere misprint for *κυρία*, and *αὐτὴ* should be omitted from the text.

[2] Nothing is known of the circumstances here referred to; but *νῦν* is in favour of *'Ανδρίοις* rather than *ἀνδρίοις* (cp. p. 51, l. 12) as the true reading.

beneficial. For if a polity is to be preserved, all the elements of the State must desire that it should exist and [1]continue permanently the same. Thus *at Lacedaemon* this is the case with the Kings owing to their royal dignity, with the upper classes owing to the Senate, as the senatorial office is a prize proposed to their virtue, and with the commons owing to the Ephoralty, as it is open to the whole body of citizens. But, although it is right that all the citizens should be eligible to this office, the election ought not to be conducted in the present fashion which is absolutely puerile. And further, as the Ephors, being persons of no special qualifications, are supreme judges in cases of high importance, it is desirable that they should not pass judgments according to their own arbitrary discretion but should be guided by written formulae, i.e. by the laws. Also the manner of life of the Ephors is not consistent with the spirit of the State, [2]as it is one of inordinate licence, whereas among the citizens generally the error is rather on the side of excessive austerity, so that their power of endurance fails, and by secret evasions of the law they enjoy the pleasure of sensual gratifications.

The Senate. Nor again are the conditions of the Senate unexceptionable. It might perhaps be said that they were advantageous to the State, if the Senators were men of virtuous character and adequate discipline in true manly excellence; although even then it would be a question whether they ought to be supreme judges in important cases during the whole period of

[1] Reading *διαμένειν τὴν αὐτήν*.
[2] Reading *αὕτη*.

their natural life, as there is an old age of the intellect as well as of the body. But when their discipline has been such that the legislator himself is distrustful of their virtue, the state of things is full of danger. Experience shows that the occupants of this office frequently sacrifice the public interest to corruption or personal favouritism. It is desirable therefore that they should not be, as now in fact they are, irresponsible. It may be thought that all the officers of State are responsible to the Ephors. But *in the first place* the prerogative so conferred upon the Ephoralty is too great, and *secondly* this general responsibility to the Ephors is not what we mean, when we say that the officers of State ought to be responsible. Further, the election of the Senators is puerile as regards the means of deciding *between the candidates;* nor is it right that anyone who is to be found worthy of the office should be obliged to make a [1]personal canvass, as the right man ought to fill the office whether he wishes or not. But in the present instance it is evident that the legislator is acting upon the same principle as in the other arrangements of the polity. It is because his object is to render the citizens ambitious that he has introduced [2]this personal canvass in the election of Senators; for nobody but an ambitious man would personally solicit office. Yet it may be said that nearly all the deliberate crimes which are done in the world are the results of ambition and avarice.

The Kings. But to come to the Kings: the question whether

[1] *τὸν αὐτὸν* is a misprint for *τὸ αὐτὸν*.

[2] Reading *τούτῳ*.

Kingship is or is not a desirable institution in States may be discussed at another time. Assuredly however it is desirable to depart from the system which now exists *at Lacedaemon* and select each King in virtue solely of his own life. It is clear that the legislator himself despairs of making the Kings noble and good; at all events he distrusts them, as not being men of sufficient goodness, and it was accordingly the custom of the Lacedaemonians to associate the enemies of the Kings with them in their missions beyond the borders and [1]to look upon the dissensions of the Kings as constituting a safeguard of the State.

The Phiditia or common meals.

Again the institution of common meals, the so-called Phiditia, as regulated by its author, is open to objection. The expenses of these meetings ought rather to be borne by the State Exchequer as in Crete; whereas at Lacedaemon every one is bound to contribute, although some of the citizens are extremely poor and unable to afford the outlay. The result is therefore just the opposite of the legislator's intention; while he means the institution of common meals to be a democratical one, as at present regulated it turns out anything but democratical. For the very poor cannot well take part in it; and yet the constitutional limit of the citizenship at Lacedaemon is that any one who cannot pay this tax should not enjoy the rights of a citizen.

The Admiralty.

The law relating to the Admirals has already been attacked by others; and rightly so, as it is a cause of civil discord. For the Admiralty is little less than

[1] Omitting the full stop after ἐχθροῖς.

a second Kingship established as a counterpoise to the Kings who are [1]perpetual generals.

Military spirit.

There is yet another criticism which may be advanced against the fundamental principle of the legislator, as indeed it has been advanced by Plato himself in the *Laws*[2]. It is that the whole system of the Lacedaemonian legislation is intended to produce one element of virtue, viz. military virtue, as conducing to a career of conquest. The result was that, so long as the Lacedaemonians were at war, all was well with them; but no sooner had they made the empire their own than their power began to decay, because they had not learnt to live a life of leisure nor acquired any more valuable discipline than that of war. And they make another mistake not less serious. They hold that those Goods which are the supreme objects of human desire are to be obtained by virtue rather than by vice, and so far they are right; but when they regard these Goods as preferable to Virtue itself, they are wrong.

Finance.

Lastly the system of public Finance among the Spartiates is bad. There is no reserve fund in the State Exchequer against the necessity of great wars, and they are slow to pay extraordinary taxes; for as nearly all the land is in the hand of the Spartiates, they are not careful to examine each other's payments. In fact the issue of the Lacedaemonian legislation has been just the opposite of such a state of things as would be expedient. For while the legislator has reduced the State to poverty, he has inspired the individual citizens with a love of money.

[1] Reading *αἰδίοις*. [2] *Laws* i. pp. 625, sqq.

We must now leave our survey of the Lacedaemonian polity, as these are the features in it which most invite criticism.

CHAP. X. The polity of Crete.

The Cretan polity is closely parallel to the Lacedaemonian; but although in some small respects it is rather superior, its general character is one of less finish. One might suspect, even if History did not relate, that the Lacedaemonian polity has been in most of its features modelled upon the Cretan; and as a general rule ancient institutions are not so finely elaborated as more modern ones. The story runs that Lycurgus, when he gave up his guardianship of King Charillus and went abroad, spent his time chiefly in Crete, being led to do so by the relationship *existing between the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans.* For the Lyctians were Laconian colonists, and the founders of the colony discovered the system of laws in question already existing among the inhabitants of that day. Accordingly the same laws prevail to the present time among the Perioeci *or subject peoples in Crete,* the theory being that this legislative system was introduced in the first instance by Minos. It may be said that the island is naturally adapted by the advantages of its situation to be the imperial State of the Greeks; for it commands the whole Mediterranean, upon which all or nearly all Greek States are situated, being but a short distance from Peloponnesus on the one hand and from the parts of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes on the other. It was thus that Minos acquired the empire of the sea, reduced or colonized all the islands and eventually in an invasion of Sicily lost his life near Camicus in that island.

Relation of the Lacedaemonian polity to the Cretan.

There is a certain analogy between the Cretan polity and the Lacedaemonian. There is in both a subject agricultural class, the Helots at Lacedaemon and the Perioeci in Crete; and in both there is the institution of common meals which were originally called by the Lacedaemonians not Phiditia but Andria as by the Cretans—a clear proof that they have been introduced from Crete. And further the political systems are analogous. The Ephors have the same authority as the so-called Cosmi in Crete, although the Ephors are five in number and the Cosmi ten; so too the Senate in Lacedaemon is equivalent to the Senate, or, as it is called, the Council, in Crete. There were Kings at one time in Crete; but subsequently the Kingship was done away, and the command in war belongs now to the Cosmi. All the citizens may attend the Public Assembly; but its power is limited to confirming the resolutions of the Senate and Cosmi.

Common meals.

The common meals are better regulated in Crete than at Lacedaemon. At Lacedaemon every citizen pays his quota as a poll-tax; and, if he fails, there is
p. 83. a law which disfranchises him, as I said before. In Crete, on the other hand, the expense is more an affair of the State. [1]Of the entire landed produce and live stock belonging to the State as well as of the taxes paid by the Perioeci one portion is set apart for the worship of the Gods and the public services and the other for the common meals, so that all alike, women, children and men, are sup-

[1] Reading ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων τῶν δημοσίων καὶ ἐκ τῶν φόρων.

ported at the public expense. The legislator has devised a variety of expedients to ensure the moderation in eating which he conceives to be beneficial and also the separation of the women from the men as a means of preventing large families. It is evident however that the common meals are better ordered in Crete than at Lacedaemon.

But the institution of the Cosmi is even worse than the Ephoralty. The evil inherent in the Ephoral College, viz. the eligibility of persons who have no special qualification, exists equally in [1]the case of the Cosmi, without the same political advantage. At Lacedaemon, as all are equally eligible to the Ephoralty, the commons to whom the highest office of State is thus opened are eager to preserve the polity; whereas in Crete the Cosmi are elected not from the whole body of citizens but from certain privileged families, and the Senators from among the ex-Cosmi. (To these last the same remarks will apply as to the Senators elected at Lacedaemon; their irresponsibility and their tenure of office for life are privileges exceeding their deserts, and their authority, not being controlled by written formulae but wholly arbitrary, involves a peril to the State[2].) Nor is it safe to infer the excellence of the constitutional system from the The Cosmi.

[1] Reading ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις.

[2] The sentence contained within the brackets, if it refers, as seems probable, to the senators, is rather in the nature of a footnote and interferes with the general course of the criticism passed upon the institution of the Cosmi. Besides this, it was the arbitrary decisions of the Ephors—not of the Senate—at Lacedaemon that were criticized (p. 48, ll. 11—13).

fact that the commons remain quiet, although they are not eligible to this office, *i.e. the office of Cosmi;* for the Cosmi, unlike the Ephors, have no opportunity of personal gain, as they dwell in an island far away from all influences likely to corrupt them. The remedy adopted for this defect, *i.e. the limitation in the choice of Cosmi,* is extraordinary and characteristic rather of a dynasty *or close oligarchy* than of a constitutional government. It not infrequently happens that a certain number either of their fellow-magistrates themselves or of private citizens combine to expel the Cosmi, and the Cosmi are at liberty to resign their office before the expiration of its full term. [1]But it is better that such matters should be ordered by law than by a rule so uncertain as the will of individuals.

[2]No evil however is so serious as the suspension of the office of Cosmi, which is often effected by great persons who desire to escape trial for their misdeeds—a fact which proves that the Cretan system has some elements of a constitutional government but is not so much a constitutional government as a narrow oligarchy. It is the habit of these persons, by forming cliques among the commons and their own personal friends, to produce [3]a state of anarchy, disturbance and civil war. But when this is the case within a State does it not virtually cease for a while to be a State? is not the political union temporarily

[1] Reading *ταῦτα δέ.*

[2] Reading *πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις οἳ ἂν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν.*

[3] Reading *ἀναρχίαν.*

dissolved? There is great danger in such a condition of the State, as anyone who wishes to attack it has now the opportunity. But, as I have already remarked, Crete is preserved by its situation; its remoteness acts like a *Lacedaemonian* edict for the expulsion of foreigners. Hence the Perioeci are faithful to the Cretans, whereas the Helots revolt again and again; for the Cretans have nothing to do with external dominion, and it is only [1]lately that a war of mercenaries has been carried into the island and has revealed the inherent weakness of its laws. p. 75.

With this remark we may conclude our survey of the Cretan polity.

CHAP. XI. The polity of Carthage.

It is a general opinion that the Carthaginians live under a polity which is excellent and in many respects superior to all others, while there are some points in which it most resembles the Lacedaemonian. The fact is that these three polities, the Cretan, the Lacedaemonian and the Carthaginian have a sort of family likeness and differ widely from all others, and not a few of their institutions are excellent. [2]It may be inferred that a polity is well ordered, when the commons are ever loyal to the political system, and no civil conflict worth speaking of has arisen, nor has anyone succeeded in making himself tyrant. The points in which the Carthaginian polity resembles the Lacedaemonian are that the common meals of

Comparison of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian polities.

[1] The allusion is probably to the expedition of the Phocian Phalaecus at the end of the Sacred War B.C. 346.

[2] Reading σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας εὖ συντεταγμένης and omitting ἔχουσαν.

the Clubs correspond to the Phiditia and the office of the Hundred-and-Four to the Ephoralty, [1]with this advantage that the Hundred-and-Four are elected for their personal merit, whereas the Ephors are taken from any ordinary people, and lastly the Kings and Senators in the one to the Kings and Senators in the other. It is a point of superiority *in the Carthaginian polity* [2]that the Kings do not belong to a separate family and this one of no particular merit, and that, although they must belong to one of certain distinguished families, they succeed to the throne by election and not by seniority. For as the Kings are constituted the supreme authorities in important matters, the result is that, if they are worthless persons, they do serious injury and in fact have done it to the Lacedaemonian State.

Character of the Carthaginian polity.

Of the points which may fairly be censured as deviations *from the best polity* nearly all are common to the three polities mentioned above; whereas those which are censurable as offending against the primary conception of an Aristocracy or a Polity *which the State proposes to itself* are errors partly on the side of Democracy and partly of Oligarchy. For instance, it is within the competence of the Kings and the Senate, provided that they are unanimous, to decide whether business shall or shall not be brought before the Commons; although, if they disagree, it is necessarily referred to the Commons. On the other hand,

[1] Reading *πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσί κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Reading *μήτε καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι γένος μήτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, εἴ τέ τι διαφέρον ἐκ τούτων αἱρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.*

whenever they submit business to the Commons, the popular assembly is thereby empowered not merely to listen to all the resolutions of the government, but it has authority also to pronounce judgment upon them, and anyone who chooses is at liberty to object to the proposals—which is not the case in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan polities. *So far the polity of Carthage is democratical.* But there is an oligarchical element in the power of cooption enjoyed by the Pentarchies, which are boards of high and various authority, in their right of electing the Hundred who are the highest officers of State and in their tenure of official power for a longer period than any other board of officers, as their power begins before they actually enter upon office and continues after they have actually gone out of it. The unpaid character of the Pentarchies, their appointment by other means than by lot, and other similar features of the polity may be regarded as aristocratical; so too is the rule by which all cases alike are tried by [1] certain fixed boards of magistrates, instead of being divided among different boards as at Lacedaemon. The point in which the Carthaginian system departs most widely from Aristocracy on the side of Oligarchy is in the popular idea that wealth as well as merit deserves to be considered in the election of officers of State, as it is impossible for a poor man to enjoy the leisure necessary for the proper performance of official duties. Assuming then that election by wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratical, we may reckon as a third method the one which obtains in the con-

[1] Reading ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχείων.

stitutional system of the Carthaginians who in the election of officers of State generally and especially of the highest officers, viz. the Kings and the Generals, pay regard *not to wealth only nor to merit only but* to both. This departure from the principles of Aristocracy must be regarded as an error of the legislator. It is a point of primary importance to provide in the first instance that the best citizens, not only during their period of office but in all their private life, may be able to enjoy leisure and be free from degrading duties. But granting that it is right to have regard *not only to merit but* also to affluence as a means of securing leisure, we may still censure the arrangement by which at Carthage the highest offices of State, viz. the Kingship and Generalship, are put up to sale. The effect of such a law is that wealth is more highly esteemed than virtue, and the whole State is avaricious. [1]Whenever the ruling class regards a thing as honourable, the opinion of the citizens generally is sure to follow suit. No polity however can be permanently aristocratical where merit is not held in supreme honour. Nor is it unreasonable that people, [2]if they pay for the privilege, should get the habit of making their official status a source of pecuniary profit, when they have been put to heavy expenses in order to hold it. If a poor man of good character will aspire to be the gainer *by his office*, the same will be true, *à fortiori*, of one whose character stands lower, *as is the case with the purchaser of official power*, when he has already been put to great expense. It follows that the offices of State ought

Purchase of offices.

[1] Reading ὅ τι δ' ἂν ὑπολάβῃ. [2] Reading τοῦτ' ὠνουμένους.

to be in the hands of the persons [1]who are able to fill them best. But even if the legislator did not trouble himself about the poverty of the higher class of citizens, it would be worth while to make provision for their leisure at least during the time that they hold office.

Another objectionable point is the concentration of several offices in the same hands, which is a favourite plan of the Carthaginians. For a single work is best performed by a single person. It is the legislator's business to secure this division of labour and not appoint the same man to be flute-player and cobbler. Thus in any state of considerable size a division of offices among a number of people is the more statesmanlike and popular arrangement; [2]not only does it admit a larger number of citizens *to official power*, but, as we said, the same work is more successfully and rapidly performed, as may be seen in naval and military affairs, in both of which the principle of rule and subjection may be said to pervade the whole force. But despite the oligarchical character of the polity the Carthaginians are [3]most successful in avoiding civil disturbance by sending out from time to time a certain number of the common people to their subject States and thereby enabling them to acquire riches. This is their means of healing the wounds of the polity and placing it on a permanent basis. But *we may fairly object that* this is but the work of Fortune, and that it is the legislator who

Accumulation of offices.

Emigration.

[1] Reading τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστα ἄρχειν.

[2] Reading κοινότερόν τε γὰρ καὶ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κάλλιον.

[3] Reading ἄριστα στάσιν ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλουτίζειν κ.τ.λ.

ought to prevent civil war; while as things are, in the event of some calamity and a general revolt of the subject class, the laws afford no means of securing peace. Such then are the conditions of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan and the Carthaginian polities which have all a just and high reputation.

CHAP. XII. Among those who have put forward theories respecting a polity there are some who never took part in political affairs of any kind but spent their whole lives in private stations. Their theories, so far as they deserve notice, have been practically discussed already. Others again who themselves engaged in public life have acted as legislators in their own or alien States, whether as the framers of codes of law only or of forms of polity as well, as e.g. Lycurgus and Solon, who were the authors both of a code and of a polity.

Solon. The Lacedaemonian polity has been already discussed. Solon is sometimes considered to have had great merit as a legislator on the ground that he put an end to an Oligarchy which until his time had been absolutely unqualified, delivered the commons from a state of servitude and established the now hereditary Democracy by a wise admixture of various constitutional elements, viz. of Oligarchy in the Council of Areopagus, of Aristocracy in the elective nature of the offices of State and of Democracy in the Courts of Law. The idea is that Solon, while he refrained from destroying the institutions which he found already in existence, viz. the Council and the election of officers of State, at the same time gave the commons a definite position by admitting all the citizens to sit in the Courts of Law. It is for this that he is sometimes

censured as having destroyed the balance of power within the State by assigning the supreme jurisdiction to a body chosen by lot like his Court of Law. For no sooner had the Court of Law [1]increased in power than public men, by paying court to the tyranny of the commons, reduced the polity to the Democracy we now know; Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the privileges of the Areopagus, Pericles converted the Courts of Law into salaried bodies, and so each succeeding demagogue outdid his predecessor in the privileges he conferred upon the commons until the present Democracy was the result. It appears however that this state of things was not so much the consequence of Solon's policy as due to accident. The fact is that the commons to whom the naval victory in the Persian wars was due were elated by their success and got unprincipled demagogues to lead them, as all respectable persons took an opposite line in politics. So far as Solon is concerned, it seems that he bestowed upon the commons no more than the necessary *minimum* of political power, viz. the right of electing officers of State and holding them responsible; for if the power of the commons were less than this, they would be slaves and enemies of the polity. All the offices of State Solon filled with members of the noble or wealthy classes, viz. the Pentacosiomedimni, the Zeugitae, and a third class called the Knights, while the fourth or Thetic class was excluded from all office.

In the list of legislators we may mention Zaleucus among the Epizephyrian Locrians and Charondas of

[1] Reading ἴσχυσεν.

Catana among his own countrymen and in the Chalcidian States of Italy and Sicily generally. An attempt is sometimes made to make out an actual catena of legislators. It is represented that the first scientific legislator was Onomacritus, a Locrian by birth, who had been trained in Crete, where he stayed some time in the exercise of his prophetic art, that Thales was his friend, Lycurgus and Zaleucus pupils of Thales and Charondas a pupil of Zaleucus. But this theory pays [1] too little regard to chronological facts, not to say that there was also the Theban lawgiver, Philolaus of Corinth, *whose name is omitted in the list.*

Philolaus. Philolaus, who belonged to the family of the Bacchiadae, formed an attachment to the Olympian victor Diocles and, when Diocles quitted the city for the loathing he had for the incestuous love of his mother Alcyone, Philolaus too migrated to Thebes, and both died there. And to this day their graves are shown at Thebes; they are easily visible one from the other, but on the side of Corinth one falls within the view and the other does not. The story is that they willed to be so buried; for Diocles still loathed his mother's passion and would not, as Philolaus would, that the land of Corinth should be visible from his tomb. This then was the cause of their dwelling at Thebes; and Philolaus gave the Thebans laws respecting various matters and especially respecting parentage, the laws of adoption as they are called, which form a peculiar feature of his legislation and are meant to preserve the number of allotments without change.

[1] Reading ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν χρόνων.

There is no legislative enactment peculiar to Charondas, except the procedure in cases of false witness; he was the author of the solemn indictment for perjury. In point of [1]detail however he is more exact even than legislators of our own time. Charondas.

The peculiar feature in the laws of Phaleas is the equalization of properties; and in those of Plato the community of women, children and property, the common meals of the women, the law relating to convivial meetings, that the sober people are to be presidents of the banquet, and the law of military exercises intended to make the citizens by practice equally dexterous with both hands, as it is not right *according to Plato* that one hand should be useful and the other useless. Phaleas.

There are also laws of Draco; but he made them for a polity already existing, nor is there any special feature in them which deserves to be mentioned, except their severity as shown in the heavy penalties. Draco.

Pittacus too was the framer of a code and not of a polity. It is a law peculiar to him that drunken people, [2]if they commit a breach of order, are to be punished more severely than sober. For as outrages are more frequently committed by people in a drunken than in a sober state, Pittacus disregarded the idea that an allowance should be more readily made for drunken people, and looked solely to the public interest. Pittacus.

[1] Omitting τῶν νόμων.

[2] Reading ἄν τι πταίσωσι.

Androdamas.

Lastly, Androdamas of Rhegium acted as lawgiver to the Chalcidians in the Thracian peninsula; he is the author of laws about cases of homicide and about heiresses, although there is no peculiar law of his to be mentioned.

Our survey of polities, whether actually realized or merely proposed by certain thinkers, may now be regarded as complete.

BOOK III.

In any inquiry into the nature and character of particular polities we may say that the first point to be considered is the nature of the State. At present there is often a difference of opinion, as one party asserts that it is the State which has done a certain action, and another that it is not the State but the Oligarchy or the Tyrant *by whom it was governed.* Also *it is necessary to settle this point, as* a State is the sphere in which all the activity of a statesman or legislator is displayed, and the polity itself is nothing more than a certain order of the inhabitants of the State. But as the State belongs to the category of compound things, like anything else which is a whole but composed of many parts, it is clear that we must first investigate the conception of the citizen; for the State is composed of a number of citizens. We have to inquire then to whom the title "citizen" belongs, or, in other words, what is the nature of a citizen. For the conception of the citizen as of the State is often disputed, nor is the world agreed in recognizing the same person as a citizen. Thus it often happens that one who is a citizen in a Democracy is not a citizen in an Oligarchy. CHAP. I. The definition of a citizen.

7—2

Now putting out of sight persons who acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional way, e.g. honorary citizens, we may lay it down that it is not residence which constitutes a citizen, as the qualification of residence belongs equally to aliens settled in the country and to slaves. Nor again does citizenship consist simply in the participation in legal rights to the extent of being party to an action as defendant or plaintiff, for this is a qualification possessed equally by the members of different States who associate on the basis of commercial treaties[1]. (It may be observed that in many places resident aliens are not admitted to the full enjoyment even of these legal rights, but are obliged to put themselves under the protection of a patron. It is only in a certain imperfect sense then that they are members of an association so constituted[2].) Such persons on the contrary are much in the same position as children who are too young to be entered upon the register of the deme or old men who are exempted from civil duties; for although these classes are to be called citizens in a certain sense, it is not in a sense quite absolute and unlimited, but with

[1] The clause καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει is not found in the best MSS. and should probably be omitted from the text. If it is retained, the meaning is "as these rights among others are enjoyed by them."

[2] I have enclosed these two sentences within brackets, not meaning that they are spurious but that they are parenthetical and interrupt the argument of the passage. In an English work they would naturally appear as a foot-note. Aristotle wishes to explain that the qualification described in the words οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες κ.τ.λ. does not necessarily belong to μέτοικοι as well as to οἱ ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦντες.

some such qualifying word as "immature" or "superannuated" or the like, it does not matter what. Our meaning at least is plain; we want a definition of the citizen in the absolute sense, one to whom no such exception can be taken as makes it necessary to correct our definition. For difficulties of a similar kind may be discussed and settled respecting persons who have been disfranchised or exiled. There is nothing whereby a citizen in the absolute sense is so well defined as by participation in judicial power and public office. But the offices of State are of two kinds. Some are determinate in point of time; thus there are certain offices which may never in any circumstances or may only after certain definite intervals be held a second time by the same person. Other officers again are perpetual, e.g. jurors and members of the public Assembly. It will be objected perhaps that jurors and members of the public Assembly are not officers of State at all and that their functions do not invest them with an official status; although it is ridiculous to deny the title of "officers" to the supreme authorities in the State. But this matter we may regard as unimportant; it is a mere question of name. The fact is that there is no word to express rightly the common function of a juror and a member of the public Assembly. Let us call it for distinction's sake a perpetual office. Citizens then we may define as those who participate in judicial and deliberative office.

This is perhaps the definition of a citizen which is most appropriate to all who are so called. It is to be observed however that, where things included under a general head are specifically different and one is con-

ceived of as first, another as second and another as third, there is either no characteristic whatever common to them all as such, or the common characteristic exists only in a slight degree[1]. But polities, as we see, differ specifically from each other, some are later and others earlier; for the corrupt or perverted forms are necessarily later than the uncorrupted. What we mean by
p. 118. perverted forms will appear hereafter. It follows then that the citizen in each polity must also be different. Accordingly it is principally to the citizen in a Democracy that our definition applies; it is possibly true in the other polities, but not necessarily. For in some there is no democratical element, nor are there any regular public assemblies but only extraordinary ones, and the administration of justice is divided among various boards, as e.g. at Lacedaemon, where different civil cases are decided by different Ephors, cases of homicide by the Senate and no doubt other cases by some other magistracy. It is the same at Carthage, where all suits are tried by certain magistrates. However, *we need not give up* our definition of a citizen, as it admits of correction. For in all polities except Democracy the right of voting in the Assembly and of acting as jurors belongs not to perpetual officers but to persons whose term of office is strictly defined; as it is either to such officers collectively or to some of them that judicial and deliberative functions, whether upon all or upon certain matters only, are assigned.

[1] Aristotle's meaning becomes clearer if the present passage is compared with *Κατηγορίαι* ch. 1. *τὰ ὁμώνυμα* there are the same as *τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἴδει* here.

Thus we see clearly the nature of the citizen. One who enjoys the privilege of participation in deliberative or judicial office—he and he only is, according to our definition, a citizen of the State in question, and a State is in general terms such a number of persons thus qualified as is sufficient for an independent life.

[1]But for practical purposes a citizen is usually defined as one who is descended from citizens on both sides and not on one side only, whether the father's or mother's, although this requirement itself is sometimes extended, e.g. to ancestors in the second or third or a higher degree. [2]But in view of this offhand definition, which is suited only to practical politics, a difficulty is sometimes raised as to the qualification of the original citizen in the third or fourth degree of ancestry. Gorgias of Leontini, partly perhaps in serious doubt, and partly in irony, [3]said that as it only wanted mortar-makers to make mortars, so it only wanted mayors to make Larisæans, as there were certain persons who might be called Larisan- CHAP. II.

[1] Reading ὁρίζονται δὲ.

[2] Reading οὕτω δὲ.

[3] The point of the joke, such as it is, seems to be that λάρισα or λάρισσα would mean either the town of that name or a kettle, and δημιουργός either a civic magistrate or an artisan. "The reply is much the same," says Mr Cope, "as if some one being asked, What makes a citizen of the town of Sandwich? were to answer, 'A cook, for he is a sandwich-maker'." The conjectural reading λαρισαιοποιούς in place of λαρισοποιούς has much to recommend it. It is well known that Gorgias, who spent a long time in Thessaly, made a boast of his ability to answer any question that might be put to him.

makers (λαρισοποιούς). But the case is simple enough. If the ancestors in the third or fourth degree satisfied our definition of citizenship, [1]they were citizens; for descent from a citizen on the father's or mother's side is a condition which cannot be applied to the original inhabitants or colonists. It may be supposed however that [2]there is more difficulty in the case of persons who obtained political rights in consequence of a revolution of polity, as at Athens when Cleisthenes, after the expulsion of the Tyrants, enrolled a number of foreigners, slaves and resident aliens in the tribes. The difficulty here is not so much to decide who is a citizen as whether he is so unjustly or justly. At the same time it is possible to raise the further question whether, if he is not a citizen justly, he does not cease to be a citizen at all, as the words "unjust" and "false" are virtually the same. But as indisputably there are rulers in the world who have no just title, and we shall recognize them as ruling, although not justly ruling, and as further it is a particular rule or office which constitutes our definition of a citizen—for it is one who participates in such and such an office who is a citizen, as we said—it is clear that the persons supposed, *viz. persons who have obtained political rights after a revolution,*

CHAP. III. are to be regarded as citizens of the State, but that the question whether they are justly or unjustly citizens is closely connected with the controversy already referred to. Some people feel a certain difficulty in determining when a particular

p. 99.

[1] Omitting ἂν.
[2] Reading ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν.

action has been the action of the State or not of the State *but of some individuals,* e.g. in the case of a revolution from an Oligarchy or Tyranny to a Democracy. In such circumstances there is sometimes an indisposition to discharge contracts, the argument being that it is not the State but the tyrant who has had the benefit of them, or to meet various other obligations of a similar nature, on the ground that there are some polities which depend wholly upon superior force and do not subserve the interests of the community. On the same principle, as there are in some States democratical polities also which rest upon force, the actions of such a polity ought [1]no more to be regarded as actions of the State in question than those performed under the Oligarchy or Tyranny.

The identity of a State.

But this is a subject which seems to be cognate to the difficult question: What are the general conditions under which a State is to be described as the same, or as not the same but different? The most obvious point to be considered in this question is one which touches the site and the inhabitants. For it is possible that the inhabitants should be divorced from the site and should come to dwell in different sites. The difficulty *as to the identity of the State in such a case* is one which need not be regarded as so serious; it is a question admitting of easy settlement, if we remember the various senses of the term "State." *For the State in the sense of "an organized body" remains the same, but in the sense of "the city" it is different.* Similarly in the case

[1] Reading ὁμοίως οὐ τῆς πόλεως.

where the same inhabitants occupy the same site *it is a question* when the State is to be considered one and the same. The identity obviously does not depend upon its enclosure within certain walls; *indeed the mere fact of circumvallation does not constitute a State at all.* For it would be possible to enclose all Peloponnesus within a single wall; and in fact Peloponnesus is probably not much larger than Babylon or any other city which includes within its circumference the territory of a tribe rather than of a State, if the story[1] is true that at the time of the capture of Babylon it was three days before a part of the city was aware of the fact. However the investigation of this difficulty is one which may be usefully
p. 175. entered upon at another time; for it is a Statesman's business to know what is the right size for the State, and whether it is expedient that its inhabitants should be all of one race or of several. But *for the present the question before us is this:* Assuming that the inhabitants and the site they occupy are the same, are we to describe the State as the same, so long as the race of inhabitants is unaltered, in spite of the fact that some persons are dying at every moment and others coming into life, as we habitually speak of rivers and fountains as the same, although some water is continually flowing up and other passing away, or on the contrary are we to say that, although the inhabitants are for a similar reason the same, the State is different, *if there is a change of polity?* Since the State is a species of association,

[1] See Herod. i. ch. 191; but if Herodotus is Aristotle's authority, he has somewhat exaggerated the story.

and [1]an association of citizens implies a polity, it would seem a necessary consequence that, when the polity changes its character and becomes different, the State too remains no longer the same, as a chorus e.g. is called different, if it appears at one time in Comedy and at another in Tragedy, although the members composing it are often the same, [2]and similarly any other association or combination is called different, if the kind of combination is different, as when we term a harmony composed of the same notes different, if at one time it is Dorian and at another Phrygian. And if the same principle holds *in regard to States*, it is evident that in predicating the identity of a State we must look at the polity, whereas its name may be changed while the inhabitants remain the same or be the same while the inhabitants are wholly changed. The justice of fulfilling engagements or not, when the State exchanges one polity for another, is a different question.

CHAP. IV. The virtue of a good man and of a good citizen.

As a sequel to these remarks, we have now to consider whether the virtue of a good man and of a virtuous citizen is to be regarded as identical or different.

But if we are to investigate this point, we must first ascertain roughly the virtue of a citizen. A citizen then like a sailor may be described as a member of a society. And although the sailors have different faculties, one being an oarsman, another a pilot, a third a "look-out" man, and a fourth having

[1] Reading *ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτεία, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας.*

[2] Changing the full stop after *ἀνθρώπων ὄντων* to a comma.

some other similar title, it is evident that, while the most exact definition of the virtue or excellence of each will be exclusively appropriate to the individual, there will at the same time be a common definition applicable to all. For safety in navigation is the object they all have in view; it is this that every sailor strives for. Similarly then in the case of the citizens, although they are different, yet it is the safety of the association or in other words of the polity which is their object; and hence the virtue of the citizen is necessarily relative to the polity.

Assuming then that there are several kinds of polity, we see that the virtuous citizen *in all polities* cannot have a uniform perfect virtue, whereas [1]it is a uniform perfect virtue which in our theory is characteristic of the good man. It is therefore clearly possible to be a virtuous citizen without possessing the virtue characteristic of a virtuous man. However we may investigate and discuss the same question in a different way by taking the case of the best polity. [2]If we assume the possibility of a State consisting solely of virtuous members, still each of them is bound to perform his own work well, and this is itself a result implying virtue; but as all the citizens cannot be alike, it follows that *in this case as in others* the virtue of a good citizen and a good man cannot be one and the same. For the virtue of the virtuous citizen must be possessed by all the citizens of this State, as otherwise it cannot be the best possible; but it is impossible that they

[1] Reading κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν.

[2] Reading εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν.

should all possess the virtue of the good man, unless the citizens of the virtuous State must all be [1]alike, *which is contrary to the conception of a State.* Again *we may put the matter thus:* Since the members of the State are dissimilar, and, as an animal e.g. consists of soul and body, soul of reason and appetite, and a household of husband and wife, [2]master and slave, so too a State consists of all these and of other dissimilar elements besides, it follows that the virtue of all the citizens can no more be one and the same than the virtue of a leader and a subordinate member of a chorus.

That the virtue of a virtuous citizen and a virtuous man is not absolutely the same is evident from these considerations. But will there be certain cases in which they are the same? We say that the virtuous ruler combines goodness and prudence, [3]whereas prudence is not indispensable to the citizen. Nay it is sometimes said that the very education of a ruler is different *from that of a subject,* as in fact we see that the sons of kings, *unlike ordinary citizens,* are educated in horsemanship and strategy, and [4]Euripides says

> "No fineries be theirs
> But only the State's needs,"

where, *as speaking of young princes,* he implies that there is a special education suitable to a ruler. If

[1] Reading ὁμοίους.

[2] Omitting κτῆσις ἐκ.

[3] Reading τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον.

[4] The quotation is from the *Aeolus* of Euripides and is given in the fuller form preserved by Stobaeus as Fragm. 16 in Dindorf's *Poetae Scenici Graeci.*

then the virtue of a good ruler and a good man is identical, and the subject as well as the ruler a citizen, it follows that the virtue of a citizen and a man will be identical, not absolutely but only in the case of certain citizens; for the virtue of a ruler *who can never be a subject* and of an ordinary citizen is not the same, and it is this fact probably which gave rise to the saying of Jason *of Pherae* that he was hungry whenever he was not a tyrant, meaning that he did not understand how to live as a private person. It must be confessed however that the capacity for rule and subjection alike is generally lauded, and that the virtue of a citizen is [1] held to consist in the ability to be both an excellent ruler and an excellent subject. If then we define the virtue of the good man as suited to a position of rule, and that of the good citizen as equally suited to rule and subjection, the union of the two qualities cannot be so laudable as is supposed. *Perhaps however the difficulty may be solved in this way.* [2] As it appears that there are some cases where ruler and subject ought to learn both rule and subjection, and other cases where they ought to learn one only, it may be seen from the following considerations that the citizen understands and participates in both. There is such a thing as the rule of a slave-master over slaves; its sphere, as we understand it, is the bare necessaries of

[1] Reading πολίτου δοκεῖ που.

[2] The reading adopted is as follows: ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα καὶ ποτὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν κἀντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις.

life, the use rather than the production of which must necessarily be understood by the ruler. The other side of this relation is absolutely slavish; I mean the capacity for performing acts of menial service. But under the term 'slave' we recognize various species, as the occupations of a slave are various. One class of slaves consists wholly of manual labourers, i.e., as the name itself implies, of those who live by the work of their hands, among whom is the mechanical artisan. It is on this account, *i.e. because artisans are necessarily slavish,* that in some States the handicraftsmen were of old excluded from public office until the extreme development of Democracy. The functions proper to subjects of this description are not such as should be learnt [1]by any good man or statesman or citizen, except occasionally for the satisfaction of his personal wants; else the relation of master and slave ceases to exist. On the other hand, there is a species of rule where the subjects are the equals of the ruler in birth and free persons, viz. constitutional rule, as we define it, which the ruler must needs learn by being a subject, as e.g. Cavalry-generalship by first serving under a Cavalry general, or Infantry-generalship by first serving under an Infantry general and holding the command of a company *as at Athens,* or a corps *as at Lacedaemon.* Hence it is said and said with truth that the only way to be a good ruler is to be a subject first. But as there is a difference in the virtue of rulers and subjects, the good citizen should possess the knowledge and ability to be both; in fact the

[1] It is desirable to omit τὸν ἀγαθὸν in one of the places where it occurs, probably in the later.

virtue of a citizen may be defined as a practical acquaintance both as ruler and subject with the rule characteristic of a free community. Also a good man is capable of rule and subjection alike, although the temperance and justice proper to rule are different in kind from those which are proper to subjection. For in the case of one who being a subject is still a free man, *and therefore enjoys his share of rule,* it is clear that his virtue, if he is good, e.g. his justice, will not be uniform but will comprise a variety of species corresponding to the position which he will hold now as ruler and now as subject, in the same way as there are differences between the temperance and courage of a man and a woman. Thus a man would be considered a coward who was only as brave as a brave woman, and a woman as a chatterbox, who was only as modest as a good man. For the domestic duties of man and woman are distinct, the function of the man being to acquire and of the woman to preserve. But *of all the virtues,* prudence is the only one which belongs exclusively to a ruler; all the rest must, as it seems, belong equally to rulers and subjects. Whereas, if we consider the case of subjects, it is not prudence but true opinion which is a virtue proper to them; for the subject may be compared to a flute-maker and the ruler to a flute-player who uses the instrument.

These considerations furnish an answer to the question whether the virtue of a good man and a virtuous citizen is the same or different, and in what sense it is either one or the other.

CHAP. V. There still remains however one difficulty re-

specting the definition of a citizen. Is it really the case that no one is a citizen who is not eligible to public office, or are mechanics to be included in the roll of citizens? If we are to include mechanics, it follows that, as they are not eligible to office, the virtue above described, *viz. virtue suited alike to rule and to subjection,* cannot be characteristic of all citizens, for here are persons who *never hold a position of rule and yet ex hypothesi* are citizens. If on the other hand no mechanic is a citizen, it may be asked to what class any particular mechanic is to be assigned, as certainly he is not a resident alien or a foreigner. It would seem however that this is not a case which causes any difficulty; for neither slaves nor freedmen belong to any of the classes named, *and yet they are not citizens.* The fact is that we cannot regard all who are indispensable to the existence of a State as being citizens. For instance, children, *although a State cannot exist without them,* are not citizens in the same sense as men; they are citizens not absolutely, as men are, but only conditionally, or in other words they are citizens but immature ones. In ancient days there were some States where the mechanic population was composed of slaves and foreigners, and accordingly the majority of mechanics still belong to these classes. Nor will citizenship in the best State be conferred upon any mechanic, or, if it is, the definition we gave of a citizen's virtue must be held to apply not to all citizens nor to all who are merely free persons, but only to such as are exempt from the occupations necessary to bare

The position of mechanics.

existence. The rest[1], if they render these services to an individual, are slaves; if [2]to the State, they are mechanics or hired labourers.

Their actual position becomes plain on a little reflexion from the following facts; for the remark p. 102. already made *respecting polities* makes it clear at the first glance. As there are varieties of polity, there will necessarily also be various kinds of citizens and especially of citizens who are subjects. Hence there is a particular polity, *viz. the extreme Democracy*, in which the mechanic and hired labourer must needs be citizens, while there are others in which this is impossible, e.g. wherever there exists a polity of the kind commonly called aristocratical, in which virtue and desert constitute the sole claim to the honours of State; for it is impossible to live the life of a mechanic or labourer and at the same time devote oneself to the practice of virtue. In an Oligarchy, on the other hand, although it is impossible for a hired labourer to be a citizen, as the elections to office are dependent on a high property qualification, it is not impossible for a mechanic; for artisans are generally persons of great wealth. There was a law at Thebes that nobody should be eligible to office who had not abstained for ten years from business in the market. But there are many polities, on the contrary, in which the law admits even foreigners to the citizenship. Thus any one whose mother was a citizen is a citizen in some Democracies, and the same is the case in many places with the bastard children *of citizens*. However, as it is only the de-

[1] Reading τῶν δ' ἄλλων. [2] Reading κοινῇ.

ficiency of genuine citizens which leads to the enfranchisement of these classes, the danger of depopulation being the sole reason of these provisions in the laws, so with the increase of population the citizenship is gradually withdrawn, first from those whose father or mother was a slave, then from those who are citizens only on the mother's side, and eventually is confined to those whose parents were both citizens of the State.

It is clear then from these facts that there are various kinds of citizens, and that eligibility to the honours of State is the most exact definition of citizenship. Thus Homer puts *into Achilles's mouth the complaint that Agamemnon had treated him*

"Like some poor honourless vagabond[1],"

applying the epithet "honourless" to a vagabond, as one who is ineligible to the honours of State is no better than an alien resident in the land. [2]But there are some States in which the exclusion of certain classes from office is carefully veiled, the object being to delude this portion of the population.

As to the question whether the [3]virtue characteristic of a good man and a virtuous citizen is to be regarded as identical or different, our remarks have served to prove that there are certain States in which they are combined in the same individual and others in which they are distinct, and that in the former

[1] *Iliad* IX. 644. It is strange that Aristotle should interpret the Homeric ἀτίμητος to mean "a person living in a state of political ἀτιμία."

[2] Reading ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ. and omitting ἐστίν at the end of the sentence.

[3] Reading τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν θετέον.

they are not found together in every one but only in the practical statesman who exercises or is capable of exercising, whether individually or conjointly with others, an influence in the conduct of public affairs.

CHAP. VI. This being determined, we have next to consider whether it is right to assume a single polity or several, and, if several, what is the nature of each, and how many there are, and what are the points of distinction between them. A polity may be defined as an order of the State in respect of its offices generally and especially of the supreme office. For the governing class is everywhere supreme in the State, and the nature of the polity is determined by the governing class. I mean e.g. that it is the commons who are supreme in a Democracy and the Few on the other hand in an Oligarchy, and *accordingly* we call their polities distinct. The same remark may be extended to all the rest; *if the governing class is different, so is the polity.*

We must begin by laying down (1) the object for which a State is framed and (2) the various kinds of rule which may be exercised over man in his social existence.

The object of political association. p. 5.

It has been stated at the very outset of our treatise in the discussion of Domestic Economy and the government of slaves that Man is naturally a political animal, and consequently, even where there is no need of mutual service, men are none the less anxious to live together. Still it cannot be denied that the common advantage of all is also a motive of union, *more or less operative* according to the degree in which each individual is capable of the higher life. Although to the citizens, both collectively and in-

dividually, this higher life is emphatically the end proposed, [1]yet life itself is also an object for which they unite and maintain the corporate political association; for it is probable that some degree of the higher life is necessarily implied in merely living, unless there is a great preponderance of hardship in the life. Certain it is that the majority of men endure much suffering without ceasing to cling to life—a proof that a certain happiness or natural sweetness resides in it.

Different forms of rule.

But *to proceed to the second point:* it is not difficult to distinguish the forms of rule which are generally recognized; for even in our unscientific discourses we often discuss and determine their character. In the government of slaves, although the interests of natural slave and natural master are really identical, yet the object of the rule is nevertheless the interest of the master and is that of the slave only incidentally, because, if the slave is destroyed, it is impossible that the master's government should be maintained. On the other hand, in the rule of children or a wife or a whole household, which in our terminology is economic rule, the end is either the good of the subjects or some common good of rulers and subjects alike, i.e. it is essentially the good of the subjects, as we see in the other arts such as Medicine and Gymnastic, although it may perhaps incidentally be also the good of the rulers themselves. For there is no reason why the gymnastic trainer should not

[1] Reading *συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ.*

himself be occasionally one of the gymnasts, as the pilot is invariably one of the crew. And thus while the trainer or pilot has in view *not his own interest but* the interest of those who are under him, yet in any case where he himself shares their position he enjoys incidentally the same benefit as they do; for the one becomes a sailor and the other one of the gymnasts, although he is a trainer. *It is because the object of political rule is the benefit of the subjects* that in any State framed on the principle of equality and similarity among the citizens a claim is put forward for an alternation of rule. It was originally claimed, as is natural enough, that all should serve the State in turn, and that, as each citizen during his period of rule or office had already paid regard to the interest of another, so that other should in turn pay regard to his. But nowadays the profits derivable from the public service and an official status create a desire for perpetuity of office; it is as though the officers of State, being invalids, were to enjoy good health *during all their term of power*, in which case it is probable that they would be equally eager for office.

It is evident then that all such polities as regard the good of the community are really normal according to the principle of abstract justice, while such as regard the private good of the rulers are all corruptions or perversions of the normal polities; for the relations of rulers to the subjects in them are like the relations of a master to his slaves, whereas the State is *properly* a society of free persons.

CHAP. VII. Having now settled these points, we have next to

consider the number of different polities and their nature. We will begin with the normal polities; for when they are determined the perverted forms will be evident at once.

Classification of polities.

As in any State [1]the polity and the governing class are virtually the same, *i.e. the polity is determined by the governing class*, as the governing class is the supreme authority in a State, and as supreme power must be vested either in an individual or in a Few or in the Many, it follows that, when the rule of the individual or the Few or the Many is exercised for the benefit of the community at large, the polities are normal, whereas the polities which subserve the private interest either of the individual or the Few or the masses are perversions; for either the members of the State do not deserve the name of citizens, or they ought to have a share in its advantages. The form of Monarchy in which regard is paid to the interest of the community is commonly known as Kingship, and the government of the Few, although of a number exceeding one, for the good of all, as Aristocracy, whether because the rule is in the hands of the best citizens (οἱ ἄριστοι) or because they exercise it for the best interests (τὸ ἄριστον) of the State and all its members; while when it is the masses who direct public affairs for the interest of the community, the government is called by the name which is common to all the polities, viz. a Polity. The result in this case is such as might have been expected. For although it is possible to find an individual or a few

[1] Reading ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα κ.τ.λ.

persons of eminent virtue, it can hardly be the case that a larger number are perfectly accomplished in every form of virtue; at the best they will be accomplished only in military virtue, as it is the only one of which the masses are capable. The consequence is that in this polity, *viz. the Polity proper*, the military class is supreme, and all who bear arms enjoy full political privileges.

As perverted forms of the polities just mentioned we have Tyranny by the side of Kingship, Oligarchy of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity. For Tyranny is monarchical rule for the good of the monarch, Oligarchy *the rule of a Few* for the good of the wealthy, and Democracy *the rule of the Many* for the good of the poor; none of them subserves the interest of the community at large.

CHAP. VIII. But we ought to describe at rather greater length the nature of these several polities, as the matter is one which presents certain difficulties, and it is proper that a philosophical inquirer in any subject, who looks at something more than the merely practical side, should not ignore or omit any point but should bring to light the actual truth in all.

Tyranny is, as has been said, a form of Monarchy corresponding in the political association to the rule of a master over his slaves; Oligarchy a government where the supreme power in the polity is vested in the propertied classes; Democracy, on the contrary, a government where it is vested in those who possess no considerable property, i.e. the poor. But there is an initial difficulty in this definition. Democracy being defined as a polity in which the

Definition of Democracy and Oligarchy.

masses are supreme, suppose the supreme authority in the State were to reside in the majority who are rich; or similarly, to take the converse case, the polity being called an Oligarchy where a small number of persons are supreme, suppose it happens somewhere or other that the supreme power is in the hands of the poor who are stronger although less numerous than the rich; it would seem that our definition of the polities is unsatisfactory in these cases. On the other hand, if we combine numerical minority with wealth and numerical majority with poverty, and designate the polities accordingly as an Oligarchy where the offices of State are in the hands of the rich being a minority, and a Democracy where they are in the hands of the poor being a majority, there is here another difficulty. How are we to describe the polities we mentioned just now, viz. where the rich being a majority or the poor being a minority are respectively supreme in the State? For there is no other polity besides those we have named. It seems then to be proved by our argument that the small or large number of the class which is supreme in the State is only an accident of Oligarchies on the one hand and Democracies on the other, owing to the fact that the rich are few and the poor numerous all the world over. Accordingly the polities above mentioned, *viz. where the rich are a majority or the poor a minority*, do not in fact constitute exceptions. The really distinctive characteristics of Democracy and Oligarchy are poverty and wealth; and it is a necessary law that wherever wealth constitutes the title to rule, whether the

rulers are a minority or a majority, the polity is an Oligarchy, whereas, if the poor are rulers, it is a Democracy. But as a matter of fact it happens, as we said, that in the one case the rulers are few and in the other many; for there are only few people who are wealthy, whereas liberty is enjoyed by all alike, and wealth and liberty are the grounds upon which the two parties respectively base their claim to be masters of the polity.

CHAP. IX. Democratical and oligarchical conceptions of justice.

In endeavouring to estimate the claims of the two parties, we must first ascertain what are the definitions they give of Oligarchy and Democracy, and what is the principle of justice characteristic of the one or the other. For Oligarchs and Democrats agree in this, that they both adhere to a certain principle of justice; but they do not advance beyond a certain point or put forward a full statement of justice in the proper sense of the word. Thus the one party, *i.e. the Democrats,* hold that justice is equality; and so it is, but not for all the world but only for equals. The others, *i.e. the Oligarchs,* hold that inequality is just, as indeed it is, but not for all the world but only for unequals. Both put out of sight one side of the relation, viz. the persons *who are to enjoy the equality or inequality,* and *consequently* form a wrong judgment. The reason is that they are judging of matters which affect themselves, and we are all sorry judges when our personal interests are at stake. And

Justice a relative term.

thus whereas justice is a relative term and, [1] as has been already stated in the Ethics, implies that the ratio of distribution is constant in respect of the

[1] The reference is to *Nicom. Eth.* v. ch. 6.

things distributed and the persons who receive them, the two parties, while they are of one mind about the equality of the thing, differ as to what constitutes equality in the recipients, principally for the reason just alleged, viz. that they are bad judges where their own interests are concerned, but secondly also because the fact that each maintains a certain principle of justice up to a certain point is one which itself leads them to suppose that they are maintaining a principle of justice in the absolute sense. For the Oligarchs, if they are superior in a particular point, viz. in money, assume themselves to be superior altogether; while the Democrats, if they are equal in a particular point, viz. in personal liberty, assume themselves to be equal altogether. But they omit the point of capital importance. If a multitude of possessions was the sole object of their association or union, then their share in the State is proportionate to their share in the property, and in this case there would seem to be no resisting the argument of the oligarchical party that, where there is, e.g., a capital of one hundred minae, the contributor of a single mina ought not in justice to enjoy the same share either of the principal or of the profits accruing as a person who has given the remaining ninety-nine. But the truth is that the object of their association is to live well—not merely to live; otherwise slaves and the lower animals might form a State, whereas this is in fact impossible, as they are incapable of happiness or of a life regulated by a definite moral purpose, *i.e. of the conditions necessary to a State.* Nor is the object military alliance and

The object of the State.

security against injury from any quarter. Nor again is the end proposed barter and intercommunion; for, if it were, the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians and all such nations as are connected by commercial treaties might be regarded as citizens of a single State. Among them there certainly exist contracts in regard to Customs, covenants against mutual injury and formal articles of alliance. But there are no magistracies common to all the contracting parties instituted to secure these objects, but different magistracies exist in each of the States; nor do the members of the one feel any concern about the right character of members of the other or about the means of preserving all who come under the treaties from being unjust and harbouring any kind of wickedness or indeed about any point whatever, except the prevention of mutually injurious actions. [1] Virtue and vice on the other hand are matters of earnest consideration to all whose hearts are set upon good and orderly government. And from this fact it is evident that a State which is not merely nominally but in the true sense of the word a State should devote its attention to virtue. To neglect virtue is to convert the political association into an alliance differing in nothing except in the local contiguity of its members from the alliances formed between distant States, to convert the law into a mere covenant, or, as the sophist Lycophron said, a mere surety for the mutual respect of rights, without any qualification for producing goodness or justice in the citizens. But it is clear that this is the true view

[1] Omitting πολιτικῆς.

of the State, i.e. that it promotes the virtue of its citizens. For if one were to combine different localities in one, so that e.g. the walls of Megara and Corinth were contiguous, yet the result would not be a single State. Nor again does the practice of intermarriage *necessarily imply a single State,* although intermarriage is one of the forms of association which are especially characteristic of States. So too if we suppose the case of certain persons living separately, although not so far apart as to prevent association, but under laws prohibitive of mutual injury in the exchange of goods, if we suppose e.g. *A* to be a carpenter, *B* a husbandman, *C* a cobbler, *D* something else, and the total to amount to ten thousand, but their association to be absolutely confined to such things as barter and military alliance, here [1]again there would certainly not be a State. What then is the reason? It is assuredly not the absence of local contiguity in the association. For suppose the members were actually to form a union upon such terms of association as we have described, suppose at the same time that each individual were to use his own household as a separate State, and their intercourse were limited as under the conditions of a defensive alliance to rendering mutual assistance against aggression, still the conception of a State in the strict view would not even then be realized, if their manner of social dealings after the union were to be precisely the same as when they lived apart.

It is clear then that the State is not merely a local association or an association existing to

[1] Reading οὐδ' οὕτω που.

prevent mutual injury and to promote commercial exchange. So far is this from being the case that, although these are indispensable conditions, if a State is to exist, yet all these conditions do not necessarily imply a State. *A State on the contrary is first realized when there is* an association of households and families in well living with a view to a complete and independent existence. (This will not be the case, however, unless the members inhabit one and the same locality and have the practice of intermarriage[1].) It is for this reason that there were established in the different States matrimonial connexions, clanships, common sacrifices and such amusements as promote a common life. But all this is the work of friendship, for the choice of a common life implies *no more than* friendship. And thus while the end of a State is living well, these are only means to the end. A State on the contrary is the association of families and villages in a complete and independent existence or in other words, according to our definition[2], in a life of felicity and nobleness. We must assume then that the object of the political association is not merely a common life but noble action. And from this it follows that they who contribute most to the association, as so conceived, possess a larger interest in the State than they who are equal or superior in personal liberty or birth but inferior in political virtue, or than they who have the superiority in wealth but the inferiority in virtue.

[1] The brackets are meant to show that the sentence is parenthetical.

[2] See *e.g. Nicom. Eth.* x. p. 1176 B_{30}—p. 1177 A_{11}.

It is evident then from our observations that in the controversy respecting the different polities each party is the representative of a certain partial justice. It is difficult however to decide what ought to be the supreme authority in the State. It must be either the masses or the rich or the respectable classes or an individual of preeminent merit or a tyrant. But all these suppositions appear to involve awkward consequences. For suppose the poor, as being a majority, distribute among themselves the property of the rich, is such action not unjust? *No*, it may be said, for it was decreed by the supreme authority in the State and *therefore* justly decreed. What then are we to describe as the height of injustice, *if not this?* Or again, take the whole body of citizens and suppose that the majority distribute among themselves the property of the minority, it is evident that they thereby destroy the State. But it is certainly not the virtue of anything which destroys its possessor, nor can justice be destructive to a State. It is evident then that such a law as we have supposed cannot be just. Again, the same hypothesis would inevitably justify all the actions of a tyrant, as his oppression depends upon superior strength, like the oppression of the wealthy by the masses. Well then, is it just that rule should be in the hands of the minority or the propertied class? But on that hypothesis, if the minority adopt the same line of action, if they plunder the masses and despoil them of their possessions, is such action just? If it is, so was the action of the majority in the former case. That all such conduct then is wrong and unjust

CHAP. X. Difficulties as to the supreme authority in the State.

is indisputable. Ought then the respectable classes to enjoy rule and supreme power? But if so, it is a necessary consequence that all the rest of the citizens are excluded from honours, as they do not enjoy the honour of political office. For we regard the offices of State as public honours; and if they are always in the hands of the same persons, it follows that all others are excluded from honour. Is then the rule of the most virtuous individual to be preferred? It may be objected that this is a system still more oligarchical than the last, as it involves the exclusion of a still larger number from honour.

Perhaps however it will be urged [1]that there is an evil in the supremacy of any human being with his liability to the emotions incident to the soul, and that the law ought rather to be supreme. But on that hypothesis, if the law is oligarchical or democratical, what difference will it make to the difficulties we have raised? The difficulties already described will still meet us.

CHAP. XI. Ought the Many or the best Few to be supreme?

We may defer for the present the discussion of all these cases except one. But the theory that supreme power should be vested in the masses rather than in a few persons, although they are the best, [2]is one which would seem to be refuted *by the remarks we have made;* and indeed there is a certain difficulty involved in it, although there is probably also a certain degree of truth. For it is possible that the Many, of

[1] Reading ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον.

[2] Reading δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι· καί τιν' ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν.

whom each individual is not a virtuous man, are still collectively superior to the few best persons, *i.e. superior* not as individuals but as a body, as picnics are superior to feasts supplied at the expense of a single person. For as the total number is large, it is possible that each has a fractional share of virtue and prudence and that, as the multitude collectively may be compared to an individual with many feet, hands and senses, [1]so the same is true of their character and intelligence. It is thus that the Many are better judges *than the Few* even of musical and poetical compositions; for some judge one part, some another, and all of them collectively the whole. But the point in which virtuous men are superior to any ordinary persons is the same in which handsome people, it is said, are superior to those who are not handsome and the representations of art to the realities, viz. that the features which *in real life* are distributed among a number of objects are *in the works of art* collected into one; for, [2]if we take each feature by itself, the eye of one *living person* and another part of another are more beautiful than those in the painting. Whether the superiority of the Many to the few virtuous persons is possible, whatever be the character of the commons or the masses, is uncertain, or perhaps in some cases it is plainly impossible. For the same line of argument would be equally applicable to the lower animals. *It would be absurd however to pretend that a number of the lower animals are superior to a few*

[1] There should be a comma, instead of a full stop, after *αἰσθήσεις*.

[2] Reading *κεχωρισμένον*.

men; yet there are human beings who may be described as not appreciably superior to the lower animals. At the same time there do exist masses of people in whose case our theory is open to no objection.

The authority of the masses. Its limitation. p. 127.

These considerations then supply us with an answer to the question which was raised before, *viz. what ought to be the supreme authority in the State*, as well as to one closely connected with it, viz. what should be the limits set to the authority of the free citizens or the masses, i.e. of all who are not wealthy and do not enjoy any especial reputation for virtue? There is a certain danger in their eligibility to the highest offices of State, a danger that injustice on the one hand will lead them into crime, and folly on the other hand into error; whereas their exclusion in theory and practice from all office is a condition of things which may well inspire alarm, as there never exists a large body of persons excluded from all honours or of poor, but the State of which they are members is sure to have a large number of enemies within its pale. It remains then that they should participate in deliberative and judicial functions. It is in accordance with this view that various law-givers, and Solon among the number, empower the commons to elect officers of State and to hold them responsible, but deny them all individual tenure of office. For in their collective capacity they possess an adequate perceptive power and by admixture with their superiors subserve the interests of the State, in the same way as adulterated food if mixed with unadulterated makes the whole more nutritious than the small amount *of unadulterated food* would have been, although indi-

vidually each has but an imperfect faculty of judgment.

Its justification.

There are however difficulties incident to this system of polity; first, that the faculty of judging, *e.g.* who has adopted a right course of medical treatment would seem to belong exclusively to the person who is also capable of treating the patient medically and restoring him from his actual malady to health, in other words to the physician. The same is true of any other art empirical or scientific. It may be argued then that, as a physician should be responsible to physicians, so should any other class of persons be responsible to their peers. The answer is that the word "physician" may mean either the ordinary medical practitioner or the scientific student of medicine, or, thirdly, one who has just mastered the principles of the art; there is hardly any art in which we do not find persons answering to these three classes, and the right of judgment is assigned as much to those who have merely mastered the principles as to those who possess a scientific knowledge of the subject. And secondly the same appears to be the case in regard to the election of officers. The right exercise of the elective power, *it may be urged,* as well as of the power of scrutiny is the function exclusively of those who are masters of the science. Thus a geometrician or a pilot ought to be elected solely by persons who understand geometry or navigation. Even granted that there are some occupations and arts in which certain non-professional persons have a vote in the election, they certainly do not exercise a greater influence than the experts. According to this theory then it is inadvisable to entrust the

masses with final authority either in electing officers of State or in holding them responsible. It is probable however that there is some mistake in this mode of argument, partly—unless the character of the masses is
p. 129. absolutely slavish—for the reason already alleged, that, although individually they are worse judges than the experts, yet in their collective capacity they are better or at least as good, and partly because there are some subjects in which the artist himself is not the sole or best judge, viz. all subjects in which the results produced are criticized equally well by persons who are not masters of the art. Thus it is not the builder alone whose function it is to criticize the merits of a house; the person who uses it, i.e. the householder, [1]is actually a better judge, and similarly a pilot is a better judge of a helm than a carpenter or one of the company of a dinner than the cook.

This difficulty we may perhaps regard as being thus satisfactorily settled. There is another however closely connected with it. Is it not an absurdity, it is often said, to invest the lower orders with supreme authority in matters of higher moment than the respectable classes? Yet there are no more [2]momentous duties than those of electing officers of State and holding them responsible, and it is
p. 130. just these which in some polities, as has been already remarked, are conferred upon the commons. For the Public Assembly is supreme in all such matters, although the members of the Assembly, the Council and the Law-courts need not be persons of large property

[1] Reading *κρίνει*.
[2] Reading *μέγισται*.

or of suitable age, whereas a [1]higher property qualification is required for lords of the treasury, generals and the highest officers of State. Yet[2] this difficulty admits of a similar solution. It may reasonably be argued that the existing state of things is right. For it is not the individual juror or the individual member of the Council or Assembly who exercises official power but the whole Court or Council or body of commons, of which the individuals specified are but fractions. It is as a mere fraction *of the whole and so deriving all importance from the whole* that I conceive of the individual member of the Council, Assembly or Law-court. Hence it is right that the masses should control greater interests *than the Few*, as there are many members of the commons, the Council or the Law-court, and the actual collective property of them all exceeds the property of those who hold high offices of State as individuals or in limited bodies.

The supremacy of the laws.

With this discussion of these points we must be content. But the initial difficulty we mentioned *as to the supreme authority in the State* brings out nothing so clearly as that it is the laws, if rightly enacted, which should be supreme, and that the officers of State, whether one or many, should have supreme authority only in those matters upon which it is wholly impossible for the laws to pronounce exactly because of the difficulty of providing in a general statement for all cases. What should be the character of the laws if rightly enacted has not yet been ascertained; on the contrary our old difficulty still remains. [3]This p. 128.

[1] Reading ἀπὸ μειζόνων. [2] Reading ὁμοίως δὲ.

[3] It seems clear that two equivalent sentences have both

only is indisputable, that the laws enacted are necessarily relative to the polity in which they exist. But if this is the case, it is evident that the laws adapted to the normal polities are necessarily just, whereas those adapted to the perverted polities are unjust.

CHAP. XII. We have seen that in all sciences and arts the end proposed is some Good, that in the supreme of all sciences and arts, i.e. the political faculty, the end is preeminently the highest Good and that justice or in other words the interest of the community is the political Good. We have seen too that justice is universally regarded as a species of equality, and that up to a certain point, if not further, the conclusions of the philosophical arguments, [1]in which ethical questions have been discussed and determined, are accepted on all hands, in so far as it is admitted that the notion of justice implies a thing to be given and persons to receive it, and that equals ought to receive an equal share. [2]We have therefore to ascertain the characteristics which constitute personal equality or inequality—a difficult question which can be settled only by the aid of political philosophy.

Political equality and inequality.

It may perhaps be urged that superiority in respect of any and every Good should be a ground for an unequal distribution of public offices, if the persons were absolutely alike in all other respects, as any difference in the persons constitutes a difference in their

found their way into the text. One of them, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ......ἢ ἀδίκους, is therefore omitted in the translation.

[1] It can hardly be doubted that Aristotle is again referring to the doctrine of *Nicom. Eth.* especially Bk. v. ch. 6. See p. 71, l. 30.

[2] It would be better to put a colon instead of a comma after φασίν, as the apodosis of the sentence begins at ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ.

rights and deserts. Yet, if this is true, complexion, stature or any other Good will equally entitle persons to a preference in political rights. But the falsity of this position is apparent on the surface, as may be seen in any other science or faculty. For instance, if there are several flute-players of equal skill, it is not right to give the persons of higher birth a preference in the flutes, for their birth will not make them better flute-players, and the superior instruments ought to be given to the superior performers. If our point is still obscure, it will be plain if we carry the illustration a little further. Suppose there is a person superior to others in the art of flute-playing, but far inferior in nobility of birth or beauty, even granting that nobility and beauty are severally greater Goods than skill upon the flute, and that their superiority to skill upon the flute is proportionally greater than the superiority of our supposed individual *to others* in flute-playing, still it is to him that we must give the finest flutes. For, *if we are to have regard to wealth and nobility in assigning the flutes*, superiority in these respects ought to contribute in some degree to the excellence of the performance; whereas they do not contribute at all. And further, the theory is one which would lead us to regard any Good whatever as comparable with any other Good. For if a certain amount of stature is preferable *to a certain amount of wealth or freedom*, it follows that stature generally may be weighed in the scales against wealth or freedom. Hence, if one person has a greater superiority in stature than another in virtue, and the distinction of stature generally is greater than that of virtue, all

things in the world will be comparable with each other. For if a certain amount of stature is more valuable than a certain amount of something else, it is obvious that there is a certain amount of stature which is equal to a certain amount of that something. But as this *universal commensurability* is out of the question, it is evidently reasonable in the realm of politics not to regard any and every inequality as constituting a title to the offices of State. For the fact that some persons are slow and others swift is no reason why they should enjoy a less or greater measure *of official power;* it is rather in the gymnastic games that superiority of this kind receives its appropriate honour. The claim to office on the other hand must be confined to those elements which enter into the constitution of a State. Accordingly it is reasonable enough that noble or free-born or wealthy persons should lay claim to political honour. For a State necessarily contains free persons and tax-payers *or a propertied class,* as it can no more consist exclusively of paupers than of slaves. But if these elements are indispensable, the same is obviously true of justice and military virtue, both of which are essential to the good administration of a State, although not, as were the elements before mentioned, to its very existence.

CHAP. XIII. If we look then to the mere existence of a State, it would seem that all or at least some of the elements named are rightful claimants *to political supremacy,* whereas if we look to a good life, it would seem that

p. 126. culture and virtue have the justest claims, as has been already remarked. But as it is not right that persons who are equal in one point only should have an equal

share or persons who are unequal in one point only an unequal share of everything, it is a necessary consequence that all such polities as are characterized by this sort of equality or inequality are perversions.

It has been already observed that the different claimants *to political power* have all in a certain sense, although not all absolutely, justice on their side. Thus the claim of the wealthy is that they have a larger interest in the soil, and the soil is national property, and also that they are generally more to be trusted in commercial transactions. The claims of free persons and of nobles on the other hand are closely related to each other. For, *if the title of the free consists in their citizenship*, the nobler classes are citizens in a higher sense than commoners, and nobility is always honoured in any country. Another argument *in favour of the nobles* is the probability that the children of better parents will themselves be better; for nobility is hereditary virtue. The same principles will lead us to regard the claim of virtue *to political supremacy* as also just on the ground that justice,[1] as we assert, is a virtue essential to an association *like the State*, and all the other virtues are necessary concomitants of justice. Again, if we compare the numerical majority with the minority, the former *may put in a claim;* for they are stronger and richer and better, when the majority as a whole are set against the minority.

The claimants to political power. p. 122.

The question arises then: If in a single State there

[1] See *Nicom. Eth.* Bk. v. p. 1129, B_{25}—p. 1130 A_{13}.

exist all these classes, i.e. the Good, the Wealthy and the Noble, and besides them a mass of mere citizens, will there or will there not be a controversy as to the persons who ought to be rulers? It is true that in the several polities we have mentioned the decision of the rulers does not give rise to controversy. For it is in respect of the bodies in which the supreme power resides that they differ from each other, one being in the hands of the wealthy, another of the men of virtuous character, and so on throughout the list. Still the point we are considering is this, When all these elements exist simultaneously *in a State*, how is the polity to be defined? Suppose that the persons possessed of virtue are extremely few in number, upon what principle is the line to be drawn? It would seem right to consider the question of fewness relatively to the task to be performed, *i.e. to consider* whether they are capable of administering a State or are sufficiently numerous to constitute a State of themselves. There is a certain difficulty however which may be raised in regard to all the claimants to the honours of State. The plea of those who claim rule in virtue of their wealth and similarly that of those who claim it on the score of birth would appear to be quite devoid of justice; for it is evident that, if we go further and suppose an individual wealthier than all the rest of the citizens together, the same principle of justice will [1] entitle this individual to be ruler of all the rest, and similarly will entitle an individual of preeminent nobility to be ruler of all whose claim depends upon

[1] Omitting δῆλον ὅτι.

personal freedom. [1]The same will be the case in aristocracies with virtue. If there is an individual morally superior to all the members of the governing class who are assumed to be virtuous, the same principle of justice, *which entitles them to govern*, entitles this individual to be supreme. Or again, if the masses are entitled to be supreme as being stronger than the Few, then in any case where an individual or several persons, although not so many as the mass of the population, are stronger than the rest, it is they rather than the masses who would be entitled to supremacy. All these considerations seem to prove that none of the principles, upon which *certain classes of people* claim to be rulers themselves and to have all others in subjection under them, is right. For even against those who claim supremacy in the governing class on the score of virtue, and similarly against those who claim it on the score of wealth, the masses would be able to advance a just plea, as there is no reason why on certain occasions the masses, not indeed individually but collectively, should not be better and wealthier than the Few.

Accordingly it is possible in this way to meet the difficult question or problem sometimes suggested. Some people find it difficult to determine whether the legislator, if he desires to enact the most absolutely right laws, should have regard in his legislation to the interest of the better classes or of the majority in cases where the conditions are such as we have described, *i.e. where the majority are collectively richer*

[1] Reading ταὐτὸ δὲ τούτοις συμβήσεται.

or more virtuous than the Few. But rightness *in regard to laws* must be conceived as implying equality and, so conceived, it has reference to the interest of the State as a whole, or in other words to the common interest of the citizens. But while a citizen in general is one who is capable of being a ruler and a subject, yet in each several polity he is different; and relatively to the best polity he is one who has the ability and purpose so to live both as subject and ruler as will conduce to the life which is according to virtue. If however there is an individual or more persons than one, although not enough to constitute the full complement of a State, so preeminent in their excess of virtue that neither the virtue of all the other citizens nor their political capacity is comparable to theirs, if they are several, or, if it is an individual, to his alone, such persons are not to be regarded any more as part of a State. It will be a wrong to them to treat them as worthy of mere equality when they are so vastly superior in virtue and political capacity, for any person so exceptional may well be compared to a deity upon the earth. And from this it clearly follows that legislation can be applicable to none but those who are equals in race and capacity; while for persons so exceptional there is no law, as they are a law in themselves. For any attempt to legislate for them would be ridiculous; they would probably make the same reply as did the lions in Antisthenes's story to the declamation of the hares when they demanded universal equality. It is for the same reason that democratical States make use of Ostracism. As it is these States which are supposed to aspire to

Legislation applicable only to equals.

Ostracism. Its use and abuse.

equality above all things, the common practice was to ostracize and so remove from the State for definite periods all whose wealth or *clientèle* or other political strength of any kind gave them an air of superior power. Such too according to the fable was the reason why the Argonauts left Heracles in the lurch, as the ship Argo would not convey him with his comrades because he was so much more powerful than the rest of the crew. Hence it is not right to regard the censures pronounced upon Tyranny and upon the advice [1]of Periander to Thrasybulus as criticisms which are true without qualification. Periander—so the story runs—did not address a syllable to the herald who had been sent to ask his advice, but simply cut off the heads of the overtopping ears until he had levelled the corn-field; upon this the herald without comprehending the meaning of his action reported the incident, and Thrasybulus understood that he was to put the overtopping citizens out of the way. Nor is this the interest or the practice exclusively of tyrants; it is much the same also in Oligarchies and Democracies, as Ostracism has in a certain sense the same effect as cutting down or banishing the citizens who overtop the rest. The same is done in the case of States or non-Greek peoples by the superior Powers as in the case of [2]Samos,

[1] The story is told by Herodotus v. ch. 92. Aristotle has curiously interchanged the parts. It is well known that the same story reappears in Livy (i. 54) and Ovid (*Fast.* ii. 705 sqq.), where the scene is Gabii and the *dramatis personae* Sextus Tarquinius and his father.

[2] See Thucyd. i. 116; iii. 10; iv. 51.

Chios and Lesbos by the Athenians, who had no sooner got the empire securely in their own hands than in defiance of their treaty obligations they crushed these islands, or by the Persian king when again and again he cut down the Medes, Babylonians and other peoples who cherished a proud spirit as having at one time been in possession of imperial power. The problem is a general one which touches all polities, the normal polities not excepted; for, if in the perverted polities regard is paid in so acting to particular interests, still the conditions are the same in those which study the common interest of all. We see the same law in any other art or science. No painter e.g. would allow in an animal a foot, however beautiful it might be, that was out of all proportion to its body, nor a shipbuilder a stern or any other part of the vessel *that was similarly disproportionate to the whole.* Nor again would a choir-master give a place in his chorus to a member who had a louder and finer voice than all the rest. Hence the fact *that the eminent citizens are put out of the way under a monarchy* is not in itself a reason why monarchs should not be in complete harmony with their States if, while they so act, their own rule is advantageous to their States. If we look then to cases of recognized superiority, there is a sort of political justice in the theory of Ostracism. No doubt it is better that the legislator should so order the system of the polity in the first instance that it does not require a remedial measure of this kind; but [1] the next best course is to try, if need be,

[1] The proper meaning of the proverbial phrase δεύτερος πλοῦς

the effect of some such corrective as I have described. But this *remedial use of Ostracism* was not the general rule in States. Instead of regarding the interest of their own polity, men employed Ostracism as a means of gaining party ends.

That in the perverted forms of polity *the practice of removing eminent persons* is advantageous to a special class and is just *according to the principle of these polities* is now evident, although perhaps it is equally evident that it is not just absolutely. But in the best polity it is full of difficulty, not as regards superiority in any ordinary Good such as strength, wealth or a numerous *clientèle*, but as to the right course of action in a case where we find an individual of preeminent virtue. It will surely not be said that such an individual should be banished or removed. [1] It would be equally absurd on the other hand to claim to rule him by an alternation of office; for we might as well presume to rule Zeus. It remains then, as indeed seems natural, that all should render willing obedience to such an one, and that he and his like should thus be perpetual kings within their States.

The case of a preeminently virtuous individual.

CHAP. XIV. Kingship.

It seems proper after the remarks we have made to pass to the consideration of Kingship, as Kingship is in our view one of the normal forms of polity. We have to consider whether for a State or a country,

is made clear by two lines which Stobaeus quotes from Menander:

ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δή που λεγόμενος
ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐρίου κώπαισι πλεῖν.

[1] Reading ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου (παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖμεν) μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς.

which is to enjoy an excellent administration, kingly government or some other polity is expedient, or kingly government is expedient in some cases and not in others.

Various forms of Kingship.

But we must first determine whether Kingship is [1] of one kind only or embraces several different forms. Thus much at least it is easy enough to ascertain, that Kingship includes several kinds, and that the type of rule is not identical in all cases. Thus the Kingship which exists in the Lacedaemonian polity is considered to deserve the name better than any other of the constitutional forms of Kingship; but the kings at Lacedaemon are not supreme in all matters, they are merely military commanders in expeditions beyond the frontiers and enjoy also as their prerogative the superintendence of religious observances. This form of Kingship may be described as nothing more than an absolute and perpetual generalship; [2] for it does not convey the power of life and death except in certain cases, as in the heroic times by martial law during military expeditions. Such is the evidence of Homer. For although Agamemnon patiently endured reproaches in the assemblies, when the army was in the field his authority extended to life and death. [3] Thus his words are

(1) The Lacedaemonian.

"Whomso I find
Afar from battle, he shall not avail
So to escape the vultures and the dogs:
Mine is the arbitrament of death."

[1] Reading ἕν τι γένος.

[2] Reading κτεῖναι μὲν γὰρ οὐ κύριος εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλεία.

[3] Reading λέγει γὰρ. The quotation is from *Iliad* ii. 391—3; but the words πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος do not occur in the existing

This then is one species of Kingship, viz. a life-generalship, and it may be either hereditary or elective. Besides it there is another species of Monarchy which includes such forms of Kingship as exist among certain non-Greek peoples. The power inherent in all these forms [1]closely resembles that of a Tyranny, but at the same time they are constitutional and hereditary. For as non-Greeks are naturally more slavish in character than Greeks and Asiatics than Europeans, they submit without a murmur to their despotic government. While then these forms of Kingship are tyrannical owing to the slavishness of the subjects, they are secure as being hereditary and constitutional. And for the same reason, *i.e. because they are hereditary and constitutional,* the body-guard *of these kings* is a kingly and not a tyrannical one. *The difference is* that, while kings are guarded by the citizens in arms, tyrants are guarded by a mercenary force; for the former rule constitutionally and over willing subjects, but the latter over unwilling subjects; and consequently the body-guard in the one case is derived from the citizens and in the other is maintained as a means of oppressing them. We have now considered two forms of Monarchy. There is a third which existed in ancient Greece, that of the Aesymnetes as they are called. This may be broadly designated as an elective Tyranny, differing from the

(2) The non-Greek.

(3) The Aesymneteia.

texts of Homer. It may be remarked that they are not found in *Nicom. Eth.* III. p. 1116 A_{34}, where Aristotle makes use of the same quotation and wrongly puts it into the mouth of Hector.

[1] Reading παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον.

non-Greek form of Monarchy, not in not being constitutional but solely in not being hereditary. The authority was exercised sometimes for life, sometimes for certain definite periods or until the performance of certain definite actions, as when Pittacus was elected by the Mitylenaeans to oppose the exiles headed by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. That they elected Pittacus tyrant is shown by Alcaeus in one of his drinking-songs, where he upbraids his countrymen [1]"for that Pittacus the low-born they had ordained to be tyrant of the craven ill-starred city, loud lauding, thronging round him." These *two last* forms of Kingship [2]in virtue of their despotic character are and always were tyrannical; but their elective character and the voluntary obedience of the subjects make them kingly. A fourth species of kingly Monarchy is formed by the voluntary and hereditary constitutional Kingships which existed in the heroic times. *Their origin was as follows.* The founders of the Monarchy, having proved themselves benefactors of the people in arts or war or by having united a number of villages in a State or acquired new territory, received the voluntary submission of their subjects and handed down the kingdom as an inheritance to their successors. Their authority was supreme in military command and in sacrifices, except such as were reserved to the priesthood; they also adjudged legal cases. This last they did sometimes under oath and sometimes

(4) The heroic.

[1] This quotation appears, although with some variety of reading, as the 37th Fragment of Alcaeus in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci.*

[2] Reading διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί.

not, [1]the oath consisting in the stretching out of the sceptre. The heroic kings of early times exercised an unbroken rule over all affairs within the State itself, within the country and beyond the frontier; afterwards partly from the voluntary resignation of the kings and partly from the encroachments of the populace nothing was left to the kings in most States except the [2]conduct of the traditional sacrifices, and, where there existed a Kingship worthy of the name, their functions were limited to military command beyond the borders.

Such are the different species of Kingship, four in number, viz. firstly the Kingship of the heroic period when the obedience was voluntary but the power of the kings strictly defined, the king being general, judge and supreme religious functionary; secondly the non-Greek, which was an hereditary despotic rule of a constitutional character; thirdly the Aesymneteia as it is called, an elective Tyranny; and fourthly the Laconian, which may be broadly defined as an hereditary generalship for life. These four are distinguished in this manner. There is however a fifth species of Monarchy, where an individual is absolute in all things, as any non-Greek nation or Greek State is absolute in its public affairs; it is the counterpart of Domestic Economy, for as Domestic Economy is a sort of Kingship of a household, so this Kingship is a domestic government of a single State or nation or of several.

(5) Absolute or universal Kingship.

[1] See by way of illustration Homer *Iliad* VII. 412 and X. 321. Virgil *Æneid* XII. 206.

[2] Reading *αἱ πάτριοι θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν.*

CHAP. XV.

We may say that there are practically only two species of Kingship to be considered, viz. this and the Laconian, as the others for the most part lie between these, having less extensive power than the universal Kingship but more extensive than the Laconian form. Hence the question practically limits itself to two points: (1) Is it advantageous or disadvantageous to States to have a perpetual generalship, whether the office is confined to *a particular* family or [1]*held by members of different families* in succession? (2) Is it advantageous or not that an individual should enjoy absolute and universal power?

Now the question of a perpetual generalship implies a particular species of laws rather than of polity, as the institution may exist in any polity. We may therefore put it out of sight in the first instance. But the remaining form of Kingship, *viz. universal Kingship*, is indeed a distinct species of polity; we must therefore investigate it and run over the difficulties it involves.

The supremacy of the best man or of the best laws.

The first point in the inquiry is whether it is more advantageous to be subject to the best man or the best laws. It is the opinion of those who believe in the advantage of kingly government that the language of the laws is simply general and gives no directions for particular cases that occur. Hence in any art (*they argue*) it is absurd for a person to be

[1] Such must be the meaning of κατὰ μέρος, if the words are retained. They then amount to much the same as καθ' αἵρεσιν, the proposed emendation which brings this passage into verbal agreement with p. 84, l. 30.

controlled in his authority by written formulae; even in Egypt a doctor is allowed to alter *the prescribed course of treatment* [1]after three days, although, if he does so sooner, it is at his peril. For the same reason then it is obvious that a polity which rests upon written formulae or laws is not the best. At the same time *it must be admitted that* no officer of State can dispense with the general principle *which is embodied in a law*, and that that which is wholly exempt from the emotional element is superior to that in which it is innate. Now a law is unemotional, whereas emotion is necessarily inherent in any human soul. But perhaps it will be urged that in compensation for this defect a person will be a better judge of individual cases. It is clear then that an officer of State should himself possess legislative powers, and that there should be a code of laws, but that their authority should not extend to cases where they are wide of the mark, whereas in all others they should be supreme.

The authority of an individual or of the masses.

But in cases where it is impossible for the law to decide at all or to decide aright, ought authority to reside in an individual of supreme merit or in the whole body of citizens? For the existing practice is that the whole body meets to try cases and to deliberate or decide upon matters of State, although these decisions all refer to individual cases. It is true that, if we take any individual and compare him *with the person of supreme merit*, he will probably be inferior. But the State consists of numerous

[1] μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον seems to be the better reading.

members *and is therefore superior to any individual,* as a picnic-repast is more sumptuous than a simple dinner given by a single person. It is for this reason that the masses are often actually better judges than any individual. [1]Also a large number is less liable to be corrupted. The masses are like a larger quantity of water; they are not so easily corruptible as the few. If an individual is overcome by anger or any other similar passion, it necessarily follows that his judgment is corrupt; but in the other case it is hardly possible that a whole people should simultaneously lose their temper and their judgment. When we speak of "the masses," it must be understood that we mean the free citizens, and that they never act without the sanction of the law, except in cases where it is necessarily inadequate.

The authority of an individual or of several persons.

Admitting however that this condition cannot easily be realized in a large number of persons, yet if we suppose the existence of several persons who are both good men and good citizens, we may inquire whether an individual in a position of rule or the several persons, all of whom are supposed to be good, will be the less liable to corruption. Surely the answer is plain—The several persons. But *it will be urged that* the larger number will [2]split into parties, which is impossible in the case of an individual. This objection however may perhaps be met by the reply that these persons are *ex hypothesi* virtuous in soul as much as the individual supposed

[1] Reading ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.

[2] Reading στασιάσουσιν.

and will therefore be free from party spirit. If then the rule of a certain number of persons, all of whom are good men, is to be called Aristocracy and the rule of an individual Kingship, it would follow that Aristocracy is in States preferable to Kingship, whether the authority of the king is or is not supported by a military force, provided that it is possible to find a number of persons equally virtuous. In fact it seems probable that the reason why kingly government was the rule in early times is that it was rare to find persons of extremely eminent virtue, especially as the States of those times were small. And further, kingly power was then conferred upon individuals as the reward of services rendered to the State. But it is the function of good men to render such services, *and if they were rewarded with kingly power, the number of good men must have been very small.* In process of time however there came to be a number of persons equally virtuous, and then they no longer submitted to kingly rule, but sought to establish a sort of *commune* or constitutional government. And afterwards as men degenerated and treated politics as a source of pecuniary gain, the creation of Oligarchies was a natural result of such a condition, as they had introduced the worship of wealth. From Oligarchies they passed in the first instance to Tyrannies and from Tyrannies again to Democracy. For the Oligarchs, as in their miserable avarice they perpetually narrowed the range of the privileged class, so augmented the strength of the populace that they rose in revolt and founded Democracies. And now that States have grown to

The reason of primitive Kingship.

Chronological succession of governments.

still larger dimensions it is perhaps no longer easy to establish any other form of polity than Democracy.

Hereditary Kingship.

Supposing however it is determined that kingly government is the best for States, *we may ask*, What is to be the case with the children? Is the family of the king to reign as well as himself? But in this case, if the sons are no better than they often have been, the interests of the State are prejudiced. [1]Is it suggested that the king, although he has the power, will not hand on the succession to his children? This we cannot well believe; it is a hard condition requiring superhuman virtue.

The military force of the king.

There is a difficulty also as to the military power of the king. Is the king designate to have such a force attached to his person as will enable him to enforce obedience upon unwilling subjects? or, if not, how can he administer his office? Even on the supposition that his authority is wholly constitutional and that he never acts arbitrarily against the law, he must still possess military power enough to guard the laws. It is perhaps not difficult to fix the limit in the case of such a constitutional king. He must have a force at his disposal; but while it is large enough to be stronger than any individual or knot of individuals, it must be weaker than the collective body of the citizens. It must be such a force as the body-guard which the ancients usually assigned, whenever they appointed an Aesymnete, as he was called, or tyrant of the State, or which someone

[1] It is better to omit the mark of interrogation after τοῖς τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κ.τ.λ. introduces a supposed reply to the question raised about hereditary Kingship.

advised the Syracusans to give Dionysius when he asked for a body of guards.

CHAP. XVI. Absolute or universal Kingship.

The case of the king who acts in all things according to his arbitrary pleasure presents itself next and claims consideration. For the so-called constitutional king does not, as we said, form a distinct species of polity, as a perpetual generalship may exist in any polity, e.g. in a Democracy or Aristocracy, and it is not uncommon to invest an individual with the supreme control of the executive. There is an office of this kind at Epidamnus among other places and, [1]although with somewhat less extensive authority, at Opus. But to come to the case of universal Kingship, as it is called, or the form of Kingship in which the king exercises arbitrary authority over all, it is by some considered absolutely unnatural that an individual should be master of all the citizens where the State is composed of persons, all of whom are alike. It is argued that, where persons are naturally alike, there must naturally be the same justice and the same desert for all; and upon this principle, as it is hurtful to the physical health that persons who are unequal should have equal food or clothing, the same is true of public honours. [2]Similarly it is hurtful that equals should have unequal shares. Accordingly, *where the citizens are alike*, it is just that they should have as large a share of subjection as of rule. It follows that the alternation *of rule and subjection* is likewise just. But this alternation at once implies law; for such

p. 148.

Objections to it.

[1] Reading κατά τι μέρος ἐλάττων.

[2] Omitting τοίνυν.

a system is itself a law. The rule of law then (*it is concluded*) is preferable to the rule of an individual citizen. According to the same theory, even on the supposition that it is advisable to have certain definite officers of State, they are to be constituted merely guardians and ministers of the laws. It is admitted that there must be certain officers of State; but that the officer should be a single individual is declared to be unjust, as all the citizens are alike. *Against the supremacy of law* however it may be urged that an [1]individual would be able to decide all such cases as apparently cannot be determined by the law. The answer is that the law expressly educates the officers of State and then sets them to decide and administer all matters beyond its province according to their most just judgment. And not only so, but the law empowers them to introduce amendments wherever experience suggests an improvement of the existing ordinances. To invest the law then with authority is, it seems, to invest God and intelligence only; to invest a man is to introduce a beast, as desire is something bestial and [2]even the best of men in authority are liable to be corrupted by anger. We may conclude then that the law is intelligence without passion *and is therefore preferable to any individual.* There is a fallacy in the illustration drawn from the arts, that it is a mistake to let oneself be doctored according to formulae, and we had better consult scientific physicians. For

[1] Reading *ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος* in place of *οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος.*

[2] Reading *καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει.*

physicians are never led by personal friendship to offend against reason; on the contrary it is only when they have restored their patients to health that they get their fee; whereas officers of State have a habit of acting in many matters out of spite or favouritism. The truth is that when the patient suspects his physician of taking bribes from his personal enemies to poison him, he would then prefer to be treated according to written formulae. Nay, physicians in their illnesses call in other physicians, and gymnastic trainers in their own exercises other trainers, as being unable to form true judgments in such cases, because the judgment is one concerning themselves, and they are prejudiced *in passing it.* It is evident therefore that to seek justice is to seek something free from bias, *or in other words to have recourse to law,* as there is no bias in law. *It is to be remembered* too *that* there are laws—the laws of custom—more important and affecting subjects of higher importance than those expressed in written formulae, so that, even [1]if a personal ruler is more to be trusted than the laws of written formulae, he is not more trustworthy than the laws of custom.

Again, it may be said that an individual cannot well attend to a large number of subjects. It will be necessary therefore to have several officers appointed by him; and, if so, what difference does it make whether this system exists in the first instance or the officers are appointed, as we suppose, by the individual? Further, as we remarked before, if a p. 150.

[1] Reading ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα κ.τ.λ.

virtuous man as being better than his fellows has a claim to rule, then two good men are better than one; witness the [1]*Homeric* saying:

"if two together go,
One thinks before the other;"

and [2]Agamemnon's prayer,

"Would I had ten such councillors as Nestor."

But there are even at the present time some matters which it is within the competence of the officers of the State, e.g. of a jury, to decide, matters which cannot be determined by the law; for in cases which it can determine no one denies that the rule and decision of the law would be best. And in fact, whereas there are some things which can and others which cannot be embraced by the laws, it is the latter which give rise to debate and examination as to whether the rule of the best law or of the best man is preferable. For it is a thing impossible to legislate upon the ordinary matters of deliberation. Accordingly *the opponents of kingly government* do not dispute the necessity of having a person to decide such cases; they merely contend that there should be a number of persons instead of only one. For granted that each several officer, if he has been educated by the law, decides well, yet it would perhaps seem strange if a man were [3]better qualified to decide with only two eyes and ears and to act with only two feet or hands than a number of people with many, especially as it is a fact

[1] *Iliad* x. 224. [2] *Iliad* II. 372.
[3] Reading εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι.

that monarchs multiply their eyes, ears, hands and feet by associating the friends of their office and persons with themselves in their power. *These must be friends of the monarch*, as otherwise they will not act according to his purpose. But if they are the friends of his person and his office, a man's friend is his equal and peer. Hence the recognition of their right to rule is a recognition of the equal right of all peers and equals.

Such are practically the objections urged by the opponents of kingly government.

It is possible however that the conditions supposed exist in some cases and not in others. [1]For there is in Nature a principle of slave-mastery, another of Kingship, and another of constitutional government, and all alike are just and expedient. But there exists no natural principle of Tyranny or of any other of the perverted forms of polity, as all these are in their origin contrary to Nature. It is plain however from the observations we have made that among peers and equals it is neither expedient nor just that an individual should be supreme over all, whether in a society where there are no laws and he is virtually a law in himself, or where there are laws, and whether as a good man over good subjects, or as one who is not good over subjects who are not good, or even in the case where he is a person of superior virtue, except in one particular instance. What this instance is we have now to state, although it has in a certain way been already described.

CHAP. XVII.

p. 140.

[1] Reading ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ.

The character of people suited to Kingship, Aristocracy or Polity.

First however we must determine the character of people suited to a Kingship, an Aristocracy, or a constitutional government, *i.e. a Polity.* The populace which is suited to Kingship is such as is naturally qualified to submit to a family whose superiority in virtue entitles them to political command; an aristocratical populace is [1]one that is capable of yielding the obedience of free men to those whose virtue fits them for command as political rulers; a constitutional populace one that is capable [2]of rule and subjection in conformity to a law which distributes the offices of State to the rich according to a principle of desert. And thus wherever there is, as it happens, a whole family or an individual so superior in virtue to all the rest that the virtue of this individual or family exceeds that of all others in the State, in that case it is but just that this family should enjoy a regal or supreme position and that this individual should be king. For to repeat our former observation, this is not only in accordance with the principle of justice usually alleged by the founders of polities whether [3]Aristocracies, Oligarchies, or Democracies, in all of which the claim to rule is dependent on superiority, although the superiority is not the same, but it accords also with the theory we laid down before. For assuredly it is not

Justification of absolute Kingship.

p. 139.

p. 143.

[1] Omitting *πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν*, and again below *ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἓν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν.*

[2] Reading *ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.*

[3] Reading *οἵ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατίας (πάντῃ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν) ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν.*

proper to put to death or outlaw or even ostracize this preeminent individual, or to require him to become a subject in his turn. For it is not natural that a part should be superior to the whole, and an individual who enjoys such an immense advantage over the rest stands to the other citizens in the relation of the whole to a part. The only alternative is that they should yield him obedience, and that he should be supreme not on the principle of alternation but absolutely.

We may now be said to have determined what are the different species included under Kingship, whether it is or is not advantageous to States, and, if so, to what States and in what way advantageous.

But as the normal forms of polity are in our judgment three, and of these the best of course is that which is administered by the best persons, or in other words that in which it is the case that there is either an individual or a whole family or a numerous body of preeminent virtue, and one party is qualified [1]so to obey and the other so to rule as is conducive to the most desirable life, and as it was further shown at the outset of our treatise that the virtue of a man and of a citizen of the best State is necessarily the same, it is evident that the same principle and the same means which serve to produce a good man would serve also to constitute a State governed by an aristocracy or a king. And from this it follows that the education and the

CHAP. XVIII. p. 119.

p. 112.

[1] It is not necessary to insert, as Spengel and Bekker do, the words καὶ ἄρχειν.

customs which form a virtuous man will be practically the same as those which form a statesman or king.

Having now determined these points, we must next endeavour to describe the natural origin and constitution of the best polity.

BOOK IV.

[1]In any attempt at an adequate investigation of the best polity it is necessary to begin by determining the nature of the most desirable life. If we do not know this, we cannot know the best polity, as it is natural that persons who live under the best polity possible to them in their circumstances should, unless for some unforeseen circumstance, enjoy the best condition of life. And hence it must first be settled what is the nature of that life which is, we may say, universally the most desirable, and secondly whether this life is the same for the Commonwealth and the individual or different. CHAP. I.

The nature of the best life.

Assuming then that the best life is the subject of sufficient discussion in many of our non-scientific discourses, we have now merely to avail ourselves of the

[1] The imperfect sentence *'Ανάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν* which occurs in the MSS at the end of Book III. is evidently only another form of the opening words of Book IV. in Bekker's text, *Περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη.* I agree with Congreve that it is probably the true reading and should be placed at the beginning of Book IV. It was repeated with some slight alterations by a copyist, when the original order of the books had been disturbed.

Three classes of Goods.

results there obtained. For undoubtedly, if we take one division of Goods, it will not be denied that, as there are three classes, viz. external Goods, Goods of the body and Goods of the soul, the happy man must possess all three. Nobody would predicate happiness of a man who had not a particle of valour, temperance, justice or prudence, who was terrified by the midges flying past him, who if he felt any desire of meat or drink abstained from no wickedness however extreme, who for a farthing would ruin his dearest friends, and who, to complete the picture, was intellectually as foolish and full of error as a child or a lunatic. [1]Yet while all would admit this in theory, there is a difference of opinion as to the degree *of these Goods necessary to perfect happiness* and as to their relative superiority. Thus people think it is enough to possess a degree however small of virtue; but of wealth, money, power, reputation and the like they seek an ever larger and larger share. We will tell them however that upon this point it is easy to satisfy themselves of the truth by the actual facts of life, if they observe that it is not the virtues which are gained and guarded by external Goods but these external Goods by virtues, and that happiness of life, whether men find it in enjoyment or virtue or both, is rather the prerogative of those whose character and intellect are cultivated to a high degree, although they are moderate in the acquisition of external Goods, than of those who, while they possess a larger share than use requires of external Goods, are deficient in the Goods of character and intelligence. At the same

[1] Omitting ὥσπερ.

time it is equally easy to perceive this truth, if we take a theoretical view. [1]External Goods like instruments have a limit, viz. their utility, and it follows that the excess of them is either hurtful or in no way beneficial to their possessor; whereas, [2]if we take any Good of the soul, the greater the amount of it, the greater is its utility, if utility no less than nobleness is to be attributed to Goods of the soul as well as of the body. Again, it is evident as a universal rule that, if we compare two things together, we shall lay it down that the best condition of the one is superior to the best condition of the other [3]in a degree corresponding to the difference between the things of which these are themselves conditions, and consequently, as the soul is both absolutely and relatively to us a thing more honourable than either property or the body, it follows that the best condition of the soul is proportionately superior to the best condition of either of these. Further it is for the sake of the soul that the body and property are naturally desirable and should be desired by all sensible persons, not the soul for the sake of these. We may regard it then as admitted that the degree of happiness which falls to the lot of any individual corresponds to his degree of virtue, prudence and virtuous or prudent action; and herein we may appeal to the

[1] Reading τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι (πέρας δὲ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν) ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.

[2] It is possible to retain εἶναι in the text, if a colon instead of a full stop is placed after τοῖς ἔχουσιν.

[3] Omitting the comma after ὑπεροχήν, so as to shew that the words ἥνπερ εἴληχε διάστασιν are equivalent to τῇ διαστάσει ἥνπερ εἴληχε and grammatically follow ἀκολουθεῖν.

witness of God who, while He is happy and perfectly blessed, is so owing not to any external Good but to Himself alone and His own intrinsic qualities. This is in fact the reason why good fortune is necessarily distinct from happiness; for Goods external to the soul are the gifts of chance or fortune, whereas nobody is just or temperate from fortune or in virtue of his fortune.

The best life the same for the State as for the individual.

Our next point, although it does not require any fresh arguments, is that the same is true of the State, and that the best State is one which is happy and doing well. [1]But it is impossible to do well [2]without doing what is well; nor can any work either of an individual or of a State be well done, if it is dissociated from virtue and prudence. But the valour, justice, prudence and temperance of a State are in effect and form identical with those, by participation in which an individual is described as brave, just, prudent or temperate.

We must be content however with these remarks by way of prelude to our argument; it is equally impossible to avoid touching upon the subject and to pursue all the arguments proper to it, as it would require a separate discussion. For the present it may be taken as established that the best life, whether for each individual separately or for States collectively, is one which possesses virtue furnished with external advantages to such a degree as to be capable of

[1] The play or argument which turns upon the double meaning of καλῶς πράττειν, "to act well" and "to fare well," is not easy to reproduce exactly in English.

[2] Reading τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν.

actions according to virtue. The objections to this doctrine we must neglect in the present inquiry and submit to a full examination hereafter, if there are any persons not convinced by our remarks.

CHAP. II. The happiness of the State identical with that of the individual.

We have still to discuss the question whether the happiness of any individual and of the State is to be considered as identical or different. Nor is this point an obscure one; it would be universally admitted that the happiness is the same. For those who believe that a good life in the case of an individual depends upon wealth agree in considering that the State also as a whole is happy, if it is wealthy; those who hold a life of tyranny in most honour *for individuals* will all say that the State which has the largest number of subjects is the happiest; and one who recognizes in virtue the source of an individual's happiness will assert that the more virtuous State also is the happier.

However, there are these two points requiring consideration, (1) which is the more desirable life, his who lives as a member of the body politic and takes part in affairs of State, or his who lives the life of an alien holding aloof from the political association? (2) what polity or what kind of political organization is to be regarded as best, whether participation in the affairs of State is desirable for all, or *for all* with some few exceptions, i.e. for the large majority? But as it is the second question rather than what is desirable for individuals, which is the object of political reflexion and speculation, and as it is a political inquiry which we have now undertaken, the question *as to the life of individuals* is of minor importance,

whereas the second is the object of our present inquiry.

It is plain then that the best polity is necessarily the system under which anybody can do best and live happily. But even on the side of those who admit that the virtuous life is most to be desired, the question is raised whether it is a political and practical life which is desirable, or rather one of isolation from all external affairs, i.e. a speculative life, which is regarded by some as the only life worthy of a philosopher. These are practically the two lives which are chosen, as experience shows, by the persons most ambitious in the pursuit of virtue, whether in former days or at the present time, viz. the political life and the philosophical. Nor is it of slight importance on which side the truth lies, as the life of [1]any sensible individual or polity as a whole will necessarily be ordered in reference to the better goal. Now it is held by certain thinkers that the rule over others, if despotic in its character, implies [2]injustice in the most extreme degree, while, if constitutional, although it does not involve injustice, it presents an obstacle to the personal felicity of the ruler. There are others who entertain what we may call the diametrically opposite view that the practical or political life is alone worthy of a man on the ground that, whatever virtue we take, virtuous actions are far less possible to private persons than to persons who lead a public or political life.

Comparison of political and philosophical life.

The life of the State.

[3]*Similarly,* while some contend *that a State*

[1] Reading τόν γε εὖ φρονοῦντα. [2] Omitting τινός.

[3] There is apparently a lacuna after πολιτευομένοις, and it has been necessary to insert some words in the translation in order to

should lead a life of isolation, others hold that the despotic or tyrannical type of polity is the only one which is happy. [1]In fact there are some countries in which the sole object of the laws and polity alike is foreign dominion. It is thus that, while the great majority of institutions in most nations have been established in what may be called a haphazard manner, yet if there is anywhere a single object which the laws keep in view, it is conquest which is the aim and end of all. At Lacedaemon, for example, and in Crete, it is to war and war alone that the whole system of education and of the laws generally is directed. And not only so, but in all non-Greek nations which are capable of an aggressive policy, e.g. the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, Celts, it is military power only which is admired. Thus in some countries there are actually particular laws encouraging the pursuit of this virtue, as at Carthage, where it is said that people are allowed to wear by way of ornament as many rings as the number of campaigns in which they have served. There was formerly too a law in Macedonia that anyone who had never slain an enemy should wear the halter about his neck. Among the Scythians again there was a certain feast at which, as the goblet passed round, nobody might

shew the natural progress of the argument. The parallelism between the lives of the individual and of the State will be preserved, if we supply a sentence in which the argument for isolating the State from external influences is stated. Upon this the words οἱ μὲν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν κ.τ.λ. follow naturally.

[1] Reading παρ' ἐνίοις δ' οὗτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος.

drink it who had never slain an enemy. Among the Iberians who are a military people it is the custom to set around the tomb of a deceased warrior a number of obelisks corresponding to the number of enemies he has killed. And there are many different ordinances of the kind in different countries, some established by law and others by custom. Yet, if we are willing to examine the matter closely, it may well appear to be a startling paradox that it should be the function of a Statesman to succeed in devising the means of rule and mastery over neighbouring peoples whether with or against their own will. How can such action be worthy of a statesman or legislator when it has not even the sanction of law? The rule which is indiscriminately just or unjust is unlawful, and the mere exercise of superior power may as well be unjust as just. Nor do we observe any such *compulsion* in the other sciences. It is not the function of a physician or a pilot to compel, if he cannot persuade, his patients or his crew. And yet it seems that most states look upon despotic government as constitutional and feel no scruple at adopting towards others a line of action which any one of them denies to be just or beneficial in its own case. For in their own case they demand that the rule should be just, whereas in their treatment of others they wholly disregard justice. But it would be strange, if there were not a natural distinction between those [1] who are proper subjects of despotic rule and those who are not; and hence, if we assume the existence of this

[1] Reading δεσποστόν twice for δεσπόζον.

distinction, it is not right to endeavour to rule despotically over all persons but only over the proper subjects of despotic power, as neither is it right to hunt human beings for a banquet or sacrifice but only such things as are fit to be hunted for such a purpose, i.e. wild animals which are good for food. And further, it must be possible for a single State, i.e. obviously a State which enjoys a good polity, to be happy even in a position of isolation, as it is always possible that there should be somewhere or other a State, in which the laws are virtuous, constituted in a position of isolation, and in this case the whole system of its polity will not be directed to war or conquest of its enemies, as all such objects are to be excluded *ex hypothesi.*

It is evident then that, while it is right to regard all military preparations as honourable, they must be so regarded not as being the supreme end of all things, but as means to that end. But it is the business of the virtuous legislator to devise means whereby a State or race of men or any other association may enjoy a good life and all the happiness of which they are capable. There will be some differences however in the institutions *of different States;* and it falls within the province of the legislative art in any case where there exist neighbour States to consider the course of action to be practised towards them according to their character or the means of performing the duties owing to each.

However the object to which the best polity ought to tend is a question which will hereafter receive a suitable investigation. But as to those who, while

CHAP. III. The life of the individual. p. 199.

they admit that a virtuous life is most desirable, yet differ about its practical realization, whether they absolutely reject political offices, as holding that the life of a free person is different from political life and is of all lives the most desirable, or on the contrary regard political life as the best on the ground that it is impossible for one who does nothing to do well, and that well-doing is identical with happiness—to both these classes we have to reply that they are partly right and partly wrong in their positions. Thus the first are right in holding that the life of a free man is better than that of a slavemaster. This is true; for there is nothing dignified in merely using a slave *qua* slave, as the mere issuing of orders about the necessaries of life has no element of nobleness in it. It is a mistake however to suppose that the rule of a slavemaster is the only type of rule; for there is as wide a difference between the rule of free men and of slaves as between those who are themselves naturally free and those who are naturally slaves. But this is a point which has been sufficiently determined in the p. 11. early part of our treatise. On the other hand the preference of a life of inactivity to one of action is an error; for happiness consists in action, and further the actions of persons who are just and temperate imply the accomplishment of many things that are noble. But in the face of these conclusions someone will perhaps suppose that supreme and universal power is the best thing, as it means the power to perform the largest number of the noblest actions. Upon this hypothesis it is not right that one who has a chance of rule should surrender it to his neighbour

but rather that he should wrest it from him; nor again that a father should consider his children or children their parent or any one friend another, or give them a thought in comparison with this, inasmuch as what is best is most desirable, and there is nothing so good as well-doing. Now it is possible that this position is a true one on the assumption that the authors of acts of robbery and violence will possess the thing which is most desirable in the world. But it is probable that they cannot possess it, and that this fundamental assumption is unsound. For, *if a person acquires rule in such a way*, it is impossible that his actions should still be noble, unless his superiority to all others is as great as that of a man to a woman, a parent to his children or a slavemaster to his slaves. And from this it follows that one who transgresses the ways of virtue can never in his subsequent life perform any virtuous action corresponding to the transgression of which he has already been guilty. For among persons of similar qualifications nobleness and justice consist in alternation of rule, as this is the condition of equality and similarity; whereas inequality among equals and dissimilarity among similars is contrary to Nature, and nothing that is contrary to Nature can be noble. And hence *on the other hand*, if there is some other individual superior in virtue and practical ability to the best, him it is noble to follow and just to obey. He ought however to possess not only virtue but the ability to put it in practice. But if this position is sound, and happiness is to be defined as well-doing, it is the practical life which will be best alike for any

The nature of the practical life.

State as a body and for individuals. At the same time it is not necessary, as is sometimes supposed, that the practical life should imply relations to others or that the only exercises of the intellect which are practical should be such as are directed to objects which result from action; on the contrary those speculations and intellectual processes which are complete in themselves and have no ulterior object are practical in a much higher sense of the word. For [1] well-doing and therefore some form of *doing or* action is the end *of human life;* but even in regard to actions which have an external effect we ascribe [2]action in the strictest sense to those whose intellectual operations constitute them the master-craftsmen. Nor again is inactivity necessarily the condition of such States as hold an isolated position and have deliberately adopted a life of isolation. Action itself is possible among the members, as there are many associations among the different members of a State. The same remark is equally applicable to any individual; as otherwise it would be hard to predicate perfection of God or the Universe, seeing that all their actions are self-contained and there are none which have an effect external to themselves.

It is evident then that the same life must needs be the best for each individual and for the State collectively [3].

[1] Here again and throughout the present passage the ambiguity of εὐπραξία and εὖ πράττειν, which is essential to the argument, is necessarily lost in an English translation.

[2] Omitting καὶ before πράττειν.

[3] Omitting καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Having made these preliminary remarks upon the subject[1], we have now in entering upon the questions which lie before us, to state at the outset the nature of the assumptions to be made in respect of the State which shall be ideally constructed. For it is impossible that the best polity should be realized without adequate external means. Hence it is necessary to begin by making various assumptions of an ideal kind, although none of these must exceed the bounds of possibility. There must be e.g. an assumed number of citizens and extent of land. For as other craftsmen such as weavers and shipwrights must have at their command the right material in a suitable condition for their craft—for the better[2] the material is prepared the more beautiful will be the product of the art—so too a politician or legislator must be able to command his proper material in a suitable condition. CHAP. IV. The ideal polity.

Among the external means of a State there is first a question as to the right number and natural disposition of the inhabitants and similarly as to the extent and character of the land. Now it is a general idea that a State can only be happy, if it is great. But granted that this idea is a true one, its advocates fail to perceive the characteristic of a great or small State. They estimate the great- Size of the State.

[1] The clause καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον is necessarily omitted in the new and correct order of the Books. The "examination of the other polities" occurs in the Books which now follow, instead of preceding the present, viz. in Books VI. VII. and VIII. of Bekker's text; for it is hardly probable that Aristotle refers in these words to Book II.

[2] Reading αὕτη.

ness of a State by the numerical total of its population; whereas it is not so much the population of a State as its power that deserves consideration. For as a State like an individual has a certain definite function, the State which is able to perform this function best [1]is the greatest State, just as Hippocrates would be called greater, not as a man but as a physician, than a person who is superior to him in bodily stature. And further, even if it is by a consideration of numbers that we should estimate *the greatness of a State,* it is not any and every multitude which is to be regarded in so doing—for a host of slaves, resident aliens and foreigners is probably an inevitable element in States—but only those who constitute a part of a State and are the proper members of which it is composed. It is superiority in the number of these alone which is an indication of a great State, while a State which sends forth a large number of mechanics and only a few heavy-armed soldiers cannot possibly be great. For a great State is not the same thing as a populous one. Again, if there is anything clearly proved by experience, it is the difficulty, nay perhaps the impossibility, of good law in an over-populous State; at least, if we look at States which are considered to enjoy good polities, we see none that wholly dispenses with restrictions upon the increase of population. The same fact may be shown by argumentative proof. Law is a species of order, and *hence* good law necessarily implies good order. But an overwhelming number cannot be reduced to order; for this is a

[1] Omitting οἰητέον.

task requiring divine power such as holds this our Universe together[1]. Hence it follows that the noblest State is one in which the proposed definition, *viz. good order*, is combined with magnitude; for number and magnitude are usual conditions of nobleness. But there is a fixed measure of magnitude for a State as for all other things, animals, vegetables or instruments, any of which, if extremely small or extravagantly large, will not retain its proper efficacy but will either be wholly divested of its natural character or will be in bad condition. Thus a vessel, if it is a span long or a quarter of a mile long, will not be a vessel at all; while, if it reaches a certain size *although not so small as a span or so large as a quarter of a mile*, its smallness in the one case and its inordinate magnitude in the other will make it almost worthless for sailing in. Similarly a State, if its members are extremely few, will not be independent, as a State must be; and if they are extremely numerous, although it will be independent as regards the necessaries of life in the sense in which a non-Greek people is independent, yet it will not be a State, as a polity cannot easily exist in it. For who is to be general of this overwhelming multitude or its public crier, if he has not the voice of a Stentor? We may conclude then that, as a State is in the nature of things first realized when the population composing it is numerically the lowest which is independent and capable of a good life, so one that

[1] The words ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι are inappropriate in their present position and should be transposed so as to follow ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον.

is numerically larger than this may still be [1]a State, although this increase cannot continue indefinitely. Nor is it difficult, if we take a practical view, to ascertain the limit of excess. The actions of a State imply rulers on the one hand and subjects on the other, and the function of a ruler is to issue commands and pronounce judgments. If then they are to determine questions of justice and distribute offices of State according to desert, it is necessary that the citizens should know each other's character; for where this is not the case the distribution of offices and the judicial decisions will be wrong. For it is not just to form off-hand opinions upon these two points, as is plainly the case in over-populated States. Further in such States it is easy for foreigners and resident aliens to usurp the franchise, as the vastness of the population affords them a ready means of concealment. We see clearly then the best limit of population; it is that the number of citizens should be the largest possible in order to ensure independence of life, but not so large that it cannot be comprehended in a single view.

Such then may be our decision as to the magnitude of a State, and the case as to the country is very similar. If its character is in question, it is evident that every one will admire the country which is most independent. But in order to be so it must yield produce of every kind, as independence consists in possessing everything and having no wants. In extent and magnitude the country which will be admired is one which is so large that the

CHAP. V. Nature of the country.

[1] Omitting μείζω.

citizens are able to live in the enjoyment of leisure with equal liberality and temperance. Whether we are right or wrong in this definition must be considered more exactly hereafter when we come to speak of property and wealth of estate generally, with the view of determining the right manner and principle of its relation to practical use. For this is a question involving many disputed points, as people display a tendency to one extreme of life or the other, viz. to parsimony on the one hand and to luxury on the other. The form of the country is not difficult to describe. There are some points in which it is right to follow the opinion of military specialists, e.g. that it ought to be difficult for enemies to invade and easy for the citizens to march out of. Also the country, as we said of the inhabitants, should be readily com- p. 176.
prehended in a single view; and when we say that it should be so comprehended, we mean that it should allow of military succour being brought to any point at a short notice.

The situation of the city.

As to the situation of the city, if we are to make it an ideal one, its position should be favourable in reference both to the sea and to the country. One characteristic is that which has been mentioned; the city must for purposes of military succour command easy communication with all points in the country. The other is that it should be easy of access for the conveyance of the produce of the soil [1]as well as of material like timber or any other similar raw material that the country may possess.

[1] The construction becomes clearer, if a comma is substituted for the full stop after παραπομπάς.

CHAP. VI.

Communication of the State with the sea.

The question whether communication with the sea is advantageous or injurious to well-ordered States is one that is [1]variously debated. It is argued that the residence in the country of foreigners educated under a different legal system is inexpedient in the interest of good order, as is also the great increase of population which is the result of a marine trade with its constant arrival and departure of a host of merchants to all quarters of the world, but is an obstacle to the possibility of a noble polity. Now it is plain enough that, if these ill results do not follow, it is better both for safety and an abundance of the necessaries of life that the State and the country should both communicate with the sea. For as a support in time of war it is right that a people who are to act upon the defensive should be capable of receiving easy assistance equally by land and sea; and for purposes of offence against assailants, if they cannot inflict damage upon them in both ways, still by commanding both they will have a better chance of doing so in one way or the other. Also it is indispensable that a State should have the opportunity of importing any commodities which it may not possess and of exporting its own surplus produce. For it is in its own interest exclusively and not in the interest of others that a State should engage in commerce. Nations which convert themselves into a universal market are actuated solely by desire of gain, and as a State ought not to be capable of such avarice, so neither ought it to possess such a mart. But as we see at the present time not a few countries or cities

[1] Reading πολλά.

[1]possessing docks and harbours conveniently situated as regards the city, so as to be neither part of the same town nor far removed from it but secured by walls and other similar fortifications, it is evident that any advantage which accrues by communication with them will be enjoyed by the city, while any injury of which they are the cause is easily guarded against by laws in which it is stated and defined who are the persons on either side who may or may not enjoy intercourse one with another. And further as to a naval force, that it is best for States to possess one of a certain strength is clear enough; for it is proper not in their own behalf alone but also in behalf of some of their neighbours that a people should inspire an amount of awe and be capable of defensive action by sea as well as by land. The number and size of this force however can only be decided by reference to the life of the State. If it is to lead an imperial and military life, the naval force which it possesses must be commensurate with its enterprises. But the great increase of population arising from the presence of a crowd of sailors is not a necessary incident in States. It is not right that such persons should form a distinct part of the State. For the marines who command and control the navigation are free men taken from the ranks of the army; while, if the State possesses a number of subjects and cultivators of the soil, it will be sure to have an abundant supply of sailors. We actually see [2]this to be the case at the present time in some

The naval force.

[1] Reading πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις.
[2] Omitting καὶ before τοῦτα.

States e.g. at Heracleia, where the citizens, despite the comparatively moderate size of their State, succeed in manning a large fleet of triremes.

Such then may be our conclusions [1]as to the country, the harbours of a State, its communication with the sea and its naval force. We have already discussed the proper limit of the civic population. It remains now to describe the right natural character of the citizens. This may practically be perceived by a glance at the States which enjoy a high reputation in Greece and at the distribution of the whole inhabited world among its various nationalities. The nations which live in cold regions, [2]those of Europe among the number, while full of spirit are comparatively deficient in intelligence and artistic skill; and the result is that, while they succeed in preserving their liberty, they are destitute of political organization and incapable of external dominion. The nations of Asia on the other hand, although intellectual and artistic, are wanting in spirit and hence remain in a state of subjection and servitude. But the Greeks, as they occupy territorially an intermediate position, so they partake of both qualities; they are equally spirited and intelligent and accordingly have always been free, have enjoyed excellent political organiza-

CHAP. VII. Character of the citizens. pp. 173 sqq.

[1] Reading χώρας καὶ πόλεως λιμένων.

[2] It is evident, if the text is correct, that Εὐρώπη has here a limited sense, including only the northern parts of our Europe, as in the lines of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo:

Ἠ μὲν ὅσοι Πελοπόννησον πίειραν ἔχουσιν
Ἠ ὅσοι Εὐρώπην τε καὶ ἀμφιρύτους κατὰ νήσους.

vv. 250—1.

tion and, if they were united in a single polity, would be capable of universal empire. The same difference however exists among the various races of Greece. The natural character of some is onesided, that of others presents a happy admixture of both these faculties. It is evident then that a people which is to be easily guided by the lawgiver in the path of virtue should be at once naturally intelligent and spirited. For when it is laid down by [1]certain philosophers as a proper condition of their Guardian class that they should be affectionate towards their friends and savage towards strangers, it is the spirit, *we must remember*, which produces the capacity for affection, as the spirit is the faculty of the soul whereby we love. We infer this from the fact that at any supposed slight our spirit rises more against friends than against strangers. Thus Archilochus is true to nature when in his bitterness against his friends he addresses his spirit in the words

[2] "Was't not for a friend that thou wast galled?"

And further it is this same faculty which inspires men with the principle of rule and personal liberty, as the spirit is something sovereign and independent. It is a mistake however to require that the Guardians should be "fierce towards strangers." For it is not right to be fierce towards anyone, nor are magnanimous natures ever savage, except towards persons who injure them, and, as has been already

[1] The reference is to Plato *Republic* II. p. 375 B.

[2] Putting a mark of interrogation after ἀπάγχεο. The Fragment of Archilochus is the 61st in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci.*

remarked, they are especially apt to be thus affected in relation to familiar friends, if they consider themselves injured by them. Nor is this at all unreasonable; for where they suppose [1]people are under an obligation to render them a service, not only is there the actual injury *to irritate them* but the feeling that they are defrauded of the service they had a right to expect. Hence the sayings[2]

"Fierce are the feuds of brethren,"

and

"excess of love
E'en breeds excess of hate."

We may now be said to have determined the proper number and natural character of the members of our State as well as the magnitude and character of the country; for we must not seek the same exactness in theoretical discussions as in the phenomena observed by the senses. But as in any natural compound the things which are necessary to the existence of the whole are not *necessarily in the strict sense* members of the whole composition, it is evident that in the case of a State or any other association composing a homogeneous unity it would be equally wrong to reckon as parts all such things as are necessary conditions of its existence. For there must be something which is one and common and the same to the members of any association, whether their share of it is equal or unequal, e.g. food, as the case may be, or a certain amount of land or anything else of

CHAP. VIII. The parts of a State.

[1] Omitting δεῖν.

[2] The quotations are from some unknown drama or dramas of Euripides.

the same kind. But when there are two things one of which is a means and the other an end, between these there is nothing common except in so far as the one *viz. the means* produces and the other *viz. the end* receives the product. This is the case e.g. with any instrument or with the craftsmen on the one hand and the work produced on the other; there is no factor common to a house and its builder, on the contrary the builder's art is a means to the house as an end. Similarly although property is indispensable to States, it is no part of a State; and there are many animate things, *it may be observed,* which fall under the head of property.

But a State is an association of similar persons for the attainment of the best life possible. And as happiness is the *summum bonum* and happiness consists in a perfect activity and practice of virtue, and as it is a fact that there are some people who are capable of this happiness and others who are capable of it only in a slight degree or not capable of it at all, it is evident that we have here an explanation of the origin of different kinds of State and of varieties of polity. For as there are various ways and means by which people aspire to gain happiness, the lives they lead and the polities they form are necessarily different.

The elements indispensable to a State's existence.

But we have to consider [1]what is the number of the things which are necessary to the existence of a State and will therefore certainly be found in it, as the parts of a State in our sense of the word will be

[1] Reading *πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη (καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη) διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν.*

included among them. Let us take then the sum of the functions *of a State* as a test which will serve to elucidate the matter. The first requisite of a State then is food; next arts, as there are various instruments, *which are made by the arts*, necessary to human existence; thirdly arms, for the members of the political association require arms at home [1] to enforce their authority against recalcitrant persons as well as to defeat the attempts of enemies to inflict injury upon the State from without; next a tolerable supply of money for purposes both domestic and military; [2] fifthly the due worship of the Gods or ritual, as it is termed; and sixthly, but most necessary of all, the means of deciding questions of policy and of justice between man and man. Such are the functions generally indispensable to a State. For
p. 103. a State according to our definition does not consist of any chance population but of one that is able to lead an independent life; and if any of these functions is wanting, the association in question cannot be absolutely independent. It follows that all these processes must enter into the composition of a State. There must be in a State then a number of husbandmen who [3] supply the food, artisans, an army, a propertied class, a priesthood and judges of questions of justice and policy.

CHAP. IX. The distribution of functions among the citizens.

Having now determined the functions of the citizens, we have still to consider the question whether all the citizens are to share them all—for it is pos-

[1] Reading ἔχειν ὅπλα πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν.

[2] Omitting καὶ πρῶτον.

[3] Reading παρασκευάζουσι.

sible that the same persons should be all at one and the same time husbandmen, artisans and deliberative and judicial functionaries—or we are to assume the existence of a separate class of citizens for each of the functions specified, or again some necessarily belong to a special class, while others are necessarily open to all the citizens. The case is not [1]the same in all polities. For, as we said, all the citizens may have a share in all the functions, or on the other hand only particular citizens in particular functions. This is in fact the point of distinction among polities, as in Democracies all the functions are open to all, whereas in Oligarchies the contrary is the case. But as we are engaged in a consideration of the best polity, and this is the polity under which our State will attain the *maximum* of happiness, and happiness, as has been already remarked, cannot exist apart p. 183.
from virtue, it is evident from these considerations that in a State, in which the polity is perfect and the citizens are just men in an absolute sense and not merely in reference to the assumed principle *of the polity*, the citizens ought not to lead a mechanical or commercial life; for such a life is ignoble and opposed to virtue. Nor again must the persons who are to be our citizens be husbandmen, as leisure *which is impossible in an agricultural life* is equally essential to the culture of virtue and to political action. But as besides these there exists in the State a military class and a class whose function it is to deliberate on questions of policy and to decide questions of justice, and these are

[1] Reading ταὐτὸ.

evidently in the strictest sense parts of the State, *the question arises,* [1]Are these functions too to be distinguished or both to be assigned to the same persons? And here again it is obvious that in one sense they must be assigned to the same and in another to different persons—to different persons in so far as the two functions are severally suited to a different prime of life, and the one requires prudence while the other requires physical strength, but to the same in so far as it is an impossibility that persons who possess the power of compulsion and prevention should put up with a permanent state of subjection; for the classes which have arms in their hands have in their hands also the continuance or dissolution of the polity. It remains then that in our polity [2]both these functions should be assigned to the same persons, not simultaneously however but [3]according to the plan of Nature by which physical strength resides in the younger and wisdom in the elder generation. This method of distribution then among the two is expedient and [4]just, as the division is one which preserves the principle of desert. And further the landed estates should be in the hands of these classes, as affluence is a necessary qualification of our citizens, and these and these alone possess the citizenship. For neither the mechanics nor any other [5]members of the State who do not cultivate virtue are entitled to political rights, as in fact is evident

Landed property.

[1] Omitting ἑτέροις. [2] Reading ἀμφότερα.

[3] Reading ἀλλ', ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, ἡ μὲν δύναμις κ.τ.λ.

[4] Reading συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν.

[5] Reading μέρος.

from our fundamental principle; for happiness, as we said, can exist only in union with virtue and, when we speak of a State as happy, it is right that we should regard not a single particular part of it but the citizens collectively. And as the husbandmen are necessarily slaves or [1]members of a non-Greek subject population, it is clear that landed property must belong exclusively to the military and the deliberative or judicial classes. There still remains in our list the priestly class whose position in the State is also clear. No husbandman or mechanic may be appointed a priest, as it is proper that none but citizens should pay honour to the Gods. And as the citizen population is divided into two classes, the soldiers and the deliberative body, and it is proper that those who are past the age for these duties should render to the Gods their worship and find their due relaxation in their service, [2]they are the persons to whom the priestly offices may properly be assigned. p. 183.

We have now enumerated the things necessary to the composition of a State and its various parts. Husbandmen, artisans, and hired labourers generally are, it is true, indispensable to States, but the only parts of the State *in the strict sense* are the soldiery and the deliberative class. And further there is in each case a separation; but the separation *between the mere elements of a State and its parts* is perpetual, while the separation *between the military and deliberative classes, both of which are parts of the State*, is partial or temporary.

[1] Omitting ἢ before περιοίκους.

[2] Reading τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

CHAP. X. Caste.

It may be said to be a discovery not made for the first time to-day or yesterday by political philosophers that there is a propriety in the division of the citizens into castes and in the separation of the military class from the agricultural. This organization prevails to the present day in Egypt where it was instituted, as is said, by Sesostris and in Crete where it was instituted by Minos. The system of common meals appears also to be of high antiquity, having been established in Crete at the era of the reign of Minos, and in Italy at a period considerably more remote. According to the local antiquaries there was a certain King of Œnotria called Italus, from whom the name of the Œnotrians was changed to Italians and the whole peninsula of Europe which lies between the Scylletic and the Lametic gulfs, [1]a distance of half a day's journey, received the name of Italy. This Italus, as the story goes, converted the Œnotrians, who until then had been a nomad people, into agriculturists, and, besides other laws that he gave them, was the first to establish the system of common meals. Hence the common meals as well as some of his laws are preserved to the present time among certain of his successors. The district bordering upon Tyrrhenia was occupied by the Opicans who still bear their old surname of Ausonians; while that which extends in the direction of Iapygia and the Ionian sea, viz. [2]the country commonly known as the Siris, was the land of the Chonians, who were also of Œnotrian descent. It is from these parts that

The origin of common meals.

[1] Reading ἀπέχει δέ.

[2] Reading τὴν καλουμένην Σῖριν.

the institution of common meals has been originally derived; whereas the division of the civic population into castes comes from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris reaches back to a much higher antiquity than that of Minos.

It would probably be right to suppose that not only these but all other political discoveries have been made repeatedly or rather an infinite number of times in the lapse of ages. For as it is natural that such things as are absolutely indispensable should be suggested by the bare necessity of the case, so it is only reasonable that, when these are already in existence, other things tending to the embellishment and luxury of life should be developed; and accordingly we must suppose the same to be the case with political institutions. The antiquity of all may be inferred from the example of Egypt. For the Egyptians, who are regarded as the oldest of peoples, [1]have always enjoyed the blessing of laws and a political system. It is our duty then, while we avail ourselves adequately of the discoveries of the past, to endeavour to fill up the deficiencies which remain. The antiquity of political discoveries.

We have already stated that the land is to be the property of the class which bears arms and is in the enjoyment of full political privileges, and that the cultivators of the soil are to constitute a class distinct from these. We have described also the size and character of the land. We have now first to discuss the distribution of the land and the nature and character of its cultivators, as it is our judgment on the one hand that property should not be held in p. 186. p. 187. Property.

[1] Reading νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν ἀεὶ καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς.

common [1]in the way that some philosophers have proposed, but should be common only [2]in virtue of the friendly use that is made of it, and on the other that none of the citizens should be destitute of the means of subsistence.

Common meals.

The institution of common meals too is universally regarded as beneficial to well-organized States, and we will hereafter give our own reasons for entertaining the same opinion. But, *if they exist*, it is desirable that all the citizens should take part in them. It is not easy however for the poor to contribute out of their private means their quota *to the maintenance of the common meals*, and at the same time to keep up the general management of their household.

Divine worship.

And further the expenses of divine worship should be borne *not by individuals but* by the whole State.

The division of the land.

It is necessary therefore that the land should be divided into two parts, one public and the other the property of private persons, and that each of these divisions should again be subdivided, so that one half of the public land may be set apart for the public service of the Gods and the other to defray the cost of the public meals, while of the land which belongs to private persons half should be such as lies upon the frontiers and the other half such as is close to the city itself, in order that two plots of land may be assigned to every citizen and they may all have an interest in both localities. This is the arrangement

[1] The reference is again to the system proposed by Plato in the *Republic* and criticized by Aristotle in the 5th Chapter of Book II.

[2] Reading *γινομένῃ*.

which is at once equal and just and calculated to produce a greater unanimity in regard to wars against neighbouring peoples. For where this is not the case, some of the citizens, *i.e. those whose land is situated near the city,* are wholly reckless about incurring the hostility of the nations whose territory marches with their own, whereas the others, *i.e. those whose land is on the frontier,* are so exceedingly fearful of incurring it that they are willing even to sacrifice the honour of the State. Hence in some nations there is a law that the citizens who live upon the frontier shall not have a voice in deliberations upon the question of declaring war against a neighbouring people, as their personal interest in the decision would affect the integrity of their counsel.

The cultivators of the soil.

It is necessary then that the land should be divided in the way described for the reasons which have been already alleged. The persons who are to cultivate it, if we are to assume an ideal state of things, should properly be slaves and not taken from people who are all of one stock or of spirited temper, if they are to be useful in labour and in no danger of rising against their masters; or if not slaves, they should be members of a non-Greek subject people having approximately the same natural characteristics as the slaves. Also [1]those of them who work upon the private properties should belong to the owners of the estates and those who work upon public land to the State. But the proper treatment of slaves and the reason why it is best to hold out

[1] Reading τοὺς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους τῶν κεκτημένων.

freedom to them all as the prize *of good conduct* are subjects which we will discuss hereafter.

CHAP. XI. The site of the city considered relatively to internal purposes. pp. 177 sqq.

But to revert to the city; we have already stated that it ought to communicate with the mainland and the sea and, so far as circumstances permit, with all parts of the country equally. [1]As to its position in itself and without reference to anything outside, if it is to be a fortunate one, there are four points to which we are bound to pay regard in our ideal. The first, as is inevitable, is health. The healthiest cities are those which stand upon a slope inclining to the East and *so* to the winds which blow from the quarter of the sunrise; the next best aspect is one that is sheltered from the North wind, as cities so sheltered enjoy milder winters. Next among our *desiderata* the ideal city must be favourably situated for political and military action. In respect of the latter it should be easy of egress for the citizens and hard for enemies to approach or blockade; also it should, if possible, possess a number of wells and fresh springs or, failing these, the supply should be provided by the construction of a great quantity of large cisterns to receive the rainwater, so that the citizens may never run short of water, if they are cut off from the country in consequence of war. And further as the health of the inhabitants is a matter which deserves attention and this depends in *the first place* upon the situation of the city being fortunately in a healthy country and enjoying a healthy aspect and secondly

[1] Reading *αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἰ δεῖ τὴν θέσιν κατατυγχάνειν, εὔχεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας* and placing a colon, instead of a full stop, after *πρὸς ὑγίειαν* and again after *αὗται μᾶλλον.*

upon its having a supply of good water, [1]this last point is also one which deserves attention as of capital importance. For the things of which we make most and most frequent use for our bodies have the greatest influence upon our state of health, and the effect of water and air is of this nature. Accordingly in any sensible State, if the springs are not all equally good or there is not an abundance of good springs, a distinction should be made between the water which is used for drinking and the water which is used for other purposes.

Situations suitable to different polities.

Coming to the question of strongholds, we find that what is advantageous to one polity is not advantageous to another. Thus a citadel is suitable to an Oligarchy or a Monarchy, level ground to a Democracy, neither of these but on the contrary a number of strongholds to an Aristocracy.

Plan of the city.

Although the arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and better suited to general purposes, if it is regular [2]according to the modern plan called after Hippodamus, yet for security in time of war a contrary arrangement such as existed in ancient times is more serviceable, as it is one in which it is difficult for an army of foreigners to escape or for an assailing force to make out its way. We conclude then that the city should combine the two arrangements—nor is this impossible, if we adopt a plan of construction like the planting of vines in quincunxes as they are sometimes termed among farmers—and that it should be laid out in regular sections

[1] Reading δεῖ καὶ τούτου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν.

[2] Omitting καί.

not as a whole but only partially and in certain places. It will then be equally well adapted for security and beauty of effect.

Walls.

Upon the question of walls, [1]the idea that they ought not to exist in States which affect a character for valour is a view that is utterly out of date, especially in the face of the fact that the States which prided themselves upon having no walls are proved by experience to be in the wrong. It is true that, when we have to deal with none but enemies similar to ourselves in character and only slightly superior in numbers, there is something discreditable in the endeavour to protect ourselves by the strength of our walls. But as it is often a fact and always a possibility that the superior force of the assailants should be too great [2]for the unaided personal valour of a small number of citizens, the only way to protect ourselves and be safe against injury and dishonour is to look upon the strongest defence in the way of walls as in the highest degree a resource of military skill, especially in these days when the missiles and engines of blockade have been brought to so high a pitch of perfection. The demand that we should not surround our cities with a ring of walls is much like the demand that we should choose for our country one that is easily exposed to invasion and should raze all the high ground *that protects it;* or again that we should leave our private houses without walls for fear the inhabitants should turn cowards, *if they*

[1] Probably Aristotle has in mind the teaching of Plato in the *Laws*, Bk. VI. pp. 777—779.

[2] Reading τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις.

were protected by them. And this too is a fact which we ought to keep in view, that people who live within a ring of walls have the chance of using their cities in two ways, i.e. both as having and as not having walls, which is not the case with those who do not possess any walls. If this is so, it follows that not only must we enclose our city in walls but must take care that they are at once appropriate to it as an embellishment and as a defence in case of need against military attacks, especially of the kind lately invented. For as the aggressors are much at pains to devise means of aggrandizing their empire, so apart from the means of defence already discovered there are others which a defending Power ought to seek according to scientific principles, as to be well-armed is a security against even so much as an attempt at aggression.

CHAP. XII. Detail arrangements of the city.

As the civic population is to be distributed into a number of messes for the common meals, and the walls are to be divided at suitable points by guard-houses and towers, it is evident that [1]the nature of the case suggests the advantage of arranging some of the common meals in these guard-houses. And, as these may well be ordered in the way described, so it is suitable that the buildings appropriated to the worship of the Gods and to [2]the common meals of the supreme magisterial boards should be placed in a convenient locality and all together with the exception of those temples for which a separate position is required by the law or by some oracle of the

[1] Reading αὐτὸ.

[2] Reading τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀρχείων συσσίτια.

Delphian God. Such a locality as we desire would be one which had a level surface [1]suited to the site of the religious ceremonial and stronger natural defences than the adjoining parts of the city. It is convenient too that at its foot should be established a market corresponding to the one usual in Thessaly and there known as the free market, i.e. one which is not to be soiled by any marketable wares or approached by any mechanic, husbandman or other such person except at the express invitation of the officers of State. The locality will be made more attractive, if the gymnastic schools of the elder citizens are situated there. *I say, of the elder*, because it is convenient that in the gymnastic institutions as well as in others there should be a division of the citizens according to age and that, while certain special officers of State live always among the younger, the elder should live among the general body of the officers. For there is nothing which so much inspires the sense of genuine modesty and the awe which is proper to free men as living always under the eye of authority. It is desirable that the market of commerce should be distinct from the free market and should be situated at a distance from it in a locality to which all wares whether coming from

[1] The forced interpretation which the editors necessarily put upon the words *πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν* seems to shew that they are in some way corrupt. It is not easy to make a satisfactory emendation. But the context suggests the mention of religious worship; and in default of anything better I have translated a reading which is but a conjecture of Mr Jackson, viz. *πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱερατείας θέσιν*.

the sea or the land are easily capable of conveyance. And further the population of the State being divided [1]into *three classes viz.* the priesthood, the executive and the army, it is suitable that buildings in which the priests as well as the supreme officers of State have their common meals should be situated near the site of the sacred edifices, while all such official boards on the other hand as have the superintendence of commercial transactions, the registration of suits, the issuing of writs and other administrative matters of the same kind as well as of the so-called police of the market or town[2] should have their establishment near a market and some general place of meeting, such as the quarter in which the market of necessaries lies. For this market is *ex hypothesi* reserved for the necessary business of life, whereas the upper market is a place in which to spend one's leisure. p. 187.

The same principle of [3]distribution which we have described should prevail in the arrangements of the country. For it is equally true in this case that the officials who are sometimes known as commissioners of woods and forests and sometimes as overseers of the land, if they are to carry on their supervision, require guard-houses and buildings for their common meals; and there must be sanctuaries also distributed about the country, some for the worship of the Gods and others of heroes. and of the country.

It would be unprofitable however to waste time

[1] Reading εἰς ἱερεῖς καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ ὁπλίτας.
[2] Omitting the full stop after ἀστυνομίαν.
[3] Reading νενεμῆσθαι.

over a minute and detailed discussion of such matters. The difficulty *in regard to them* lies not so much in the theory, which is a mere matter of wishing, as in the realization of it, which is dependent upon good fortune. Further consideration of them therefore may be dispensed with for the present. But coming to the actual polity, we have to consider the nature and [1]character of the citizens composing a State which is to be happy and to enjoy a noble polity.

CHAP. XIII. The nature and character of the citizens.

The elements of success.

There are two things in which success consists universally, viz. firstly the right determination of the goal or end of our actions and secondly the discovery of such actions as are conducive to that end. For there may be either discrepancy or harmony in these respects. Thus, *to illustrate the discrepancy,* it sometimes happens that the goal is properly determined but in action we fail to attain it, and sometimes again that all the means to the end are within our grasp but the end we set before ourselves is a wrong one. And there are occasions also when we wholly mistake both end and means, [2]as when physicians occasionally fail alike to form a correct judgment of the condition of the body in a state of health and to compass the means of effecting the object they have proposed to themselves. But the right thing in any art or science is to master both the end and the actions which are means to it.

Now it is evident that all men desire to live well and to be happy. But while some have it in their power to attain these objects, there are others who

[1] Omitting ἐκ.

[2] Reading οἷον περὶ ἰατρικὴν οὔτε ποῖόν τι κ.τ.λ.

from some fault of [1]Nature or Fortune have it not, as a certain amount of external advantages is necessary to a noble life, although a larger amount in the case of the inferior natures than among those of a higher temper and tone. Others again there are who, although they have the power of attaining happiness, from the first do not seek it in a right way. But as our object is to discover the best polity, or in other words the polity under which the State would be best organized, and as the best organized State is the one which offers the greatest possibility of happiness, it is evidently our duty to apprehend the nature of happiness. [2]It is stated and determined by us in the Ethics, if that work is of any value, that happiness consists in a complete activity and practice of virtue, and this not conditionally but in an absolute sense. [3]When I say "conditionally," I refer to such actions as are indispensable *in the existing state of society*, whereas by *what is virtuous* in an absolute sense I mean what is moral *per se*. To take e.g. the case of just actions, just acts of revenge or punishment, although proceeding from a virtuous disposition, are *at the best but* indispensable, and it is only as being indispensable that they possess a moral character—for it would be a better state of things, if nothing of the kind were necessary either to the

The nature of happiness.

[1] Reading φύσιν ἢ τύχην.

[2] Reading φαμὲν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. It is sufficient to refer to *Nicom. Eth.* i. ch. 6, p. 1098 A 15–20.

[3] Although I have not felt justified in departing from the received text, it is right to point out that a new reading and interpretation of the present passage is given by Mr Jackson in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. x. p. 311.

individual or the State—whereas such actions as lead to honours and emoluments are highly moral in an absolute sense. For the former consist simply in the removal of a certain evil, but the latter on the contrary in the establishment and production of good. No doubt the virtuous man will make a moral use of poverty, disease and all the other evil chances of life; still it is *not in these but* in their opposites that true happiness resides. For it is one of the results arrived at [1]in our treatise upon Ethics that the character of the virtuous man is such that things which are good in an absolute sense are owing to his virtue good also relatively to him. But it is evident that it is the use he makes of these *rather than of things which absolutely and in themselves are evil* which is moral and virtuous in an absolute sense. And it is just this *good use which the virtuous man makes of things absolutely good, i.e. of external Goods,* which accounts for the popular conception of external Goods as causes of happiness, when it would be equally just to attribute a brilliant and powerful execution upon the lyre to the instrument itself rather than to the skill of the performer. It follows from what has been said that *of the conditions necessary to the ideal State* some must be found ready to hand, whereas others must be provided by the legislator. Accordingly in all matters in which Fortune is supreme —we assume for the moment the supremacy of Fortune—we can but pray that the composition of the State may be an ideal one. The virtuous character of the State on the other hand is an affair not

So. moral

[1] See *Nicom. Eth.* iii. ch. 6, p. 1113 A 22.

of Fortune but of knowledge and moral purpose. Further, a State is virtuous only when all the citizens who enjoy political rights are virtuous, and political rights are universal among the citizens of our State. The point to be considered therefore is the means by which a man becomes virtuous. For even if we admit the possibility of the citizens being virtuous collectively without each individual being so, still it is better that the individuals should be virtuous, as the virtue of all is a consequence of the virtue of each. But there are three means by which a person becomes good and virtuous viz. nature, habit and reason. He must in the first place possess a certain nature e.g. the nature of a human being rather than of some other animal, and [1]similarly certain natural qualities of body and soul. [2]There are some points however in which natural disposition is of no value, as they are altered by habituation, for there are certain qualities which are naturally ambiguous [3]but directed by habit to a lower or a higher end. [4]And hence the need that nature and habit should be harmonious. Now while all animals except Man live principally according to the impulses of their nature and only in some cases and to a slight extent by habit, Man as being the only rational animal lives also by reason. For it often happens that our reason leads us to act contrary to our training and nature, if we are convinced of the advantage of a different course.

The conditions of virtue.

[1] Reading οὕτω καὶ. [2] Reading ἔνια δὲ.

[3] Reading διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἀγόμενα.

[4] It is desirable to place here the clause ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, which in the text occurs two lines lower down.

[1]The right natural disposition for citizens who are to be tractable in the legislator's hands has been already determined: the rest is the work of education, as our learning consists partly in habituation and partly in direct instruction.

p. 181.

CHAP. XIV. Education.

As every political association is composed of rulers and subjects, the question we [2]now have to consider is whether the rulers and subjects are to be different *at different times* or the same for life; for it is evident that their education will necessarily vary according as the distinction is permanent or temporary.

The distribution of rule and subjection among the citizens.

If then there should be a class of persons as far superior to all others as are the Gods and heroes in our conception to human beings, having a vast pre-eminence first of all in bodily stature and then secondly in the qualities of the soul, so that the superiority of the rulers to the subjects was indisputable and self-evident, in that case it would doubtless be desirable that the same persons should be respectively rulers and subjects once and always. But as this is a state of things hard to realize and it is not the case, as Scylax describes among the Indians, that the kings display this eminent superiority to their subjects, it is evident that there are many reasons why all the citizens must alike participate in an alternation of rule and subjection. For among persons who are similar equality consists in identity *of power*, and a polity which is framed in defiance of justice can hardly be of a permanent character. *Its peril is the greater* inasmuch as on the side of the subject citizens, *who have been*

[1] Reading τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἵους εἶναι δεῖ.
[2] Reading τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτέον.

excluded from power, are all the *unenfranchised* inhabitants of the land ready for revolt, and it is an impossibility that the members of the governing class should be so numerous as to be stronger than the two together. On the other hand that the rulers should be superior to the subjects is indisputable. The means of arriving at this result and of giving all the citizens a share in rule and subjection are matters for the consideration of the legislator. Or rather the point is one which has been already discussed. Nature has herself supplied the [1]distinction we need, in that those who are in actual race the same she has made some junior and others senior, and to the former a position of subjection and to the latter one of rule is appropriate. Nobody feels indignant or fancies himself superior to his place, if the ground of his subjection is simply his youth, especially when he is sure to enjoy this privilege *of rule* in his turn, as soon as he has reached the proper age. Our conclusion then is that the rulers and subjects are in one sense the same and in another different. And from this it follows that their education too must be in one sense the same and in another different. *The point of identity and of difference is the fact* that nobody, as it is said, can be a good ruler without having first been a subject. Rule, however, according to the p. 112.
remark we made at the outset of our treatise, may be for the benefit either of the ruler or of the subject. The former kind we call the rule of a slavemaster over his slaves, the latter the rule which is exercised over free persons. But in the case of a certain class

[1] Reading διαίρεσιν.

of commands the distinction *between obedience which is free and obedience which is servile* lies not so much in the actual tasks enjoined as in their object. Accordingly there are many tasks regarded as menial which it is honourable even to free persons to perform in their youth, as the honour or dishonour of such actions depends not so much upon the actions in themselves as upon the end or object for which they are performed. And as the virtue of a citizen, while p. 110. he actually holds a position of rule, is according to our definition identical with the virtue of the best man, and the same person is to become a subject first and a ruler afterwards, the endeavour of the legislator should be to make men good, to study what are the occupations which produce goodness and what is the end *and object* of the best life.

The parts of the soul. The human soul is divided into two parts, one of which contains reason in itself, and the other, although not containing in itself reason, is at the same time capable of obeying it. Also it is to these parts that the virtues belong which entitle a man to be called good. Nor can it be doubtful to anyone who adopts our division of the soul in which of the two the end *of human existence* is to be regarded as properly residing. For it is a constant rule equally conspicuous in the realms of Art and Nature that the lower is for the sake of the higher, and in the case of the soul the rational part is the higher. The reason according to our usual method of division is divided into two parts, viz. practical reason and speculative reason. It follows evidently that the rational part of the soul must be similarly divided. We shall recognize a corresponding

division in the actions *of its parts;* those of the part which is naturally the higher deserve the preference at the hands of anyone who is capable of all the actions of the soul or of these two kinds of action; for in the case of any individual the highest of which he is capable is most deserving of his preference. Again, all life is divided into business and leisure, war and peace; and within the sphere of action there are some things which are *at best* indispensable or salutary and others which are moral *per se.* And here too the same rule of preference must prevail as in regard to the parts of the soul and their actions; the end or object of war should always be peace, of business leisure, of things indispensable and salutary things moral *per se.* It is right then that a Statesman should in his legislation pay regard to all these points whether in respect of the parts of the soul or of their actions, but especially to the higher points or the ends. The same is true of the various kinds of life and the different objects of action. It is right that the citizens should possess a capacity for business or war but still more for the enjoyment of peace and leisure; right that they should be capable of such actions as are indispensable and salutary but still more of such as are moral *per se.* It is with a view to these objects then that they should be educated while they are still children and at all other ages until they pass beyond the need of education.

The objects of education.

But if we look at those of Greeks who are supposed to enjoy the best polities at the present time and at the legislators who have established these

polities, it is clear that they had not [1]the highest end in view in framing their political systems nor the sum of all the virtues in their laws and education; on the contrary they took a lower line and turned aside in search of such as are supposed to be profitable and to afford a better chance of self-aggrandisement. And following their example some later writers have expressed the same sentiments, eulogizing the Lacedaemonian polity and admiring the object of their lawgiver in that all his legislative measures were *exclusively* directed to conquest and war. This is a view which not only can be easily refuted on logical grounds but has been [2]utterly refuted by history. The truth is that, as most men [3]covet a wide extent of despotic authority as being the means to a rich abundance of external blessings, so [4]Thimbron and all other writers upon the Lacedaemonian polity make no secret of the admiration they feel for the legislator, because the Lacedaemonians being disciplined to face dangers were enabled to rule an extensive empire. Yet *on this hypothesis* it is evident that, as the Lacedaemonians have now lost their empire, they are no longer happy, and their lawgiver must no longer be called a good one. And besides this there is something ridiculous in the idea that, while remaining true to his laws and absolutely unimpeded in the exercise of them, nevertheless they have failed to

[1] Reading τὸ βέλτιστον τέλος.

[2] Omitting νῦν.

[3] Reading ζηλοῦσι.

[4] Θίμβρων is the form of the name which has the best MSS authority.

preserve a noble life. As a fact however *those who form this sort of estimate* are wrong in their conception of the rule upon which the legislator should set a conspicuous value. For *they prefer despotic rule, whereas* such rule as is exercised over free persons is nobler and implies a higher degree of virtue. And further it is no reason for esteeming the State happy or eulogizing the legislator [1]that he disciplined the citizens to endurance in order that they might enjoy external dominion; for such a principle as this is full of mischief. For it is evident that on *the same principle* any citizen who has the power should try to succeed in making himself ruler of his own State; yet this is a charge which the Lacedaemonians bring against their king Pausanias notwithstanding the high honours he enjoyed. No such [2]law or theory is statesmanlike, expedient or true. For the same principles of morality are best both for individuals and States, [3]and it is these which the legislator should implant in the souls of men. The object of military training should be not to enslave persons who do not deserve slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves against becoming the slaves of others, secondly to seek imperial power not with a view to a universal despotic authority, but for the benefit of the subjects whom we rule, and thirdly to exercise despotic power over those who are deserving to be slaves. That the legislator should rather make it his object so to order War.

[1] Reading καρτερεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν.

[2] Reading νόμων καὶ λόγων.

[3] Reading καὶ κοινῇ, καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

his legislation upon military and other matters as to promote leisure and peace is a theory borne out by the facts of History. For such States as *aspire to military success,* although they are saved in time of war, generally collapse as soon as they have obtained imperial power. [1]They lose their temper like steel in time of peace. For this however the legislator is to blame in that he did not educate them in the capacity for enjoying leisure.

CHAP. XV. The virtues of the citizens.

As it appears that the end is the same for men both collectively *as members of a State* and individually, and the definition of the best man and the best polity is necessarily the same, it is evident that the virtues which are suited to leisure must be found *in the best State.* For war, as we have remarked several times, has its end in peace, and business its end in leisure. But the virtues which are useful to leisure and to rational enjoyment are not only such as find their sphere of action in leisure but such also as find it in business; for *it is the latter which produce the necessaries of life, and* the possibility of leisure presupposes the possession of various necessaries. [2]Hence valour and endurance are virtues suitable to our citizens, as it is proverbial that "slaves know no leisure," and a people incapable of facing dangers valorously are the slaves of every assailant. And if valour and endurance are thus necessary to business, intellectual culture is necessary to leisure, and temperance and justice at both times but more especially in time of peace or leisure; for war necessi-

pp. 205 sqq.

[1] Reading ἀνιᾶσιν.

[2] Omitting σώφρονα.

tates the practice of justice and temperance, whereas the enjoyment of the gifts of fortune and a life of peace and leisure have a tendency to produce an insolent disposition. We conclude then that a high degree of justice and temperance is necessary to persons who are reputed to be most prosperous and who enjoy all the Goods for which men are accounted happy, e.g. to those, if such there be, who dwell, as poets say, in the islands of the Blessed; for they above all will need culture, temperance and justice in proportion as their life is one of leisure amidst a rich abundance of such Goods.

It is evident then that our State, if it is to be happy and virtuous, must participate in these virtues. For if it is disgraceful to be incapable of making a right use of our Goods *at any time*, still more disgraceful is it to be incapable of so doing in seasons of leisure, to display a good character in time of business or war and a slavish character in time of peace and leisure. And from this it follows that we ought not to practice virtue after the manner of the Lacedaemonians, who differ from the rest of the world not in refusing to recognize the same things as the highest Goods but in imagining that they are best attained by one particular virtue only [1]and also that these Goods and the enjoyment of them are higher than the enjoyment of the virtues.

[2]*It is evident from these considerations that it is*

[1] Reading ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν.

[2] If the reading given above, which is supported by p. 50, ll. 6—10, is correct, and indeed whatever view is taken of the pas-

our duty to cultivate the virtue which has its sphere in leisure and to do so for its own sake. It is the means and manner of attaining this virtue which now remain to be considered.

p. 201. We have already decided that nature, habit and reason are all indispensable to this end. *The first point, viz.* the proper natural character of the citizens, has been already determined; and it only remains to consider whether their education is to begin with the reason or the habits. For it is necessary that there should be the most perfect harmony between reason and habits, as it is equally possible that the reason should have quite missed the best principle of life and that the citizens should have been led astray by force of habit.

The order of education.

One thing at least is perfectly evident at the outset here as elsewhere, viz. that the process of production starts from a beginning and that the end to which a certain beginning leads is itself the [1]beginning of another end. Now reason or intellect is the end *or complete development* of our nature; consequently it is in reference to them that we should order our process of production or in other words the training of the habits. Further as soul and body are two, so also in the soul itself we find two parts, viz. the irrational and the rational, with two distinct habits, the one appetite and the other

sage, it cannot well be doubted that there is a lacuna after *ἀρετῶν*. The context suggests some remark about *ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἀρετή*. The reading adopted in the translation is purely conjectural, but gives, I hope, something like the true sense: *<ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἀρετὴν δεῖ ἀσκεῖν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερὸν κ.τ.λ.*

[1] Reading *ἀρχῆς ἀρχὴ ἄλλου τέλους*.

intellect. Also as the body in process of production is prior to the soul, so is the irrational part of the soul prior to the rational—a fact not difficult to perceive, as spirit, will and desire also exist in children from the moment of their birth, while ratiocination or intellect is in the course of Nature not developed in them until they grow older. And hence in the first place the care of the body must precede that of the soul, that of the appetite must be second, but always that of the appetite for the sake of the intellect and that of the body for the sake of the soul.

Seeing then that it is from the first the legislator's business to provide for the best possible physical condition of the persons he has to educate, he must at the outset devote his attention to the question of marriage. He must consider the right times for persons to contract the matrimonial alliance and the proper sort of persons to contract it. And in legislating about this association, *viz. marriage*, he should have in view not only the persons themselves who are to marry but their time of life, so that they may arrive simultaneously at corresponding periods in respect of age, and there may not be a discrepancy between their powers, whether it is that the husband is still able to beget children and the wife is not or *vice versa*, as this is a state of things which is a source of mutual bickerings and dissensions. Secondly the legislator ought to have regard to the time at which the children *will be grown up and* will be ready to take their parents' places. They should not be too much younger than their parents nor too nearly of the same age. In the former case the

CHAP. XVI. The physical condition of the citizens.

Marriage.

seniors lose the benefit of such services as their children might render them *in old age*, and the children of the support they might derive from their parents *in youth;* and the latter is one full of difficulty, as the children feeling themselves to be nearly of an age with their parents entertain less reverence towards them, and the proximity of years is a cause of dispute in domestic matters. Another point *deserving the legislator's attention* is the one with which our present digression began, viz. that the bodily condition of the children shall be such as he desires. Practically all these results may be secured by a single precaution. As it is a general rule that seventy among men and fifty among women is the extreme limit of age at which they are capable of begetting children, the beginning of marriage should be fixed at such a time that the parents may reach these ages simultaneously. Marriage at a youthful age has a prejudicial influence upon the procreation of children. It is a law of the whole animal world that the offspring of youthful parents are imperfectly developed, are apt to procreate females and are small in body, and we must conclude the same to be the case among human beings. We infer it from the fact that in all States, in which the practice of youthful marriage is in vogue, the citizens are imperfectly developed and small in stature. Another *objection to such marriages* is that young women are greater sufferers in their travail and die oftener; in fact it is sometimes said that this was the explanation of the [1]oracular response

[1] The oracle was *μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα*, according to a gloss upon the present passage.

which was given to the Troezenians, referring not to the ingathering of the fruits of the earth but to the great mortality among their women in consequence of the practice of marriage at an early age. Again, it is expedient in the interest of continence that the women should not be given in marriage until they are older, as experience shews there is a greater danger of unchastity, if they are young at the time of cohabitation. Further it seems that the bodies of males are apt to be stunted in their growth, if they marry before the body has finished growing; for the body too has its fixed limit of time after which it ceases to grow. It is convenient then to marry the women at about the age of eighteen and the men at about thirty-seven[1]; they will thus be at the height of their physical vigour at the time of marriage and will come simultaneously and at the right season to the period of life when they cease to beget children. Finally as regards the time when the children will succeed to their parents' places, the children, if they are born as we may expect immediately after the marriage, will be entering upon their prime at the time when the parents are already well stricken in years and are drawing near to the age of seventy.

So much as to the age for entering upon the matrimonial state. In regard to the seasons of the year [2]it is well to follow the wise system generally retained at the present time, by which it is fixed that this union should take place in winter. [3]The parents them-

[1] Omitting ἢ μικρόν.

[2] Reading χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι οἷς οἱ πολλοί.

[3] Reading δεῖ δέ.

selves too in view of the procreation of children should pay attention to the rules of physicians and natural philosophers, the former of whom are competent authorities upon the occasions suitable to their physical condition and the latter upon the various kinds of winds, northerly winds being in their judgment preferable to southerly.

What is the physical condition of the parents which will be most beneficial to the children they beget is a question we shall have to discuss more particularly when we come to treat of the supervision of children. For the present a mere sketch of the subject must suffice. For a vigorous habit of body in one who is to lead a political life, for health and for the procreation of *healthy* children, what is wanted is not the bodily condition of an athlete nor on the other hand a valetudinarian and invalid condition, but one that lies between the two. The right condition then, although it is one of discipline, is disciplined not by violent exercises nor for one purpose only like an athlete's, but for all the actions of a liberal life. Also this condition should be [1]the same for women as for men.

Again, the women should take care of their bodily health during pregnancy, not leading a life of indolence nor yet adopting a scanty diet. This care of their bodies may be easily secured by the legislator, if he ordains that they should daily take a certain walk to render due service to the Gods whose function it is to preside over childbirth. But their mind unlike their bodies should at such a time be comparatively indo-

[1] Reading ταὐτὸ.

lent *and free from anxiety*, as we see that the children are affected by the state of the mother during pregnancy just as plants by the condition of the soil.

As to the question of exposing or rearing the children [1]born, there should be a law against rearing any cripple. [2]On the other hand the exposure of children simply on the ground of their number is prevented by the established customs of the State, as there is to be a limit set to the number of children the citizens may beget. If however a larger number are born to some parents in marriage, abortion should be procured before they acquire sensation or life; for the morality or immorality of such action depends upon whether the child has or has not yet obtained sensation and life.

The exposure of children.

Further as we have determined the time of life at which a man and a woman [3]are to enter respectively upon matrimony, it is right to settle also the limit of time during which they are to beget children for the service of the State. For the children of parents who are above, as also of those who are below the proper age are imperfectly developed in body and mind, while those of aged parents are feeble. Hence *the limit* must depend upon the intellectual prime *of the parents*, and this is generally, as it has been stated [4]by certain poets who divide human life into periods

[1] Reading *γενομένων*.

[2] Reading *διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γενομένων· ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.*

[3] Reading *δεῖ*.

[4] See e.g. the well-known lines which appear as the 25th Fragment of Solon in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*.

of seven years, about the age of fifty. If this is true, it follows that as soon as a person is four or five years above this age he should be discharged from the duty of begetting children who are to see the light of day, and such persons should in future enjoy such sexual intercourse only as is good for health or some other similar object.

And lastly as to the connexion of a man with a woman who is not his wife or of a woman with a man who is not her husband, while such intercourse in whatever form or under whatever circumstances must be considered absolutely discreditable to one who bears the title of husband or wife, so especially any one who is detected in such action during the time reserved for the procreation of children should be punished with such civil degradation as is suitable to the magnitude of his crime.

CHAP. XVII. Early education. (1) Infancy.

The children being now supposed to be born, the character of their diet, [1]we must consider, has an important influence on their physical powers. Whether we examine the case of the other animals or of nations which set themselves to encourage such a condition of body as is useful in war, it is evident that a diet containing plenty of milk is best suited to the bodily health of children; it should consist of as little wine as possible for fear of the diseases which a wine-diet produces. Also it is expedient that [2]children at this early age should indulge in all such movements as are possible to them. As a means of preventing their limbs which are so supple from getting twisted, it is

[1] Reading *οἴεσθαι δεῖ*.

[2] Reading *τηλικούτους*.

the practice among some nations even at the present day to employ certain mechanical instruments which keep the bodies of young children straight. It is well too from a very early age to inure the children to cold; such a practice is highly useful not only as a source of health but also as a preparation for military duties. It is accordingly the custom among many non-Greek peoples either to plunge their newborn babes into a cold river or, as the Celts do, to cover them with scanty clothing. For wherever it is possible to habituate children to anything, it is best to begin the process of habituation [1]early in life and continue it gradually; and the bodily condition of children from its warmth is naturally adapted to such a training in the endurance of cold. [2]Nor is it right to prohibit, [3]as do some persons in their Laws, the spasmodic stretchings and screamings of the children; they are helpful to growth, as being virtually a sort of gymnastic exercises for their bodies. For just as labourers get strength by holding their breath, so do infants by these spasmodic cries.

Such then or similar to these are the precautions to be taken in the first months of a child's life. In the subsequent period up to the age of five, when as yet it is not well to make them apply themselves to (2) From infancy to the age of five.

[1] Reading ἀρχομένων.

[2] The natural sequence of the subjects discussed is somewhat confused in the MSS text which Bekker retains. But I have not ventured to do more in the way of transposition than to insert after τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν the two sentences τὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν παίδων......καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις, p. 128, ll. 4—9.

[3] Plato *Laws*, VII. p. 791 E sqq.

study of any kind or compulsory bodily exercises for fear of injuring their growth, they should be allowed just so much movement as not to fall into a sluggish habit of body, and this should be secured among various forms of action by the amusement they take. But their amusements themselves should not be of an illiberal sort nor yet too laborious or effeminate. Further it should be the duty of the officers who are called overseers of the youth to determine the character of the tales and legends which the children at this tender age are to hear. For all this early education should be preparatory to their subsequent pursuits, and accordingly their amusements should for the most part be imitations of their serious occupations in the future. The overseers of the youth too, while superintending their general manner of life, should take especial precautions against their associating more than is necessary with slaves; *and there is a certain danger of their so doing,* as children at this age and up to the age of seven are necessarily brought up at home.

There is then, as we see, a strong probability that they may [1]derive a taint of ungentlemanliness even at this tender age from the objects which meet their ears and eyes. And hence, as light talking about foul things is closely followed by doing them, it is the duty of the legislator to banish foul language [2]as much as any other foulness from his State, [3]from

[1] Reading ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν.

[2] Reading ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο.

[3] The construction becomes clearer, if the words ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ

among the young especially, who should not be allowed either to say or hear anything of the kind, [1] while anyone who is convicted of using such language or doing any such action as is prohibited should be punished with [2] reprimands and stripes, if he is a free man but not yet of an age to take his seat at the public tables, and, if older, should be visited with civil degradation involving the loss of a free man's rights because he has conducted himself in a manner worthy of a slave. And as we banish all foul language from our State, so undoubtedly should we also banish from the observation of the citizens all indecent pictures or tales. It should be the business then of the officers of State to see that there is no image or picture representing indecent scenes, except in the temples of those Gods to whose worship scurrilous jesting is by law declared to be appropriate; [3] and besides it is only [4] persons of a suitable age who are permitted by law to render honour to these Gods on their own behalf and on behalf of their children[5]. Nor again should the younger generation be [6] allowed to be present at the performance of satirical plays or comedies until they have attained the age at which

εὐχερῶς λέγειν......τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς are regarded as a parenthesis and the full stop after *σύνεγγυς* is changed to a colon.

[1] Placing a comma only, instead of a full stop, after *μηδὲν τοιοῦτον*.

[2] Reading *ἐπιτιμήσεσι*.

[3] Reading *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις*.

[4] Reading *τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας τὴν ἱκνουμένην*.

[5] Omitting *καὶ γυναικῶν*.

[6] Reading *θετέον*.

they will be admitted to a seat at the common tables and to a share in convivial meetings and will in all cases be secured by their education against the injury resulting from such performances.

We have alluded to these matters now only in passing. It will be proper hereafter to dwell upon them more at length and set them at rest by a thorough examination of the question whether in the first place the young citizens are or are not *to be admitted to such performances*, and *secondly, if so*, on what conditions they are to be admitted. For the present however, *as I say*, we have alluded to it only so far as is necessary to our purpose. For it was perhaps a wise judgment of the famous tragic actor Theodorus, when he never allowed any actor however insignificant to come upon the stage before himself on the ground that the audience surrender themselves to anyone or anything that they hear first. The same is the case in all our dealings with men and things; the first favourable impressions are always the strongest. Hence we should keep our youth from all acquaintance with evil, especially such as involves vice or [1]coarseness.

(3) From five years to seven.

After the age of five the two following years up to seven they should spend in observation of the lessons which they will be required in the future to learn themselves.

The division of human life.

There are two periods into which their education *in the proper sense of the word* should be divided: the one from the age of seven to puberty, the other

[1] Reading δυσγένειαν.

from puberty to twenty-one. For the division of human life into periods of seven years is upon the whole not a bad one; but it is best to follow strictly the division of Nature herself, as it is the purpose of all art and culture to supply the deficiencies of Nature.

BOOK V.

Education. [1]WE have to consider then in the first place whether it is desirable to establish a definite system in the education of children, secondly whether it is expedient that the superintendence of them should be the concern of the State or, as is now the case in most States, of private individuals, and thirdly, *if there is to be a system,* [2]what should be its character.

CHAP. I. Education an affair of the State.

That the education of the young is a matter which has a paramount claim upon the attention of the legislator will not be disputed. The neglect of it in existing States is prejudicial to their polities. For the [3]educational system must always be relative to the particular polity, as it is the character proper to each polity which is its habitual preservative, as it is in fact the original cause of its creation, e.g. a democratic character of a Democracy, an oligar-

[1] The last sentence of Book IV. in Bekker's text is so closely connected with the subject of Book V. and forms so natural an introduction to the chapters on education, that I have had no scruple about transferring it with Spengel and Susemihl to the beginning of the present Book.

[2] Reading ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ εἶναι ταύτην.

[3] Reading παιδεύεσθαι in place of πολιτεύεσθαι.

chical of an Oligarchy and so on, and, the higher this character *of the citizens*, the higher is the polity it produces. And further there is no faculty or art in which a certain process of education or habituation is not essential as preparatory to its exercise; and it follows as an evident consequence that the same is true of the practices of virtue.

Again, as the end proposed to the State as a whole is one, it is clear that the education of all the citizens must be one and the same and the superintendence of it a public affair rather than in private hands, as it now is, when each individual superintends his own children privately and with such private instruction as he thinks good. The training in public business should itself be public. And further it is not right to suppose that any citizen is his own master but rather that all belong to the State; for each individual is a member of the State, and the superintendence of any part is naturally relative to that of the whole. This is one point in which the Lacedaemonians deserve praise; they devote a great deal of attention to the educational needs of their children, and their attention takes the form of action on the part of the State.

CHAP. II. The educational system.

The propriety of legislating upon education and of treating it [1]as an affair of the State is now evident. But we must not leave out of sight the nature of the education and the proper manner of imparting it. For at present there is a [2]practical dissension upon this point; people do not agree upon the subjects which

[1] Reading κοινῇ.

[2] Reading διὰ τῶν ἔργων.

The subjects of education.

the young should learn, whether they take virtue *in the abstract* or the best life as the end to be sought, and it is uncertain whether education should properly be directed rather to the cultivation of the intellect or the moral discipline of the soul. The question is complicated too, if we look to the actual education of our own day; [1]nobody knows whether the young should be trained in such studies as are merely useful as means of livelihood or in such as tend to the promotion of virtue or in the higher studies, all of which have received a certain number of suffrages. Nor again, *if virtue be accepted as the end*, is there any agreement as to the means of attaining it; for at the very outset there is a difference of opinion respecting the nature of the virtue that is held in honour and consequently, as might be expected, a disagreement as to the method of training young people in it.

That such useful studies as are absolutely indispensable ought to be taught is plain enough; not all useful studies however, for in face of the distinction which exists between liberal and illiberal occupations it is evident that our youth should not be allowed to engage in any but such as being practically useful will at the same time not reduce one who engages in them to the level of a mere mechanic.

Mechanical studies.

It may be observed that any occupation or art or study deserves to be regarded as mechanical, if it renders the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise and practice of virtue.

[1] Reading καὶ δῆλον οὐδενί.

Accordingly we describe as mechanical not only those arts which degrade the condition of the body but also all mercenary employments, as depriving the intellect of all leisure or dignity. And even if we confine ourselves to the liberal sciences, there are some in which, although the study of them up to a certain point involves no departure from liberal culture, yet [1]an excessive assiduity and endeavour after perfect mastery are subject to the drawbacks just mentioned. It is the object of any action or study which is all-important. There may be nothing illiberal in them if undertaken for one's own sake or the sake of one's friends or the attainment of virtue; whereas the very same action, if done to satisfy others, would in many cases bear a menial or slavish aspect.

The studies established at the present day are, as has been already remarked, of an ambiguous character. We may say that there are four usual subjects of education, viz. Reading and Writing, Gymnastic, Music, and fourthly, although this is not universally admitted, the Art of Design. Reading and Writing, and the Art of Design are taught for their serviceableness in the purposes of life and their various utility, Gymnastic as tending to the promotion of valour; but the purpose of Music is involved in great uncertainty. Although it is generally studied at the present day solely for the pleasure it affords, yet in the first instance it was made a branch of education because the endeavour of Nature herself, as we have frequently remarked, is that men

CHAP. III. The usual subjects of education.

pp. 205 sqq.

[1] Reading τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν.

may be able not only to engage in business rightly but also to spend their leisure nobly; and *the guidance of Nature deserves to be followed, as* Nature, if we may repeat what we have already said on the subject, is the first principle of all things. For if *the right conduct of business and the noble employment of leisure* are both requisite, and at the same time leisure is preferable to business [1]and is the end *of human existence,* we are bound to investigate the right manner of employing leisure. It should evidently not be spent in mere amusement; else it would follow that amusement is the end and object of our life. But if this supposition is impossible, if amusements are to be our resource in times of business rather than of leisure—*as may well be the case,* since it is persons who exert themselves that need such recreation as is the object of all amusement, and business necessarily involves exertion and effort—it follows that in introducing amusements [2]one must carefully observe the seasons proper to their use and consider that they are applied as a sort of medicine. For the motion of the soul thereby produced is a relaxation and from its pleasurable effects a recreation; whereas the enjoyment of leisure is admitted to contain in itself not only pleasure but happiness and a life of pure bliss. Such a life is the prerogative not of persons engaged in business but of those who enjoy leisure. For the man of business seeks by his business to attain some end and therefore *ex hypothesi* is not in possession of it

The employment of leisure.

[1] Reading *ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον.*

[2] Reading *καιροφυλακοῦντα* and *προσάγοντα.*

already; whereas happiness, which is universally allowed to be associated with pleasure and not with pain, is itself an end, *and is therefore to be found only in leisure. But this general agreement extends* no further. There is no consensus of opinion as to the definition of this pleasure; each individual is guided by his own personality and habit of mind, and it is the perfect man whose pleasure is perfect and derived from the noblest sources.

It is evident then *from our consideration of business and leisure* that there are certain things in which instruction and education are necessary [1]with a view to leisure, and that these branches of education and study are ends in themselves, while such as have business for their object are pursued only as being indispensable and as leading to some ulterior object. Accordingly Music was introduced into the educational system by our forefathers not as indispensable— it has no such characteristic—nor as practically useful in the sense in which Reading and Writing are useful for pecuniary transactions, domestic economy, scientific study and a variety of political actions, or as the Art of Design is in the general opinion useful as a means of forming a better judgment of works of art, nor again as useful like Gymnastic in promoting health and vigour. Neither of these two results do we find to be produced by Music. It remains therefore that Music is useful for the rational enjoyment of leisure; and this is evidently the purpose to which it was in fact applied by our forefathers, as it is ranked by them as an element of the rational enjoyment

The object of Music.

[1] Omitting *ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ*.

which is considered to be appropriate to free persons. It is thus that Homer described *the bard* as one

[1] "Meet to be bidden to the festive board;"

and similarly after the mention of certain other classes of persons he adds

[2] "Who bid the bard, to gladden all men's hearts."

So too in another place Odysseus says there is no enjoyment so good as when men make merry

[3] "And i' the hall the feasters list the bard
Seated in rank."

Utilitarian education.

We see clearly then that there is a certain education which our sons should receive not as being practically useful nor as indispensable but as liberal and noble. Whether it comprises a single branch or several, and, *if the latter*, what is their character and how they should be taught are questions which we shall have to discuss hereafter. At present however

[1] It may be suggested on metrical grounds that the true reading of the line is

ἀλλ' οἷόν γε μέν ἐστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην.

But it does not occur in the existing text of Homer, although the same sentiment is found in *Odyssey* XVII. 381—6, the passage from which the next quotation seems to be taken.

[2] Aristotle cites from memory and not quite accurately, if the reference is as is probable to *Odyssey* XVII, 381—6 and the words *οἳ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν* are part of the quotation. The actual lines are

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἳ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασιν,
μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων;
οὗτοι γὰρ κλητοί γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.

[3] *Odyssey* IX. 7.

we have advanced so far as to see that antiquity itself supplies us, in the shape of the established studies, with a certain testimony *to the importance of a right use of our leisure;* for Music makes this point clear. And further even among such subjects as are practically useful we see there are some, e.g. Reading and Writing, in which our children must be educated not only for their utility but because they are a means to the acquisition of various other kinds of learning. Similarly they must be taught the Art of Design, not only that they may avoid serious mistakes in their private purchases and may not be cheated in the purchase and sale of household goods, [1] but rather because it renders them scientific observers of physical beauty. The universal pursuit of utility on the other hand is far from becoming to magnanimous and free spirits.

As it is evident that the education of the habits must precede that of the reason and the education of the body must precede that of the intellect, it clearly follows that we must surrender our children *in the first instance* to Gymnastic and the Art of the Trainer, as the latter imparts a certain character to their physical condition and the former to the feats they can perform. The order of education.

At the present day the States, which enjoy the highest repute for care in the education of children, generally produce in them an athletic condition whereby they mar their bodily presence and development; while the Lacedaemonians, although they CHAP. IV. Gymnastic.

[1] Reading ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον.

The Lacedaemonian system.

avoided this mistake, render them brutal by the exertions required of them in the belief that this is the best means to produce a valorous disposition. Yet, as we have several times remarked, valour is neither the only [1] virtue nor the virtue principally to be kept in view in the superintendence of children; and, even if it were, the Lacedaemonians are not successful in devising the means to attain it. For neither in the animal world generally nor among uncivilized nations do we find valour associated with the most savage characters, but rather with such as are gentle, like the [2] lion's. There are many uncivilized nations who think very little of slaying and eating their fellow-creatures, e.g. the Achaeans and Heniochans on the shores of the Black Sea and other nations of the mainland *in those parts*, some of whom are as savage as these and others more so; yet although their existence is one of piracy, they are absolutely destitute of valour. Nay if we look at the case of the Lacedaemonians themselves, it is well known that, although they maintained their superiority to all other peoples so long as they alone were assiduous in the cheerful endurance of laborious exercises, they are now surpassed by others [3] in the contests both of the wrestling-school and of actual war. The fact is that their preeminence was due not to their disciplining their youth in this severe manner but solely to their giving them a course of training, while the other nations *with whom they*

pp. 84. 206 sqq.

[1] Reading οὔτε πρὸς μίαν ἀρετὴν οὔτε κ.τ.λ.

[2] Aristotle's view of the lion's character is expressed more fully περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστοριῶν I. p. 629 B 8 sqq.

[3] Reading καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.

had to contend did not. [1]But it is right that we should base our judgment not upon their achievements in the past but at the present day; for at present they have competitors in their educational system, whereas in past times they had none. We may conclude then that it is not the brutal element *in men* but the element of nobleness which should hold the first place—for the power of encountering noble perils must belong not to a wolf or to any other brute but only to a brave man—[2]and that to give up our children overmuch to bodily exercises and leave them uninstructed in the true essentials, *i.e. in the rudiments of education*, is in effect to degrade them to the level of mechanics by rendering them useless in a statesman's hands for any purpose except one and, as our argument shews, not so useful as other people even for this.

The period of gymnastic exercises.

The duty then of employing Gymnastic and the method of its employment are admitted. Up to the age of puberty gymnastic exercises of a comparatively light kind should be applied with a prohibition of hard diet and compulsory exercises, so that there may be no impediment to the growth. The fact that these [3]may have the effect of injuring growth may be clearly

[1] There is here again some confusion in the order of sentences, and it is desirable to insert after μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν the single sentence δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων......πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον, ll. 23—25, which is evidently out of place in its present context.

[2] Changing the full stop after ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός to a colon, so as to shew that the sentence is still continued.

[3] Reading δύνανται.

inferred from the circumstance that in the list of Olympian victors it would not be possible to find more than two or three who have been successful in manhood as well as in boyhood; for the effect of their training in youth is that they lose their physical vigour in consequence of the enforced gymnastic exercises they perform. When our youths have devoted three years from the age of puberty to other studies, it is then proper that the succeeding period of life should be occupied with hard exercises and severities of diet. For the intellect and the body should not be subject to severe exertion simultaneously, as the two kinds of exertion naturally produce contrary effects, that of the body being an impediment to the intellect and that of the intellect to the body.

CHAP. V. Music. p. 225.

Coming to the subject of Music, although we have already in the course of our treatise entered into a discussion of some of the points in dispute concerning it, it is right to resume and continue the discussion now, in order that it may serve as a sort of keynote to the theory which may be put forward by a systematic writer on the subject. It is not easy to define the faculty of Music or the object for which it should be studied. Should the object of Music be amusement and relaxation as it is of sleep or conviviality, which are not in themselves virtuous but pleasant and, as Euripides says, are at the same time "[1]dull care's lullaby"? It is in this view that Music is ranked *with sleep and conviviality*, all the three are treated alike,

The object for which it is studied.

[1] ἅμα μέριμναν παύει is the reading which has the best MSS authority. In *Bacchae* 378—381, the passage from which the quotation is taken, the MSS. give ἀποπαῦσαι τε μερίμνας.

and dancing is included in the same category. [1]Is it on the other hand to be considered that Music has a certain moral tendency because, as Gymnastic produces a certain condition of the body, so it is within the power of Music to produce a certain condition of the character by training the young in the faculty of enjoying themselves in a right manner? Or again does Music contribute more or less to rational enjoyment and intellectual culture? for this must be regarded as a third supposition.

That mere amusement should not be our object in the education of the young is plain enough; for learning does not mean amusing ourselves, as it necessarily involves a painful effort. Nor again is rational enjoyment a proper occupation for children or persons of a youthful age, as *rational enjoyment is the end or perfect state of human existence, and* [2]perfection is not suited to one who is imperfect *like a child.* It may perhaps however be supposed that the serious pursuits of children are intended as means of amusement for them when they have grown to the perfect state of manhood. But on this hypothesis we may ask why they should themselves be taught Music instead of following the example of the Persian

[1] The construction of the original Greek will be perspicuous, if the colon after *μέθης*, l. 15, and the full stops after *τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις*, l. 19, and *χαίρειν ὀρθῶς*, l. 23, are changed to commas, and ll. 15—19 *ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν...τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις* enclosed in brackets as a parenthesis.

[2] It is difficult to express at all without a periphrasis, and even then to express satisfactorily the force of the play upon words in the Greek *οὐθενὶ γὰρ* (or, as the better reading is, *οὐδὲ γὰρ*) *ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος.*

and Median kings and enjoying the pleasure it affords [1]by means of the performances of others, *i.e. of professional musicians*, [2]without receiving instruction in it themselves. For the execution of persons who have adopted Music as their special occupation or art will necessarily be superior to theirs who have studied it only so far as to acquire an ordinary musical education. We may add that, on the principle that they are personally to undertake the labour of musical performances, they ought also to be educated in cookery; which is absurd. The same difficulty is involved in the supposition that Music is capable of improving the moral character. Why—*it may be asked*—should our young citizens be personally taught musical performances instead of enjoying themselves in a right manner and acquiring a correct musical judgment by listening to the performances of others, as is the case with the Lacedaemonians who are not taught Music and yet are able, as they say, to form correct judgments of good or bad pieces? The same remark may be made, if *we assume that* Music is to be used as a means to happiness and the rational enjoyment of a liberal life. Why should the young be personally taught it instead of enjoying it in the performances of others? We may consider *in this connexion* our conception of the Gods. Zeus is never represented by the poets as himself singing or playing upon the cithern. On the contrary we regard professional musicians as on a level with mere mechanics and musical execution as

[1] Reading δι' ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων.

[2] Reading καὶ ἄνευ τῆς μαθήσεως.

unworthy of a man, unless in some moment of conviviality or amusement.

These however are perhaps matters for future investigation. The first question which meets us now is whether Music is or is not to be made a branch of education, and, *if it is*, which of the three disputed effects it may produce, viz. moral discipline, amusement or rational enjoyment. It may reasonably be ranked under all three heads and be regarded as capable of all these different effects. For the object of amusement is relaxation, and relaxation is necessarily pleasant, being as it were a process of healing the pain of labour. Again, it is admitted that there should be an element of pleasure as well as of nobleness in rational enjoyment; for happiness, *which is attained only in rational enjoyment*, consists of both. It is a truism however to say that nothing is pleasanter than Music whether instrumental or accompanied by the voice.

[1] "Song, mortals' sweetest pleasure"

[2]says Musaeus himself, and accordingly Music in virtue of its power to make glad the heart of man is naturally introduced into social gatherings and festivities. From this fact alone we might infer the propriety of giving the younger citizens an education in Music, as all pleasures of a harmless kind are suitable not only to the end *or perfect state of human life* but also as means of relaxation. And as it is

[1] The words βροτοῖς ἥδιστον ἀείδειν should be printed as a quotation.

[2] Reading φησὶ γάρ.

seldom the fortune of men to find themselves in the perfect state, whereas they frequently take relaxation and indulge in amusements not merely for the profit they afford but for the pleasure as well, it will be useful to them to find relaxation from time to time in the pleasures of Music. The world has come however to treat its amusements as the end or perfect state. The reason is probably that there is a certain pleasure in the end as well as in amusement, although it is not a pleasure of a commonplace kind, and that in the endeavour after this *true pleasure* men mistake for it the commonplace one, because there is in this last a certain resemblance to that which is the end of all human actions. For it is the characteristic of the end that it is not desirable for the sake of any future object; and similarly the pleasures of amusement have their cause not in the future but in the past, i.e. in the labour or pain *we have undergone*. This then may reasonably be supposed to be the reason why men seek to obtain happiness by the pleasures of amusement. But they take up Music not on this account only but also because it is conceived to be useful for purposes of recreation. At the same time it is a question worthy of consideration whether, if we grant this to be an incidental quality of Music, it is not in its nature more honourable than merely to supply the need of recreation, whether it is not the right principle not merely to enjoy the universal pleasure it affords, of which all the world is sensible,—for the pleasure of Music is a natural one, and hence the use of it is attractive to persons of all ages and characters—but to consider whether it has also any

tendency to form the moral character and influence the soul. Nor will there be any room for doubt about the matter, if *it can be shewn that* Music produces in us certain conditions of character. But this effect of Music is proved by various instances and especially by the musical compositions of Olympus; for it is admitted that they make our souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an emotional condition of the character of the soul. And further, when we listen to imitations, we all acquire a sympathy *with the feelings imitated*, even apart from the actual rhythms and melodies. And as Music is in fact a pleasant thing, and virtue consists in enjoying right pleasures and entertaining right feelings of liking or dislike, it is evident that there is nothing in which it is so important that men should be instructed and trained as in forming right judgments and feeling pleasure in honourable characters and noble actions. But it is in rhythms and melodies that we have the most realistic imitations of anger and mildness as well as of courage, temperance and all their opposites and of moral qualities generally. This we see from actual experience, as it is in listening to such imitations that we suffer a change within our soul. But to acquire the habit of feeling pain or pleasure upon the occurrence of resemblances is closely allied to having the same feelings in presence of the real originals. For instance, if a person feels pleasure in the contemplation of somebody's picture for no reason except the beauty of the form itself, it necessarily follows that the contemplation of the man himself whose picture he contemplates will be plea-

The moral effect of Music.

sant to him; [1]and this is a sensation enjoyed by all alike. The fact is however that there is no imitation of moral qualities in the objects of sense generally, e.g. in the objects of touch and taste, except indeed in the objects of sight and here only in a slight degree. For figures possess this imitative power, although only to a small extent; and indeed they are not actual imitations of moral qualities, but the figures and colours which are produced are rather symbols of moral qualities, and their influence works [2]through the body upon the emotions. Nevertheless as there is a considerable importance attaching to the contemplation of pictures, it is proper that the young should contemplate not the works of Pauson but those of Polygnotus or any other painter or sculptor who has an ethical character. Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves representations of moral qualities. This is a fact beyond dispute, as there is an initial distinction between the natures of different harmonies, so that we are variously affected by the sound of them and do not experience the same mood when we listen to all, but in listening to some, e.g. the mixed Lydian as it is called, experience a mood of comparative melancholy and restraint; in listening to others, e.g. the lax harmonies, a more tender mental mood; and again an intermediate and sedate mood in listening especially to a third—for such is, as it seems, the effect of the Dorian har-

[1] It is probable that the clause *καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν*, ll. 18—19, should be transposed, as it is in the translation, so as to follow *ἡδεῖαν εἶναι*, l. 15.

[2] Reading *ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος*.

mony alone—while we are excited to enthusiasm by the Phrygian. This is well set forth by writers who have treated this branch of education from a philosophical point of view; for they appeal to the evidence of experience in support of their theories. [1]And the same is true of rhythms: some have a more sedate, others again an exciting character, and among these last the means of excitement are in some cases more vulgar and in others more refined. [2]In fact there seems to be a sort of relationship between *the soul on the one hand and* harmonies and rhythms on the other; and hence there are many [3]philosophers who hold either that the soul is itself a harmony or else that it contains a harmony.

It is evident then from these considerations that Music possesses the power of affecting in a certain way the character of the soul; and, if so, it is clear

[1] Reading τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον.

[2] The sentence καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια...οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἁρμονίαν, ll. 14—17, should probably follow ἐλευθεριωτέρας, l. 8. But it is not necessary to insert the words πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν as Bekker has done, although they serve to bring out the true meaning of the passage.

[3] Compare the discussion in περὶ ψυχῆς, i. ch. 4. The passage which Aristotle had chiefly in mind was doubtless Plato *Phaedo*, pp. 86 sqq. But it is worth while to refer to the Fragment of Parmenides beginning

ὡς γὰρ ἕκαστος ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων
τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν κ.τ.λ.,

which will be found in Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philosophiae*, § 102, to Lucretius III. 100 sqq., and to Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* I. 20, 21.

that we ought to make use of it and educate the younger generation in it. For instruction in Music is appropriate to the natural disposition of the young, as from their tender years they do not willingly put up with anything that is not sweetened, and there is a natural sweetness in Music.

CHAP. VI. Are the young to practise Music themselves? p. 233.

We have now to discuss the question, which has been already raised, whether their instruction should or should not take the form of personally singing and performing upon musical instruments. Nor can it be doubted that personal acquaintance with the practice of anything is far the best way of acquiring certain qualifications; for it is in fact difficult, if not impossible, to become a good critic without any such practical experience. And besides this children require some occupation. We cannot but approve as a capital invention the *so-called* rattle of Archytas, which is given to children to keep them employed and to prevent their breaking furniture, as young people are unable to keep quiet. As this rattle then is suitable to babes, so the education they receive serves as a rattle *or amusement* to children of a more advanced age.

Such considerations as have been adduced shew clearly the propriety of educating the young in Music to the point of actual acquaintance with the practice. It is not difficult however to determine what is or is not becoming to different periods of life and to meet the objection of those who maintain that the practice of Music is worthy only of mechanics. In the first place, as the acquisition of a right judgment is the sole object with which they are to take part in musical

performances, it follows that they should perform only during their youth and, when they have grown older, should be released from all performance and yet be enabled by the instruction they have received in youth to form a judgment of noble pieces of music and enjoy pleasures of a right kind. Nor is it difficult to meet the objection sometimes brought against Music as reducing its students to the level of mere mechanics, if we consider what are the limits to be set to actual performances in the case of persons whose education is directed to political virtue, what kind of melodies and rhythms they should practise, and thirdly—for this too is probably a point of some importance—what is the nature of the instruments to be used in their instruction. It is here that the answer to the objection lies, as it is quite possible that some species of Music may produce the ill effects above described.

It is evident then that their musical education ought not to prove an impediment to their subsequent actions or render their body mechanical and unfit for the exercise of war and politics, i.e. [1]for instruction in them at the present time and for its practical application in the future. And *the result we desire* will be attained in their education, if they do not spend their time and labour upon performances which are suitable only with a view to the contests of professional musicians or upon performances of an extraordinary and exceptional kind, such as have lately been introduced into these con-

The nature of the Music.

[1] Reading πρὸς μὲν τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὕστερον.

tests and from them into the educational curriculum, [1]and if they carry their musical studies only so far as to acquire a capacity for enjoying noble melodies and rhythms and not merely that general effect of Music which is enjoyed by some of the lower animals, as well as by a number of slaves and children, no less than by men.

Musical instruments.

We see from this too the sort of instruments to be used. It is not proper to introduce into education the flute or any other instrument which requires professional skill, like a cithern or other instrument of the kind, but only such as will make them apt recipients either of musical education or of education generally. And further the flute is an instrument of a strongly exciting rather than of an ethical character and should consequently be employed only upon occasions when the object of the audience is the purging of the emotions rather than the improvement of the mind. We may add, as an incidental objection to the use of the flute in education, that flute-playing prevents the use of the voice. It was with justice then that our forefathers banished the flute from the education of the young and of persons of free birth, although they had originally employed it. For [2]as the increase of wealth afforded them better opportunities of leisure and quickened the moral aspirations of their souls, the result was, even before the Persian wars and still more after them in the full flush of their achievements, that they

[1] Placing a comma, instead of a full stop, after παιδείαν and omitting καὶ before τὰ τοιαῦτα.

[2] Reading γινόμενοι.

essayed every kind of education, drawing no line anywhere but making experiments in all directions. Thus the use of the flute among other things was introduced into the educational curriculum. For there was a master of a chorus at Lacedaemon who himself accompanied his chorus upon the flute, and at Athens the use of the flute became so popular that the majority of free persons may be said to have had some knowledge of it, as we see from the tablet set up by Thrasippus on the occasion when he acted as master of the chorus for Ecphantides. At a later date however the flute was rejected upon actual trial, when it was possible to form a better opinion of what was or was not conducive to the practice of virtue. The same was the case with not a few antique instruments, e.g. [1]dulcimers, psalteries and others which serve merely to tickle the ears of the audience, septangles, triangles, sackbuts and all such as require manual dexterity. The old legend about the flute has much truth in it. It is said that Athene discovered [2]the flute and afterwards flung it away. It is not a bad idea that the goddess did so in consequence of the disgust she felt at the disfigurement of her countenance *by flute-playing*; but at the same time the reason is more likely to have been that

[1] I do not think it is possible to find English equivalents for the names of instruments given in the text. They seem to have been all stringed instruments, some of native Greek invention like the *βάρβιτος*, and others, like the *σαμβύκη*, borrowed from foreign nations. The names *τρίγωνα* and *ἑπτάγωνα* are evidently descriptive of shape.

[2] *τοὺς αὐλούς*. The Plural, as it was usual for the Greek performer to play two flutes.

education in flute-playing has no intellectual value, as it is to Athene that we ascribe science and art.

Professional musicians.

Professional education then, whether in respect of the instruments or of the execution, we reject, meaning by "professional" such as is suitable to public contests. For in it the object of the performer is not the promotion of his own virtue but the pleasure of his audience, and this a vulgar sort of pleasure. Accordingly we regard such execution as unworthy of free men and as being rather a species of hired labour. It is a fact too that *the professionals* sink to the level of mechanics, as the object which they have in view in the choice of their end is a debased one. For the low character of the audience usually necessitates a *corresponding* variety in the Music; and hence a *deteriorating* effect is produced not only upon the character of the musicians, whose study is directed solely to the pleasure of the audience, but upon their bodies too by the *ungraceful* movements which they make *in playing*.

CHAP. VII. Harmonies and rhythms.

There still remains the question of harmonies and rhythms. [1]We have to consider *firstly* whether it is proper to make use of all the different harmonies and rhythms indiscriminately or to draw a distinction between them, secondly whether we are to adopt the same distinction [2]or some other in the case of persons who are serious students of Music for educational purposes, and thirdly, as Music consists of melody and rhythms and we ought not to be ignorant of the educational value of either, whether the preference

[1] Omitting καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν.

[2] Reading θήσομεν ἤ τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.

should be given to melodious or to rhythmical Music. Believing then that the subject is fully and excellently treated by some musicians and on the philosophical side by such philosophers as have a practical acquaintance with musical education, we will leave anyone who chooses to refer to these authorities for a detailed discussion of particular points and will at present determine them from a legislative point of view, contenting ourselves with a mere outline of the subject.

Classification of melodies.

We accept the classification of melodies adopted by some philosophical writers, who distinguish them as ethical, practical and enthusiastic, and hold that different harmonies are in their nature appropriate to the ~~several~~ different [1] ~~melodies~~. Further we maintain that Music should not be employed for a single benefit only but for several, i.e. as a means of education, as a purgative of the emotions—what we mean when we speak of purging the emotions, although here stated only in general terms, will be explained more clearly hereafter in our [2] treatise on Poetry—and thirdly [3] for the relaxation ~~or recreation of~~ the tense condition *of the soul.* It is evident then that, although it is right to make use of all the different harmonies, they ought not all to be used in the same manner, but the harmonies of the most strictly ethical character for educational purposes, and the practical and enthusiastic harmonies when we listen to the performances of others. It is to be observed that

[1] Reading μέλος.

[2] The passage referred to is *Poet.* ch. 6.

[3] Omitting πρὸς διαγωγήν.

an emotion, which is strongly incident to one soul, is existent in all, although they differ in their degree of it, whether it be compassion or fear or even enthusiasm; for there are some people who are exceedingly liable to the emotion of enthusiasm. [1]And in the case of the sacred melodies we observe that such persons, after listening to melodies which raise the soul to ecstasy, relapse into their normal condition, as if they had experienced a medical or purgative treatment. The same is of course the case with compassionate and fearful persons and emotional persons generally, and with others in proportion as each participates in such emotions: they all experience a sort of purging and a pleasurable feeling of relief. Similarly melodies of a [2]practical sort produce in men a feeling of innocent joy. Hence it is with harmonies and melodies of this sort that persons who practise [3]music professionally should be set to contend. But as there are two sorts of audience, one free and cultivated, the other vulgar, consisting of mechanics, hired labourers and the like, the second class no less than the first requires appropriate musical contests and exhibitions for its relaxation. And as their souls are distorted from their natural condition, so are there *correspondingly* corrupt forms of harmony and melodies of a strained and artificially coloured character. A feeling of pleasure is excited in every class of persons by what-

The purging of the emotions.

[1] The *ἱερὰ μέλη* are apparently the same as the *Ὀλύμπου μέλη* p. 137, l. 28.

[2] Reading *τὰ μέλη τὰ πρακτικά.*

[3] *θεατρικὴν* is not found in the best MSS.

ever has an affinity to their own nature, and accordingly performers, who compete for the prize before a vulgar audience, must be allowed to employ this species of Music. As a means of education, on the other hand, the ethical melodies and the corresponding harmonies should be employed. The Dorian harmony, as we remarked before, has an ethical p. 239. character; nor may we refuse to accept any other that is recommended to us by those who are versed in philosophical studies and in musical education. But Socrates in the [1]*Republic* is wrong in making an exception in favour of the Phrygian harmony, which he allows as well as the Dorian, especially when he has rejected the flute as an instrument. For the Phrygian harmony corresponds in its effects to the flute among instruments, both being of a strongly exciting and emotional nature. We may find an evidence of this fact in poetry. For all revelry and such excitement is expressed by the flute better than by any other instrument; while, if we look to harmonies, it receives its appropriate expression in the Phrygian melodies. Thus it is generally allowed that the dithyramb is a composition which requires a Phrygian melody; and of this there are various proofs adduced by those who are competent authorities upon the subject, especially the circumstance that Philoxenus failed in the attempt to set his dithyrambic poem "The Mysians" to a Dorian harmony and was driven by the nature of the case to fall back upon the appropriate Phrygian. The Dorian harmony on the contrary is recognized on all hands as preeminently

[1] *Republic*, III. p. 399 A.

staid and characterized by a spirit of valour. And further as it is the mean between two extremes that we always admire and regard as the proper object of our pursuit, and as the Dorian harmony stands midway between the others, it is evident that Dorian melodies are particularly suited to the education of the young. There are always two objects to be kept in view, viz. possibility and propriety; for it is such things *and such only* as are within his capacity and appropriate to his character that each individual should choose to undertake. But the conditions of possibility and propriety are determined by the ages of the persons in question. For instance, people who are old and feeble cannot easily sing the strained harmonies; it is rather the lax ones that Nature suggests at this time of life. Accordingly there is justice in the reproach brought against Socrates by some musical authorities that [1]he rejected the lax harmonies in his educational system, regarding them as intoxicating, not in reference to the effects of intoxication *at the time*—for it rather produces a disposition to revelry—but of intoxication when the actual fit has passed away. Hence it is in view of their later or more advanced years that they should essay harmonies and melodies of this kind. And further if there is any harmony appropriate to the age of childhood in virtue of its capacity for combining propriety with culture, as seems to be particularly the property of the Lydian harmony[2]...... It

[1] The passage referred to is Plato *Republic*, III. p. 398 E.

[2] It can hardly be doubted that the true apodosis of the sentence has fallen out of the text. How much more has been

is evident that these are the three canons to be laid down *respecting the use of Music* in education, viz. that it should be of an intermediate character, that it should be within the capacity of the learner and that it should be appropriate to his age.

Canons of education.

lost before δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους κ.τ.λ. cannot now be determined; but the whole discussion of Music as an educational agent is imperfect.

BOOK VI.

CHAP. I. The scope of political science.

In all the roll of arts and sciences, which are not restricted to a single branch of a subject but are complete treatments of some one subject as a whole, it is the province of one and the same art or science to consider all the questions appropriate to a given subject, e g. *if we take the case of Gymnastic, to consider firstly* the sort of discipline which is beneficial to particular physical constitutions; secondly the nature of the best discipline, as it is certain that the best discipline is such as is appropriate to the person who enjoys the finest constitution and is endowed with the richest natural advantages; and thirdly the discipline which is uniformly beneficial to the great majority of people taken collectively; [1]for this is equally a function of Gymnastic. And further if a person is content with aspiring to something short of his proper physical condition or scientific expertness in athletic exercises, it is none the less the business of the trainer or gymnastic master [2]to produce even this inferior measure of capacity. Similarly we find

[1] Reading καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

[2] Omitting τε.

this to be the case in Medicine or Shipbuilding or Tailoring or any other art. It is evidently therefore the business of the selfsame science to consider the nature of the best polity or in other words the character of polity which would best satisfy our ideal, if there were no impediment in external circumstances, and *secondly* the nature of the polity appropriate to particular classes of persons. For as the best polity is probably out of the reach of large numbers of people, it is right that the [1]good legislator and the true statesman should keep his eyes open not only to the absolutely best polity but also to the polity which is best under the actual conditions. We may add thirdly an assumed polity; for it is right that in the case of any given polity he should be competent to consider the means of calling it into existence and, when it has come into existence, the method of endowing it with the longest life. I am referring to the case where the conditions of a particular State are such that the polity under which it exists is not the best *nor indeed can ever be the best, as* it is unprovided with the very essentials *of the best polity,* nor again is the best which is possible in the circumstances, but some polity of an inferior kind. And besides all this it is right that he should understand the polity which is most appropriate to the mass of states, *especially* as the great majority of political writers, even if successful in their treatment of the other points, utterly miss the mark of practical utility. For it is

[1] Reading τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην.

not only the *absolutely* best polity which is the proper subject of consideration, but also that which is possible *in any given case* and similarly that which is comparatively easy of attainment and has a closer affinity to the polities of all existing States. But our modern writers either aspire to the highest polity, for which a number of external advantages are indispensable, or, if they describe a form more generally attainable, put out of sight all existing forms *except the favoured one* and pronounce a panegyric upon the Lacedaemonian or some other polity. What we want however is to introduce some system which the world will easily be induced and enabled to [1]accept as an innovation upon the existing forms; for it is quite as troublesome a task to amend a polity as to establish it in the first instance, just as the task of correcting one's knowledge is quite as troublesome as that of acquiring it at first.

The qualifications of a statesman.

It is proper then that in addition to the points specified *by these political writers* the true statesman should be capable of coming to the rescue of existing polities, as has been already said. Nor can he possibly do this, if he is unacquainted with all the various kinds of polity. [2]*I say this*, because in our own day it is the opinion of some writers that there is only one kind of Democracy or Oligarchy. This however is not the true state of the case. The eyes of the statesman therefore should be open to all the shades of difference between the various polities and to the number

[1] Reading καινοτομεῖν.

[2] Reading νῦν γὰρ μίαν δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ.

of possible combinations; [1]and by the light of the same practical science he should discern the best laws and the laws appropriate to each form of polity, as it is the laws enacted which should be, and in fact are universally relative to the polities rather than the polities to the laws. For whereas a polity is the general system of any State in regard to the distribution of the executive offices, the supreme political authority and the end which [2]the citizens propose to themselves in their association, laws, as distinct from the institutions which express the character of the polity, are merely the conditions according to which the officers of state are to hold office and to exercise surveillance over lawbreakers. And from this we see clearly the necessity, even from a legislative point of view, of a familiarity with the differences between polities and the number *of the varieties* of each *in a general classification of polities;* for the same laws cannot be beneficial to all Oligarchies or Democracies alike, as there are several species of Democracy and Oligarchy rather than a single species only.

CHAP. II. The arrangement of the *Politics.* pp. 119, 120.

As at the beginning of our treatise we divided [3]polities into the normal polities, which are three in number, viz. Kingship, Aristocracy and Polity, and the perversions of these which are also three, viz. Tyranny the perversion of Kingship, Oligarchy of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity; as Aristocracy and Kingship have been already discussed—for the consideration of the best polity is nothing else than a

[1] The construction becomes clearer, if the full stop after ποσαχῶς is changed to a colon.

[2] Reading ἑκάστοις. [3] Omitting περὶ.

discussion of the polities which bear these names, as in theory each of them is constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means—and as further the points of difference between Aristocracy and Kingship and the occasions when a polity is to be regarded as regal have been determined, it remains to describe the form which is called by the general name of all polities, *viz. the Polity*, and the remaining forms, Oligarchy, Democracy and Tyranny.

The comparative badness of the perverted polities.

It is evident, if we consider these perversions, which is the worst and which is the next worst. For the perversion of the primary or most divine form must be the worst; and as Kingship must either be a mere name and not a reality or must have its justification in the vast superiority of the reigning king, it follows that Tyranny is the form which is worst and farthest removed from a constitutional government, Oligarchy the next worst—for Aristocracy, *it must be remembered*, is widely different from Oligarchy—and Democracy the least bad. [1]An earlier writer has already expressed himself in this sense, although not from the same point of view as ours. For *he recognized a good and a bad form of each of these polities and* held that of all the polities when they are good, i.e. of good Oligarchy and the like, Democracy is the worst, but that when they are bad it is the best. We maintain on the contrary that these polities are wholly vitiated, and it is not right to speak of one Oligarchy as being better than another but only as being less bad.

[1] The reference is to Plato *Politicus*, pp. 302 sqq.

This discussion however we may dismiss for the present. We have now first to determine the different species of the various polities, assuming that there are several kinds of Democracy and Oligarchy, and next the polity that is most generally attainable and most desirable with the exception of the best polity and any other that is aristocratical and constituted on noble principles—I mean the polity which is suited to the great majority of States. We have then to determine among the remaining forms of polity what special form is desirable for particular people, as it is probable that in some cases Democracy is necessary rather than Oligarchy, and in others Oligarchy rather than Democracy, and next to consider the right means to be employed by one who wishes to establish these polities, i.e. the several species of Democracy and again of Oligarchy. And finally, after briefly noticing as best we may all these points, we must try to enumerate the agencies destructive and preservative of polities both generally and individually and the causes which tend especially to produce them.

CHAP. III. **The causes of a variety of polities.**

The existence of a number of polities is due to the fact that in any State there are a number of parts. For in the first place all States, as we see, are composed of households; then again the population so formed necessarily consists partly of the rich, partly of the poor and partly of the middle class, and further the rich and poor may both be subdivided into soldiers and civilians. Again, one people, as we see, is agricultural, another commercial and a third mechanical. And among the upper classes themselves there are again distinctions in

respect of their wealth and the magnitude of their property, as e.g. in regard to keeping a stud of horses; for it is only persons of large property who can easily afford to keep horses. It was thus that in older times in any State, whose military strength resided in its cavalry, there was always an oligarchical government. Cavalry, it may be observed, was used in wars with border States as e.g. by the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnetians on the Maeander and many other Asiatic peoples. To the differences of wealth may be added differences in race or virtue or in anything else of the same kind which has been described as a part of a State in our discussion of
pp. 182 sqq. Aristocracy, where we defined the number of parts necessary to the existence of a State, as political rights are sometimes enjoyed by all these parts and at other times by only a smaller or larger number of them. It is evident then that there must be a number of polities differing specifically from one another, as there is a specific difference between these their parts. For a polity is simply the system of the offices of State, and this is distributed by all the citizens among themselves either in virtue of the superior power of the privileged class or of some qualification common to both alike—I mean e.g. in virtue of the power of the poor *in numbers* or of the rich *in wealth* or of some power which they possess in common. It follows as a necessary consequence that there is a number of different polities equal to the number of systems dependent upon the superiorities or differences of the members of a State. But it seems that there are principally two polities, that as

The two principal polities.

in the case of winds some are described as northerly, others as southerly and all the rest as perversions or variations of these, so the polities may be reduced to two viz. Democracy and Oligarchy. For Aristocracy is reckoned as a species of Oligarchy, being regarded as in a certain sense an Oligarchy, and the so-called Polity is reckoned as a Democracy, as among winds the West wind is called a species of North wind and the East wind a species of South wind. It is much the same with harmonies according to some authorities, who reckon only two species, the Dorian and Phrygian, and describe all the other combinations as either Dorian or Phrygian. [1]This then is the usually accepted view of polities. But it is not so true or good as our classification, according to which there are only two polities or even only a single polity constituted on noble principles, and all the rest are perversions of the best polity, corresponding to the variations of the well-tempered harmony *in Music*, the more intense and despotic polities being oligarchical and the lax and mild polities democratical.

The true classification of polities.

CHAP. IV. The definition of Democracy and Oligarchy.

But it is not right to follow the fashion of some contemporary writers in defining Democracy without any qualification as a polity in which the masses are supreme. For it is equally the case in an Oligarchy and in any other polity whatever that the supreme power is in the hands of the greater part. Nor again may we define Oligarchy without any qualification as a polity in which the Few are supreme. For sup-

[1] Reading μάλιστα μὲν οὖν εἰώθασιν.

pose that the gross population of a State amounted to thirteen hundred, of whom one thousand were rich, and that the thousand rich persons did not allow any share of rule to the three hundred poor, although they were personally free and similar to the thousand in every respect except riches; nobody would maintain that the polity of this State was democratical. Similarly suppose the case of a small number of poor persons who are yet stronger than a larger number of the rich; here again nobody would describe such a polity as an Oligarchy, if the mass of the population being rich were excluded, *as they are ex hypothesi*, from the honours of State. It is more correct then to say that the polity is a Democracy when the supreme power is in the hands of the free citizens, and an Oligarchy when it is in the hands of the rich, [1]and that it is only an accidental circumstance that the former constitute [2]a majority and the latter a minority of the population, as there are many free persons in the world and only a few persons of property. For *on the assumption that it is the supremacy of the Few which makes an Oligarchy* it would follow that, if the distribution of the offices of State among the citizens were regulated by stature, as [3]according to some authorities is the case in Æthiopia, or by personal beauty, the polity would be an Oligarchy; for the number of beautiful or tall persons is small. *This however is evidently out of*

[1] There should be a comma, instead of a full stop, after πλούσιοι.

[2] Reading πλέιους.

[3] See Herodotus III. ch. 20. Cp. p. 118, l. 25.

the question. But at the same time even wealth and personal freedom taken alone are not sufficient as the determining characteristics of Democracy and Oligarchy. On the contrary, as both these polities include a variety of members, it is proper to draw a further distinction and to lay down on the one hand that the polity is not a Democracy, if a minority of simply free citizens rule a majority[1] as e.g. at Apollonia upon the Ionian sea and at Thera, in both which States the civic honours were engrossed by the families which claimed a preeminent nobility as having been the original founders of the colonies, although they were numerically few and their subjects were many, and on the other hand that it is not an [2]Oligarchy, if the rich rule solely in virtue of their numerical superiority, as was formerly the case at Colophon, where the majority of the citizens had acquired a large property before the era of the Lydian war. The truth is that a Democracy exists when the authority is in the hands of the free and poor who are in a majority, and an Oligarchy when it is in the hands of the propertied or noble class who are in a minority.

Thus the fact that there are more polities than one and the reason of the fact have been stated. We have now to show that there are more than the two we have mentioned, *viz. Democracy and Oligarchy,* and to describe the nature and the cause of each, starting from the consideration which has been already adduced. We all allow that every State con- p. 255.

[1] Omitting καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων.

[2] Reading ὀλιγαρχία.

The parts of a State.

tains not one part only, but several. Accordingly we must proceed in the same way as if it were our purpose to ascertain the different species of animal. We should begin in that case by specifying the organs indispensable to any animal; I mean certain of the organs of sense, the organs which receive and digest food, viz. the mouth and stomach, and also the members by means of which each animal moves. Supposing that this is an exhaustive list of the different organs, and that of each organ there are different kinds, I mean, supposing that there are several kinds of mouth, stomach and organs of sensation as well as of the members which are organs of movement, we see that the number of possible combinations of these organs will necessarily produce several kinds of animals, *although the number of different species will not be unlimited*, as the same animal cannot have several different kinds of mouth or ears. Hence if we take all the possible combinations of these organs, they will produce different species of animals, and there will be as many different species of animals as there are combinations of the organs necessary to their existence. It is the same with the polities in question; for States like animals are composed not of a single part, but of several, as has been more than once remarked. One of these parts is the class which is concerned with the supply of food, viz. the husbandmen as they are called. A second is the so-called mechanical class, viz. the class [1]which is occupied with such arts as are indispensable to the administration of a State, whether they are absolutely necessary

[1] Reading ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας.

to its existence or conducive to luxury and refinement of life. A third is the commercial class, by which I mean the class that devotes itself to the sale and purchase of goods and to business both wholesale and retail. There is fourthly the class of hired labourers; fifthly, the military class which is quite as indispensable as the foregoing, if the citizens are not to be the slaves of any assailants. *And this power of self-defence is absolutely requisite;* for it is an impossibility, we may say, that a State which is naturally the slave of others should deserve to be called a State at all, as independence is a characteristic of a State, and slaves are destitute of independence. Hence this subject has been treated inadequately although ingeniously in the [1] *Republic* of Plato. Socrates there says that a State is composed of four absolutely indispensable elements which he specifies as a weaver, a husbandman, a cobbler and a builder; but at a later point, as if he felt the insufficiency of these four for independence, he adds to the number a smith, people to take charge of the necessary live stock, and still further a merchant and a retail trader; and all these elements collectively form the complement of the State in its primary form, as if it were [2] only the necessaries of life which are the objects of the constitution of any State, and refinement or nobleness were not more indispensable to a State than cobblers or husbandmen. The military class he does not assign to the State until the increase of its territory and its

Criticism of the view of Socrates.

[1] *Republic* II. p. 369 B sqq.

[2] Reading *τῶν ἀναγκαίων γε* and below *ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.*

contiguity to that of a neighbouring people have landed the citizens in war. But it may fairly be objected that among his four associates or whatever the number may be, there must be somebody to pronounce and adjudge justice. And on the same principle as we should regard the soul as being more properly a member of an animal than the body, so it is right to regard the corresponding classes in the State, viz. the military class, the class which is invested with the administration of legal justice, and thirdly, the deliberative body—for deliberation is a task which demands political intelligence—as being members of a State in a higher sense than the classes which merely serve to supply the necessary wants of life. Nor does it make any difference to our argument whether these functions are appropriated to particular classes or are united in the same hands, *as is often the case;* for it happens not infrequently that the soldiers are at the same time the husbandmen. Thus as the classes which constitute the soul of the State, as well as those which constitute its body are to be regarded as members of the State, it is evident that the military class is necessarily a member[1]. . . . . . The seventh class consists of those

[1] It would appear that some words have fallen out of the text after *μόριον τῆς πόλεως*. For after mentioning five parts or elements of a State (p. 151, ll. 7—18) Aristotle is led into a digression upon the necessity of a military class and a criticism of the views put forward by Socrates in the *Republic* (p. 151, l. 19 – p. 152, l. 10); then he resumes his enumeration of the parts of a State with the words *ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν*. A comparison of the present passage with Bk. IV. ch. 8 suggests the insertion of *ἕκτον δὲ οἱ ἱερεῖς*.

whose properties enable them to bear the public burdens, or in other words of the rich. The eighth comprises the executive magistrates who serve the State in the different public offices, as officers are indispensable to a State. It is necessary therefore that there should be a class of persons who are capable of holding office and who render this service to the State either continuously or by a system of alternation. There remain the classes which we incidentally defined just now, viz. the body [1]which is to deliberate, and the body which is to adjudicate upon questions of justice between litigants. And as all the functions we have named ought to be discharged and nobly and justly discharged in a State, it is indispensable that there should be also a class of public men endowed with virtue.

It may be observed, that all the faculties we have described may with one exception be often united in the same hands. Thus the same persons may constitute the military, agricultural, and artisan classes, and also the deliberative and judicial bodies. All classes too affect to possess the requisite virtue and consider themselves competent to fill nearly all the public offices. But it is impossible that the same persons should be poor and rich. And hence it is supposed that these two classes, viz. the rich and the poor, are in a preeminent sense parts of a State. And further, as the one class is almost always numerically small, while the other is numerically large, it appears that these are the really antagonistic mem-

[1] Reading *τὸ βουλευσόμενον καὶ κρινοῦν.*

bers of a State. The result is that the character of all existing polities is determined by the predominance of one or other of these classes, and it is the common opinion that there are two polities and two only, viz. Democracy and Oligarchy.

pp. 255 sqq.

The cause of varieties of Democracy and Oligarchy.

We have already stated that there are several polities and have indicated the causes. We have now to show that there are several kinds of Democracy and Oligarchy. But the remarks we have already made serve to elucidate this point. For there are various classes among the commons as well as among the so-called upper orders. One class of commons is composed of husbandmen, another of artisans, a third of merchants who are occupied with the purchase and sale of goods, a fourth of seafaring people, whether engaged in war, business, transport service or fishing, for each of these classes is numerous in different places, as e.g. fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, marines at Athens, traders in Ægina or Chios, and persons engaged in transport service in Tenedos. To these we may add manual labourers and all who possess so little property as to be incapable of leisure, as well as all who are free but not descended from citizens on both sides, and any other similar class of population. Among the upper classes on the other hand, the differences consist in wealth, nobility, virtue, culture, and other recognized characteristics not less distinctive than these.

Democracy according to the primary conception of it is the polity which is preeminently based upon equality. According to the law of Democracy as so

conceived, equality implies that the poor should not be in any sense [1]rulers rather than the rich, that neither the one party nor the other should be supreme but that both should stand upon the same footing. For if we grant that freedom and equality are, as some suppose, especially found in a Democracy, they will best be realized where all the citizens have the largest share of political rights upon equal terms. But as the commons form a numerical majority and the will of the majority is supreme, it follows that the polity in which these conditions are realized must be a Democracy. [2]One species of Democracy then is that in which eligibility to the offices of State is dependent upon a property qualification, but the qualification is a low one and, as anyone who acquires the amount of property enjoys the privilege of eligibility, so anyone who loses it ceases to be eligible. There is a second species of Democracy in which all the citizens who are not liable to any objection *on the score of birth* are eligible to office but the law is supreme. A third is that in which everybody is eligible to the offices of State, provided only that he is a citizen, *i. e. is actually in the enjoyment of the rights of citizenship*, but the law is supreme. There is yet another species which is similar to the last in all respects except that the people rather than the law is here supreme. This is the case when it is popular decrees which are the supreme or final authorities, and not the law. It is the demagogues who are to blame for this state of things. For in States

The various species of Democracy.

The extreme Democracy.

[1] Reading ἄρχειν. [2] Omitting τοῦτο, ἄλλο δέ.

which enjoy a democratical polity regulated by law no demagogue ever makes his appearance, and it is the best citizens who enjoy the posts of honour. But it is where the laws are not supreme that demagogues appear. For the commons in such a State are converted into a monarch, i.e. into an individual composed of many other individuals; for the supreme power is vested in the many, not indeed as individuals but collectively. What is the nature of the "multitude of lords," which in the language of [1]Homer is "no blessing," whether it is this or a number of rulers exercising individual authority, is a question involved in obscurity. But in any case the commons whom we are supposing aspire in virtue of their monarchical character to exercise monarchical power, as being exempted from the control of the law; they become despotic and consequently pay high honour to sycophants, and in fact a Democracy of this description is analogous to Tyranny among monarchical forms of government. Thus in both there is the same character, in both an exercise of despotic rule over the better classes; the popular decrees in the one case answer to the edicts *of the tyrant* in the other, and the demagogues and sycophants are the same and correspond. Nor is there any class so influential as the sycophants and demagogues in their respective spheres, the former in the court of tyrants and the latter in the kind of Democracy which I have described. It is the demagogues who are responsible for the supremacy of the popular decrees rather than of the laws, as they

[1] *Iliad* II. 204.

always refer everything to the commons. *And they do so,* because the consequence is an increase of their own power, if the commons control all affairs, and they themselves control the judgment of the commons, as it is their guidance that the commons always follow. Another *circumstance which leads to the last form of Democracy* is that all who have any complaint against the officers of State argue that the judicial power ought to be vested in the commons; and as the commons gladly entertain the [1]indictment, the result is that the authority of all the offices of State is seriously impaired. It would seem a just criticism to assert that this kind of Democracy is not a constitutional government at all, as constitutional government is impossible without the supremacy of laws. For it is right that the law should be supreme universally and the officers of State only in particular cases, [2]if the government is to be regarded as constitutional. And as Democracy is, *as we have seen,* a form of polity, it is evident that the constitution, in which all business is administered by popular decrees, is not even a Democracy in the strict sense of the term, as it is impossible that any popular decree should be capable of universal application.

The various species of Democracy may be thus determined.

CHAP. V. The various species of Oligarchy.

Among the species of Oligarchy the first is [3]one in which a property qualification is the condition of eligibility to the offices of State, but it is only so high that

[1] Read προσκλησιν.

[2] Reading καὶ ταύτην πολιτείαν κρίνειν.

[3] Reading ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων κ.τ.λ.

the poor who are excluded from office may form a majority of the population, and everyone who acquires the amount of property enjoys full political privileges. Another species is when eligibility to office is dependent on a high property qualification and the officers themselves elect to the vacancies. In this case, if the election takes place from among the whole body of qualified citizens, the system may be regarded as tending towards an Aristocracy, but if it is confined to particular classes, as *essentially* oligarchical. A third species of Oligarchy is one in which a son succeeds to his father's office, *i.e. is based upon the principle of heredity;* a fourth one in which the same hereditary principle exists, and the supreme authority rests with the Executive and not with the law. This last species of Oligarchy is the counterpart of Tyranny among monarchical forms of government and of the extreme form of Democracy, as we defined it, among Democracies and is commonly described as a Dynasty.

There are thus all these various species of Oligarchy and Democracy. But it would not be right to ignore the fact that it happens in a considerable number of States that, while the polity as expressed in the laws is not democratical, the [1]habit and tendency of the citizens produce a democratical spirit in the administration, and so conversely in other cases that, while the polity as expressed in the laws is comparatively democratical, it is from the tendency and habits of the citizens more oligarchical in its

[1] Reading ἔθος.

administration. And this is especially the case after political revolutions, as men do not pass easily from one political régime to another but are content in the first instance with petty encroachments upon the privileges of their rivals, so that the laws which existed before the revolution continue in force, although the revolutionary party has got the upper hand.

CHAP. VI. Recapitulation of the species of Democracy and Oligarchy.

That this is an exhaustive classification of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy is sufficiently proved by the nature of facts we have alleged. For it is inevitable that political privileges should be enjoyed either by all the classes of the commons as we have specified them or by some of them only.

This being the case, whenever it is the agricultural class or in other words the class possessed of a moderate property which enjoys the supreme authority in the polity, the administration is based upon an observance of law. For as an agricultural population is obliged to work for its living and is incapable of a mere life of leisure, they bow their necks to the law and content themselves with holding only such meetings of the Assembly as are indispensable. But political privileges in this polity are open to any inhabitant of the State upon his acquiring the legally determined property qualification[1]. The reason of these conditions is that the absolute exclusion of any individual from political privileges is a mark of Oligarchy; while on the other hand the possibility of leisure is out of the question, if there is not an adequate pecuniary income. This then is one species

[1] Omitting διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτωμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν.

of Democracy, and such are the circumstances which give rise to it. There is a second species based upon the next principle of eligibility. For political privileges may be open theoretically to any inhabitant against whom no objection can be brought on the score of his descent, although they are not practically exercised by anyone, unless he is able to enjoy a life of leisure. The result is that in this second form of Democracy the laws are supreme owing to the want of pecuniary means among the citizens. The third species is one in which political privileges are open to all the inhabitants, provided only that they are of free birth, although they are prevented from actually exercising them by the reason alleged in the last case, *viz. want of means*, so that in this polity too the law is necessarily supreme. The fourth species of Democracy is the one which was chronologically developed last in States. For it results from the great increase in the size of States as compared with their original dimensions and from the accession of large pecuniary resources that not only do all the inhabitants theoretically enjoy political privileges in consequence of the predominant influence of the masses, but they actually exercise them in the conduct of political business, as even the poor are enabled by the pay they receive to enjoy the leisure *necessary to political life.* And indeed it is a population of this kind which has the largest amount of leisure; for they are not impeded in any way by the management of their private affairs as is the case with the rich, who are thus frequently prevented from attending the Assembly or the Courts of Law. The conse-

quence is that it is the mass of the poor rather than the laws that become the supreme authority in the polity.

So much for the number and character of the species of Democracy as determined by the force of the circumstances we have described.

We come now to those of Oligarchy. When there is a considerable number of people possessing an amount of property which is comparatively small or at the most not very large, this is the first species of Oligarchy, one in which anybody who acquires the amount of property is entitled to the exercise of political privileges and in which, as there is a large number of members of the governing class, it is a necessary consequence that the supremacy resides not in human beings but in the law. For the more widely the citizens are removed from monarchical government, and the more nearly it is the case that the amount of property which they possess is not so large as to enable them to enjoy leisure [1] without attending to business or so small that they require to be supported at the expense of the State, the more certainly will they approve the supremacy of the law in their case rather than their own supremacy. If on the other hand the propertied class is smaller than in the last case, and the requisite amount of property larger, the second species of Oligarchy is realized. For the increase of their resources leads them to aspire to a proportionate increase of their power; and the result is that they

[1] Reading ἀμελοῦντες.

exercise the right of coopting the members of the governing body from the [1]masses and, as they have not yet attained sufficient strength to dispense with the authority of law, they accommodate the law to the general principle of the polity. If again they intensify the form of polity by still further diminishing the number of the governing body and augmenting the requisite amount of property, they arrive at the third stage of Oligarchy, in which not only are the offices of State in the hands of the privileged class, but the tenure of office is regulated by a law which prescribes that at the death of the parents the children shall succeed to their places. But when the accumulation of vast properties and the presence of a numerous *clientèle* leads to an exaggerated intensification *of the oligarchical principle*, a dynastic government of the kind thus constituted approaches closely to a Monarchy, and the supreme authority is vested in human beings rather than in the law. This is the fourth species of Oligarchy, the counterpart of the latest development of Democracy.

CHAP. VII. Apart from Democracy and Oligarchy there are still two forms of polity or constitutional government, one of which is generally recognized and has been mentioned in this book as one species of the four acknowledged polities, viz., Monarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and fourthly the so-called Aristocracy. But there is a fifth which is called by the general name of all polities, viz., a Polity, although from the infrequency of its actual realization writers who en-

[1] Reading ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν.

deavour to enumerate the species of polities pass it over and confine themselves, like Plato in the books of his *Republic*, to the usual four.

Aristocracy.

Properly speaking we should confine the name of Aristocracy to the form of polity described in the early part of our treatise. For the only polity which in justice deserves the name of Aristocracy is that in which the citizens are the best persons in an absolute sense, according to the standard of virtue and not in reference to any arbitrary definition of goodness. For it is here and here only that the good man and the good citizen are absolutely the same; whereas in every other polity the goodness of the good is relative to their own polity.

The strict definition of the term.

Its popular use.

However there is a class of polities which present certain points of difference as compared with oligarchical polities on the one hand[1] and with the so-called Polity on the other, as in them the elections to office are not determined by wealth only but also by virtue. This form of polity differs both from Polity in the strict sense and from Oligarchy, and is called aristocratical. It arises from the fact that even in States which do not treat the promotion of virtue as a matter of public interest there are still certain persons whose name stands high and who are generally regarded as the better classes. Any polity then in which regard is paid to wealth, virtue and numbers, as at Carthage, is aristocratical; so too is any polity in which regard is paid to two of these only, viz., to virtue and numbers as in the Lacedaemonian polity[2], and there is a fusion of the two elements, numbers and virtue.

[1] Omitting καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι.

[2] There should be a comma after οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων.

There are thus two species of Aristocracy besides the primary or best polity; and we may reckon as a third species all the forms of the so-called Polity which have rather an inclination to Oligarchy.

CHAP. VIII. It remains for us to speak of the form specially called Polity and of Tyranny. We have adopted this order, although neither the Polity nor anyone of the forms of Aristocracy just described is properly a perversion, because in strict truth they all fall short of the absolutely normal polity and consequently are placed in the same catalogue with the perversions, and the perversions properly so-called are perversions of

p. 120. these, *i.e. perversions in the second degree*, as we said at the outset. And it is reasonable to discuss Tyranny last as being of all polities the least worthy to be called a polity or constitutional government, and it is only with polities that our treatise is concerned.

Polity.

Having then stated the justification of our arrangement, we have now to speak of the Polity. Its essential character will be clearer after our determination of the features of Oligarchy and Democracy; for a Polity may be described in general terms as a fusion of Oligarchy and Democracy. It is the fashion however to assign the name of Polity to such forms only of the fusion as incline to Democracy, and of Aristocracy rather to such as incline to Oligarchy, inasmuch as culture and nobility, *which are the characteristics of an Aristocracy*, are more usually the concomitants of wealth. Another reason *for regarding as aristocratical the forms of fusion which have a tendency to Oligarchy* is the assumption that the rich are in possession of the advantages for which crimes are

The distinction between Polity and Aristocracy.

usually committed, *and are therefore likely to lead virtuous lives;* hence they are designated the gentle or upper classes. And thus as it is the purport of Aristocracy to assign the superiority to the best citizens, it is held that the citizens in Oligarchies are also likely to be the gentle classes. But it may be said to be an impossibility [1]that a State should be well-ordered, if it is governed not by the best but by the lower classes, and similarly that a State should be under the government of the best, if it is not well-ordered. Good order however does not consist in the mere enactment of good laws, if they are not obeyed. Hence we must distinguish two kinds of good order, one consisting in the obedience of the citizens to the existing laws, and the other in the wise enactment of the laws by which they abide; for it is possible to obey bad laws as well as good ones. But this wise enactment of the laws may take two forms; they may be either the best laws possible to the citizens in question or the best absolutely. It seems that Aristocracy consists principally in the distribution of the honours of State according to virtue. (For the principle of Aristocracy is virtue, of Oligarchy wealth and of Democracy freedom; but the definition that the will of the majority is supreme is true of all, as it is the case in Oligarchy and Aristocracy no less than in Democracy that the will of the greater part of those who enjoy full political privileges is supreme[2].) In the

[1] Reading *τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην.*

[2] The brackets mark the parenthetical nature of the sentence, which is not necessary to the progress of the argument.

great majority of States then it is the species which is really a Polity that is called an [1]Aristocracy; *it is really a Polity*, because the fusion of rich and poor aims merely at *the representation of* wealth and freedom, *but it is generally called an Aristocracy*, because the rich are in fact popularly regarded as occupying the position of the gentle classes. But as there are three things, viz. freedom, wealth and virtue, which claim to be the standard of equality in a polity—for the fourth or nobility, as it is called, is a necessary concomitant of the last two, being nothing else than [2]ancestral virtue and wealth—it is evident that, while the fusion of the two elements, the rich and the poor, ought to be called a Polity, that of the three deserves the name of Aristocracy more than any other polity except the genuine or primary form.

It has been stated then that there are other species of polity besides Monarchy, Democracy and Oligarchy. It is clear too what is the character of these several species, what are the points of difference between the forms of Aristocracy and between Aristocracy on the one hand and the various forms of Polity on the other, and how nearly they are related to one another.

CHAP. IX. The constitution of a Polity.

As a sequel to these remarks we have now to describe the manner of creating the so-called Polity as distinct from Democracy and Oligarchy and the method of setting it up as a constitution. This will be made clear at once by a simple statement of the characteristics of Democracy and Oligarchy; for we

[1] Reading καλεῖται ἀριστοκρατία.

[2] Reading ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος.

have only to ascertain the points of distinction between them and then to take the corresponding half, so to say, of each and put the two together.

But there are three principles of this combination or fusion. The first consists in the adoption of both the institutions [1]of the two parties, *viz. the Oligarchs and Democrats.* Take for instance the question of attendance in the Courts of Law. It is customary in Oligarchies to inflict a fine upon the rich for non-attendance but not to give the poor any fee *for attendance,* and in Democracies on the other hand to pay the poor but not to inflict a fine upon the rich. The combined or intermediate system is a union of both and is therefore appropriate to a Polity, as consisting in a fusion of the two principles. This then is one method of combination. Another consists in taking a mean between the systems of the two parties. Thus if we take the privilege of attendance in the public Assembly, in the one case there is no property qualification required or it is a very small one, and in the other it is large; the combined system is not to adopt either of these qualifications but to strike a mean between the two. A third method is to adopt parts of both systems, i.e. part of the oligarchical and part of the democratical law. For instance, if the appointment of the offices of State by lot is, as is generally supposed, democratical, while the appointment by suffrage is oligarchical, if it is democratical not to require a property qualification and oligarchical to require it, then the aristocratical

[1] Reading ἃ ἑκάτεροι νομοθετοῦσιν.

or political system is to take part from each of the two polities, viz. to take from Oligarchy the system of election by suffrage and from Democracy the absence of a property qualification.

The criterion of a Polity.

And as this is the method of fusing the two polities, Democracy and Oligarchy, so the criterion of a good fusion is the possibility of calling the same polity a Democracy and an Oligarchy; for it is evident that the cause of this uncertainty in language is the success of the fusion. It is in fact a general characteristic of the mean that the two extremes are discernible in it. This is just the case with the Lacedaemonian polity. There are many people who endeavour to describe it as a Democracy because of the many democratical elements in its constitution. We may instance first the education of the children. The children of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor and receive an education which would not be beyond the children of poor parents. And the same is true of the years succeeding childhood, and again afterwards when they reach man's estate; there is no distinction between rich and poor. So too they all fare alike in the common meals, and the rich wear a dress which any poor man would be able to procure. Another *democratical feature* is that of the two chief offices of State to the one the commons elect and to the other they are themselves eligible; for they elect the Senate and are themselves eligible to the Ephoralty. Others again call the Lacedaemonian polity an Oligarchy because of its numerous oligarchical elements, e.g. the appointment of all the officers of State by suffrage

instead of by lot, the concentration in a few hands of the powers of life and death and exile, and many other similar features. Where the fusion is successful it is proper that the polity should appear to be both an Oligarchy and a Democracy and to be neither, and further that it should owe its preservation to internal rather than to external causes, and to internal causes [1]not merely in the sense that the party which is anxious for its preservation should form a majority, as this may be the case even in a bad polity, but that there should be no element of the State whatever which is anxious for a change of polity.

The proper manner of establishing a Polity as well as the so-called Aristocracies has now been stated.

It remains for us, as we said, to speak of Tyranny, not that there is much to be said on the subject, but in order to give it its proper place in our treatise, as we regard it as one among the various kinds of polity. We entered into a discussion of the forms of Kingship in the early part of our treatise, when we were investigating Kingship in the strict sense of the term, the advantage or disadvantage of it to States, the nature and antecedents of the king and the manner of instituting kingly government. There are two species of Tyranny which we distinguished in our investigation of Kingship; for their character in a certain sense approximates to Kingship and overlaps it, inasmuch as both these forms of rule are regulated by law. I refer to the absolute monarchs

CHAP. X. Tyranny. Its various species.

pp. 144 sqq.

[1] Omitting ἔξωθεν.

elected among some non-Greek peoples and to the corresponding monarchs who were formerly created among the ancient Greeks and were known as Æsymnetes. No doubt there are certain points of difference between these two forms; but they both approximate to Kingship in their constitutional character and the voluntary obedience of the subjects, while they resemble a Tyranny in the despotic [1]and wholly arbitrary nature of the rule. There is a third species of Tyranny which may be regarded as Tyranny in the strictest sense, being the counterpart of the absolute Kingship. A Tyranny of this kind is necessarily realized in the form of Monarchy which is an irresponsible [2]exercise of rule over subjects, all of whom are the equals or superiors of the ruler, for the personal advantage of the ruler and not of the subjects. And hence the obedience is in this case involuntary; for no free person submits willingly to such rule.

Such then for the reasons alleged are the character and number of the species of Tyranny.

CHAP. XI. The best average polity.

But [3]what is the best polity and the best life for the great majority of States and persons, as tested by the standard not of a virtue which is beyond the attainment of ordinary human beings, nor of such an education as requires natural advantages and the external resources which Fortune alone can give, nor again of the ideally constructed polity, but of such a life as the majority of people are capable of realizing

[1] Reading δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην.
[2] Reading ἀρχὴ.
[3] Putting a mark of interrogation after μετασχεῖν.

in a political association and such a polity as the majority of States are capable of enjoying? For as the so-called Aristocracies of which we recently spoke lie in some respects beyond the reach of ordinary States and in others approximate to the Polity in the limited sense of the term, we may speak of the two forms, *viz. Aristocracy and Polity*, as one and the same.

In the determination of all these questions we may start from the same principles. If it has been correctly stated in the [1] *Ethics* that the happy life is a life which is unimpeded in the exercise of virtue, and that virtue is a mean between two extremes, it follows that the mean life, [2] viz. the attainment of the mean condition possible to the citizens of any State, is the best. And further the same canons of virtue and vice necessarily hold good for a State and for its polity, as the polity is, so to say, the life of a State.

In every State without exception there are three parts, viz. the very rich, the very poor and thirdly the intermediate class. As it is admitted then that the moderate or intermediate condition is best, it is evident that the possession of Fortune's gifts in an intermediate degree is the best thing possible. For this is the condition in which obedience to reason is easiest; whereas one who is excessively beautiful, strong, noble or wealthy, or on the contrary excessively poor or weak or deeply degraded cannot easily live a life

The middle class.

[1] The reference would seem to be to *Nicom. Eth.* VII. ch. 14, p. 1153 B_9 sqq.; but perhaps it is rather the general doctrine of the *Ethics* than any particular passage that Aristotle has in mind.

[2] There should be a comma after βέλτιστον.

conformable to reason. Such persons are apt in the first case to be guilty of insolence and criminality on a large scale, and in the second to become rogues and petty criminals. But all crimes are the results either of insolence or of roguery[1], both which are conditions prejudicial to the interests of States. And further persons, who are in the enjoyment of an extraordinary amount of Fortune's gifts, strength, wealth, friends and so on, have neither the disposition nor the knowledge necessary for submission to authority—a fault which they derive from their home-training in early years, as they are educated amidst such indulgence that they do not get the habit of submitting [2]even to their masters—while persons who suffer from too great deficiency of these blessings are reduced to a state of mental degradation. Thus while the latter do not understand how to rule, but only how to be ruled like slaves, the former do not understand how to submit [3]to any rule, but only to exercise the rule of slave-masters. The result is a State composed exclusively of slaves and slave-masters instead of free men, with sentiments of envy on the one side and of contempt on the other. But such sentiments are the very negation of friendship and political association; for all association implies friendship, as is proved by the

[1] Omitting the words ἔτι δ' ἥκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσι; for the "unwillingness to hold military and civil office" is not a point that deserves mention here. If they are retained in the text, ἀμφότερα will mean, not insolence and roguery, as in the translation, but the disposition to commit crimes on the one hand and the unwillingness to hold office on the other.

[2] Reading οὐδὲ τοῖς διδασκάλοις.

[3] Reading οὐδεμίαν ἀρχήν.

fact that people do not choose even to walk on the same road with their enemies. But in theory at least the State is composed as far as possible of persons who are equal and similar, and this is especially the condition of the middle class. And from this it follows that, if we take the parts of which the State in our conception is composed, it is a State of this kind, *viz. composed largely of the middle class*, which enjoys the best political constitution. Further it is this middle class of citizens which runs the least risk of destruction in a State. For as they do not like paupers lust after the goods of others, nor do others lust after theirs, as paupers after the property of the rich, they pass an existence void of peril, being neither the objects nor the authors of conspiracies. Hence it was a wise prayer of [1] Phocylides

> The middle class within the State
> Fares best, I ween;
> May I be neither low nor great
> But e'en between.

It is clear then that the best political association is the one which is controlled by the middle class, and that the only States capable of a good administration are those in which the middle class is numerically large and stronger, if not than both the other classes, yet at least than either of them, as in that case the addition of its weight turns the scale and prevents the predominance of one extreme or the other. Accordingly it is an immense blessing to a State that the active citizens should possess an intermediate and

[1] Fragment 12 in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci.*

sufficient amount of property; for where there is a class of extremely wealthy people on the one hand and a class of absolute paupers on the other, the result is either an extreme Democracy or an untempered Oligarchy, or, as the outcome of the predominance of either extreme, a Tyranny. For Tyranny results from the most violent form of Democracy or from Oligarchy, but is far less likely to result from a polity in which the middle class is strong and the citizens all stand much on the same level. The reason of this we will state hereafter when we treat of the revolutions of polities. It is evident however that the intermediate form of polity is best, as it is the only one which is free from political disturbances. For it is where the middle class is large that there is the least danger of [1] disturbances and dissensions among the citizens. And this too, viz. the largeness of the middle class, is the reason why great States are comparatively little liable to political disturbances; whereas in small States it is easy to divide the whole population into two camps, leaving no intermediate class, and all the citizens in them are practically either poor or rich. It is the middle class too which imparts to Democracies a more secure and permanent character than to Oligarchies, as the middle class are more numerous and enjoy a larger share of the honours of State in Democracies than in Oligarchies; for if there is no middle class, and the poor in virtue of their numbers are preponderant, the consequence is failure and speedy destruction of the State.

pp. 356, 360, 363.

[1] Reading στάσεις.

We may fairly regard it as an indication *of the same fact, viz. of the superiority of the middle class*, that the best legislators belong to the middle class of citizens, e.g. Solon, as is evident from his poems, Lycurgus—for he was not king—Charondas and most others.

The reasons why most polities are Democracies or Oligarchies.

We see too from these facts why it is that the great majority of polities are either democratical or oligarchical. The reason is that, as the middle class is generally small in them, whichever of the two other classes enjoys the superiority in any case, whether it be the propertied class or the commons, it is a party which transgresses the rule of the mean that imparts its own bias to the polity, and thereby produces either Democracy or Oligarchy. And there is the further fact that in consequence of the political disturbances and contentions between the commons on the one hand and the rich on the other whichever party happens to get the better of its opponents, instead of establishing a polity of a broad and equal kind, assumes political supremacy as a prize of the victory and sets up either a Democracy or an Oligarchy. We may add that the two States, which have attained an imperial position in Greece, having regard solely to their own respective polities always established either Democracies or Oligarchies in the different States, not out of any consideration for the interests of the States in question, but simply for their own interest. And the result of all these circumstances is that the intermediate polity is either never realized at all or only seldom and in a few States; for among all who have hitherto attained a commanding position there has

been only a single [1]individual who was prevailed upon to restore this political system, *viz. a Polity.* And indeed it has become a settled habit among the citizens of Greek States not even to desire the principle of equality but to seek a position either of rule or of patient submission to a dominant power.

The comparative excellence of different polities.

The nature of the best polity and the reason why it is the best are now clear. But taking the general list of polities and remembering that according to our [2]former statement there are several varieties of Democracy and Oligarchy, we shall not after our determination of the best polity find a difficulty in discerning what kind of polity is to be placed first, second and so on in due order according to their comparative excellence and inferiority. For the nearer a polity is to the best polity, the better of course it will be, and the further it is removed from the mean, the worse it will be, unless indeed it is tried with reference to an arbitrary standard. And when I speak of an arbitrary standard, I mean that there are many cases in which one of two polities is preferable *in itself*, but the other [3]may well be more advantageous to a certain State.

p. 264

CHAP. XII.

The polities suitable to particular States.

The nature and character of the polities suited to particular natures and characters is the next question which we have to consider.

[1] It is impossible to determine who was the "individual" meant by Aristotle among the ten or more different names suggested by commentators. The language in which he describes the Solonian polity (p. 56, ll. 8 sqq.) would lend itself to the view that he is here referring to Solon. But ἀποδοῦναι is in favour of Congreve's suggestion that it is the Lacedaemonian Pausanias who was in his mind.

[2] Reading ἔφαμεν.

[3] Reading κωλύει.

It is necessary to begin by assuming a principle of general application, viz. that the part of the State which desires the continuance of the polity ought to be stronger than that which does not. But in every State there is a qualitative and a quantitative element. By the former I mean freedom, wealth, culture and nobility; by the latter mere numerical superiority. But it is possible that of the parts of which the State is composed the quality may belong to one and the quantity to another, e.g. that the ignoble classes may be numerically larger than the noble or the poor than the rich, but that their superiority in quantity may not be commensurate with their inferiority in quality. It is necessary therefore to institute a comparison between the two elements.

Where the numerical superiority of the poor bears the proportion we have indicated *to the qualitative superiority of the rich, i.e. is vastly superior to it*, it is natural that the polity established should be a Democracy, and that the species of Democracy should be determined by the character of the commons to whom the superiority belongs, i.e. that, if it is the agricultural population which is predominant, it should be the primary form of Democracy, if the mechanical and wage-earning population, the latest development of Democracy, and so for all the intermediate forms. Where on the other hand the superiority of the rich or upper classes in quality is greater than its inferiority in quantity, it is natural that the polity should be an Oligarchy, and as in the last case that the species of Oligarchy should be determined by the character of the oligarchical population in whom the superiority resides.

The importance of the middle class.

But the legislator in his political system ought always to secure the support of the middle class. For if the laws which he enacts are oligarchical, he should aim at *the satisfaction of* the middle class; if democratical, he should engage their support in behalf of the laws. But it is only where the numbers of the middle class preponderate either over both the extremes or over only one of them that there is a possibility of a permanent polity. For there is no danger of a conspiracy among the rich and the poor against the middle class, as neither rich nor poor will consent to a condition of slavery[1], and if they try to find a polity which is more in the nature of a compromise, they will not discover any other than this, *viz. the polity which rests upon the middle class.* For the mutual distrustfulness *of the Oligarchs and Democrats* will prevent them from consenting to an alternation of rule. All the world over on the other hand there is nobody so thoroughly trusted as an arbitrator, and the middle class occupies a position of arbitration *between the rich and the poor.*

But the permanence of the polity will depend upon the excellence of the fusion. It is a common and serious mistake made even by those who desire to set up aristocratical polities not only to give an undue share of power to the rich but to endeavour to deceive the commons. For the spurious advantages are sure in time to produce a real evil, as the usurpations of the rich are more fatal to the polity than those of the commons.

[1] Omitting τοῖς ἑτέροις.

CHAP. XIII. Political artifices:

The artifices usually adopted in polities as pretexts to impose upon the commons are five in number, having reference to the Public Assembly, the offices of State, the Courts of Law, the possession of arms and [1]gymnastic exercises.

(1) oligarchical,

In regard to the first the artifice is that, while attendance in the Public Assembly is a privilege allowed to all alike, the rich are liable to a fine either exclusively or to a fine of a much more serious amount for non-attendance. In regard to the offices of State it is that the poor enjoy the privilege of declining office, which is not accorded to persons possessing a certain property assessment. In regard to the Courts of Law it is that, whereas the rich are subject to a fine for non-attendance, the poor enjoy an immunity, or the former are mulcted heavily and the latter only in a small sum, as is the case in the laws of Charondas. There are some States also in which the entire population is entitled after registration to attend the Assembly and the Courts of Law, but if after registration they fail to attend, they are liable to a heavy fine, the object being that the poorer citizens may be deterred by fear of the fine from registering themselves and in consequence of not being registered may be unable to attend the Courts of Law or the Public Assembly. The same principle prevails in the legislation respecting the possession of arms and gymnastic exercises. It is a penal offence to be without arms in the case of the rich but not of the poor, and similarly it is a penal offence in the rich but not

[1] Reading *γυμνάσια*.

in the poor to omit their gymnastic exercises; and here again the object is that the former may be induced by fear of the fine to engage in such exercises and the latter having no such fear before their eyes may not engage in them.

(2) democratical,

And as [1]these artifices of legislation are oligarchical in their character, so there are counter-artifices in Democracies. Thus, *to take a single instance*, a fee is given to the poor for attendance in the Assembly and the Courts of Law, but no fine is inflicted upon the rich for non-attendance.

(3) suited to a fusion of Oligarchy and Democracy.

It is evident therefore that anyone who is anxious to produce a just fusion should combine the characteristics of the two polities, *Democracy and Oligarchy*, i.e. he should fee the poor and fine the rich. This will be a means of securing the participation of all the citizens *in the business of the Assembly and the Courts of Law*, whereas in any other case the polity falls entirely into the hands of the one class or the other.

The limit of citizenship in a Polity.

The Polity should be exclusively in the hands of the class which possesses heavy arms; but it is not possible to define absolutely the amount of the property assessment *requisite for the enjoyment of political privileges* and to say that it must reach a certain figure. We must rather consider what is the [2]highest property assessment which in each particular case is consistent with the hypothesis that those who are admitted to the exercise of political privileges are more numerous than those who are not, and then determine it at this amount. For the poor are content

[1] Reading *ὀλιγαρχικὰ τὰ σοφίσματα.*
[2] Reading *πόσον.*

to keep the peace despite their exclusion from the honours of State, if nobody insults them or despoils them of any of their property. Not indeed that this is an easy condition; for it is not the case that the members of the governing body are invariably persons of a delicate sense of honour. And again it is the custom of the poor on occasion of war to refuse to serve, if in spite of their poverty they are not supplied with the means of subsistence; although, if the means are given them, they consent to take the field. But there are some States in which the Polity is in the hands not only of all who are actually serving as heavy-armed soldiers but of all who ever have so served and are now past the military age; while among the Malians, although both these classes enjoyed political privileges, it was only the persons actually serving in the army who were eligible to the offices of State.

The first polity or constitutional government in Greece, which was formed after the era of the kings, included none but the military class. The original polity of all was in the hands of the knights, as it was the cavalry that at that time constituted military strength and superiority. For heavy infantry is useless without organization and, as there was no such thing as any experience or system in the organization of infantry among the ancients, their strength resided wholly in the cavalry. But as the different States increased in size, and the heavy-armed soldiers acquired greater power, a larger number were admitted to political privileges. This is the reason why the constitutions which we call Polities were called by our forefathers Democracies, and the Polities of antiquity

Historical succession of polities.

were, as might be expected, oligarchical and regal in their character; for as owing to the paucity of inhabitants the middle class in them was not large, their numerical and strategical insignificance inclined them to acquiesce in a position of subjection.

We have now stated the reason why there are varieties of polity and why there are more than the actual names imply, there being more kinds than one of Democracy and so on; we have also described the points of difference between them and the reason of the difference, the nature of the best average polity and the character of polity suited to particular kinds of people.

CHAP. XIV. Let us proceed to discuss the points which naturally follow not only generally but in reference to particular polities, taking them in order and starting from the suitable basis of the subject.

The three departments of a polity.

Every polity comprises three departments, and a good legislator is bound to consider what is expedient to particular polities in respect of each. For the good order of the polity necessarily follows from the good order of these departments, and the differences of polities necessarily depend upon the differences in these respects.

The first of the three points is [1]the nature of the body which deliberates on affairs of State, secondly the nature of the Executive, i.e. the offices to be created, the extent of their jurisdiction and the right system of election, and thirdly the nature of the Judicial Body.

[1] Reading ἐν μὲν τί τὸ βουλευόμενον.

The Deliberative Body is supreme upon all questions of war and peace, the formation and dissolution of alliances, the enactment of laws, sentences of death, exile and confiscation; to it belongs [1]the election of the officers of State, and to it they are responsible at the expiration of their term of office. It is necessary that all these decisions [2]should be committed either to the citizens collectively or to some of them, i. e. to a single definite office or to several, or that different decisions should be committed to different offices, or that some of them should be committed to the citizens collectively and others to some of the citizens only.

(1) The Deliberative Body:

The exercise of deliberative powers by all the citizens upon all subjects is a characteristic of popular government; for this universal equality is in the spirit of Democracy. But there are various modes of ordering this general deliberative power. The first is that it should be exercised by all the citizens not collectively but by alternation, as e.g. in the polity of the Milesian Telecles or in other polities in which it is the various official boards which meet for deliberative purposes, but all the citizens enter upon official positions according to a rotation of tribes or whatever are the very smallest divisions of the State, until the tenure of office has passed down the entire body. The citizens only assemble collectively under this system to enact laws, to settle constitutional questions and to receive the reports of the officers of State. Another mode is that the citizens collectively should form the Deliberative Body but should not assemble

in a Democracy,

[1] Reading δημεύσεως καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως.

[2] Reading ἀποδίδοσθαι.

except [1]to elect officers of State, to enact laws, to determine questions of war and peace and to hold the audit of the officers' accounts, while upon all other matters the power of deliberation is vested in officers appointed for the particular duties, these officers being appointed from the whole body of citizens by suffrage or by lot. A third mode is one by which the citizens all meet for the election of officers of State, for the audit of their accounts and for deliberation upon questions of war and of alliance, while all other matters are administered by the officers of State, who are appointed by suffrage so far as is possible *in this advanced form of Democracy*, viz. in all cases where special knowledge is required in the officers. A fourth mode is one in which the citizens meet collectively to deliberate upon all questions, and the officers of State do not possess the power of decision in any case but merely of preliminary examination—a method of administration prevailing at the present day in the latest development of Democracy, which is in our view analogous to an Oligarchy of a dynastic or a Monarchy of a tyrannical type.

in an Oligarchy,

As the modes we have hitherto described are all democratical, so the system in which deliberation upon all matters is confined to certain citizens is oligarchical. And in this case too there are several different forms. When the election to the Deliberative Body is simply dependent upon a comparatively low property assessment and the body is in consequence comparatively numerous, when they do not interfere with any legally

[1] Omitting αἱρησομένους.

prohibited subject but are always obedient to the law, and when participation in the deliberative procedure is open to anyone upon his acquiring the requisite property assessment, the constitution in question is an Oligarchy, but an Oligarchy which in virtue of its moderate character is a close approximation to a Polity. When again the privilege of deliberation is not open to all the citizens *who possess the requisite property assessment* but is limited to an elected body, but as in the last case their authority is conformable to law, the system is *in the strict sense* oligarchical. And when the body with whom the deliberative power resides has the power of cooption, and *similarly* when a son succeeds to his father's place in the Deliberative Body, *i.e. when the hereditary principle is introduced*, and the Deliberative Body is superior to the laws, the system in question must be an [1]extreme form of Oligarchy.

Where again there are certain matters which are in the control of certain persons, e.g. where questions of war and peace and the audit of the officers' accounts come before the citizens collectively, while everything else is left to executive officers and the officers are appointed by [2]suffrage, the polity is an Aristocracy. in an Aristocracy,

If on the other hand the subjects of deliberation come in some cases before persons appointed by suffrage and in others before persons appointed by lot, whether appointed by lot absolutely or from a body previously selected, or before persons appointed partly by suffrage and partly by lot, these conditions are in a Polity.

[1] Reading ὀλιγαρχικωτάτην.

[2] Omitting ἢ κληρωτοί.

characteristic partly of an aristocratical form of polity and partly of a Polity in the strict sense.

The Deliberative Body is distinguished in the way we have described relatively to the several polities, and the [1]administration of each polity corresponds to the distinction we have stated.

Expedients appropriate to the extreme Democracy.

But in the interest of the [2]Democracy of our own day which is supposed to have a pre-eminent title to the name—I mean the Democracy in which the commons are superior even to the laws—it is well, if we would improve the deliberation, to adopt the same expedient as is adopted in reference to the Courts of Law in Oligarchies, where a fine *for non-attendance* is imposed upon the class whose presence in the Courts is desired, as a means of securing their attendance (while the advocates of popular government give a fee to the poor *for their attendance*), and to apply it to the meetings of the Public Assembly. For the deliberation [3]is better conducted, if all the citizens collectively take part in it, the commons as well as the upper classes and the upper classes as well as the masses. It is advisable too that an [4]equal number of members of the Deliberative Body should be appointed by suffrage or by lot from each division of the citizens. And further, if the Democrats have a vast numerical preponderance over the capable statesmen, it is advisable either to give the fee for attendance not to the whole number but to a number corresponding to

[1] Reading *διοικεῖται.*
[2] Reading *δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ νῦν.*
[3] Reading *βουλεύονται.*
[4] Reading *ἴσους.*

the numerical strength of the upper classes or to throw out by lot all who are in excess of the proper number.

and to Oligarchy

In an Oligarchy on the other hand it is advisable either to elect by anticipation certain representatives of the people *as members of the Deliberative Body* or to establish such an office as exists in certain polities under the name of Preliminary Councillors or Guardians of the Laws and to allow the whole body of citizens to take into their consideration such matters only as have already received the preliminary decision of these boards. This will be a means of giving the commons a share in the deliberation and at the same time of preventing them from abolishing any institution of the polity. It is advisable too that the commons either should simply confirm the resolutions brought before them *by the Preliminary Councillors or the Guardians of the Laws* or *at least* should not pass any resolution of a contrary nature or, that while the privilege of giving advice is conferred upon all, the right of actual deliberation, *i. e. of voting,* should be confined to the officers of State. It is proper too to adopt just the opposite course to the one usually adopted in polities, i. e. to make the veto of the masses final but not their positive resolutions, and always to let a bill *which has been rejected by the commons* be referred back to the executive officers. For in existing polities the converse is the practice; it is a small body that has a supreme power of veto but not of positive resolution, and there is always a power of reference back to the masses.

Such then is the result of our discussions respect-

ing the Deliberative Body and therefore of course the supreme authority in the polity.

CHAP. XV. (2) The Executive.

We come next to the distinction in respect of the offices of State. For in this department of the polity as in the last there is room for a good many variations. The questions arise what is to be the number of the offices of State, the extent of their jurisdiction and the period of each—for in some States the officers are appointed for six months, in others for a shorter period, in others again for a year and in others for a still longer time—and further whether the offices are to be tenable for life or for a long period, or neither of these is to be the case, but they are to be tenable several times by the same person, or they are never in any circumstances to be tenable by the same persons twice. And coming to the appointment of the officers of State, we have to inquire into the nature of the persons eligible and of the electing body and into the method of election. For it is right that upon all these various points we should be able to distinguish all the various possible arrangements and then to adapt the different offices to the [1] polities to which they are suited.

Nature and number of the offices of State.

But it is not an easy matter at the outset to determine the character of the positions which are properly described as offices of State. For there are many mere superintendents necessary to the political association and, *as these are certainly not officers of State,* it is not correct to regard all functionaries appointed either by suffrage or lot as officers. The priesthood is an obvious case in point; it should be regarded

[1] Reading πολιτείαις.

not as an office in the strict sense but as something distinct from and parallel to political offices. Then again there are masters of choruses and heralds *who are elected,* and we elect [1]ambassadors also; *but none of these are officers of State.* Some offices of superintendence are political, whether the superintendence is over all the citizens in respect of a particular function, as e.g. the superintendence of a general in the field of battle, or departmental, like that of a censor of women or boys. Others again are economic—it is a common thing e.g. to elect inspectors of weights and measures —and others again simply menial, to which people, if they are wealthy, appoint slaves. Strictly speaking however we must define offices generally as all positions to which are assigned the functions of deliberation, decision and command on certain points and more especially the last, as to command is an especial characteristic of official power. But such a question as the exact meaning of the term office is in fact one of no practical significance; for no controversy about the name has ever yet been raised or decided; although it has a distinct speculative import.

It is more to the point to raise a question in respect of all polities without exception and especially of small States as to the character and number of the offices indispensable to the existence of a State and the character of such offices as, although not indispensable, are yet serviceable to a high order of polity. For in large States it is equally possible and right to have a single office appointed to a single

[1] Reading πρεσβευτάς.

work, as on the one hand it results from the large number of the citizens that there are many persons ready to be admitted to the official board, so that [1]in some cases the office is held a second time only after a long interval and in others is never held more than once, and on the other hand every work is better done when the attention is exclusively devoted to it instead of being distracted by a number of things. In small States on the other hand it is necessary to concentrate a number of offices in a few hands, as the scantiness of the population makes it difficult for a large number of people to be in office at the same time. For *if this is the case,* who are to relieve the first set of officers? But it sometimes happens that small States require the same offices and laws as great ones, with this difference that in the latter case [2]they are required frequently and in the former only at considerable intervals. Hence there is no reason why several functions should not be assigned to the same persons; for they will not be any impediment to one another, and in view of the scanty population it is necessary to constitute the offices on the principle of [3]spit-candlesticks. If we are in a position then to enumerate the offices necessary to any State and the offices which are [4]appropriate, although not wholly indispensable, the knowledge will facilitate

[1] Reading τὰς μὲν διαλείπειν and below τὰς δ' ἅπαξ ἄρχειν.

[2] Reading αὐτῶν for τῶν αὐτῶν.

[3] i.e. articles which were spit and candlestick in one. See note on Bk. I. ch. 2.

[4] It is better to interchange the positions of δεῖ and ἁρμόττει.

a conclusion as to the character of the offices which may properly be united in a single one.

Nor is it fitting to neglect the further question, what is the [1]character of the subjects which should be under the superintendence of many local officers and of the subjects over which a single office should be supreme universally, e.g. whether public propriety should in the market be under the control of a censor of the market and of different officers in different places or of the same office everywhere. There is the further question whether the division should depend upon the subject or the persons, I mean e.g. whether there should be a single minister of public propriety or different officers for children and women. And yet again, looking to the different polities we have to ask whether there is a special class of offices suited to each polity or not; in other words whether the same offices are supreme in Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy and Monarchy, although the persons eligible to them are not equal and similar but [2]differ in the different polities, being the cultured classes in an Aristocracy, the wealthy in an Oligarchy and all free-born persons in a Democracy, or whether on the other hand there are [3]different kinds of office corresponding to the differences between the polities, and the same offices are in some cases similar and in others different in consequence of these differences, as it is appro-

[1] Reading *ποίων δεῖ κατὰ τόπον ἀρχεῖα πολλὰ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.*

[2] Reading *ἑτέρων.*

[3] Reading *κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν* and below *καὶ ὅπου διαφέρουσι διὰ ταύτας.*

priate that the same offices should be influential in one polity and insignificant in another. It must be admitted however that there are certain offices peculiar to particular polities, e.g. a Preliminary Council, which unlike a Council is distinctly non-democratical. For there must be some body to undertake the business of preparing measures for the consideration of the Public Assembly and thereby enabling the commons to attend to business. But if the members of it are numerically few, the institution is characteristic of Oligarchy; and as a Preliminary Council is necessarily small, it is therefore oligarchical. Where however both these offices, *viz. a Council and a Preliminary Council,* exist, the latter is established as a controlling influence upon the former; for while the Council is an institution of Democracy, the Preliminary Council is an institution of Oligarchy. But the authority of the Council is gradually undermined in all Democracies in which the commons themselves assemble for the transaction of business of every kind. And this is usually the case when the members of the Public Assembly are in receipt of large pay for their attendance, as in that case they have sufficient leisure to assemble frequently and themselves pronounce decisions upon all questions. On the other hand a censorship of women or children or any other office charged with similar superintendence is characteristic of an Aristocracy, but not of a Democracy, as it is impossible *in a Democracy* to prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors, nor yet of an Oligarchy, as the wives of the actual Oligarchs lead luxurious and unrestrained lives.

Offices peculiar to particular polities.

So much however at present for these questions. We must now endeavour to enter upon a thorough discussion of the various methods of appointing the officers of State. The points of difference are comprised under three general heads, the combinations of which will certainly give us all the possible modes of procedure. The questions which arise are firstly, who are the persons that appoint the officers of State? secondly, who are eligible to office? and thirdly, what is the mode of election? And further under each of those heads there is a [1]certain number of possible variations.

The various modes of appointing officers of State.

The power of appointment may be in the hands either of all the citizens or of some, and the persons eligible may be either all or some, the some being determined e.g. either by property assessment or birth or virtue or some other similar qualification, as at Megara where they were the exiles who had come home in a body and fought against the commons; and further the appointment may be made either by suffrage or by lot. Again, there are combinations of these different modes; I mean that some of the officers may be appointed by some citizens and others by all, to some offices all the citizens may be eligible and to others only some, and in some cases the appointment may be made by suffrage and in others by lot. Further each of these different possibilities admits of four variations. For either all may appoint from all by suffrage or all from all by lot, [2]or all from some by suffrage or all from some by

[1] Reading διαφοραί τινές εἰσιν.

[2] Inserting the words ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν

lot; and [1]in appointing from all the appointment may be made either by a system of rotation, i.e. according to tribes, townships and clans, until it has passed through the entire body of citizens, or in all cases from the whole body, or again partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if it is some only of the citizens who appoint, they may appoint either from all by suffrage or from all by lot or from some by suffrage or from some by lot or partly in one way and partly in another, I mean [2]partly by suffrage and partly by lot. We thus arrive at twelve as the number of possible modes, not including the two combinations. [3]And of these there are two systems of appointment which are democratical, viz. that all should appoint from all by suffrage or lot or by a combination of the two, i.e. to some offices by lot and to others by suffrage. On the other hand the system

κλήρῳ, without which the *δώδεκα τρόποι* cannot be satisfactorily made out.

[1] Omitting *ἢ* before *ἐξ ἁπάντων*.

[2] Omitting *ἐκ πάντων*.

[3] The text which I have adopted—it is mainly Spengel's—is as follows: *τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν. Τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἅμα μὲν καθιστάναι, ἐξ ἁπάντων δ' ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει) πολιτικόν· καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. Τὸ δὲ τινὰς τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. Τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν· ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ το αἱρέσει ἢ τὸ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν. Τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἁπάντων τό τε ἐκ τινῶν πάντας αἱρέσει ἀριστοκρατικόν.*

in which the appointment is not vested in all the citizens collectively but all are eligible, and the appointment is made either by lot or suffrage or both, or in which the persons eligible are in some cases all the citizens and in others some of them and the appointment is made either by lot or suffrage or both, i.e. in some cases by lot and in others by suffrage, is characteristic of a Polity; and the same is true of the system in which some appoint from all partly by suffrage and partly by lot. The system in which the appointment is made by some partly from all and partly from some either by lot or suffrage or partly by suffrage and partly by lot is suited to a Polity of an aristocratic type. The system in which some appoint from some by suffrage or some from some by lot or some from some by a combination of the two ways is oligarchical, although the appointment by suffrage is more strictly oligarchical than that by lot or by a combination of the two. Finally the appointment by some from all or by all from some by suffrage is suited to an Aristocracy.

Such is a complete catalogue of the modes of appointment to office and such their division according to the different polities. The institutions suitable to particular people, the methods of appointment and the nature of the [1]authority appertaining to the several offices of State will now be evident. And when I speak of the authority of an office, I mean e.g. the control it exercises over the revenues or the defences of the State; for there are different kinds of authority, as we see if we compare the

[1] Omitting καὶ.

authority of a general and of a superintendent of commercial transactions in the market.

CHAP. XVI. (3) The Courts of Law. Their constitution. p. 303.

The third point which still remains to be discussed is [1]the constitution of the Courts of Law. And here we must follow the same principle as before in ascertaining the modes of constituting them. The points of difference in respect of the Courts of Law fall under three general heads, viz. the persons eligible, the extent of their jurisdiction and the manner of their appointment. By the persons eligible I mean the question whether they are to be the whole population or only a class; by the sphere of their jurisdiction, the various kinds of Courts; by the method of appointment, the choice between lot or suffrage.

The different kinds of Court.

Let us begin by determining the different kinds of Court. They are eight in number, viz. a Court of scrutiny, a Court to try offences committed against the State, another to try all constitutional questions, a fourth to try cases that arise between officers of State and individuals respecting fines, fifthly the Court which deals with important cases of private contract, and besides these sixthly the Court of homicide, and seventhly the Court of aliens. The Court of homicide is of various kinds, whether the judges who hear the suits are the same or different, according as it deals with homicide of malice prepense, involuntary homicide, cases where the fact is admitted but the justice of it is in dispute, cases where persons [2]who have left the country *in consequence of an accidental homicide* are on their return tried upon a charge

[1] Reading εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαστηρίων.

[2] Reading τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ καθόδῳ ἐπιφέρεται φόνου.

of murder, as is said to be the case at Athens in the Court at Phreatto, although at the [1]present time such cases are of rare occurrence even in large States. The Court of aliens too has two divisions, one dealing with cases between two aliens, the other with cases between an alien and a citizen. And lastly there is a Court for the trial of petty contracts to the amount of a drachma or *at the most* five drachmae or a little more; for it is necessary that these cases like others should be decided, although they are not suitable to come before a number of judges.

These cases however, like cases of homicide and cases in which aliens are concerned, we may dismiss. We have now to discuss political cases, which must be satisfactorily ordered, if we are to avoid dissensions and disturbances of the polity.

The modes of judicial procedure.

If all the citizens are capable of judicial office, the various cases we have distinguished must either all come for decision before all the judges, who are appointed by suffrage or lot or partly in one way and partly in the other, or some of them must invariably come before certain judges appointed partly by lot and partly by suffrage. These modes of organization then are four in number; and there is an equal number, if it is only a portion of the citizens who are eligible to the judicial office. For with this limited eligibility there may be a Court of universal jurisdiction appointed by suffrage or by lot or partly in one way and partly in the other; or there may be particular Courts with special jurisdiction composed of members elected by lot or suffrage.

[1] Reading παρόντι.

Such then, as we have described them, are the possible modes of organization in the cases mentioned. There are also combinations of the same, e.g. cases where the persons eligible are sometimes all the citizens, sometimes some and sometimes again both, as when the members of the same Court are appointed partly from all and partly from some and either by lot or by suffrage or by a combination of the two.

All the possible modes of constituting the Courts of Law have now been stated. The systems first described, viz. the various conditions of universal eligibility and universal jurisdiction, are democratical. The next, viz. limited eligibility and universal jurisdiction, are oligarchical. The third, viz. the combination of universal and limited eligibility, are characteristic of an Aristocracy and a Polity.

BOOK VII.

THE number and nature of the different forms of the Deliberative or Supreme Body in the polity, of the system of the executive offices and the Courts of Law and the several forms of these institutions which are appropriate to the various polities have already been the subjects of discussion[1]. But as there are in fact several kinds of Democracy and similarly several kinds of the other polities, it is worth while to investigate any point which has not yet been considered in regard to them, and at the same time to determine the proper and convenient organization of each polity. We have also to consider the various ways in which the different methods of organizing the institutions in question may be combined; for it is the combinations of them that cause polities to overlap, producing Aristocracies which have an oligarchical bias on the one hand and Polities which have a democratical bias on the other. And when I CHAP. I.

[1] The clause *ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας*, relating as it does to the subject of Bk. VIII., is necessarily omitted in Bekker's order of the Books.

speak of such combinations as deserve consideration but have not yet been considered, I mean e.g. the case where the system of the Deliberative Body and the election of the executive officers are constituted on oligarchical and the system of the Courts of Law on aristocratical principles, or where the Courts of Law and the Deliberative Body are constituted on oligarchical and the election of the executive officers on aristocratical principles, or again in some other way the institutions characteristic of a particular polity are not all found in combination.

p. 287. The character of Democracy suited to a particular State or of Oligarchy to a particular population or the form of any other polity which is advantageous to particular people are subjects which have been already discussed. Still[1] it is not enough to elucidate the form in which any of the polities we have mentioned is [2]best for a particular State; we must proceed to examine briefly the proper method of establishing these or any others. We will begin with Democracy, as the consideration of Democracy will serve to display the characteristics of the polity antagonistic to it, i.e. of the polity sometimes called Oligarchy.

For the purpose of this investigation it is necessary to ascertain the characteristics which are democratical or regarded as consequent upon Democracy; for it is their combinations which give rise to the different species of Democracy and indeed to the exist-

[1] It is not necessary to insert ἐπεὶ, as Bekker has done, if the commas after ὅμως δὲ and κατασκευάζειν are omitted.

[2] Reading ἀρίστη.

ence of a plurality of Democracies differing from each other. For there are two reasons for a plurality of Democracies. The first is that which has been already alleged, viz. the variety in the character of the populations. For the population consists in one case of agriculturists, in another of mechanics or labourers, *and so on;* and if the first is added to the second and again the third to the first two, the difference in the Democracy is not merely one of superiority or inferiority but amounts to an actual change of kind. The second is the reason we are now considering, viz. that the various combinations of the characteristics consequent upon a Democracy and regarded as proper to this form of polity produce corresponding differences in the Democracy, as a smaller number of these characteristics will be consequent upon one form of Democracy, a larger number upon another, and all of them upon a third. The knowledge of these several characteristics is valuable as enabling us not only to establish any polity we may desire but also to effect the necessary reforms *in those which already exist.* For the founders of polities generally endeavour to combine all the characteristics proper to the principle of their polity and in so doing fall into an error[1]. But we may now proceed to describe the fundamental assumptions, the moral features and the objects of the different polities.

The reasons for a plurality of Democracies.

The primary principle of a democratical polity is CHAP. II.

[1] It is necessary in Bekker's order of the Books either to omit the clause καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον or, as Spengel proposes, to alter εἴρηται πρότερον to ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον.

The primary principle of Democracy.

personal liberty. Such is the language which is in everybody's mouth, as if Democracy were the only polity in which liberty is enjoyed; for it is this, *viz. the enjoyment of liberty*, which is said to be the end and object of every Democracy. But one feature of liberty is the alternation of rule and subjection. For justice in the democratical view consists in equality as determined not *proportionally or* by merit but arithmetically, *i.e. by merely counting heads;* and where this is the principle of justice, it necessarily follows that the masses are supreme, and that, whatever is the will of the majority, this is [1]final, and in this justice consists. For the theory being that all the citizens should share alike, the result is that in a Democracy the poor exercise higher authority than the rich; for they constitute a majority of the population, and the will of the majority is supreme. This then is one token of liberty, which is represented by all friends of popular government as a criterion of a democratical polity. The other is that every citizen lives according to his own pleasure. For this is said to be a function of liberty, as the converse is a function of one whose life is spent in a condition of slavery. This is then a second criterion of Democracy; and from this has been deduced the exemption of the citizens from authority, in the extreme case from all authority whatever, but at all events from anything more than such authority as they themselves exercise in turn. And thus this second criterion of liberty coincides with the liberty that consists in equality.

[1] Omitting καὶ before τέλος.

The characteristics of a popular government.

In view of these primary principles and of the character of the authority which we have described, *viz.* *alternate authority*, the following features are characteristic of a popular government, viz. the eligibility of all the citizens to the offices of State and their appointment by all, the rule of all over each individual and of each individual in his turn over all, the use of the lot in the appointment either to all the offices of State or to all that do not require experience or special skill, the absence of a property qualification or the requirement of the lowest possible qualification for office, the regulation that the same person shall never hold any office twice or shall not hold it much oftener than once or shall do so only in a few cases with the exception of military offices, a system of short tenure of office either in all cases or in all cases where it is possible, the power of all or[1] of a body chosen from all to sit as judges in all or almost all or at least the greatest and most important cases, such as cases arising out of the audit of the officers' accounts, constitutional cases and cases of private contract, the supreme authority of the Public Assembly in all questions or[2] at least the most important, and of no individual office over any question or only over the smallest number possible. Of all offices of State the most democratic institution is a Council, except where all the citizens receive a large fee for attendance in the Assembly; in which case they despoil the Council as well as all the other

[1] Reading πάντας ἢ ἐκ πάντων.

[2] The words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων, which in Bekker's text follow ὀλιγίστων, should be placed after πάντων.

offices of their authority. For the commons, being well paid *and consequently having leisure to attend the Assembly frequently*, draw all decisions without
p. 270. exception into their own hands, as has been said in the preceding part of this treatise. Another democratical feature is the payment of the members of all *the three powers in the State*, viz. the Assembly, the Courts of Law and the executive offices or, if this is impossible, of the executive offices, the Courts of Law[1] and the regular assemblies or, *if not of all offices*, of those whose members require a common table. And further as it is birth, wealth and culture which are the characteristics of Oligarchy, it would seem that those of Democracy are the opposites, viz. low birth, poverty and intellectual degradation. And in respect of the offices of State it is democratical that none should be held for life, and that, if any such office survives from an ancient revolution, its power should be curtailed under the Democracy, and the appointment to it should be by lot instead of by suffrage.

Such being then the general features [2]of Democracy, Democracy or a democratic population in the strict sense of the word as now conceived is an outcome of the principle of justice which is admitted to be democratical, i.e. of universal arithmetical equality. For the condition of equality is one in which the rule is not any more [3]in the hands of the poor than of the rich, in which neither party enjoys

[1] Omitting καὶ τὴν βουλήν.
[2] Reading τῆς δημοκρατίας.
[3] Reading τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους.

an exclusive supremacy, but all stand upon a numerical equality. It is in these circumstances that equality and liberty would *in the judgment of Democrats* be realized in the [1]State.

CHAP. III. The nature of democratical and oligarchical equality.

The next point, viz. the manner in which the citizens are to enjoy equality, presents a certain difficulty. The question is whether it is right to consider the assessed properties of (*let us say*) five hundred citizens as distributed among, *or in other words balanced by, the properties of* a thousand others and to give the thousand only equal power with the five hundred—or perhaps instead of ordering the equality of property thus, it is right, while we adopt this method of distribution, to select an equal number of representatives of the five hundred and the thousand and to invest them with the supreme authority over the [2]election of the executive officers and the procedure of the Courts of Law—Is it then, *we may ask*, a polity so constituted or one in which the principle is simply that of counting heads, that is the justest according to the popular conception of justice? *I say the popular or democratical conception of justice*, for it is contended by the friends of popular government that the decision of the majority is just; while the oligarchical party makes justice to consist in the decision of the wealthier, maintaining that the amount of property is the standard that should determine the decisions. But in either case there is a certain inequality and injustice. The theory that the decision of the Few is just will justify Tyranny, as if we suppose the

[1] Reading πόλει.
[2] Reading ἀρχαιρεσιῶν.

case of an individual possessed of larger means than all the other members of the wealthy class, the oligarchical principle of justice will entitle him to a monopoly of rule, and the theory that the decision of the mere numerical majority is just will [1]justify, as has been already said, the confiscation of the property of the wealthy minority. The nature of the equality to which both Oligarchs and Democrats will yield assent is a question which must be considered by the light of their respective definitions of justice. They agree in the view that the decision of the majority of the citizens should be supreme. This we may admit, although not without some limitation. As there are two elements of which the State is composed, viz. rich and poor, we may determine that the decision of the [2]majority of both, if they agree, and, if they disagree, of the absolute majority, or in other words of those whose collective property assessment is higher, should be supreme. Suppose e.g. that there are ten rich and twenty poor and that there are six rich on one side and fifteen poor on the other; there are then four rich on the side of the fifteen poor and five poor on the side of the six rich. Reckoning the poor and rich together on both sides, we determine that the decision of the side which has the larger property assessment is supreme. But supposing that the sides chance to come out equal, we must look upon this as a difficulty which is liable to occur in any system of voting and actually does occur when e.g. the Public Assembly or the Court of Law is evenly divided.

p. 127.

[1] Reading οὐκ ἀδικήσουσι.
[2] Omitting ἤ.

The only thing to be done then is to appeal to the lot or to adopt some other similar expedient.

But where the question is the principle of equality or justice, difficult as it is—and it is most difficult—to discover the truth, still it is an easier task to arrive at it than to win the practical compliance of those who have it in their power to aggrandize themselves. For appeals to [1]justice and equality have ever been the resource of the weaker and are systematically disregarded by the strong.

CHAP. IV. The four forms of Democracy: p. 269.

While there are four forms of Democracy, it is the first in order which is the best, as was remarked in the earlier part of our treatise, not to say that it is the most ancient of all. When I speak of the first or primary Democracy, I refer to the natural classification of populations. As the agricultural population is best, it is only possible to realize [2]the best Democracy where the people live by agriculture or grazing. For the members of a population so composed, not possessing a large property, are occupied about their business, so that they cannot hold frequent meetings of the Assembly; while, as they [3]do possess the bare necessaries of life, they devote themselves to their proper occupations and, instead of coveting the property of their neighbours, prefer a life of labour to political activity and official power, except where office promises an opportunity of large gain. For the Many care more for pecuniary gain than for honour, as may be inferred from their ac-

(1) the agricultural,

[1] Reading τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἴσον.

[2] Inserting τὴν βελτίστην before δημοκρατίαν.

[3] Omitting μή.

quiescence in the tyrannical governments of antiquity and the Oligarchies of our own day, provided that no one interferes with their labour or despoils them of any of their property. The reason is that, *if they are left to themselves*, they rapidly acquire riches or at least are relieved from poverty. It may be added that their control of the elections to the offices of State and the responsibility of all the officers of State to them fully satisfy any ambitious cravings they may have. For there are some States in which the Many are content to let the election to the offices of State pass out of their own hands into the hands of a body elected from all the citizens by alternation[1], provided that they retain the deliberative functions in their own hands. And yet even this we must consider to be a form of Democracy, an example of which formerly existed at Mantineia. Thus it is at once a beneficial and a customary condition of the Democracy already described that, while the officers of State are elected by all the citizens and are responsible to all, and all exercise judicial powers, the principal officers of State are appointed by suffrage rather than by lot, and eligibility depends upon a property qualification, which is raised in proportion to the importance of the office, or that, if no property qualification is required in any case, the offices of State should be confined to competent persons. A political constitution of this kind is sure to be excellent; for the offices of State will always be in the hands of the best men with the full assent of the commons and without any feeling of envy on their

[1] Omitting ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ.

part against the better classes, and the better or upper classes will certainly be content with such a system, in virtue of which they will never be subjected to the rule of their inferiors, while in the exercise of their own authority they will be prevented from violating the principles of justice by their responsibility to the supreme authority of others. For there is an advantage to the State in the feeling of dependence on the part of the officers and in the limitation of their arbitrary dealing, as the power of arbitrary action is incompatible with the control of the baser elements existing in each individual. And thus the result will certainly be the condition of things which is the most highly beneficial in any polity, viz. the rule of the better class provided that they behave themselves well without any infringement of the rights of the people.

It is evident then that this is the best form of Democracy, and that it owes its excellence to the character of its population. For the encouragement of agriculture among the people there are certain laws of [1] ancient date which are all effective, such as a law absolutely prohibiting the possession of more than a certain amount of land or prohibiting the possession of more than a certain amount within a certain distance of the city proper or the State. Another *similar measure* was the legal regulation which formerly existed in many States actually prohibiting the sale of the original allotments. The law of Oxylus, as it is called, against taking a mortgage upon a particular part of the landed estate belonging to any citizen is calculated

[1] Reading *παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς* and omitting *τὸ ἀρχαῖον*.

to have much the same effect. But at the present day, if we would effect the necessary reform we must have recourse to the law of [1]Aphytis which is suitable to the end of which we are speaking. For the citizens of Aphytis, although their number is large and their country small, are all engaged in agriculture, because they assess the value of estates not in the gross but in subdivisions so small that even the poor can more than attain the necessary standard of assessment.

(2) the pastoral. Next to an agricultural people the best population is one consisting of graziers who depend for their living upon live stock. For the life of a grazing population has many points of resemblance to agriculture; nor are there any people who have a condition so well disciplined for military service or who are so active physically or so well able to endure exposure to the elements.

The other populations of which the remaining forms of Democracy are composed are practically all a great deal lower *in the scale of civilization* than these. (3) the mechanical or commercial. For the life of mechanics, tradesmen and labourers is a low one; nor has any of the occupations in which such people engage any necessary connexion with virtue. And further all this class of persons, always loitering as they are about the market and the town, is ready enough to attend meetings of the Assembly; whereas an agricultural population being scattered throughout the country does not assemble *so readily* or feel the same need of such meetings. Where the situation of the country hap-

[1] 'Αρυταίων in Bekker's text is a mere misprint.

pens to be such that [1]it is at a great distance from the city, it is easy to establish a good form of Democracy or a Polity; for as the mass of the population is obliged to make its settlements in the fields, the mob of the market, even if it exists, is bound not to hold meetings of the Assembly without the rural population, *and therefore holds them only on rare occasions.*

The proper method of establishing the best or primary form of Democracy has now been stated. Nor is it difficult to see how to establish all the rest. We must deviate step by step from the primary Democracy and separate *from the citizens an unenfranchised* body which will in each succeeding case be worse than before.

(4) the extreme.

The latest development of Democracy, admitting as it does all the citizens to an absolute equality of political privileges, is one which cannot be endured by every State and cannot well have a permanent existence *in any,* unless supported by a good system of laws and moral habits[2]. It is with the view of establishing this form of Democracy and of confirming the power of the commons that the popular leaders usually [3]enroll the largest possible number of persons *in the ranks of the citizens,* conferring political rights not only upon all the legitimate children of citizens but upon their bastards and upon

[1] Omitting *τὴν χώραν.*

[2] Omitting the sentence *ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλεῖστα σχεδόν,* which has reference to the contents of Bk. VIII.

[3] Omitting *τῷ.*

children who are descended from citizens upon the side of one parent only, whether the father's or the mother's. For all such elements are particularly congenial to the extreme Democracy. It is, as I say, the custom of demagogues to establish a Democracy upon these principles; but the right course is to enroll new citizens only up to the point at which the numbers *of the commons* just preponderate over the numerical strength of the upper and middle classes, and to advance no further. For if[1] their numbers are in excess of this limit, they disturb the equilibrium of the State and irritate the upper classes into a spirit of dissatisfaction with the Democracy, which proved to be the cause of the political disturbances at Cyrene. For although the mob element may be overlooked, so long as it is small, if it reaches large dimensions, it forces itself more upon the attention. Again, the interests of the extreme Democracy are subserved by such institutions as were adopted by Cleisthenes at Athens in his desire to strengthen the power of the Democracy and at Cyrene by the founders of the democratical constitution. New and more numerous tribes and clans must be created, the number of private religious rites must be united in a smaller number of public ceremonies, and no stone must be left unturned to secure the intermixture of all the different classes in the State and the dissolution of the former private associations. And finally the established characteristics of Tyranny seem to be suited without exception to

[1] ὑπερβάλλοντας should of course be ὑπερβάλλοντες.

the extreme Democracy, such, I mean, as the licence of slaves, women and children—although in the case of slaves it may be a good thing up to a certain point—and the connivance at a life of uncontrolled liberty among all the citizens. For there are many different ways of strengthening this sort of polity, as the Many prefer a life of irregularity to one of continence and control.

CHAP. V. The means of preserving Democracies.

It is not the principal or sole business of the legislator or of anyone who aspires to constitute such a polity as we have described merely to establish it in the first instance but rather to provide for its security. For it is easy enough for people to endure for a single day or two or three days under any form of polity; *but a polity, if it is to be permanent, demands special provisions.* Hence it is proper[1] to take measures for its preservation by guarding against all destructive agencies and ordaining such laws whether written or unwritten as shall best embrace all the preservatives of polities, and to regard as eminently democratical or oligarchical not such measures as will give the strongest democratical or oligarchical character to the State, but such as will enable it to preserve that character for the longest time. But our modern demagogues adopt a different line. They seek to gratify the commons of their respective States by using the instrumentality of the Courts of Law to confiscate a great part of

[1] Omitting the words *περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον τίνες σωτηρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκ τούτων*, unless indeed it is better to follow Spengel and Susemihl in reading *θεωρήσομεν ὕστερον*.

the property of the rich. Hence the true friends of the polity should seek to counteract these measures by enacting a law that nothing that is paid into the treasury by persons who are condemned in a lawsuit shall escheat to the public but that it shall all be consecrated to the service of the Gods. For the result will be that, while malefactors will be quite as cautious as before, as being liable to precisely similar penalties, the mob will be less eager to return a verdict of condemnation against accused persons, if they have no prospect of getting anything for themselves. Another expedient[1] is to reduce as far as possible the number of State cases by imposing heavy penalties as deterrents upon the originators of baseless prosecutions. For it is not the friends of popular government but the upper classes that are the favourite objects of impeachment; whereas it is desirable that all the citizens should, if possible, be well-disposed to[2] the polity or at least that they should not look upon the supreme power in the State, *viz. the commons*, as hostile. Again, as in the latest development of Democracy the population is large, and the citizens cannot well attend the Assembly without being paid, and where there are no revenues of State the payment of members is prejudicial to the interests of the upper classes—for the means are sure to be supplied by extraordinary taxes, confiscation of property and judicial iniquity, causes which have before now proved the ruin of many Democracies—but to resume, where there are no

[1] Changing ἀεὶ to δεῖ.
[2] Omitting καὶ.

revenues of State, it is desirable to hold only few meetings of the Assembly, and to make the Courts numerically large but to allow them only to sit for a few days at a time. For this tends to relieve the wealthy from dreading the expense, if it is only the poor and not the rich who are the recipients of payment for attendance in the Courts of Law, and at the same time to secure a far better administration of justice, as the rich are willing to absent themselves for a short time, but not for many days, from the management of their private affairs. Where there are revenues of State on the other hand, it is desirable not to follow the example of modern demagogues in dividing the surplus. The poor no sooner receive the money than they require it again; for the sort of assistance thus given them is like the proverbial leaky pitcher *of the Danaides*. But the genuine friend of the people should take measures to prevent the masses from being sunk in extreme poverty, as this is a state of things which produces a degradation of the Democracy. Accordingly a systematic effort must be made to secure a permanent prosperity. And as this is the interest of the rich as much as of the poor, the residue of the public revenues should be collected and distributed in large sums to the poor, especially if it is possible to collect enough to supply them with the means of acquiring a plot of land or, failing this, to start them in business or agriculture. And if it is impossible to subsidize all the poor citizens at once, there should be a distribution of money among them by a rotation of tribes or some other division. Meanwhile

the rich should contribute the necessary payment for the indispensable meetings *of the Assembly and the Courts of Law*, on condition[1] of being released from all useless public burdens. It is by some such political procedure as this that the Carthaginians have secured the loyalty of the commons, as they raise a certain portion of them to affluence from time to time by sending them out as colonists to the surrounding subject States. Again, it shows good taste and good sense on the part of the upper classes, if they take individual members of the poorer population and direct them to some industrial pursuit by giving them the means of starting in it. Nor is it a bad plan to imitate the method[2] of rule among the Tarentines, who secure the [3]loyalty of the masses by giving the poor a share in the practical enjoyment of their property. Another of their artifices was to divide all the offices of State into two classes, the appointment to one of which was by suffrage and to the other by lot, the object in the latter case being to secure the participation of the commons in office and in the former to improve the character of the administration. But it is possible to treat the same office in this way by adopting a principle of division, so that one part of the officers is appointed by lot and the other by suffrage.

CHAP. VI. The methods of instituting the different forms of Democracy have been described, and we may say

[1] Reading *ἀφιεμένους*.

[2] *τὴν Ταραντίνων ἀρχὴν* is the reading which has the best MSS. authority.

[3] *εὔνους* is a misprint for *εὔνουν*.

The forms of Oligarchy.

that the methods of instituting those of Oligarchy are evident at once from these. For we must infer the characteristics of the several forms of Oligarchy from their opposites by observing the analogy between each and the corresponding form of Democracy. Let us take e.g. the primary or best-tempered form of Oligarchy. It is the form which approximates to the so-called Polity; and in it we have to distinguish two separate kinds of property assessment, a lower which is requisite as a condition of eligibility to the merely indispensable offices of State and a higher as a condition of eligibility to the offices of greater importance. It is a further characteristic of this polity that the exercise of political privileges is open to anybody who acquires the requisite amount of property, the number of the commons introduced[1] into the ranks of citizens on the strength of the property assessment being so large as to secure the predominance *of the enfranchised* over the unenfranchised classes in the State. We may add that the persons admitted to the citizenship should in all cases be taken from the superior elements of the commons.

Similarly the second form of Oligarchy is to be established by a slight intensification of the oligarchical principle.

The form of Oligarchy which is opposite to the extreme Democracy, i.e. the form of Oligarchy which is the closest approximation to a dynastic or tyrannical form of government, as it is the worst of all Oligarchies, is the one that requires the largest

[1] Reading εἰσαγομένους.

precautions. For as bodies which are in a thoroughly healthy condition and vessels which carry a crew fit to put to sea admit of numerous blunders without being fatally injured by them, while sickly bodies and crazy vessels manned by a bad crew cannot sustain the smallest blunders, so in the case of polities it is the worst that require the greatest precautions.

The means of preserving Oligarchies.

As in a Democracy then it is a general rule that the best preservative is a large population—for it is the plea of numbers which is the correlative to the plea of merit—so on the other hand in an Oligarchy it is plain that the safety of the State must be due to a good adjustment of the polity.

CHAP. VII. The four branches of the military service. Their adaptation to the several polities.

The population of the State may be subdivided into four principal parts viz. husbandmen, mechanics, tradesmen and labourers, and there are four branches of the military service viz. cavalry, heavy infantry, light-armed troops and marines. Accordingly where the country happens to be suited to cavalry, there is a natural propriety in instituting the Oligarchy there in a pronounced form; for in this case the safety of the inhabitants depends upon the force of cavalry, and it is only persons of large property who can afford to keep horses. Where again the country is suitable to heavy infantry, the next form of Oligarchy is appropriate; for it is the rich rather than the poor who are qualified to serve as heavy infantry. A strong force of light-armed soldiers or marines on the other hand is wholly democratical. Recent experience shows that, where there is a large number of light-armed soldiers and marines, the Oligarchs

are often worsted in the event of civil war. This is a danger which ought to be met by an expedient borrowed from strategy, where generals unite with their cavalry and heavy infantry forces a proportionate number of light-armed troops. It is the light-armed service that gives the commons in different States their victory over the rich in civil wars, as their light armour enables them to fight without difficulty against a force of cavalry or heavy infantry. If the Oligarchs then in any State allow the light-armed force to be taken exclusively from the commons, they are so far forging a weapon of attack upon themselves. The proper course, in view of the differences of age and of the natural distinction between old and young, is that the Oligarchs should let their sons in youth receive instruction in the easy exercises of the light-armed service, so that, when they have passed out of the ranks of boys, they may be personally masters of the system.

Admission to the governing class in an Oligarchy. p. 327.

Admission to the governing class should be open to the general population either upon the principle already described, viz. to all who acquire the requisite property qualification, or as at Thebes to such persons when they have desisted for a stated period from mechanical occupations or as at Massalia by a selection of deserving persons whether members[1] of the polity or external to it.

Oligarchical devices.

Again the most important offices of State, which must be confined to members of the governing body, should be saddled with public burdens, so that

[1] It is probable that ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι and ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ below should change places.

the commons may acquiesce in their exclusion and may not grudge the officers of State the authority for which they pay so heavy a sum. And the officers of State upon their accession to power may appropriately celebrate magnificent sacrifices and construct some public work, that participation in the entertainments which naturally follow and the view of the city with its rich embellishment of votive offerings and public edifices may induce the commons to welcome the permanence of the polity; not to say that the offerings and edifices will serve in the future as memorials of the heavy expense incurred by the upper class. But our modern Oligarchs adopt an exactly contrary line of action. They are fully as eager for the spoils as for the honour of office, so that these Oligarchies may well be described as nothing better than Democracies on a small scale.

So much for the right method of establishing the different forms of Democracy and Oligarchy.

CHAP. VIII. The number and nature of the executive offices. p. 298.

The next step in our discussion is to subdivide the field of the executive offices properly, determining their number, nature and provinces, as has been already said. For as it is impossible that a State should exist without the necessary offices, so it is impossible that it should be properly administered without such offices as advance the cause of good discipline and order. And further as the number of the offices will necessarily be smaller in small p. 300. States and larger in large ones, as indeed has been already remarked, it is necessary to ascertain the character of the offices which may appropriately be combined with each other or kept distinct.

Taking first the functions which are indispensable in any State, we begin with the superintendence of the market, which should be under the control of a definite office having the oversight of commercial transactions and general good order. For a system of sale and purchase may be said to be indispensable to any State as a means to the mutual supply of necessary wants; nor is there any other equally ready method of securing independence, which is *ex hypothesi* the object of association in a single polity. (1) political.

Another function, which comes next to this and is closely allied to it, includes the superintendence of all public and private property in the city with a view to the maintenance of good order, the preservation and restoration of dilapidated buildings and streets, the supervision of boundaries between neighbours in order to prevent disputes, and any other similar duties of superintendence. The office in question is commonly called the commissionership of the city. It embraces however various departments, to each of which in the more populous States different officers are appointed, such as constructors of fortifications, superintendents of the water-supply and guardians of the [1]harbour.

There is a third office equally indispensable and similar to the last, as its duties are the same, except that its locality is the country and the suburbs of the city. These officials are sometimes called commissioners of public lands and sometimes commissioners of woods and forests.

[1] Reading λιμένος.

Apart from these three offices of superintendence there is a fourth consisting of persons whose duty it is to receive and hold in charge the public revenues and to distribute them to the different branches of the administration. The name of these officers is receivers or treasurers.

Another office is the one before which all private contracts and the decisions of the Courts of Law have to be registered. It is in the presence of the same officers too that indictments have to be laid and preliminary proceedings in a lawsuit taken. Although there are some States in which the functions of this office, as of the commissionership of the city, are divided among several officers, it is *practically* a single office which controls all such business, under the name of recorders, presidents, remembrancers or some other similar title.

Next to this is an office which is probably the most indispensable and most difficult of all, viz. the office which is concerned with executions upon the property of persons who have been cast in their suits or are posted according to the registers of public defaulters, and with the custody of their persons. The difficulty of the office lies in the fact that it involves a considerable amount of odium, and consequently in any State where it offers no opportunity of large pecuniary gain people either refuse to accept it or, if they do accept it, will not perform the duties in accordance with the laws; its necessity in the fact that there is no good in having legal decisions upon disputed questions of right, if they never receive practical execution, and hence if civic

The levying of fines.

society is impossible without lawsuits, it is equally impossible without the levying of fines. *In view of the unpopularity of the office* it is desirable that these officials should not form a single body, but that different persons should be appointed by the different Courts of Law and that an effort should be made to effect a similar division in regard to the proscription of persons whose names are posted. And further it is desirable that in some cases the fine should be levied by the officers themselves, and especially that fines imposed by the officers[1] of last year should by preference be levied by the officers of the current year, while as regards fines imposed by the existing officers it should be one officer who imposes the fine and another who levies it, e.g. the city-commissioners should levy the fines imposed by the censors of the market and some third board of officers the fines imposed by the city-commissioners. For the smaller the degree of odium attaching to the levying officers, the more effectual will be the execution. Where it is the same persons who impose and levy the fines, they are subject to a double unpopularity; while where it is the same persons who levy the fines in all cases, they are placed[2] in a relation of hostility to all the citizens. There are many States in which the police-authority has itself a distinct organization from the levying authority, as at Athens in the case of the officials known as the Eleven, *who have the custody of prisoners in some cases but do not levy fines.* Thus *as there are successful precedents for*

[1] Reading τὰς τῶν ἔνων.

[2] Reading πολεμίους ποιεῖ πᾶσιν.

the division, it is better to keep the police distinct and in their case to have recourse to the same artifice as before. For although the police are quite as necessary as the levying officers, it is a fact that this is the office of all others which the respectable classes are most disposed to shirk; while it is not safe to intrust the lower orders with such authority, as they are more in need of police-supervision themselves than in a position to exercise it over others. The proper thing then is that there should not be a single definite office or the same office perpetually engaged in the work, but that the younger citizens, where there exists a system of youthful volunteers or militia, and the officers of State in certain sections should undertake the charge.

These are the offices which must be placed in the first rank as being in the highest degree indispensable. We come next to those offices which, although not less indispensable, are invested with a higher dignity, as requiring a large degree of experience and trustworthiness. I refer to such as are concerned with the defence of the city or are appointed for military purposes. Warders of the city-gates and walls, reviewing officers and inspectors of the drill of the citizens are equally necessary in time of peace and of war. The number of offices appointed to these various duties is larger in some States and smaller than others; in fact in small States there is sometimes only a single office for[1] all of them. The officers in question are called generals and members

[1] Reading περὶ πάντων.

of the Council of War. And in addition to these, if there is a force of cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or marines in the State, there are sometimes distinct officers appointed to command these several[1] departments and known as admirals and cavalry or infantry commanders with their subordinate and departmental officers, such as naval captains, majors, colonels, and so for each subdivision of a regiment. But all these functions fall under a single general head, viz. military supervision.

Such is the condition then of the office we have described. And as there are some officers, if not all, who have a large amount of public money passing through their hands, it is indispensable that there should be a distinct board of officers, whose business it is to receive and audit the accounts, while there is no money passing independently through their hands. They are variously called auditors, accountants, inspectors of accounts and public prosecutors.

The supreme office.

In addition to all these offices there is still the supreme office of all. For it is often one and the same office which enjoys the power of ratification as well as of initiation, or there is an office to which belongs the presidency of the popular Assembly in States where the authority of the commons is supreme; for there must be a body which convenes the supreme power in the polity, *viz. the commons.* It is sometimes called a Preliminary Council from its function of giving a preliminary consideration to bills *before they are presented to the Public As-*

[1] Reading ἐπὶ τούτων ἕκαστον.

sembly, but more usually where the government is a popular one, a Council.

(2) religious. This is practically a complete list of such offices as are political in their character. Another species of superintendence is the superintendence of divine worship, including such officers as priests and superintendents of the ordinances of religion, whose duty it is to keep existing buildings in a good state of repair, to restore dilapidated buildings and to look after the general apparatus of divine worship. These duties are in some places, i.e. in small States, all placed in the same hands, while in others they are confided to a number of officers distinct from the priesthood, such as masters of the sacrifices, warders of sanctuaries and treasurers of the sacred funds. Next to these are the officers who are appointed to direct all such public sacrifices as are not assigned by law to the priesthood but are solemnly celebrated upon the hearth of the State. They are in different States termed archons, kings and presidents.

Speaking summarily then we may say that the objects of necessary superintendence are religious services, the science of war, the revenue and expenditure of the State, the market, the city, the harbours and the country, the system[1] of the Courts of Law, the registration of contracts, the levying of fines, the custody of prisoners, the audit, inspection and scrutiny[2] of the officers' accounts. There is finally the deliberative agency in matters of State.

[1] Reading τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια.

[2] Reading προσευθύνας.

There are certain other officers who exist only[1] in such States as enjoy a larger degree of leisure and prosperity and have also a regard for general decorum, such as censors of women, guardians of the laws, censors of boys, presidents of gymnastic exercises and lastly the superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests and any other similar performances that may take place. But of the offices in question some, e.g. the censorship of women and boys, are evidently not suited to a Democracy, as the poor having no slaves are obliged to use their wives and children as attendants. Lastly, of the three forms which may be adopted in the election of the supreme office of State, viz. a Guardianship of the Laws, a Preliminary Council and a Council, the first is an aristocratical, the second an oligarchical and the third a popular institution.

(3) extra-ordinary.

The different offices of State have now practically all been described in general outline.

[1] Reading ἴδιαι.

BOOK VIII.

CHAP. I. Political revolutions.

THE discussion of the various subjects of which we undertook to treat with one exception is now practically complete. We have next to consider the nature, number and character of the circumstances which produce political revolutions, the agencies destructive of the several polities, the general sequence of polities in a revolutionary age and lastly the preservatives of polities both generally and [1]individually.

The cause of a variety of polities.

It is right at the outset to assume the principle that the cause of the appearance of many different polities in History is that, while all people agree in the conception of justice as proportional equality, they fail to realize this equality, as has been already said. Thus Democracy originated in the theory that persons, if equal to others in any respect, are equal absolutely, for it is because all are free alike that they suppose themselves to be all equal absolutely; and Oligarchy in the assumption that persons, if unequal to others in a single respect, are wholly unequal, for

pp. 123 sqq. 134 sqq.

[1] The clause *ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σῴζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη* is, as Susemihl suggests, a *διττογραφία*, and is omitted in the translation.

it is because the few are unequal, *i.e. superior to others*, in respect of property that they assume themselves to be unequal *or superior* absolutely. The consequence is that the Democrats on the one hand in virtue of their supposed equality lay claim to an [1]equal share in all respects, while the Oligarchs on the other in virtue of their supposed inequality aspire to enjoy a preponderant share of everything; for preponderance is a form of inequality. It appears then that, while both polities, *Democracy and Oligarchy,* represent a certain principle of justice, they are erroneous as tested by an absolute standard. Accordingly, whenever one party or the other fails to enjoy such a political influence as is consistent with its own conception *of justice,* it becomes the author of sedition. But the class of persons who would have the strongest justification for seditious conduct, although they are the least guilty of sedition, is the class distinguished by preeminent virtue; for it is such persons and such only who may most reasonably be supposed to be unequal *or superior to others* in an absolute sense. There are however certain persons who from their superiority in birth prefer a claim to more than a merely equal share on the score of this inequality *or superiority,* the theory being that nobility implies hereditary virtue and wealth.

(Such are what we may call the predisposing causes or fountain-heads of sedition. It [2]is the many

[1] Omitting *τῶν*, as in Bekker's text.

[2] It seems best to insert at this point the sentence *στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις......τῶν ἴσων οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες* p. 199,

who raise sedition in an Oligarchy, considering themselves to be aggrieved by the denial to them of equal privileges, as has been already remarked, despite their proper equality, and the upper classes in a Democracy by their limitation to a mere equality of privileges despite their proper inequality *or superiority*. And *as there are these two parties*, it follows that the revolutions also may take two forms.

Forms of revolution.

It sometimes happens that they affect the form of the polity. This is the case when the object of the revolutionary party is to set up a new polity in place of the one already established, e.g. an Oligarchy in lieu of a Democracy, a Democracy in lieu of an Oligarchy, a Polity or an Aristocracy in lieu of one of these or one of these in lieu of a Polity or an Aristocracy. There are other occasions when the revolution does not affect the established form of polity. The political constitution advocated *by the revolutionaries* is the same as before; it is still, let us say, the old Oligarchy or Monarchy, but they desire to have the control of it in their own hands. Again, the revolution may merely turn upon a question of degree. Its object e.g. may be either in an existing Oligarchy to emphasize or mitigate the oligarchical character, or in an existing Democracy to emphasize or mitigate the democratical character of the administration, and similarly in any other polity to produce an intensification or relaxation of its character. Or again the

ll. 14—17, which is there clearly out of place. Then the words ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν may be omitted, perhaps as a note of the transcriber indicating the proper position of the sentence which had been left out.

object may be an innovation in some particular department of the polity, e.g. the institution or abolition of a particular office, as when according to some authorities an attempt was made at Lacedaemon by Lysander to abolish the Kingship and by the king Pausanias to abolish the Ephoralty. There was a similar partial revolution of the polity at Epidamnus by the substitution of *a democratical body,* the Council, for the Presidents of the Tribes, although—*and this is characteristic of an Oligarchy*—it is still obligatory upon the members of the governing class who are actually in office to attend the Heliaea *or Public Assembly* upon any occasion of voting for officers of State, and there [1]is a further oligarchical feature in the single Archon of the Epidamnian polity[2].)

It is inequality, as we have seen, that is everywhere the cause of sedition. Not that inequality *in this sense* exists among people who are only proportionately unequal, for there is no *necessary* inequality *even* in a lifelong Kingship, except where the subjects are the equals of the king. *Yet the tendency of inequality to cause sedition is a general truth;* for as a rule it is the ambition of equality which incites people to seditious action. But equality is of two kinds, arithmetical and proportional, *or equality determined by numbers and by merit.* By arithmetical equality I mean identity or equality of number

Arithmetical and proportional equality.

[1] Omitting ἦν, as in Bekker's text.

[2] The whole passage enclosed within brackets, if indeed it is genuine, so seriously interrupts the course of the argument that it must be regarded as a parenthetical afterthought.

and magnitude, by proportional equality equality of ratios. For instance, the arithmetical excess of three over two is equal to the excess of two over one, but the ratio of four to two is equal to the ratio of two to one; for two is the same fraction of four as one of two, each being a half. But while all agree in the doctrine that justice in an absolute sense consists in p. 338. proportional equality, they differ, as we remarked before, in that one party on the strength of equality to others in [1]a single respect imagines itself to be altogether equal, and the other on the strength of inequality in[1] a single respect prefers a claim to an unequal share of everything. The result is that there are only two polities of common occurrence in the world, Democracy and Oligarchy; for nobility and virtue, *which would constitute the basis of an Aristocracy*, are the attributes of few, while [2]the characteristics of Democracy and Oligarchy are common enough. For you will not find a hundred noble or good people anywhere; but there are plenty of rich[3] *and poor* all the world over. And yet a system constituted absolutely in all respects according to either the oligarchical or the democratical principle of equality is a bad one, as is clear from the issue; for no polity so constituted is permanent. The reason is that some ill result is sure to meet us at the end as the outcome of a primary or initial error; *and there is a primary error in both these principles.* The proper course is

[1] Reading *κατά τι*.

[2] *ταῦτα* is the reading which has the authority of the MSS. and is adopted in the translation.

[3] Reading *εὔποροι*.

then to adopt the principle partly of arithmetical and partly of proportional equality. Still there is more stability and less danger of sedition in Democracy than in Oligarchy. For in an Oligarchy there occur two forms of seditious disturbance, one among the Oligarchs themselves and the other between the Oligarchs and the commons; but in a Democracy sedition can only take the form of an attack upon the Oligarchs *who aspire to exclusive power*, while no sedition worth speaking of ever occurs within the ranks of the commons themselves. And finally the polity which rests upon the middle class has more affinity to Democracy [1]than to Oligarchy, and there is no polity among the class we are now considering, *i.e. with the exception of the best polity*, which has a character of so much stability as this.

Comparative stability of Democracy and Oligarchy.

CHAP. II.

But as we are investigating the circumstances which give rise to seditions and political revolutions, we must first ascertain generally their predisposing occasions and causes. These[2] are practically three in number, which must first be roughly distinguished in the abstract. We have to ascertain the conditions under which people are seditious, the objects which they have in view, and thirdly the occasions predisposing them to political disturbances and seditions.

The conditions favourable to sedition.

The principal cause which produces in people more or less of a disposition to revolution must be generally defined as the one of which we have already spoken. For it is the aspiration after equality which provokes the commons to sedition when they suppose

[1] Omitting ἤ.
[2] Reading εἰσὶ δὲ.

that they have a smaller share *of political advantages* although they are the equals of the privileged Few, and it is the aspiration after inequality or in other words after superiority which provokes the Oligarchs to sedition, when they imagine that despite their inequality their share of *political advantages* is not greater than that of others but is equal or even smaller. This ambition of equality or inequality may be either just or unjust; *but the fact is such as I have described,* for in the one case it is from a position of inferiority that people are encouraged to sedition by the hope of equality, and in the other from a position of equality by the hope of predominance.

The objects of sedition.

Such are the conditions under which people become the authors of sedition. The objects of sedition on the other hand are gain, honour and their opposites; for it is sometimes in the effort to avoid dishonour and pecuniary loss or to shield their friends from them that people raise seditions in their States.

The causes predisposing to sedition.

The causes and predisposing occasions of political disturbances, which produce in the agents the disposition we have described and produce it in reference to these objects, are from one point of view seven and from another more numerous. Two of these are identical with the objects we have already mentioned, although they have a different bearing. For gain and honour are in this case the causes of our exasperation against one another not in the hope of acquiring them for ourselves, as in the last case, but from the sight of others enjoying either justly or unjustly a larger share of them than we do. The other predisposing causes are insolence, fear, predominant influence, contempt, the

disproportionate increase *of some one class in the State,* and from a different point of view party-spirit, neglectfulness, insignificant change and dissimilarity of race.

Taking them in order, we may regard as self-evident the effect of insolence and pecuniary gain and the sense in which they are causes of sedition. It is the insolence and avarice of persons in an official position that produce among the citizens factious antagonism to one another as well as to the political constitutions which invest these persons with their authority. And this avarice is gratified at the expense sometimes of private property and at other times of the property of the State. CHAP. III.

It is equally easy to discover the effect of honour and the sense in which it is a cause of sedition. Sedition is produced by the sense of dishonour done to ourselves and by the sight of the honour enjoyed by others. But the case is one of injustice when either the honour or dishonour is disproportionate, and of justice when it is proportionate, to the merit of the persons concerned.

Sedition again is the result of predominant influence when the power of an individual or of several persons is greater than is consistent with the nature of the State and the authority of the governing class, as the general result of such a state of things is the creation of a monarchical or dynastic form of government. And hence it is the custom in some States, as e.g. at Argos and Athens, to resort to ostracism. It is better however to prevent in the first instance the existence of persons so predominant in a State than

first to allow their appearance and subsequently to adopt remedial measures.

Fear is a cause of sedition among persons who have been guilty of crime, as they are afraid of punishment, and among persons who expect to be the victims of crime, as they are anxious to anticipate it. An instance of the latter case was the conspiracy of the upper classes at Rhodes against the commons, having its origin in the legal suits with which they were threatened.

A feeling of contempt leads to sedition and insurrection, e.g. in Oligarchies when the unenfranchised members of the State form a majority, as they then imagine themselves to be the stronger party, and in Democracies when the disorder and anarchy of the commons have inspired the rich with contemptuous sentiments towards them. Thus at Thebes after the battle of Œnophyta the Democracy was ruined by the defects of the political administration, and the Democracy at Megara by the disorder and anarchy which destroyed the superiority of the commons. It was the same at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon and at Rhodes where the Democrats had become contemptible before the rising of the Oligarchs against them.

Yet another cause of political revolutions is the disproportionate increase *of one class in the State.* For as a body is composed of various parts, and the growth of all the parts must be proportionate, if the [1]symmetry is to be preserved, and, if not, the body is

[1] Reading *ἵνα μένῃ ἡ συμμετρία.*

destroyed, *as is the case* when the foot e.g. is four cubits and the rest of the body only two spans long, or sometimes would actually be metamorphosed into the form of another animal, if the disproportionate growth were not only quantitative but qualitative, so a State is composed of various parts, and it often happens that there is an imperceptible increase in one of these, let us say in the poorer population in Democracies or Polities. This may sometimes even be the result of accidental circumstances. At Tarentum e.g. the defeat and destruction of a large number of the upper classes by the Iapygians a little subsequently to the Persian wars led to the substitution of a Democracy for a Polity. At Argos again after the destruction of the members of the seventh[1] order by the Lacedaemonian Cleomenes it was necessary to admit some of the Periœci *or surrounding subject population* to the citizenship, and at Athens the reverses sustained by the army led to a diminution in the number of the upper classes, as every man whose name appeared on the register was compelled to serve in the ranks during the Lacedaemonian war. And the same result, although not to the same extent, occurs in Democracies, where an increase in the numbers of the poorer classes or in the amount of property *possessed by the Few* effects a revolution to an oligarchical or dynastic form of government.

[1] It is impossible to attach any precise or certain meaning to the phrase τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ; but the context is in favour of the notion that it describes a class of the citizens rather than a time or place.

Polities may be revolutionized without actual sedition in consequence of party-spirit, as at Heraea where the change from suffrage to lot in the appointment of the officers of State was due to the prevalent habit of electing none but the candidates of a party, or in consequence of neglectfulness in allowing the admission of persons disloyal to the polity to the supreme offices of State, as was the case at Oreos where the overthrow of the Oligarchy arose from the accession of Heracleodorus to an official position, who converted the existing Oligarchy into a Polity and *afterwards* a Democracy.

Another cause of revolution is insignificant change. It happens not infrequently that a great alteration has[1] been imperceptibly wrought in the institutions of a State from a failure to observe the insignificant steps. In Ambracia e.g. where the property qualification for office was originally small, people eventually came to hold office without possessing any property qualification at all from the idea that there was no difference between a small qualification and none at all or that they came to very much the same thing.

Diversity of race among the citizens is another cause of sedition, so long at least as the different elements have not been welded together. For it is as little possible to create a State in any arbitrary period of time as to create it of any arbitrary population. Accordingly the great majority of States to which a number of alien colonists have been admitted at the time of their foundation or at a later date have

[1] Reading γενομένη.

been the scenes of [1]violent sedition. Thus the Achaeans who united with the Troezenians for the colonization of Sybaris afterwards attained a numerical superiority and expelled them from the State; the result of which was the [2]curse that fell upon the Sybarites. Again, at Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their fellow-colonists and were expelled for preferring a claim to exceptional privileges upon the plea that they were the proper lords of the country. And there are other similar cases, as at Byzantium, where the later colonists being detected in a conspiracy against the original citizens were driven out at the point of the sword, at Antissa where the Chian exiles who had been admitted to the citizenship were expelled in the same way, and at Zancle where the citizens were themselves expelled by the Samians whom they had welcomed within their walls. Again, the Apolloniates on the Euxine sea were involved in civil war by the admission of a fresh body of settlers, the Syracusans after the [3]era of the tyrants were divided owing to the aliens and mercenaries upon whom they had conferred the citizenship and came to an actual pitched battle, and the Amphipolitans were expelled almost to a man by the colonists whom they had themselves received from Chalcis.

[1] Reading διεστασίασαν.

[2] "The curse that fell upon the Sybarites" was probably the destruction of their State B.C. 510, as related by Diodorus xii. 9, 2 sqq.

[3] By "the era of the tyrants" is meant the Gelonian dynasty. It was in B.C. 466 that Thrasybulus, its last member, was driven from Syracuse.

It sometimes happens too that the cause of sedition in States is their localities, when the country is not naturally adapted to the existence of a single State. We may instance the feuds at Clazomenae between the inhabitants of [1]Chytron and the islanders and at Colophon between the Colophonians and the [2]Notians. Nor is there a complete harmony *of democratical sentiments* at Athens; but the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more advanced Democrats than the population of the city. For as in war the passage of streams however small breaks up a regiment, so it seems that every distinction in a State is a cause of division. The greatest division perhaps is that between virtue and vice, the next that between wealth and poverty, and there are other divisions more or less striking, one of which is the local division we have described.

CHAP. IV. Distinction between the objects and the occasions of sedition.

It is not the objects of sedition that are unimportant but the occasions; the objects are always important. And the effects of quite unimportant seditions are serious, when the parties to them are the powerful people in the State. It was so at Syracuse in the olden days when a political revolution was the consequence of a quarrel between two youths of official rank about a love-affair. In the absence of

[1] Chytron or, as Strabo calls it, Chytrion was on the Ionian coast, probably occupying the site of the old Clazomenae, from which the inhabitants had withdrawn in the earlier part of the 5th century B.C., to the island lying opposite to it. Alexander the Great united the island-city to the mainland by a mole.

[2] Notion, as appears from Thuc. iii. 34, was the harbour-town of Colophon.

one of them one of his companions seduced the object of his affections, and the aggrieved person in his indignation against the offender retaliated by inducing his wife to commit adultery. The result was that they gradually collected adherents among the members of the governing class until they had arrayed the whole body in two opposing factions. It is necessary therefore to be on our guard against dangers of this kind at their commencement and to put a *speedy* end to the feuds of leading and influential people in the State. For it is at the beginning that the mistake is committed in these cases, and as the beginning according to the proverb is half the whole, *i.e. is as important as all the rest*, it follows that even a small mistake at the beginning *of any affair* bears the same proportion, *i.e. is equivalent*, to the mistakes made at all the other points. It is a general rule that feuds among the upper classes involve the State as a whole in their effects. This was the case at Hestiæa subsequently to the Persian wars in consequence of a dispute between two brothers about[1] their patrimonial estate; for the poorer of the two, finding that his brother refused to produce the property and the treasure discovered by their father, made himself a party among the Democrats, and the other being a man of large property, among the wealthy class. So too at Delphi it was a dispute arising out of a matrimonial question that was the beginning of all the subsequent seditions. The bridegroom, interpreting as an omen of evil some accidental

[1] Reading περὶ τῆς πατρῴας νομῆς.

occurrence at the time when he came to fetch his bride home, went away without her, and the bride's relations [1]feeling themselves to be insulted threw some consecrated property into the flames while he was sacrificing and then put him to death for sacrilege. At Mitylene again it was a feud arising about heiresses that proved to be the beginning of a world of troubles and *more especially* of the war with the Athenians in which their city was captured by Paches. *The circumstances were as follows.* A rich citizen named Timophanes died leaving two daughters. [2]Dexandros who had been a rejected suitor for them on behalf of his sons became the prime mover in the feud and, as he was Athenian consul at Mitylene, incited the Athenians to declare war. Again, in Phocis it was a quarrel of which an heiress was the subject between Mnasias the father of Mneson and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus that proved to be the beginning of the Phocian sacred war. And lastly the polity of Epidamnus was revolutionized in consequence of a marriage engagement. A person who had secretly betrothed his daughter to a young citizen, being fined by the father of his future son-in-law in his official capacity, felt the indignity so acutely that he formed an alliance with the unenfranchised classes in the State *to effect a revolution.*

One cause of revolution in polities, although it may equally lead to an Oligarchy, a Democracy or a Polity, is the accession of high repute or

[1] Reading *οἱ δ' ὡς ὑβρισθέντες.*

[2] Dexandros and Mnasias are the forms which have the best MSS. authority.

influence to some particular office or class in the State. Thus it was apparently the reputation won by the Court of Areopagus in the Persian wars which intensified the character of the polity, *i.e. rendered it more oligarchical;* and on the other hand the sea-faring population by its services in winning the victory at Salamis and [1]thereby founding the Athenian supremacy, which rested on the command of the sea, succeeded in increasing the strength of the Democracy. So too at Argos the nobles were emboldened by the renown they won in the battle fought at Mantineia against the Lacedaemonians to attempt the overthrow of the Democracy; at Syracuse the commons, to whom had been due the victory in the war with the Athenians, revolutionized the existing Polity into a Democracy; at Chalcis the commons after allying themselves with the nobles to destroy the tyrant Phoxus proceeded at once to keep the control of the polity in their own hands; and similarly in Ambracia again the commons after aiding the conspirators to expel the tyrant Periander got the polity into their own power. It is indeed a general rule of which we must not lose sight that all who have been instrumental in augmenting the power of a State, whether private individuals or executive officers or tribes or any class or body whatever, become a cause of political disturbance, as it happens either that there are persons who disturb the peace out of envy at the honour paid to these public benefactors or else that they are themselves so much

[1] Reading διὰ ταύτην.

elated by their preeminence as to refuse to acquiesce any longer in mere equality.

Another occasion of political disturbance is when the classes that appear antagonistic in the State, viz. the rich and the commons, are evenly balanced, and there is no [1]middle class or it is extremely small; for if one of the two classes has a great and manifest superiority of power, the other is unwilling to undergo the risk of a contest. And this is the reason why the class distinguished by conspicuous virtue is hardly ever guilty of seditious action; they constitute an insignificant minority.

Such is broadly the state of the case as regards the predisposing occasions and causes of sedition and revolution in the various polities. But political disturbance may be effected either by force or by fraud, and force may take the form either of initial or of subsequent compulsion. For the fraud as well as the force may be of two kinds. It sometimes happens that the revolutionary party begins by fraudulently inducing the people to consent to a political revolution and afterwards employs force to maintain it against their will. Thus the Four Hundred during their régime at Athens first deceived the people by the pretence that the Persian king would supply money for the war against the Lacedaemonians and after this false statement made a protracted effort to maintain the polity by force. There are other occasions when persuasion is successfully employed at a later stage as well as in the first days of a revolution to secure the acqui-

The modes of political revolution.

[1] Reading μηδὲν ἢ μικρὸν.

escence of the people in the authority of the Government.

Speaking broadly then of polities in general, we may say that these are the causes which have resulted in revolutions. We have now to take the various kinds of polity severally and by the light of the principles at which we have arrived consider the actual results in detail. CHAP. V.

Revolutions in Democracies. Their causes and nature.

The main cause of revolutions in Democracies is the intemperate conduct of the demagogues who force the propertied class to combine partly by instituting malicious prosecutions against individuals—for the worst enemies are united by a common fear—and partly by inciting the masses against them as a body. We may see this actually [1]occurring in many cases. At Cos e.g. the democracy was revolutionized through the appearance of unscrupulous demagogues in the State and the consequent combination of the nobles. [2]At Rhodes the demagogues were in the habit of supplying the people with fees *for their attendance in the public Assembly and the Courts of Law* and of preventing the payment of dues to the trierarchs, so that they were compelled by fear of the lawsuits with which they were threatened *by their creditors* to form a conspiracy and abolish the Democracy. It was the fault of the demagogues again that the Democracy of Heracleia was abolished immediately after the foundation of the colony; for the nobles fled one after another from the oppression to which they were subjected, until at a later date the exiles

[1] Omitting *οὕτως*.

[2] Reading *καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ μισθοφορὰν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον*.

collected in a body, returned home and abolished the Democracy. It was much in the same way that the Democracy at Megara was overthrown. The demagogues in order to have an opportunity of confiscation ejected large numbers of the nobles from the State, until they had swelled the ranks of the exiles to such an extent that they returned home, conquered the Democrats in a pitched battle and established the Oligarchy. The same was the case at Cyme with the Democracy overthrown by Thrasymachus. And if we look at the generality of other States, we may discover the same characteristics in their revolutions. The demagogues drive the nobles to combine sometimes by direct oppression in the hope of currying favour with the people, whether they make an actual re-distribution of their properties *among the lower orders or cripple* their incomes by heavy public burdens, and at other times by vexatious prosecutions intended to afford an opportunity of confiscating the possessions of the wealthy.

It usually happened in ancient times, whenever the functions of demagogue and general were united in the same person, that Democracies were revolutionized into Tyrannies. The great majority of ancient tyrants had been demagogues. The reason why this was the case in those days and is not so now is that the demagogues of that age belonged to the class of active generals, as at that early date there were no practised rhetoricians *to become popular leaders,* whereas in our own day, when Rhetoric has become so important, it is able speakers who play the part of demagogues, and their ignorance of military matters

prevents them from attempting to seize supreme power, although there may have been some trifling exceptions to this rule. One reason for the creation of Tyrannies in former times rather than in our own day was the importance of the official positions intrusted to individuals. Thus at Miletus a Tyranny was the outcome of the Presidency owing to the wide and important jurisdiction of the President[1]. Another reason is that, as States were not large in those days, and the people lived in the country busily engaged in their occupations, the popular leaders, whenever they were men of military genius, attempted to make themselves tyrants. They were enabled to do so in all cases by possessing the confidence of the commons, the ground of this confidence being their detestation of the wealthy classes. This was the case at Athens with Pisistratus in consequence of his feud with the *wealthy landed* proprietors of the plain, with Theagenes at Megara after his slaughter of the live stock of the wealthy whom he found encroaching upon the pasture-land by the river, and with Dionysius who was elevated to the tyranny as a reward for his accusation of Daphnaeus and the propertied class, because his hostility to them won him confidence as a friend of the people.

Yet another species of revolution is from the traditional to the most modern form of Democracy. Where the offices of State are elective, but there is no requisite property qualification, and the election is in the hands of the commons, candidates who are eager for office go so far in their desire of popularity

[1] The πρύτανις or President was, as Susemihl thinks, the highest officer of State in republican Miletus.

as to invest the commons with an authority superior even to the laws. The means of preventing or at least mitigating this evil would be to place the appointment of the executive officers in the hands of the tribes instead of the whole body of commons.

The causes which I have specified are practically productive of all the various revolutions in Democracies.

CHAP. VI. Revolutions in Oligarchies. Their forms and causes.

Revolutions in Oligarchies on the other hand generally assume two most conspicuous forms.

The first is the case where the Oligarchs oppress the masses. For any champion of the people is good enough at such a time, especially when it happens that the leader is taken from the ranks of the Oligarchs themselves, like Lygdamis at Naxos who subsequently made himself tyrant of the Naxians.

But secondly when the sedition arises among the actual[1] Oligarchs, it may take a variety of forms.

Sometimes the destruction of the polity is effected by persons who are members of the propertied class, although not of the official body, when the honours of State are in the hands of a narrow clique. This has been the case at Massalia, at Istros, at Heracleia and in other States where the members of the propertied class who were excluded from office kept up an agitation until first the elder and at a later date the younger brothers obtained admission. It must be explained that there are some States in which a father and a son and others in which an elder and a younger brother are not allowed to hold office simultaneously. And while at Massalia the [2]Oligarchy assumed more the character of

[1] Reading ἐξ αὐτῶν.

[2] Reading ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.

a Polity, at Istros it ended eventually in a Democracy and at Heracleia was transferred from the hands of a smaller body to a body of Six Hundred. Again, the revolution of the Oligarchy at Cnidos was due to an internal quarrel among the nobles arising from the fact that the admission to office was confined to a few persons and, as has been said, if a father was a member of the official class, the son was excluded, and if there were several brothers in a family, it was only the eldest who was admitted. For the commons seizing the opportunity of these feuds and finding a champion in the ranks of the nobles rose in insurrection and overcame the Oligarchs; for a house divided against itself can never stand. It was the same at Erythrae with the Oligarchy of the Basilidae in olden times. The strict limitation of the official class, despite the wise administration of the persons who possessed political privileges, produced such a feeling of indignation in the commons that they revolutionized the polity.

Another occasion of disturbance in Oligarchies arising within the oligarchical body itself is when personal rivalry induces the Oligarchs to assume the rôle of demagogues. But this demagogy may take two forms. It may be within the oligarchical body itself. The appearance of a demagogue is possible even in a narrow clique of Oligarchs. Thus it was within the ranks of the Thirty at Athens that the party of Charicles rose to power by courting like demagogues the other members of the Thirty, and it was within the ranks of the Four Hundred that the party of Phrynichus rose to power in the same manner. It may be the mob on the other hand to whom the

members of the Oligarchy pay court, as at Larisa where the Guardians of the citizens were always toadying the mob upon whom they were dependent for election. This is liable to occur in any Oligarchy where it is not the class from which the officers of State are taken that constitutes the body of electors but, while eligibility to office is conditional upon a high property qualification or upon membership in a political club, the electing body consists of the heavy-armed soldiers or of the whole body of commons, as was long the case at Abydos. It is the same where the Courts of Law are not constituted of members of the governing class. The result of the court paid to the people in order to secure favourable verdicts is a revolution of the polity, as actually happened at Heracleia upon the Pontus. Another occasion of revolution is when an effort is made by a certain party to narrow the Oligarchy still further, as the advocates of equality *among all the members of the oligarchical body* are then obliged to invite the assistance of the commons.

Again, revolutions occur in an Oligarchy when *some of the Oligarchs* have wasted all their private means in riotous living, as in this case they are eager for innovation and either affect a Tyranny themselves or set up somebody else as tyrant. It was thus that Hipparinus helped to place Dionysius on the throne of Syracuse, that at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus introduced the Chalcidian settlers and upon their arrival arrayed them in opposition to the rich, and that at Ægina the person who conducted the negociation with Chares attempted for a similar reason to effect a revolution of the polity. The spendthrifts in

question sometimes make a direct[1] attempt at political innovation and at other times plunder the Treasury; and in the latter case the result is that an attack is made upon the Government either by the offenders, *if it offers a resistance to their proceedings*, or, *if it is favourable to them*, by the opponents of their malversation, as was the case at Apollonia upon the Pontus.

[2]Another occasion of seditions *arising within the oligarchical body itself* is when some of the actual Oligarchs suffer a repulse at the hands of others or are the victims of party violence in matrimonial or legal cases. We may instance as the results of a matri- p. 352.
monial question the seditious disturbances which have been already described as well as the overthrow of the Oligarchy of the Knights at Eretria by Diagoras in consequence of the wrong done him in an affair of marriage. A judicial sentence was the motive cause of the sedition at Heracleia and at Thebes, where Euetion[3] in the one case and Archias in the other were subjected on a charge of adultery to a punishment which no doubt was merited but was prompted by a spirit of factious partisanship; for their enemies carried the vindictiveness of rivalry to such an extent as to have them confined in open market in the pillory.

It has frequently happened too that the over-des-

[1] Reading *εὐθὺς ἐπιχειροῦσι.*

[2] It seems best to follow Susemihl in transposing to this place the passage *γίνονται δὲ στάσεις......ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία* p. 206, ll. 17—30, as describing other forms of sedition which arise within the oligarchical body.

[3] *Εὐετίωνος* is the form of the name which has the best MSS. authority.

potic character of Oligarchies has led to their overthrow by exciting a sentiment of indignation in the breasts of some members of the governing class. Such was the case of the oligarchies in Cnidos and Chios.

But where harmony prevails among the Oligarchs an Oligarchy is not easily destroyed[1]. This we may infer from the case of the Pharsalian polity in which the Oligarchs, although they form only a small minority of the population, are able to retain authority over the Many by being on good terms among themselves.

Oligarchies are sometimes destroyed on the other hand by the creation of a second Oligarchy within the first; and this is liable to occur when the entire governing class is numerically small, and yet the highest offices of State are not open to all the members of this small body. Such was once the case at Elis where the polity was in the hands of a Few, and it was only a small fraction of the Few who were admitted to the Senate, as the Senators who were always ninety in number held office for life and the method of election was dynastic, *i.e. characteristic of a narrow Oligarchy*, and similar to the election of the Senate at Lacedaemon.

A revolution in an Oligarchy[2] may take place in time either of war or of peace. The occasion in the former case is sometimes that the Oligarchs from distrust of the commons are obliged to employ mercenary troops, and thus the individual in whose hands

[1] Omitting ἐξ αὐτῆς.

[2] Reading ὀλιγαρχιῶν.

they place the command not infrequently makes himself tyrant like Timophanes at Corinth or, if there are several commanders, they found a dynastic government in their own interest, and at other times that the fear of this induces the Oligarchs to admit the masses to full political privileges, as they cannot dispense with the assistance of the commons. The circumstances in which an Oligarchy is revolutionized in time of peace are when the mutual distrustfulness of the Oligarchs is so great that they put the police of the city into the hands of mercenary troops and an arbiter between the factions who sometimes succeeds in making himself master of both, as happened in [1]the case of Simus at Larisa during the reign of the Aleuadae and at Abydos in the era of the political clubs, among which the club of Iphiades was one.

Lastly, accidental circumstances may be the cause of revolutions whether in the so-called Polity or in Oligarchies, i. e. in all governments where a certain property assessment is requisite for the Council, the Courts of Law and the offices[2] of State. If we take e.g. the property qualification originally fixed with reference to existing conditions, admitting a Few only in an Oligarchy and the middle class in a Polity to the enjoyment of political privileges, it often happens that a season of prosperity due to *long-continued* peace or some other fortunate circumstance multiplies so greatly the value of the same estates as to admit the entire body of citizens to full privileges, sometimes gradually by a slow and imperceptible process of re-

[1] Reading ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς περὶ Σῖμον.

[2] Omitting ἄλλας.

volution and at other times with an excessive rapidity.

We have now enumerated the causes of revolutions and seditions in Oligarchies. It is to be observed as a general rule applicable both to Democracies and Oligarchies that they are sometimes altered not to the antagonistic polities but to other polities of the same kind, e.g. from the restricted forms of Democracy and Oligarchy to the absolute forms and *vice versa*.

CHAP. VII. Revolutions in Aristocracies. Their causes and occasions. p. 358.

Coming to Aristocracies, we find that one cause of sedition is the limitation in the number of persons admitted to the honours of State, a cause which has been already described as an element of disturbance in Oligarchies. (For an Aristocracy itself is in a certain sense an Oligarchy, as in both the ruling class is numerically limited. But the ground of the limitation is different; in fact it is only in appearance that Aristocracy, as being so limited, is an Oligarchy[1].) This cause of political disturbance is necessarily most operative when there is a considerable[2] body *of unprivileged persons* within the State who have a proud feeling that they are the equals[3] *of the privileged class* in virtue, like the so-called Partheniae at Lacedaemon on the strength of their descent from the Peers[4] *or fully enfranchised citizens;* for the Partheniae were detected in a conspiracy and sent away out of the country to be the colonists of Tarentum. Again,

[1] The sentences enclosed in brackets are virtually parenthetical.

[2] Reading τι πλῆθος. [3] Reading ὁμοίων.

[4] The ὅμοιοι or Peers at Lacedaemon, as opposed to the ὑπομείονες, were the fully enfranchised and privileged members of the State.

sedition is apt to occur when a stigma is put upon persons of consequence who are fully the equals of any citizen in virtue by other citizens who hold a position of greater dignity, as e.g. upon Lysander by the Lacedaemonian kings. *Other occasions of sedition in an Aristocracy are* when there is an individual of strong character who is excluded from the honours of State like Cinadon the author of the conspiracy and insurrection against the Spartiates in the reign of Agesilaus, or again when there is excessive poverty on one side and excessive wealth on the other within the State—a condition of things which is especially incident to warlike times and actually occurred at Lacedaemon about the time of the Messenian war, [1]as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus called Eunomia (Good Order); for it was under pressure of the war that a certain number of the citizens demanded a re-distribution of the soil—or lastly if there is an individual already powerful and capable of extending his power, *who heads a sedition* in the hope of making himself monarch, as according to the popular view was the case of Pausanias the commander-in-chief in the Persian war at Lacedaemon and of Annon at Carthage.

But the main cause of the dissolution of Polities and Aristocracies alike is a deviation from their proper principles of justice in the constitution of the polity itself. Its origin is the unsuccessful fusion of the democratical and oligarchical elements in the Polity and of these elements with virtue added in the Aristocracy, but especially of the first two, as it is a fusion of these elements only that

[1] Omitting *καὶ* before *τοῦτο*.

Comparative stability of Aristocracies and Polities.

is attempted in the majority of so-called Aristocracies as well as in Polities. For the difference between Aristocracies and Polities in the limited sense of the word and the reason why the latter are more permanent than the former is that all constitutions of the kind *we are considering* which incline to Oligarchy are called Aristocracies, while those which incline to popular government are called Polities. And thus the comparative stability of all such Polities is due to the fact that in them the numerical majority have the upper hand, and they are sooner satisfied with mere equality, while the propertied class, if invested with superiority by the political constitution, is eager to display an insolent and aggressive spirit. It is a general rule however that, whatever may be the bias of a polity, it is in that direction that it is usually revolutionized, as the two parties in the State, *the rich and the poor*, respectively extend their power, viz. Polity in the direction of Democracy and Aristocracy in the direction of Oligarchy. It may happen on the other hand that these polities are revolutionized to their opposites, viz. Aristocracy to Democracy, when the poorer classes feeling aggrieved effect a violent circumvolution of the government, and Polity to Oligarchy. For the only conditions of permanence are proportional equality and security of rights. There was an instance of a polity being changed to its opposite at Thurii where the excessive amount of the property assessment requisite for office led to its reduction and to an increase in the number of the official boards, and the illegal acquisition of the entire soil by the nobles—an encroachment facilitated

by the excessively oligarchical character of the Polity —resulted in the commons who had been disciplined in the war getting the upper hand of the Guards *or military force maintained by the Oligarchs and never resting* until a surrender had been made by all who were in actual possession of an exorbitant amount of land. Another cause of revolution is that the tendency of all aristocratical polities to be oligarchical affords the nobles an opportunity of self-aggrandisement. At Lacedaemon e.g. the wealth of the country is gradually falling into the hands of a Few, and the nobles enjoy a greater freedom of action and *especially* of matrimonial alliance. And while we are upon this point, it was the marriage connexion[1] with Dionysius, *we may remark*, that led to the destruction of the Locrian State; which would never have happened in a Democracy or in an Aristocracy where there was a successful fusion of the different elements.

But an imperceptible revolution in Aristocracies is effected principally by a gradual process of dissolution. It is a remark which has been already made in this work, as applicable to all forms of polity generally that insignificant change is one cause of revolutions. For no sooner has some one constitutional point been surrendered than it is easier to introduce another slightly more important innovation, *and so on* until an innovation has been effected in the whole existing p. 348.

[1] One of the wives of the elder Dionysius was Doris a native of the Epizephyrian Locri. It was this connexion that led the younger Dionysius upon his expulsion from Syracuse B.C. 356 to flee to Locri, where he was generously received and requited the hospitality of the citizens by making himself their tyrant.

system. This was the case with the polity at Thurii among others. There was a law there that nobody should be general a second time except after an interval of five years. Upon this some of the younger generation, who had displayed military talents and were in the enjoyment of a high popularity among the masses[1], in contempt of the executive authorities and in the expectation of an easy success began by making an attempt to abrogate this law so as to allow the same people to be generals continuously, as they saw that the commons would be only too glad to vote for them. The officers appointed to watch innovations in the laws, the Councillors as they were called, although eager at first to resist the proposition, were prevailed upon to acquiesce in it under the impression that the young citizens, if they succeeded in altering this law, would leave the rest of the polity undisturbed; but at a later date their desire to prevent further innovation proved absolutely ineffectual, and the entire system of the polity was revolutionized to a dynastic government in the hands of the party who had originated the revolution.

Polities generally are liable to dissolution not only from within but from without, when there is *a State having* an antagonistic polity either near to them or distant but possessed of considerable power. This is a truth that was continually verified in the case of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, the former of whom abolished the Oligarchies and the latter the Democracies wherever they found them.

[1] Omitting τῶν φρουρῶν.

The origins of revolutions and seditions in polities have now practically been described. We have next to discuss the means of preserving polities both generally and individually.

CHAP. VIII. The preservatives of polities.

It is evident at the outset that, as we know the means of destruction in the different polities, we know also the means of their preservation; for opposite effects are produced by opposite causes, and destruction is the opposite of preservation.

In any polity, in which a successful fusion of various elements has been achieved, we ought above everything to be on our guard against illegality and especially to take precautions against insignificant steps in this direction. [1]For illegality is imperceptibly admitted into States *and brings them to ruin*, as small expenses frequently incurred are the ruin of properties. The reason why the deception[2] is not observed is that it does not take place all at once; for the judgment is deluded by petty acts of illegality according to the sophistical argument that if every part is small, so is the whole. But although there is one sense in which this is true, there is another in which it is false. The truth is that the whole or the sum total is not small but is only composed of small parts.

We must be on our guard then in the first place against this beginning of revolution, and secondly we must put no trust in the measures concocted as artifices to impose upon the masses, as they are proved by experience to be failures. What we

[1] Reading *λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη ἡ παρανομία ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον.*

[2] Reading *ἡ ἀπάτη.*

understand by political artifices has been already described.

Further, it is to be observed that there are some polities, not only Aristocracies but even Oligarchies, which owe their permanence not to the stability of the polities in themselves but to the good terms on which the persons in official positions live with the citizens who do not enjoy political privileges as well as with the members of the governing class, in that they abstain from all oppression of the unprivileged body, admit to full political privileges the members of it who show a capacity for command and never wound the honour of the ambitious spirits on the one hand or injure the pecuniary interests of the Many on the other, while in all their relations to one another and to the members of the privileged body generally they display a true democratical spirit. For the principle of equality, which it is the ambition of the popular party to realize in the case of the masses, is not only just but actually advantageous in the case of the Peers *or privileged class in an Oligarchy or Aristocracy.* And from this it follows that, if there is a considerable number of members of the governing class, there are not a few popular institutions which are advantageous, one such being the limitation of the tenure of office to a period of six months as a means of admitting all the Peers in turn to an official position. For the Peers in virtue of their equality form a sort of Democracy among themselves, and it is thus that demagogues often make their appearance among them, as

p. 359. has been already remarked. Another advantage *of a system of short tenure* is that there is not the same

danger of Oligarchies and Aristocracies being merged in Dynasties. For abuse of power on the part of the officers of State is not so easy where the tenure of office is limited as where it is long, as it is the long tenure which in Oligarchies and Democracies is a cause of the establishment of Tyrannies. For the attempt to seize tyrannical power is made either by the most influential individuals in the two polities, viz. by the demagogues in the one case and the Dynasts *or most powerful Oligarchs* in the other, or else by persons holding the highest official positions, whenever the system is one of long tenure.

Again, polities are preserved not only by their remoteness from destructive agencies but in some cases by their very proximity to them, as fear induces the citizens to keep a stricter control upon the polity. It is proper therefore for the friends of the political constitution to suggest alarms, that the citizens may be on their guard instead of neglecting the defence of the polity like a watch in the night, and to bring what is far off home to them.

And further, an effort should be made by legal regulations among other means to keep a watch upon the rivalries and feuds of the upper classes before[1] the infection has actually spread to those who at present stand outside the rivalry, as it is not in the power of any ordinary person but requires the ability of a statesman to discern the evil at its commencement.

As a precaution against the revolution from an Oligarchy or Polity which is occasioned by the property

[1] Omitting the comma after ὄντας.

assessment when there is a large influx of money while the assessment requisite for office remains unchanged, it is well to revise by comparison with the former assessment the total amount of assessed property in the State, either annually[1], wherever there is an annual assessment of property, or in larger States at intervals of three or five years and, if the total amount of assessed property is many times larger or smaller than the last by which the assessments of individuals for political purposes were regulated, to fix according to legal rule an increase or diminution of these assessments, an increase corresponding to the multiplication of the total value, if it has risen, and a corresponding diminution and reduction, if it has fallen. For in Polities and Oligarchies, if there is no reduction of the requisite assessment from time to time, an Oligarchy in the one case and a Dynasty in the other is the result, while if there is no increase, a Polity is converted into a Democracy and an Oligarchy into a Polity or Democracy.

It is a rule equally applicable to Democracy, Oligarchy and all other constitutional governments not to invest any individual with an excessive and disproportionate authority but to aim at assigning unimportant honours of long duration rather than high honours with rapid change—for high honour has a corrupting influence, and [2]*as the saying is*

"Not everyone is equal to good fortune,"

[1] The words κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον should stand after κατ' ἐνιαυτόν.

[2] Stahr is probably right in regarding these words as a quotation.

or at least, if this is impossible, not to assign all these honours at once and afterwards revoke them all at once, but to proceed gradually and to try, if circumstances are favourable, so to use the regulating[1] influence of the laws that no citizen may appear who is vastly superior to the rest in the number of his *clientèle* or the amount of his wealth or, failing this, to banish his supporters from the land.

Again, as one cause of revolutions is to be found in the private lives of the citizens, it is proper to create certain officers in the State whose province it is to have supervision over all who by their manner of life exercise a prejudicial influence upon the polity, viz. upon the Democracy, if the polity is democratical, upon the Oligarchy, if it is oligarchical, and similarly in each of the remaining polities.

And further, the same reason, *viz. the danger of unconstitutional conduct*, will justify precautions against any class or order in the State which in the vicissitudes of human fortune is at the time in the enjoyment of remarkable prosperity. A certain safeguard against this danger is to be found in always entrusting the conduct of business as well as the official positions to the antagonistic elements in the State —I refer to the antagonism between the respectable classes and the masses or between the poor and the rich—or in endeavouring either to effect a fusion of the poorer and richer population or else to increase the strength of the middle class, as it is this class which composes all such feuds as arise from a sense of inequality.

[1] Reading οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν ὥστε.

But the chief requisite in any polity is that the system of the laws and the general administration should be so ordered as to afford the officers of State no opportunity of personal gain. This is a point to be especially observed in oligarchical polities. For it is not so much exclusion from office that excites a feeling of indignation in the Many, who are actually thankful if they are allowed leisure to attend to their own business, as the idea that the officers of State appropriate the public money. When this is the case, they feel a double annoyance in being excluded both from the honours and from the gains of State. The only possible means of combining Democracy and Aristocracy is by a system in which official gain is impossible, as this is the only way of satisfying equally the wants of the upper classes and of the commons. For while universal eligibility to office is a characteristic of Democracy, it is a characteristic of Aristocracy that all official positions are in the hands of the upper classes. But this latter condition will be realized whenever office affords no opportunity of gain, as the poor having no prospect of gain will not be desirous of office but will prefer to attend to their own business, while the rich will be capable of holding office, as having money enough of their own to do without the public money. The result will be that, while the poor will acquire wealth by devoting themselves to their occupations, the upper classes will not be subjected to the rule of persons who possess no special qualifications; *and both will be satisfied.* Now as a means of preventing malversation of the public money, it may be suggested that the transference of

the State chest from one set of officers to another should take place in the presence of the whole body of citizens, and that copies of the accounts should be deposited with the different clans, companies and tribes. Purity of administration on the other hand should be encouraged by the institution of public honours as the reward of officers who preserve a blameless reputation.

Again, it is right in Democracies to spare the rich by abstaining[1] not only from confiscation of their estates but even from confiscation of the produce, which imperceptibly occurs in some polities. It is better to go so far as to prohibit them, even if they are inclined, from undertaking expensive but useless public services, such as the maintenance of choruses, the superintendence of torch-races and the like. In an Oligarchy on the other hand it is right that especial attention should be devoted to the poor, that all such offices as afford an opportunity of profit should be assigned to them, that heavier fines should be inflicted upon the rich for insolence to the poor than for insolence to the members of their own class, that inheritances should descend not by bequest but by entail and that the same person should not succeed to more than one, for so there will be a greater equality of properties and a larger number of the poor will be placed in a condition of affluence. It is expedient in Democracy and Oligarchy alike to allow either equality or precedence in all respects except political power to the class that has a smaller inte-

[1] Reading μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις, κ.τ.λ.

rest in the polity[1] in question, viz. in a Democracy to the rich and in an Oligarchy to the poor, except in the case of all the supreme offices in the polity, and to place these on the contrary in the hands of the privileged class either exclusively or so that they may form a majority of the official body.

CHAP. IX. Qualifications for offices of State.

There are three qualifications requisite in all who are to hold the supreme offices of State, viz. firstly loyalty to the established polity, secondly the greatest capacity for the duties of their office, and thirdly the virtue and justice appropriate to the polity whatever it may be; for if the idea of justice is not the same in all polities, it necessarily follows that there are different kinds of practical justice. A difficulty arises however as to the principle of selection[2] in any case where these *desiderata* are not all found in the same individual. Suppose e.g. that A is an able general but a person of bad character and an enemy of the polity, while B is just and loyal to the polity, *but a bad general*, how is the selection to be made? It would seem that the right course is to have regard to two points, viz. which is the qualification possessed in a larger and which in a smaller measure by the generality of men. Thus while in a case of generalship regard should be paid to experience rather than to virtue, as people have generally a smaller share of strategical skill than of respectability, in an office of police or of the treasury the opposite[3] should be the case, as it demands a higher degree of virtue than is possessed by ordinary people, but the requisite knowledge is common to all.

[1] Reading τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης.

[2] Reading αἵρεσιν. [3] Reading τοὐναντίον.

It is possible however to raise the question: Granted the existence of capacity [1]and loyalty to the polity, what is the need of virtue? The first two qualities alone will satisfy all purposes. The answer is that people who possess them both may yet be deficient in self-control and that thus, as there are persons who with the requisite knowledge and self-love do not advance their own interests, so there may well be persons who stand in this relation to the State.

It may be said generally that all the legislative enactments, which we describe as beneficial to polities, tend to their preservation, and especially the most important principle so often mentioned, viz. that care shall be taken to ensure that the part of the population which is favourable to the polity shall be stronger than the part which is not.

But in addition to all these precautions there is one point of which we never should lose sight, although it is in fact left out of sight in the perverted forms of polity, I refer to the proper mean. For there are many apparently popular or oligarchical measures which are the ruin of Oligarchies or Democracies. But people who suppose that this *insistence upon an oligarchical or democratical line of polity* is the one and only virtue carry it to an excess. They do not see that, as there may be a nose which deviates from the ideal straightness towards the aquiline or the snub, but still remains beautiful and fair to view, and yet, if you still further intensify and exaggerate these tendencies, you will first sacrifice the due proportion of the feature and, *as you proceed*, will eventually

The value of the mean.

[1] Reading καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία.

make it cease to look like a nose at all from the prominence of one and the deficiency of the other of these opposite characteristics, *viz. aquilineness and snubness*, [1]and as the same is true of any other feature, so too this is equally the case with polities. An Oligarchy or Democracy may be tolerably good, although they are departures from the ideally best system; but if you still further intensify either, you will begin by impairing the polity in question and will end by making it cease to be a polity at all. Accordingly the legislator or statesman must not be unacquainted with the character of the democratical measures which tend to preserve or destroy a Democracy or of the oligarchical measures which tend to preserve or destroy an Oligarchy. For neither Democracy nor Oligarchy can exist and endure unless it includes the rich and the masses. An equalization of property, if once introduced, necessarily involves an entire change of polity. We conclude then that the destructive agency of extreme laws, *whether extremely oligarchical or extremely democratical*, issues in the destruction of these polities. It is in this respect that an error is made in Democracies and Oligarchies alike. It is made in Democracies, where the power of the masses is superior to the laws, by the demagogues who divide the State into two hostile camps by their perpetual antagonism to the rich. They ought properly to adopt an exactly contrary line, always affecting to be the advocates of the rich. Similarly in an Oligarchy the true Oligarchs should affect to advocate the cause of

[1] There should be a comma only after ἐναντίων and again after μορίων.

the commons, and the oaths they take should be exactly the opposite of those now in vogue. Instead of swearing as they do now in some Oligarchies "I will be a foe of the commons and will devise whatsoever ill I may against them," they should take or pretend to take a precisely opposite view, emphasizing in their oaths the pledge "I will do the commons no wrong."

Education in the spirit of the polity.

But the greatest safeguard for the permanence of any polity, greater than any we have hitherto mentioned, is one which is universally disregarded at present, viz. the education of the citizens in the spirit of the polity. For the wisest of laws, although ratified by the consentient voice of the whole civic body, are of no avail unless the citizens are trained by habit and education in the lines of the polity, i.e. democratically, if the laws are democratical, and oligarchically, if they are oligarchical. For the same[1] intemperance which is found in an individual may be equally found in a State. But an education conducted in the spirit of the polity does not imply the performance of such actions as are agreeable to the friends of Oligarchy or Democracy, but of such as will facilitate an oligarchical or democratical administration. The actual fact however is that in Oligarchies the sons of the ruling class live in luxury, while the sons of the poor are subjected to a severe and laborious discipline which tends to produce in them at once the desire and the capacity for revolution, and in such Democracies as are considered to exemplify the most pronouncedly democratical character the state of

[1] Reading ἥπερ.

Misconception of liberty.

things is just the contrary of their true interest. The reason in the last case is the erroneous conception of liberty. For there are two things which are popularly regarded as the determining characteristics of Democracy, viz. the supremacy of the numerical majority and personal liberty. For it is assumed that justice is equality, that equality consists in the supremacy of the will of the masses, and that it is a characteristic of liberty[1] that every citizen acts as he chooses. The result is that in this kind of Democracy each individual lives as he chooses or in the language of Euripides[2] "as he likes it." This however is a serious mistake; *for the citizens should live and live gladly in the spirit of the polity*, as such a life ought not to be regarded as a bondage but rather as a means of preservation.

Such then are broadly the various causes of revolution and destruction as well as the means of preservation and permanence in polities. It remains to discuss the natural destructives and preservatives of Monarchy.

CHAP. X. Monarchy. Its dangers and preservatives.

The actual history of kingly and tyrannical forms of government is much the same as our description of constitutional polities. For while Kingship corresponds to Aristocracy, Tyranny is a compound of the extreme form of Oligarchy and Democracy and is thus of all governments the most prejudicial to the subjects, as being composed of two evils and containing in itself the perversions and errors of both these polities.

Contrast of Kingship and Tyranny.

The very origins of these two forms of monarchical government are precisely opposite. Whereas Kingship

[1] Omitting καὶ ἴσον.

[2] *Fragment* 883, in Dindorf's *Poetae Scenici Graeci.*

is instituted for the protection of the better classes against[1] the commons, and a king is appointed from among the members of the better classes on the ground of his personal superiority in virtue or actions which result from virtue or of the superiority of a virtuous race, the tyrant is taken from the mass of the commons to act against the nobles and to protect the commons from injury at their hands. This is a truth which is evident from the facts of History. It is an almost universal rule that persons who have succeeded in making themselves tyrants have been ex-demagogues, who had won the confidence of the people by abuse of the nobles. Some Tyrannies were established in this way, *i.e. in the person of demagogues*, from the time when States had attained considerable dimensions, others at an earlier date in the person of kings who exceeded their hereditary privileges and aspired to a more despotic authority, others again in the person of citizens elected to the supreme offices of State, as it was the ancient custom of the commons in different States to allow a long term of office to the civil and religious magistrates, and others finally as the outcome of Oligarchies by the election of an individual with supreme power to the highest offices of State. In all these cases it was no difficult matter for the individuals in question to effect their object, if they had but the will, as the power was already theirs in their kingly authority or high official status. It was thus that Pheidon at Argos and others made themselves tyrants on the

The origin of Tyrannies.

[1] Reading ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον.

basis of an existing Kingship, that the Ionian tyrants and Phalaris rose from high honours of State, that Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse and others in the same manner rose from the position of demagogues.

The origin of Kingships. But to resume: Kingship, as we said, so far corresponds in principle to Aristocracy as it is based upon merit, whether upon the virtue of an individual or of a family, or upon public services or upon the combination of these with power. For it was in virtue of services they had rendered or were capable of rendering to their States or races that people in all cases attained regal dignity, whether by having defended them from subjugation on the field of battle like Codrus, or by having liberated them from slavery like Cyrus, or as founders of the State or conquerors of new territory like the kings of the Lacedaemonians, Macedonians and Molossians.

In theory the king is a guardian appointed to protect the propertied class on the one hand from spoliation and the commons on the other from insolence. pp. 120, 280. Tyranny on the contrary, as has been frequently remarked, is absolutely regardless of the public weal, except so far as it subserves the personal interest of the tyrant. And while the object of the tyrant is pleasure, that of the king is moral elevation. It is thus that the tyrant is distinguished by the ambition of [1] exorbitant gain, but the king by that of extravagant distinction, and that, while the body-guard of the latter consists of citizens, that of the former is exclusively composed of mercenaries.

[1] Reading τὰ μὲν εἰς χρήματα.

The vices of Tyranny.

It is evident that Tyranny combines in itself the evils both of Democracy and of Oligarchy. It borrows from Oligarchy *firstly* the pursuit of wealth as its *summum bonum*—for it is only wealth that enables the tyrant to maintain his body-guard and gratify his luxurious tastes—and *secondly* its absolute distrust of the masses which leads to a general seizure of arms and to other measures equally characteristic of Oligarchy and Tyranny, such as the oppression of the common people, their banishment from the city and distribution through different parts of the country. It borrows from Democracy its hostility to the upper classes, so that the tyrant makes away with them by secret and open measures and banishes them from the State as rivals and obstacles to his authority. For it really is the case that they are the authors of conspiracies against tyrants from their desire in some cases of personal rule and in others of deliverance from slavery. It was this feeling that prompted the counsel of Periander to Thrasybulus when he cut off all the overtopping stalks as a sign that he ought from time to time to put the overtopping citizens out of the way.

The causes predisposing to insurrection in Monarchies. p. 380.

[1]It appears then, as has been already remarked, that the predisposing causes of revolutions must be considered to be practically the same in Monarchies as in constitutional polities. It is injustice, fear and contempt that commonly cause the insurrections of subjects against monarchical governments; and the injustice consists principally in insolence, although sometimes in the spoliation of private property. Also

[1] Reading καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, σχεδὸν τὰς αὐτάς, κ.τ.λ.

the objects of the insurgents are the same in Tyrannies and Kingships as in constitutional polities; for monarchs are in the possession of great wealth and honour, and these are the objects of universal desire.

Forms of insurrection.

Insurrections may take the form of an attack either upon the person or upon the authority of the rulers.

Where an insurrection is occasioned by insolence, it assumes the first form. There are various kinds of insolence, any one of which is provocative of the anger which incites to insurrection; but where anger is the motive, it almost always happens that the object is revenge rather than personal predominance. Thus the insurrection against the Pisistratidae was a consequence of the insult offered to the sister of Harmodius and the humiliation inflicted upon Harmodius himself; for Harmodius was incited to rebel by regard for his sister and Aristogeiton by regard for Harmodius. Similarly the cause of the conspiracy against the Ambracian tyrant Periander was an insulting question he put to his favourite, when he was sitting with him over his cups. The conspiracy of Pausanias against Philip was due to his having suffered him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, that of Derdas against Amyntas the Less to his having boasted of the liberties he had taken with him, that of the eunuch against Evagoras of Cyprus whom he murdered to his resentment of the insult offered him by Evagoras's son in seducing his wife. Again, a frequent cause of insurrections is the personal affront[1] offered to their subjects by some monarchs. It was so in the insurrection of

[1] Reading *αἰσχῦναι*.

Crataeus against Archelaus. It was because of the disgust he had always felt on this account that he was satisfied with so comparatively trivial an excuse *for assassination* as that Archelaus had violated his agreement to give him one of his daughters in marriage, and had given the elder under pressure of the war with Sirras and Arrabaeus to the King of Elimeia and the younger to his own son Amyntas in the hope of thereby reducing to a minimum the chance of a quarrel between him and his son by Cleopatra. *This was the immediate motive of the assassination*, but the beginning of his alienation was the old feeling of disgust. It was the same reason which induced Hellanocrates of Larisa to associate himself with the conspiracy. As Archelaus who had been his lover did not fulfil his promise of restoring him to his country, he conceived the idea that it was simply insolence which had prompted the king to the intimacy. Python[1] and Heracleides of Ænos assassinated Cotys in revenge for their father's death, and Adamas was incited to revolt from him by a sense of the insult to which he had been exposed in childhood at Cotys's orders. Again, people have often been goaded to such fury by the degradation of corporal punishment that their sense of the insult has led them either to murder or attempt to murder their insulters, even although these were persons holding high official positions or members of regal dynasties. At Mitylene e.g. the Penthalidae, as they were going their rounds

[1] Pyrrhon is the form of the name which has the best MSS. authority here; but we know from other writers that it was properly Python.

and dealing blows with their clubs, were attacked and killed by Megacles and his friends, and at a later date Penthilus himself was assassinated by Smerdis whom he had visited with corporal punishment and had forcibly dragged from his wife's side. Lastly, in the conspiracy against Archelaus it was Decamnichus who took the lead, being the first to incite the conspirators. The cause of his anger was that Archelaus had handed him over for scourging to the poet Euripides who was annoyed by some remark of his about the foulness of his breath. And there have been many others who for similar reasons were the victims either of assassination or conspiracy.

Fear again is similarly a cause of conspiracy. We have already seen that this is one motive in Monarchies as well as in constitutional polities. It was thus that Artapanes assassinated Xerxes for fear of the accusation that would be brought against him because he had put Darius to death by hanging without the authority of Xerxes himself in the expectation that the king would overlook the act, as his hard drinking at the time would prevent his remembering the circumstances.

Another cause of conspiracy is contempt. Thus it was the sight of Sardanapalus carding wool among his wives that incited someone to the assassination, if indeed the story is true, and if it is not true of him, it may well be so of somebody else. It was contempt that led Dion to rise against Dionysius the Younger, as he saw the citizens ready for revolt and Dionysius himself perpetually drunk. It sometimes happens too that contempt leads the personal friends of the

monarch to rise against him, the contempt proceeding from the confidence reposed in them which inspires the hope of escaping detection. It is in a certain sense too a feeling of contempt which incites to insurrection persons who suppose that they have the power to maintain monarchical authority, as the sense of power and the contempt for danger which it produces make them ready to venture upon the attempt. This is the case when generals rise against the monarchs under whom they serve, as when Cyrus rose against Astyages, whose life and power he regarded with an equal contempt, as his power had been utterly worn out, while the king himself was sunk in self-indulgence, or the Thracian Seuthes against Amadocus whose general he was. [1]But none are so much encouraged by this motive to an attempt as those who are at once naturally brave and invested with a high military position in the service of their monarchs; for [2]we have here natural valour armed with power, both strong inducements to insurrection as inspiring a hope of easy success....There are yet other cases where the insurgents are moved by a combination of more than one of these motives, e.g. of contempt with the hope of pecuniary gain as in the insurrection of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes.

In the case of persons incited to insurrection by ambition there is a cause of another kind besides those we have already described. It is not that everyone

[1] It is best to place here the sentence *μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν......ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις* p. 220, l. 32—p. 221, l. 4, and to mark a lacuna before *οἳ δε καὶ διὰ πλείω τούτων κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Omitting *θράσος*.

who is spurred by ambitious motives to insurrection deliberately makes the venture in the spirit of some whose reason for an attack upon tyrants is the sight of the large emoluments and high honours which they enjoy; it is rather that, as they would act in any other undertaking which was extraordinary and offered a prospect of renown and general notoriety, so they rise in revolt against monarchs from the desire not of personal monarchical power but only of fame. It must be admitted however that it is only quite a small minority who are prompted by this motive, presupposing, as it does, an utter disregard of their own safety, if they are[1] to be successful in their undertaking. The spirit of Dion must ever be present to such persons, a spirit which cannot easily be engendered in ordinary breasts. Dion marched with a small force against Dionysius, declaring that, however far he should succeed in advancing, it was enough for him to have accomplished so much of his undertaking, aye that, even if he should fall as soon as he had set foot on shore, he gloried in meeting such a death.

Destruction of a Tyranny, (1) from without,

One way in which a Tyranny, like any other polity, is destroyed is from without, if there is an antagonistic polity of superior strength *with which it is brought into contact.* For the antagonism of principle will evidently keep alive in such a State the wish *to compass its destruction;* and people, if they have the power, always carry out their wishes. The polities antagonistic to Tyranny are Democracy, as "potter to potter" in Hesiod's language[2], for Democracy itself in its extreme form is a Tyranny, and again Kingship or

[1] Omitting μή. [2] Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι, 25.

Aristocracy from the natural antagonism of polity which led to the abolition of large numbers of Tyrannies by the Lacedaemonians and by the Syracusans so long[1] as they were in the enjoyment of a good political administration.

Another way in which Tyrannies are destroyed is from within, when there is a feud among the associates of the tyrant. It was so with the Tyranny of the Gelonian family, when Thrasybulus the brother of Hieron paid court to the son of Gelon and incited him to a life of sensual indulgence in the hope of placing himself upon the throne, and the relations of Gelon got together[2] *a band of adherents among the citizens* to prevent the destruction of the Tyranny by destroying Thrasybulus, and the band of citizens thus collected finding their opportunity expelled the whole Gelonian dynasty from the State. It has been so in our own day with the dynasty of Dionysius; for Dion the brother-in-law of Dionysius made war upon him, expelled him with the aid of the commons and was then himself destroyed. **(2) from within.**

Of the two most usual causes of insurrection against Tyrannies, viz. hatred and contempt, while the former is an inevitable condition of tyrannical government, it is from exposure to contempt that Tyrannies are most[3] frequently overthrown. This we may infer

[1] The period referred to is B.C. 466—406, from the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty to the accession of the elder Dionysius to tyrannical power.

[2] Reading *συστησάντων*, so that there is no need to insert *κατ'* before *αὐτῶν*.

[3] Reading *αἱ πολλαί*.

from the fact that, whereas the founders of Tyrannies have generally succeeded in preserving their authority to the end, their successors almost always lose it immediately. The reason is that their self-indulgent mode of life exposes them to contempt and affords many opportunities to rebels. Anger, *it may be added*, is properly considered one branch of hatred, as their effects are in a certain sense the same. And indeed anger is often a more drastic agent than hatred; for as it is an emotion which disregards rational calculation, there is a greater impetuosity in its assaults. (It is insolence *on the part of persons in power* which preeminently inspires a blind obedience to the impulses of passion; and this was the cause which led to the abolition of the Pisistratid Tyranny and many others[1].) Hatred on the contrary allows more room for reason; for while anger implies pain, which is an impediment to rational calculation, hatred is painless *and may so far be reasonable*. It may be said summarily that all the various causes *of destruction* which we have specified in the untempered or latest form of Oligarchy and the extreme form of Democracy are to be regarded as equally causes of destruction in Tyranny, as the extreme forms of Oligarchy and Democracy are simply Tyrannies in which there are a number of tyrants.

Destruction of a Kingship from within.

Kingship as being of all governments the least liable to destruction from external causes is the most permanent. It is from within that the destructive agencies generally arise. And the destruction may

[1] Again the brackets mark a parenthetical sentence.

take two forms; one in consequence of a sedition among the members of the royal family, and a second when the kings endeavour to adopt a method of administration which approximates to Tyranny by claiming more extensive and unconstitutional powers. Kingships are no longer created in modern times but, if monarchical governments are created at all, they are generally Tyrannies. For while Kingship implies voluntary obedience on the one hand and comparatively high authority on the other, there is *in modern times* a large body of persons who stand on the same level and no individual of such preeminent distinction as corresponds with the importance and dignity of the regal office. There is thus no voluntary submission to the rule of an individual; but if such rule is founded upon fraud or force, it is admitted to be *ipso facto* a Tyranny.

The reason why Kingships are not created in modern times.

If we take hereditary Kingships, there is yet one further cause of their destruction to be found in the contemptible character displayed by many of the kings and the insolent conduct of which they are guilty, when it is not tyrannical but regal dignity that they enjoy. For in this way the abolition of Kingships was facilitated, as no sooner is the good will of the subjects lost than the ruler will cease to be a king, although he may be a tyrant, for the good will of the subjects is not a necessary condition of Tyranny.

Hereditary Kingship.

CHAP. XI.

The preservatives of Monarchy, (1) of Kingship,

These then and other similar circumstances being the causes of destruction in Monarchies, it is clear[1] that the means of their preservation are generally the opposites and in the case of Kingship more particu-

[1] Reading δῆλον ὅτι.

larly a tendency to moderation. For the narrower the limitation of the kings' authority, the longer is their power sure to continue without diminution, as the kings themselves display a less despotic spirit and in character stand more on an equality with the citizens and are less liable to the envy of their subjects. This accounts for the long duration of the Kingship among the Molossians as well as among the Lacedaemonians, where it was due to the original bi-partition of the regal authority and again to the restrictions put upon it by Theopompus in various ways, and especially in the institution of the Ephoral office as a check upon the kings. For as by diminishing the power of the Kingship he increased its permanence, it was true in a certain sense that he made it greater rather than less. It is said in fact that when he was asked by his wife if he did not feel ashamed that the Kingship as he bequeathed it to his sons was not so great as he had inherited it from his father, "Certainly not," he replied, "for as I bequeath it it is more permanent."

(2) of Tyranny. Oppressive measures.

There are two modes exactly opposite to each other in which Tyrannies are preserved. The first is the traditional mode adopted by the large majority of tyrants in the exercise of their authority. It is Periander of Corinth who gets the credit of having introduced most of the rules, but there are many others of a similar kind which may be borrowed from the Persian government. I refer to the measures mentioned in an earlier part of this treatise for the preservation of Tyranny, so far as possible, viz. the practice of cutting off the prominent characters and

p. 383.

putting out of the way the high spirits in the State, the prohibition of common meals, political clubs, high culture and everything else of the same kind, precautionary measures against all that usually tends to produce two results viz. spirit and confidence, the opposition offered to literary *réunions* or any other meetings of a literary kind and the endeavour by every possible means to produce the greatest mutual ignorance among all the citizens, as it is acquaintance that tends to produce mutual confidence. Another expedient of Tyranny is that the residents in the city should live always in public and spend their time loitering about the palace-doors; for so their actions will have the least chance of escaping detection, and the perpetual state of slavery in which they live will habituate them to a humble conceit of themselves. All similar measures too which are in use among the Persians or other non-Greek nations are suited to Tyranny; for they are all directed to the same end. Another expedient is the endeavour to prevent any word or action of any subject from escaping detection by a system of spies like the "tale-bearers" (ποταγωγίδες) as they are called at Syracuse or the "eaves-droppers" (ὠτακουσταί) sent out by Hieron wherever there was a meeting or assemblage of any kind. For the citizens are then less free of speech for fear of the spies and, if they do speak freely, are more easily discovered. Yet another expedient is to produce a state of general suspicion and conflict among the citizens, setting friends against friends, the commons against the upper classes and the rich at variance among themselves. It is charac-

teristic of a tyrant again that he pauperizes his subjects in order to support his bodyguard and to prevent them from having the leisure for conspiracy by keeping them occupied with their daily work. We may find instances of this practice in the pyramids of Egypt, the votive offerings of the Cypselidae, the erection of the Olympieum[1] by the Pisistratidae and the[2] great works of Polycrates at Samos, all which have the same effect, viz. that the subjects are kept in constant occupation and poverty. Heavy taxation *is another part of the same system,* as at Syracuse, where in five years of Dionysius's reign the citizens actually paid in taxes the full amount of their property. Again, a tyrant is fond of making wars, as a means of keeping his subjects in employment and in continual need of a commander. And whereas a king relies for safety upon his friends, it is a mark of a tyrant that he distrusts none so much as his friends in the belief that, while all have the desire, they have more than any others the power *to compass his destruction.* And further all the characteristics of the extreme Democracy are found in a Tyranny, viz. the rule of women in the family circles, that they may betray their husbands' secrets, and for the same reason the licence of slaves; for so far from any danger of conspiracy on the part of the slaves or women against tyrants, the easy life that they lead under tyrannical government is sure to render them well-disposed to Tyrannies and, *we may add,* to Democracies, as the commons in a Democracy aspire to monarchical power, *i.e. are virtually tyrants.* It is thus that

[1] Reading Ὀλυμπιείου. [2] Reading τὰ περὶ Σάμον.

sycophants enjoy such high honour in both, i.e. demagogues in Democracies, the demagogue being a sycophant of the commons, and cringing associates in the court of tyrants, as such cringing is characteristic of a sycophant. For the reason why tyrants are so fond of low companions is simply that they are pleased by sycophancy, and nobody[1] of a liberal spirit will condescend to such arts, but respectable people are true friends or, *if not*, are *at any rate* not sycophants. Low people too are serviceable for low purposes, as "one nail" according to the proverb[2] "drives out another." Again, it is characteristic of a tyrant that he has no pleasure in anyone of dignified or liberal bearing; for of dignity and liberal spirit he claims a monopoly, and whoever rivals him in these respects infringes the preeminence and despotic authority of his Tyranny. All such persons then he regards with hatred as undermining his power. And further a tyrant is distinguished by the choice of foreigners rather than citizens as messmates and daily companions in the belief that, while the latter are enemies, the former are not in any sense his opponents.

These and other similar rules are suited to Tyranny and calculated to maintain the authority of the tyrant; nor is there any villany from which he shrinks. But practically they are all comprehended under three heads. For there are three objects and three only of

The three objects of a tyrant.

[1] Reading *οὐδεὶς ἂν ποιήσειε.*

[2] The proverb, which according to Suidas strictly and usually means the expulsion of one evil by another, must here, as the context shows, refer to the suitability of particular characters to the corresponding actions.

a Tyranny. The first is that the subjects may be mean-spirited; for the mean-spirited will never conspire against anybody. The second is that they may thoroughly distrust each other; for no Tyranny is ever abolished until[1] there is mutual confidence among some of the citizens. It is thus that tyrants are the enemies of the respectable classes as endangering their authority not only by their unwillingness to submit to despotic rule but also by the confidence which they inspire among themselves and in their relations to the citizens generally and by their reluctance to betray any persons whether members of their own body or not. The third aim of a tyrant is to produce in his subjects a general incapacity for affairs; for, as nobody attempts impossibilities, it follows that nobody will attempt to destroy a Tyranny, if he lacks the capacity for doing so. [2]These three then are in fact the goals to which the aspirations of tyrants may be referred. For all the measures of a Tyranny may be referred to one or other of these fundamental principles, viz. to prevent mutual confidence among the citizens, to incapacitate them for action and to degrade their spirit.

Conciliatory measures.

Such being the first mode of preservation in Tyrannies, the second offers in the nature of its precautions almost an exact contrast to the means we have described. We may ascertain this mode by considering what it is that destroys Kingships. For as one mode of destroying a Kingship consists in ap-

[1] Reading πρὶν ἢ πιστεύσωσι.

[2] There is no sufficient reason for enclosing this sentence in brackets.

proximating the regal authority to a Tyranny, so it is a safeguard of Tyranny to approximate it to a Kingship, securing however one point only, viz. the power of the tyrant, so that he may maintain his authority not only with but also without the goodwill of his subjects. For the surrender of this point is the surrender of tyrannical rule altogether. But while this must necessarily remain as a fundamental principle, the tyrant except in this one point should always either in reality or pretence successfully play the part of a true king[1]. He should affect primarily to be careful of the public money by not lavishing it in such presents as excite the indignation of the masses, when the money extorted from their labour and thrifty toil is squandered upon mistresses, foreign favourites and artists, and by rendering formal accounts of all receipts and expenses, as has been already the practice of some tyrants. For an administration so conducted will assume the character of Domestic Economy rather than of Tyranny. Nor is there any reason why a tyrant, *if he so rules*, should dread a deficiency of funds so long as he retains supreme authority in the State. So far is this from being the case that it is actually better for tyrants who are obliged to go abroad to have acted thus, *i.e. to have been moderate in their pecuniary exactions*, than to leave behind vast sums of money which they have amassed, as there is less danger of an attempt upon their power being made by the guardians *of the royal treasure* who, as remaining at home, are an object of greater dread to tyrants during their absence from home than the citizens who accompany them in

[1] Reading τὸν βασιλικόν.

Further precautions of Tyranny.

their expeditions. Again, it is proper for the tyrant to make a show of collecting the taxes and imposing public burdens upon the citizens solely for economical purposes and in case of need in military emergencies, and generally to assume the attitude of a guardian and treasurer of funds which he treats as the property of the State rather than as his own. And further his address should be not stern but dignified, so as to inspire all who meet him with a feeling of reverence rather than of fear. But this is a result difficult of attainment, if he is personally contemptible. Accordingly even if he disregards all other virtues, he should still devote his attention to political virtue and infuse into the minds of the citizens a high opinion of his excellence in this respect. Again, neither the tyrant himself nor any member of his court should ever be seen to offer an insult to any of his young subjects whether male or female. There should be not less prudence in the behaviour of their wives to the wives[1] of the other citizens, for insolent actions on the part of the wives have been one frequent cause of the destruction of Tyrannies. In regard to sensual indulgences the tyrant should adopt a contrary line to that which is taken in modern times by some tyrants who not only begin their indulgences at early dawn and continue them without intermission for many days, but are actually anxious to let their conduct be seen by the citizens generally in order to excite an admiration of their happiness and felicity. So far from acting in this way the tyrant should, if he is wise, be

[1] Reading πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἄλλων.

moderate in his sensual pleasures or should at least avoid publicity; for it is not one who is sober or vigilant but one who is intoxicated or asleep that exposes himself to contempt and insurrection. And almost all the actions already described he should reverse. He should enrich the city with edifices and decorations in the spirit rather of a guardian of the public interests than of a tyrant. Again, he should always display a conspicuous zeal in the service of the Gods; for people are less afraid of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of their ruler, if they regard him as religiously minded and attentive in his duties to the Gods, and are more likely to abstain from conspiracy against him in the belief that he has the Gods as his allies. Yet he must not go to such lengths in his religious observances as to incur the reproach of a weak superstition. Citizens who display excellence in any respect he should treat with signal honour, so as to inspire them with the idea that they would never have received higher honours from the citizens, if they had been independent. And further while he personally dispenses these honours, he should inflict his punishments by other agencies, such as officers of State and Courts of Law. It is a precaution suitable to every form of Monarchy not to elevate any individual to a position of greatness but, if such elevation is necessary, to elevate several people, as they will then keep an eye upon each, or, if it really is necessary to elevate an individual, anyhow not to choose a person of intrepid character; for such characters are preeminently disposed to aggressive action in all the affairs of life.

Similarly, if it is the tyrant's pleasure to remove anybody from his position of power, he should do so gradually instead of stripping him of all his prerogatives at a single stroke. Also he should restrain himself from every form of insolence and from two forms more particularly, viz. corporal chastisement and indecent conduct. This precaution he must especially observe in dealing with the ambitious spirits. For as it is neglect of their pecuniary interests which is resented by the avaricious, so it is such neglect as issues in dishonour which is resented by the ambitious and respectable of mankind. And thus the tyrant should either abstain from all dealing with these ambitious spirits or should make it clear that his punishments are inflicted in a paternal spirit rather than from contemptuous thoughtlessness, and that his addresses are prompted by the motions of love rather than by the mere wantonness of power; and generally he should redeem the apparent humiliations by more than equivalent honours. The authors of attempts upon the lives of tyrants are most formidable and demand the strongest measures of defence when they are willing to sacrifice their own lives if only they succeed in the assassination. It is necessary therefore to adopt the gravest precautions against persons who conceive that an insult is offered either to themselves personally or to the objects of their affection. For anybody who is incited by passion to a murderous attempt is not in a mood to spare himself, *and is therefore formidable* according to the saying of Heracleitus that "it is a hard battle with passion, as the passionate buy vengeance

with their lives." Finally, as States are composed of two elements, viz. the rich and the poor, it is desirable that both, if possible, should see in the authority of the tyrant the basis of their own security, and that neither party should be subject to oppression at the hands of the other or, failing this, that the stronger party of the two whichever it is should be made the creatures of his authority; for if this support is assured to the existing order of things, the tyrant has no need to resort to a general emancipation of slaves or disarmament of the citizens, as the accession of this one party to the side of the tyrant's power is a guarantee of ability to crush all insurrectionary efforts. But it is superfluous to discuss all these measures in detail. The object is clear, viz. that the tyrant in the eyes of his subjects should wear the appearance not of a tyrant but of a householder or king, not of a self-seeker but of a guardian of the public interests, that he should aim at all that is moderate rather than at all that is extravagant in his life and that, while he wins the hearts of the upper classes by affability, he should conciliate the masses by flattery. The result is sure to be not only that his rule will assume a higher and more enviable form, as the subjects instead of being degraded will be morally elevated and he will not himself be always an object of hatred or fear, but that it will be also more permanent, and, we may add, that his own moral disposition will either be *absolutely* noble and virtuous or *at least* half-virtuous and not *absolutely* bad but *at the worst only* half-bad.

Still there are no polities which have so short a CHAP. XII.

The duration of Tyrannies.

duration as Oligarchy and Tyranny. The Tyranny of Orthagoras and his descendants at Sicyon, which had the longest existence, lasted only a hundred years. The explanation of its permanence is that they treated their subjects with moderation and submitted themselves in many instances to the laws, that the military genius of Cleisthenes prevented him from becoming an object of contempt and that they won the hearts of the commons as much as any demagogues could have done by the constant attention which they devoted to their interests. It is said at least that Cleisthenes, *when he was a competitor for a prize*, bestowed a crown upon the judge who had refused him the victory; and there are some authorities who assert that the sitting statue in the market is the effigy of the judge who pronounced this decision. It is said too that Pisistratus himself submitted on one occasion to appear in answer to a summons before the Areopagus. Next to the Sicyonian Tyranny the most permanent was that of the Cypselidae at Corinth which lasted seventy-three years and six months. For Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years, Periander for forty years and six months [1] and Psammitichus [2] the son of Gordias for three years. The causes of permanence were the same in this case as in the last, viz. that Cypselus played the part of a demagogue and never employed a bodyguard during the whole period of his rule, while Periander with the

[1] The substitution of ἓξ μῆνας for τέτταρα seems to be the most satisfactory means of making the items tally with the total given above.

[2] The MSS. authority is in favour of Ψαμμίτιχος as the form of the name.

character of a tyrant had also the genius of a general. The third longest Tyranny was that of the Pisistratidae at Athens, although it did not continue without intermission, as Pisistratus was twice banished during his Tyranny and consequently in a period of three and thirty years was not tyrant for more than seventeen. These with the eighteen years' Tyranny of his sons make a total of thirty-five. The longest Tyranny with these exceptions was that of Hieron and Gelon at Syracuse[1], although it too did not last a great number of years, only eighteen in all. For Gelon died after seven years of tyrannical power, Hieron enjoyed it for ten years and Thrasybulus was expelled in the eleventh month of his rule. The majority of Tyrannies have not lasted more than a very short time.

The causes of destruction and preservation in constitutional polities and in Monarchies have now practically been all discussed.

Criticism of the Socratic theory of revolutions.

In the *Republic*[2] the subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates, but not satisfactorily. For *in the first place* there is no particular treatment of the revolution incident to his best or primary polity. He assigns as a cause the fact that nothing in the world is permanent, all things change in a certain cycle, and the principle of change is contained in certain figures[3]

[1] Reading περὶ Συρακούσας.

[2] The discussion occupies nearly the whole of the 8th and 9th Books of the *Republic*.

[3] *Republic*, VIII. p. 546 C. The 'Platonic number' was a standing puzzle of scholarship, at least as early as Cicero's time (*ad Att.* VII. 13. 5). Some account of the proposed explanations is given in Prof. Jowett's *Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. III., Introduction to the *Republic*, pp. 113—117.

whose root, which is in the ratio of 4 : 3, by combination with the number 5 produces two harmonies *or proportional numbers,* i.e. when the number of the diagram is cubed. The theory is that Nature from time to time produces bad men who defy all educational influences; and so far perhaps Socrates is not far wrong, as there may well be persons whom it is impossible by any educational process to convert into virtuous men. But the question arises why this form of revolution should be peculiar to the best polity of his nomenclature rather than to any other polity and indeed to anything that comes into being. Secondly, as regards the period of time which according to Socrates works a revolution in all things, it may be asked whether things which did not come into being simultaneously experience a simultaneous revolution, e.g. whether[1] a thing is revolutionized with the rest, if it came into being only on the day preceding the change. And further why should the revolution from the best polity be *always, as Socrates says it is,* to the Lacedaemonian? For all polities are more often revolutionized into opposite than into closely similar polities.

The sequence of polities.

The same remark will apply to the other revolutions *described by Socrates.* The Lacedaemonian polity, he says, is revolutionized to Oligarchy, Oligarchy to Democracy and Democracy to Tyranny. But it may be objected that revolutions occur equally in the reverse order, e.g. from Democracy to Oligarchy and in fact more frequently to Oligarchy than to Monarchy.

[1] Reading ἆρ' ἅμα μεταβάλλει;

Another point is that Socrates does not state whether Tyranny will be liable to revolution or, if it is not, what is the cause of its exemption and, *if it is*, what sort of polity will succeed it. The cause of the omission is that he would have had a difficulty in settling the question. No precise determination of it is possible, whereas his theory requires that Tyranny should be revolutionized to the primary or best polity, if there is to be continuity and a complete cycle *of revolutions*. The truth however is that one Tyranny may give place to another, as the Tyranny of Myron at Sicyon to that of Cleisthenes, or to Oligarchy, like the Tyranny of Antileon at Chalcis, or to Democracy, like the Tyranny of the Gelonian family at Syracuse, or to Aristocracy, like the Tyranny of Charilaus at Lacedaemon or the Carthaginian.

There are also revolutions from Oligarchy to Tyranny, as in the great majority of the ancient Oligarchies of Sicily, where the Tyranny of Panaetius at Leontini, that of Cleander at Gela and that of Anaxilaus at Rhegium were all the outcomes of Oligarchies, and the same has been the case in many other States.

It is a strange idea[1] too *of Socrates* that the cause of revolution to an Oligarchy is simply the love of money and the habit of commerce existing in the official body rather than a feeling on the part of the class which enjoys a great superiority of property that there is an injustice in allowing people who possess nothing to exercise equal political rights

[1] *Republic*, VIII. pp. 550 sqq.

with the possessors of wealth. We may add that there are many Oligarchies in which lucrative business is not allowed *to the governing class* but is prohibited by special laws and that in Carthage[1] the citizens engage in business pursuits and have never yet passed through a revolution.

Again, it is a strange remark[2] *of Socrates* that an oligarchical State contains in itself two States, one of the rich and another of the poor. Why is this more true of an Oligarchy[3] than of the Lacedaemonian or any other State, where there is not an equality of property or a similarity of virtue among all the citizens?

It may be added that without the impoverishment of any citizen it still happens that polities are revolutionized from Oligarchy to Democracy, if there is an increase in the number of the poor, or from Democracy to Oligarchy, if the rich are stronger than the poor and are on the watch *for opportunities*, which the poor disregard.

Again, although there are various causes of revolutions in Oligarchies, Socrates mentions only one[4], viz. the impoverishment of the citizens by proffigacy and usurious interest, as though they were all or nearly all originally rich. This is not however a true statement of the case. The truth is that, if it is some of the leading citizens who have wasted their properties, they introduce innovations, but, if it is others, no serious consequence ensues. Nor, if there is any seri-

[1] Omitting δημοκρατουμένη.
[2] *Republic*, VIII. p. 551 D.
[3] Reading αὕτη.
[4] *Republic*, VIII., 555 D.

ous consequence, does the revolution take the form of a Democracy rather than of any other polity.

Again, if there are persons who are excluded from the honours of State or subjected to oppression or insult, they become the authors of seditions and political revolutions. They may do so, even if they have not squandered their property, simply for the sake of attaining the privilege of acting as they choose—a result which in the view of Socrates[1] is due to a spirit of excessive liberty.


Lastly, *it may be objected that,* although there are various forms of Oligarchy and Democracy, Socrates in describing the revolutions of each speaks as though there were but one.

[1] The reference is apparently to *Republic*, VIII. pp. 562 sqq.

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